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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The first chapter discusses Origen's conception of the way 
in which the Word of God fulfils the Father's creative purpose, and 
ends by pointing out the difficulties thus arising in distinguishing 
creation from redemption. The second chapter discusses the way in 
which the Word of God reveals God's nature to human beings, and points 
out the consequent minimising of the importance of the Incarnation. 
The third and fourth chapters discuss the gifts bestowed on the Son 
by the Father, some for Himself, and others to be passed on to human 
beings, and enlarge especially on His power of judgement and the 
chastisement He has to administer in order to confer sanctification 
on human beings. 
The two sections of the ffth chapter contain a det 
. 
ailed survey A 
of Origen's conception of the Incarnation, and show how his attitude 
veers between an acceptance of traditional doctrine and the idea 
that the Divine Word employed a separate soul to act as His represent- 
ative. The conclusi6n is that although Origen's own doctrine leaves 
much to be desired as an explanation of the humanity of the Word 
of God, such criticisms are also applicable to traditional doctrine. 
The sixth chapter discusses the human and Divine aspects of 
Christ's personality, and tries to show that in Origen's view it 
is only the human-Jesus whose sacrifice is accepted by God and who 
is thus taken into fellowship with God. There follows a discussion 
of the distinction made by Origen between the disciple who knows 
his Master from the outward point of view and the one who attains 
to the knowledge of the invisible Word of God. 
In the final chapter there is a discussion of the way in which 
Christ reconciles human beings to the Father, and the question is 
raised why it was that Origen supposed the final destiny of human 
beings to be contemplation rather than action. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is an attempt to examine and evaluAte the Christ- 
ology of Origen. It should not be imagined that his views are of 
no relevance today; on the contrary, he develops to their logical 
conclusions various lines of thought deriving from the traditional 
view of Jesus Christ as both Divine and human, and thus shows that 
those conclusions cannot be reconciled with each other. Perhaps 
he himself was unaware of this incompatability; such is the fate 
of those who are the objects of adulation in their own lifetime, 
and against whom, therefore, no one ventures to make damaging criticisms. 
.. 
The present writer has endeavoured to approach the writings 
of Origen with a completely open mind, so that he may assess the 
evidence without partiality; but in so doing he has tried to take 
account of the views of others who have treated of this subject. 
He has found the study of their writings most stimulating, and would 
in particular acknowledge that in one instance his attention has 
been drawn to an important passage regarding possible limitations 
in Christ's knowledge which he might otherwise have bverlooked. 
There is one observation which the writer specially wishes 
to make, and that is that it appears ludicrous to regard Origen as 
a devotee of Scripture. His knowledge of the Bible may well have 
been unrivalled, but in all honesty let us admit that he simply uses 
it as a peg on which to hang his own preconceived ideas. This becomes 
clear from the way in which he arbitrarily attaches his own meaning 
to many Scriptural passages which he quotes, without bothering to 
ascertain the meaning which the original authors attached to them. 
On the other hand, let us not criticise him unduly for this 
seemingly cavalier attitude: after all, Scripture itself is a heter- 
ogeneous collection of books which bear abundant signs of the limited 
character of the outlook of their authors, and therefore we cannot 
contruct a theology on the basis of Scripture alone. We need rather 
x 
to use our minds to estimate the extent to which the witness of Scrip- 
ture to theological truth is reliable. Admittedly, we, like Origen, 
can be regarded as under the influence of our own preconceived ideas, 
but this in itself is no criticism: it all depends on whether they 
are harmonious with one another and with the facts of which they 
claim to be the explanation. 
xi 
LIFE OF ORIGEN 
. -Origen was born about 185 A. D. in Alexandria, a city of Egypt, the 
eldest son of Christian parents. In his youth he became well versed in 
Scripture and in Greek philosophy. He was a great admirer of his father 
Leonidas, in fact so much so that his theology was. influenced in the 
sense that he tended to think of God the Father as existing in splendid 
isolation from the universe. Leonidas suffered martyrdom in the per- 
secution of the Emperor Severus, and Origen .,: a-- only prevented from 
sharing his fate because his mother hid his clothes. At the age of 18, 
he started a catechetical school, that is, a centre for giving instruction 
to enquirers about the Christian faith. He was thus launched on his 
meteori c career as a lecturer and writer. He took a step, however, which 
he seems afterwards to have regretted, that of self-castration, partly 
no doubt in order to escape the sexual temptations arising from being 
surrounded by admiring females, partly as a result of an unfortunately 
worded injunction in the Gospels which would appear to recommend the 
adoption of celibacy from necessity rather than from choice, and partly, 
perhaps, in order to undergo in part the martyrdom which had been denied 
to him in full. This again had a profound effect on his theology, as I 
shall suggest at the end of my book. The bishop of Alexandria refused to 
ordain him to the priesthood on account of his disability, but the bishop 
of Caesarea in Palestine did not object to doing so, and so Origen migrated 
to Caesarea where he continued to write and lecture. He was cruelly 
tortured during the persecution of Christians by the Emperor Decius round 
about 250 A. D., and died a few years later at Tyre, where his splendid 
tomb was on view for centuries, though it has now disappeared. 
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CHAPTER I 
The relation of the Word to the Father in the process of creation . 
According to Origen, such knowledge as we can acquire about the way 
the Son is related to God the Father, whether in His own being or in the 
process of creation, is due to the bounty of the Father alone. Such is 
the inference we draw from various passages. For instance, Origen prays 
the God may send to him and his readers the Divine Word, so that by the 
bounty of the Father they may become spectators of the depths of the being 
of that same Word of Godý')Inpther words, the Divine Word is only able 
to act as a purveyor of knowledge about the nature of God because the 
Father has granted this power to Him 
ý2) 
In the same way, only God through 
His Son can explain the meaning and purpose of the created universe. In 
a passage in which there is clearly a play on the word ayps , 
it is 
stated that an exact account (AýyoS ) of the wisdom of God displayed in 
creation can only be bestowed through the will of the Father of the Word 
11ý4 (Gý6vf,, S IV, 60 qo'S -ralu' Alb"yov ) on a %Pcj)Cn* which is cleansed and 
aware of its own inadequacy 
ý3 )Origen 
says, in fact, that the Father knows 
what each soul is capable of receiving, and thus understands when it is 
appropriate for a soul to receive the enlightenment which the Divine 
Word provides 
! 4) 
It would first seem appropriate to discuss Origen's view of Jesus 
Christ as the Father's Agent in the creative process. Origen makes it 
clear in a number of passages that only God himself possesses absolute 
existence. The scriptural statement "There is none beside Thee" (I Sam. 
ii. 2) is explained as meaning that no existent thing possesses existence 
as something natural to it. God alone possesses existence granted by no- 
one else; all created things possess existence by the will of their 
Creator. Hence because at one time we did not exist, it is not strictly 
true to say that we exist, so far as the time is concerned when we did 
not exist! 
5)So 
also in De Princ. Origen affirms that "all things which 
3 
exist derive their share of being from Him Who truly is, and who said 
through Moses "I am Who I am. , 
(6) 
It is important to recognise that "existence" means more to Origen 
than merely "subsisting" in the ordinary sense; it means sharing in the 
Divine life in a way only possible for rational beings. In several. pass- 
ages Origen makes it clear that real existence is only derived from part- 
icipating in the life of God 
ý7 )There 
is a remarkable fragment 
(8 
where, with 
reference to the verse 110 let my soul live, and it shall praise Thee", 
Origen says that the implication is that it does not yet live, because as 
St. Paul says "our life is hidden with Christ in God", in the sense th at 
in so far as we do not yet follow the guidance of the Word of God, our 
does not yet live. 
And what applies to us applies also to Jesus Christ, in the sense 
that He derives both existence and "life" in the fullest sense from the 
(9) 
Father alone. Thus Origen says that it is no matter for wonder if the 
ordinary person does not know where Jesus Christ comes from; for he does 
not see that the Father is His root and source t. %l K-At 
r% 
(10) 
9LLA-OJ In another passage Origen says that. the Father of the universe 
gave a share of Himself and of His greatness to His Oniy-begotten Son, so 
that He might act as the Image of the Father in His greatness as well as 
(11) 
in other respects. Yet again, Origen pays that even though Christ is the 
equal of the Father, both the term y6veir. j. $ ("bringing into being") and 
the term YEVVtjd%S ("begetting") can still be applied to Him without irrev- 
erence, because "begetting" is a special kind of "bringing into being. " 
But although the existence of the Son is derived from the Father, the 
Son is also the Father's Agent in imparting existence to all other existing 
CP er 
beings. Thus the Word of God is spoken of as the Agent by Whom (UJ5 o4i 
(12) (13) 
all things were made. It is said elsewhere that though the devil may have 
obtained power over those whom he has not brought into being, they will 
eventually leave him and become followers of Jesus Christ, their Lord and 
Creator Who has brought them into being (qui eos genuit). On the other hand 
4 
(14) 
Origen corrects any misunderstanding of this statement by saying elsewhere 
Ij/ 
that strictly speaking, all things came into being IA. (by means of) the 
Word of God, and not Urt-6 (by the agency of) the Word of God, because the 
ultimate Agent is a Being superior to the Word - none other, in fact, than 
God the Father Himself. He likewise says that even though all souls and 
rational beings are incorporeal so far as their own nature is concerned, 
(15) 
they were none the less made by God through Christ. (It is noteworthy that 
there are several passages where, in spite of what Origen says in other 
places, he implies that the Word of God took human nature directly upon 
Himself. Thus it is said that Jesus Christ "ministered to the Father in 
(16) 
the foundation of all things" before he took human nature upon Himself. 
(17) 
In one 
t 
passage Origen says (with reference to John i. 15) that John the Baptist 
recognised that Jesus, although conceived six months after himself, was 
higher-in rank because He was his God and 
/ (Creator! ). In 
(18) 
cf7 r, ao ftcps 
another place, with reference to the devil's offer of the kingdoms of the 
world (Matt. iv. 10), the devil is said to be rebuked for presuming to give 
(19) 
what the Word Himself had brought into being; inyet another, with reference 
to the passage in Romans (viii. 32) where the Son is said to have been given 
up by the Father for all human beings, Origen says that if the Creator 
Himself is bestowed on us, surely the entire creation will be granted to 
us also. ) 
Origen makes it clear that it was by virtue of His wisdom that the 
(20) 
Word of God created all things. This wisdom was shown not just in bringing 
them into being, but in doing what was necessary for their welfare. In 
that sense the wisdom of God is shown in contriving their full development 
(21) 
or entelechy. On the other hand, there are several passages where the 
.. ' 
(22) 
Father Himself is referred to as 6yjjiovrY*S. The solution of the 
(23) 
difficulty is hinted at in another passage, where it is made clear that the 
Son of God is not the Father's servant, but His Co-adjutor. If it be pointed 
5 
out that the Word of God is elsewhere stated to be the UlTjrfirrLý 
(24) 
of the Supreme God, the apparent contradiction is resolved by saying that 
the Son bears the same relation to the Father as the disciples are said 
by Christ to bear to Himself when He calls them not servants but friends, 
(25) 
because He has made known to them the inner counsels of the Father. 
Origen puts the matter in his own way when he says that although St. Paul 
declares the Father to be the Origin of all things and Christ to be the 
(26) 
instrumental Cause of all things, that does not mean that Christ is not on 
an equality with the Father, even though the Son derives His Divinity from 
the Father. The matter is summed up very neatly by saying that "Christ is 
not subordinate to the Father, even though He derives His being from the 
(27) 
Father" (non enim post Patrem est ipse, sed de Patre). 
In fact it is true to say that in Origen's view the Son's relation 
to the Father is that of "right-hand man", the officer entrusted with all 
the plans of the director of an enterprise and given authority to carry 
(28) 
them out, as Joseph was in Egypt as the Pharaoh's vicegerent. There are 
(29) 
various references to the Son as the Father's "right hand". He acts in 
this capacity not only as Creator of the universe, but also as Governor 
(30) 
and Controller of it. Thus it is said that just as the Fathei- is said to 
%. 01% r r% have made all things tak -Vou uwo , so, although He has handed over all 
things to the Son, He Himself rules over all things 
4t 
*<%JrQU in virtue 
(31) 
of His union with the Son. There is a striking passage where the rebuke 
addressed to the disciples after the stilling of the storm (Matt. viii. 25) 
"Why are ye fearful, 0 ye of little faith? " is interpreted as meaning "If 
you have accepted Me as the God and Creator of all things, why do you not 
believe that I have in my power those things which I have made? " There is 
(32) 
also a curious passage where the function of feeding young birds is attri- 
buted to the Father and the Son at-, the same time. Origen says that if the 
Son is Almighty, that is, all-powerful, that is only because He shares the 
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(33) 
all-mightiness of the Father. 
Origen actually suggests that there are some who regard the Word of 
God as occupying the place of the Father Himself as the Being upon Whom 
(34) 
the uni verse depends. On the other hand, he himself is not always guiltless 
(35) 
of confusing the Father with the Son, as when he says that "He" (referring 
to Christ) gave us heaven, earth, and sea for our own use, together with 
sun and stars, but in the fullness of time gave Himself (semet ipsum dedit), 
seeing that "God so loved the world, that He gave His Only-begotten Son" 
(36) 
for the life of the world. He likewise says elsewhere that when the Saviour 
says "When I receive the congregation, I will recount all Thy marvellous 
works", He may be teaching us about His own activities oI.. c IF(ol-S 
Ef yetAs in describing the Father's nature and-purpose. In another 
(37) 
very cu rious passage, 'it 
is suggested that when it is said that God alone 
made great wonders, this is said not so as to. disparage the Son but to 
contrast Him with the demons. The implication seems to be that He and He 
alone gives the demons power to perform "lying wonders" Yevis-OuS 
II. Thess. ii. 9), so that all that they achieve is ultimately due to Him. 
There is one passage where Origen throws into sharp relief the problem 
(38) 
of all the evil in the world. He is discussing the insolence of Shimei and 
his hurling stones at King David.. It is agreed, says Origen, that this was 
not the work of God. Origen considers, that this is made clear by the words 
of David himself "Let him curse, because the Lord has spoken to him, so that 
He may see my humiliation, and requite me good things for his present 
cursing. " It is thus clear, says Origen, that Shimeils behaviour did not 
please God; and what did not please Him, He would not have ordered anyone 
to do. If David said that God ordered Shimei to do these things, that simply 
means that He allowed him to do them. But this seems too facile a solution 
of the problem if we remember that according to Origen's own principles, the 
Word of God exercises complete control over all things, so that nothing 
happens without His overruling direction. It would seem better to say that 
everything that-happens is in accordance with God's will, but that in the 
7 
long run certain things which happen now will no longer happen, because 
God's purpose will have been fulfilled. 
It ought to be pýointed out that although in Origen's view the Son 
is the only being who shares the Father's Divinity in it's fullness, there 
(39) 
are other beings - angels and men - who possess that Divinity in part. 
Divinity is thus arranged in a fourfold hierarchy, in which the higher of 
the inferior types is surpassed by the Word of God, and the Word in turn is 
(40) 
surpassed by the God of the universe. In fact certain beings (i. e. the 
angels) are explicitly stated to have been honoured by God with the title 
(41) 
of"god" in so far as they partake of His Divinity. In one place Origen points 
out that St. John inserts the definite article before the word 
when that term refers to the veYf-VrLroS Cause of all things, but omits 
(42) 
it when the word is applied to the A oyaS It can scarcely be said 
that Origen is himself meticulous in this matter; thereis a passage in 
(43) 
Convs. with Her. in which it is said that the offering of prayer should 
always be made to the Almighty God through Jesus Christ, as being related 
n to the Father through His Divinity, and thus to God through God ( 
6(-&, 
j 
Of course this implies that the Son stands in a 
special relationship to the Father, and on this relationship. Origen enlarges 
(44) 
in the same treatise. He says that this relationship cannot be expressed 
by the use of the phrase or 
'ýV IrVeUe"'rOL but in a 
much higher way as C-CS We must therefore safeguard both the 
unity and duality; the unity, in so far as we affirm the full Divinity of 
Christ, and the dualitY, in so far as we regard the Son as being distinct 
from the Father. (This attitude seems in contrast to that of Bishop 
(45) 
Heraclides, who affirmed that the Son of God was Divine so far as His spirit 
was concerned K-ki-pt'- IrV Such an attitude seems to 
I 
imply that Jesus Christ was simply an inspired man who allowed himself to 
be indwelt by the Spirit of God, as indeed Origen himself tended at times 
to suppose in so far as he distinguished the human Jesus from the Divine 
Word. ) Origen-makes an impressive statement of his doctrine of the unique 
8 
(46) 
Sonship of Christ when he says that if God is perfect and thus always has 
the power of being a Father, His Fatherhood is perpetual. The Sonship 
of Christ however overflows to other beings, inasmuch as partial rays of 
the entire brightness of God's glory are bestowed on other rational creat- 
(47) 
ures. And so the term "gods" is applied in Scripture to other beings 
than the Father and the Son and in particular to the angels and to those to 
whom the Word of God comes, even though it is strictly speaking a misuse of 
the term "God" to apply it to anyone other than the Supreme Being. But the 
only really false use of the term is its application to the gods worshipped 
(48) 
by the heathen. 
Origen regards the command referred to in Ps. cxlviii. 5 which resulted 
in the creation of the universe, both visible and invisible, as addressed 
(49) 
by the Father to His Only-begotten Son. (Origen here speaks of the Ultimate 
God as EV VITOS but this does not imply that the Son was created, 
because the word does not appear to have meant in Origen's time "uncreated" 
as distinct from "unbegotten", but simply "underived", "not brought into 
(50) 
being. " Indeed, Origen insists elsewhere that the Father begets the Son and 
brings forth the Holy Spirit, not as beings Who did not previously exist, 
I. 
(51) 
but simply as beings of whom the Father is the origin and source. ) It is 
worth observing that in several places Origen refers to Christ Himself as 
the Father of creation, in so far as He is the immediate Agent by Whom 
the creative activity of God is exercised. For instance, in discussing the 
text "He is my God, and I will honour Him: He is theGod of my father, and 
(52) 
I will exalt Him", Origen declares that "our Father, Who has created us 
(53) 
and brought us into being, is Christ, the Christ Who said "I ain going to 
(54) 
my Father and your Father, to my God and your God. " Origen thien points 
out that it requires-a special degree of insight to understand how Christ, 
in order to preserve the truth that there is one fount of Deity, addresses 
(55) 
as His God Him Whom He describes as His Father by nature. Elsewhere, Christ 
is described not as the Father but as the Husband of the souls who have beer 
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(56) (57) 
created in His image, and who can so easily go astray after false gods. 
In yet another place He is described as the Master Whose service those 
created by Him forsake whe n they sell themselves to the devil by sinning, 
(58) 
and Who has bought them back from that service with his own blood. It is 
also worth observing that Christ is also called "Father", not primarily 
(59) 
in the sense of Creator, but in the sense of Redeemer. Thus in one place 
the apostles are compared to children in so far as they are converted 
by the agency of the Holy Spirit; they are in fact said to be the children 
whom God gave to the Saviour -in accordance with the words of the prophet 
(60) (61) 
Isaiah. Elsewhere Christ is described as "the Father of the world to 
(62) 
come" in so far as He guides souls on their journey to the Father. We 
shall-see this conception of Christ's Fatherhood more fully expressed in a 
(63) 
later chapter. 
When Origen describes the method of creation, he seems to regard 
the Son of God as performing the role of the Demiurge or Craftsman described 
in Plato's Timaeus, 'in so far as He implants form upon chaotic matter in 
(64) 
accordance with the archetypes residing in Him as the Wisdom of God. 
Likewise in De Princ. Origen says that the Wisdom Who is the Son of God 
forms within Himself beforehand and contains the types and causes of all 
(65) 
created nature. The world is constructed in'accordance with the principles 
prefigured in the Son Who is the Wisdom of God, just as a 
house and ship have as their source the plans and principles 
(66) 
of the architect. Origen stresses that the Wisdom of God is a separate 
being Who contains the various conceptions (Ocof y,, ýOf 
which embrace the principles ( -AbyOus of all thinas. This is what is 
implied in the statement in Scripture that "God established me (i. e. wisdom) 
(67) 
as the beginning of His ways with a view to His work. " The created universe 
exists because it partakes of Divine Wisdom. Some of its components under- 
(68) 
stand the wisdom which created them, but a far greater number do not. Else- 
where the Word of God is said to be Himself a universe ( Koa, "S ), in so 
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far as the principles A*O'yoas of all things reside in Him; in fact 
He is a more complex jr*(A(j<&jre? ttj universe than that which is, 
apprehended by the senses, presumably inasmuch as the principles underlying 
(69) 
the sensible universe only reveal themselves gradually. In a curious in- 
terpretation of the word as used in John xvii. 24, Origen 
regards the creation of the material universe as a result of the fall of 
(70) 
immaterial spirits from a state of perfection. 
There is one passage in which Origen says that God the Father exer- 
(71) 
cises His almighty power by means of the creative activity of the Son. 
In another striking passage, with reference to the Gospel statement that 
Christ "arose and rebuked the winds and the sea" (Matt. viii. 26. ), Origen 
says that it was He Who in the beginning "imposed bars and gates" and said 
"To this point shall you come and no further, and your waves shall be 
(72) 
broken in yourself" (Job xxxviii. 10,11). It is in this way that Origen 
solves the conundrum of how God could be almighty before the universe 
came into being; for in the Son Who is the Wisdom of God the creation was 
(73) 
always present in form and outline. This reasoning seems to us to be mere 
word-play; but Origen was driven to this course by an exaggerated emphasis 
on the changelessness of God so natural to one who had inheriýed the 
(74) 
Platonic way of thinking. 
Origen is said by Justinian to have called both the Son and the 
11 Holy Spirit created beings ( KIT' I terrA! raf- ), and to have numbered them with 
other creatures, and in fact to have called them "ministering creatures" 
(75) (76) 
Cr K a-z 
S&ýý We have already pointed out that all that 
Origen need be supposed to have meant was that the being of the Son and 
the Holy Spirit is derived from God the Father; but Origen may also have 
had in mind the description of the angels as "ministering spirits" in 
Heb. i. 14. The angels minister to those who are destined to inherit . 
salvation; the Son and the Holy Spirit minister to the Father in the creation 
of the world. Origen considers that the operation of the Son and the Spirit 
1 11 
in the creation of the universe was indicated by the Psalmist when he 
declared that "by the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and 
(77) 
all their power by the spir. it of His mouth. " Elsewhere, with reference to 
the changing of the water into wine at Cana of Galilee, Origen says that 
Christ manifested His glory in this way, in so far as it belonged to the 
Creator ( kr(crT ) and not to a created being such I'S 
N 
as the disciples, to change the substance of the water into wine ( Tb 
2. " en 
(78) (79) 
00(rlAv I. -. C-rA 
ý'PL X re IV). In yet another passage Origen says that 
whereas heretics either deny that the Father and the Son are of one nature, 
or else confuse the three Divine Persons in such a way as to suggest that 
one God can be referred to in three ways, those who have grasped the truth 
on the one hand assign their respective qualities to the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, but at the same time declare that their substantial 
nature is the same; in other words, even though the Son and the Spirit act 
as the Father's delegates in creating and sustaining and redeeming the 
universe, they are not essentially inferior to Him. Such also appears to be 
(80) 
the meaning of the curious passage where Origen, in commenting on the answer 
given in Matt. xx. 23 to the request of James and John, says that when 
different levels are spoken of as existing in the Trinity, 
this must be understood of our own condition. For instance, if the Father 
is said to be greater than the Son, this statement does not apply to their 
own nature and substance, but to our own condition. The suggestion seems 
to be that though the Son and the Holy Spirit are equal to the Father in 
essence, they carry out His comm. iands so far as the requirements of the 
created universe are concerned, whatever apparent lowering of their status 
this may involve, and can thus be thought of from this'point of view as 
'(81) 
inferior to the Father. 
So far as the actual process of creation is concerned, Origen uses 
the passage "He spake and they were made; He commanded and they were 
created" (Ps. cxlviii. 5) as a means of distinguishing the creation of 
material substance ex nihilo from the imposition of the qualities whereby 
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(82) 
the original substance became differentiated into individual creatures. 
Origen could have gone on to suggest that it was within the province of 
the Father alone to perform the initial act of creation, but within that 
of the Son to perform the second act whereby formless matter was moulded 
into form; but he does not in fact do this, even though such a conception 
would be more in keeping with his idea of the immanence of the Word of 
(83) 
God in the universe as a privilege granted to Him by God the Father. 
It is by invoking this idea of the immanence of theDivine Word that 
Origen explains the answer addressed by John the Baptist;. "There standeth 
(84) 
one among you whom you know not", etc. (John i. 26). In the same way, 
Origen suggests that although the prophets foretold that an "effulgence 
and image of the Divine nature" would enter human life together with 
the incarnate soul of Jesus, it would not be the case that the Word of God 
(85) 
from Whom the Divine rays proceed existed nowhere outside the human Jesus. 
Elsewhere, Origen describes the Divine Word as not being allotted one, place 
like other gods in human form, but as extending over all the world 
7%% 
ýrck a. LC--LV -rqv OtK41UL"-, -"qV so as. to attract to the good life by 
(86) 
His Divinity those whom He finds inclined thereto. Indeed, because the 
Word of God pervades the whole of creation, the creatiVe process never 
,)) el 
(87) 
ceases Td- yt"10 0 It is 
on these lines that Origen interprets the statement "He, Christ, shall 
(88) 
be great" in the angel's message to the Virgin Mary; for he explains it 
as meaning not only that Christ is Lord and Craftsman Ir Lour YOS 
of all things, but also that He pervades the universe tJS 
c 
(89) (90) 
). There is a passage in Comm. in Rom. where Origen makes 
a distinction between two different modes of the immanence of the Divine 
Word. With reference to the passage "There stands in the midst of you one 
whom you know not", he says that this is true only potentially (possibilitate), 
and not actually (efficacia), because those addressed are capable of 
apprehending Him (possunt eum capere), but do not apprehend Him in fact; 
whereas He is actually present among those of whom He said "Where two or 
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three are gathered in My Name ... 11 It must be acknowledged, however, 
that Origen is here faced with a dilemma, because it is doubtful whether 
the distinction which he makes is ultimately vaiid. Either the Divine 
Word is present or He is not. It would be better to say that while He is 
universally present, His presence manifests itself more clearly in some 
individuals and some actions than in other individuals and other actions. 
(91) 
(The dilemma. is even more apparent in another passage, where Origen says 
that just as the animating principle of our being pervades 
the whole extent of our body, even so nothing is empty of God. Neverthe- 
less God does not fill the sinner, because the sinner is filled with unclean 
spirits, and. these must be removed before God can take their place. This 
appears-. to introduce a very rigid distinction between good and evil, 
whereas in fact what appears to be evil may well be an essential ingredient 
in the production of what. is supremely good. ) 
But even though Origen is insistent on the all-pervasiveness of the 
Divine Word, he also insists that it is still true that it is the Father 
Who principally indwells the created universe, and that it is only because 
the Son resides in Him that the Son is allowed to permeate the whole of 
Creation 6ýývjS, as a secondary Divinity 
(92) 
cls 'k-jIrO\/ ýCu-rcecj 
47-1 This is also 
the implication of Origen's statement that it is "the-Word of God Who 
embraces all things" (sermo Dei universa complectens) Who condemns and 
forbids the making of likenesses of things in heaven and on earth pro- 
(93) 
hibited in the second com. -i-andment. 
Elsewhere, Origen points out that the Word of God fashioned the 
world in a different capacity from that in which He redeemed the world. He 
considers that St. John indicates this fact when he subjoins to the statement 
"In the beginning was theWord" the statement that "the Word was with God. " 
When He came into the world at', the time of the Virgin Birth, He was sent 
(94) 
by the Father; but He did not bring the universe into being as one sent by 
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the Father; He did so rather because He shared inthe Father's Divinity 
(95) 
and acted as His CD-adjutor. 
Qrigen points out that when the Son is described as Only-begotten 
tovoy6v-, ), what is meant is that the Son is derived from the ILS 
Father's being; whereas created things do not derive their being directly 
from the Father ,;, e ý' -reos Lbut from the Father through lcýL 'b 
the Word For if other things received their begin- 
ning from the Father TGACA. T('. d-recxg the Son could hardly be called 
Only-begotten, because many other beings would derive their being from. 
the Father. Whereas the Only-begqtten Son is said to be full of grace and 
truto (John i. 14), because He is identifiable with the things of which He 
(96) 
is said to be full. Thus Origen says that the Only-begotten Son of God, 
Who is His Word and Wisdom, has access to all the varied power of God, 
because He is implanted in God (pertingit et pervenit ad omnem viriutem 
(97) 
Dei, insertus ei). Elsewhere Origen makes the same point by saying that 
the Only-begotten Son is Son by nature, and therefore His Sonship is 
eternal and unalterable; whereas others only become "sons of God" in so 
far as the Son of God has given them power to do so. Origen says that 
other sons derive their birth (i. e. spiritual birth) from God, but are 
not born with the same birth as that with which the OnlY7begotten Son is 
born. * There is as much difference between the true Son and those to whom 
it is said "You are sons of the Most High" as there is between the true 
(98) 
God and those to whom it is said "I have said: you are gods. " Origen 
seems to be suggesting that it was not appropriate for the Father to 
perform the act of creation directly, but only by means of One Who shared 
(99) 
His own being. At any rate, in one place he says that the phrase "the 
(100) 
firstborn of all creation" ( -r('? &. vro, rav<oS Trýxejs t-(T'fe&4 is applied 
by St. Paul to Christ because He is the earliest of the things which God 
C% 
has made toij ), and that it was to Him 
that God said with reference to the fashioning ( StIt-toueya, 4-C ) of man: 
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(101) 
"Letus make man in our image and likeness. " 
It is not however clear that even if we were to regard the Father 
alone as exercising creative activity, the Son would thereby be deprived 
of His unique relationship to the Father, in so far as the Son would be 
the only product of God's activity Who would be derived from His very 
being and so be "of one substance" with Him, to use the Nicene terminology. 
In fact, to insist on the creative activity of the Son makes it very 
difficult to separate creation from redemption, inasmuch as creation 
(102) 
itself is a continuous process, as Origen himself admits, whereby the 
universe is brought into the state in which the Father intends it to 
be. If the Son of God is thought of as-active in the world only from the 
time of. the incarnation, the process of redemption is more easily seen as 
supplementing and completing the process of creation. In fact in one 
(103) 
passage Origen seems to suggest that the gift of life is derived directly 
from the Father, because the Father imparts to others the life which is 
His eternal possession, with the result that they receive life as partic- 
(104) 
ipating in it OITY )- 
(105) 
In a recently published book it is stated that "redemption is a part 
of creation - it is the task of 'winning back' which is ever-present in 
the risk of creativity: and the Word of God by Whom the heavens were made 
is that same Word of God Who 'suffered to redeem our loss'. " The author is 
driven to make redemption into one aspect of creation by identifying Jesus 
of Nazareth with the eternal Word of God Who is eternally active in 
the world of His making. It will be contended in a later chapter that in 
making this identification no allowance is made for the true humanity of 
(106) 
Jesus Christ; but in any case, if the Word of God is equally occupied in 
both creation and redemption, it becomes very difficult to think of each 
as a process separate from the other, because creation inevitably means 
"bringing new situations into being", and that is also how redemption can 
be described, at any rate from one point of view. 
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There are however certain passages where it seems to be suggested 
that the Son of God is not responsible for creation as such, but is simply 
the Giver of reason to those who are endowed with it. Thus in De Princ. 
Origen suggests that the Father is the direct Creator of the universe in 
so far as He imparts to each being its existence from His own substance 
,j.. ý- ,9- A'Wo #rOV 14(OU whereas"the Son, being less than the Father, is 
11 -) % J-1 % #1 
(107) 
concerned with rational beings alone" (4bkYjf t-fcl "'. " XT `4) - 
But even that limitation does not altogether remove the difficulty of 
separating creation from redemption. A little later it is stated that 
"all rational creatures are partakers of the Divine Word, i. e. of reason, 
and thus have in undeveloped form the qualities of wisdom and righteousness 
(108) 
which are the essence of Christ", and a little later still it is stated 
that Christ is the Word or Reason by sharing. in which human beings are 
(109) 
entitled to be called "rational. " In another passage it almost seems 
to be suggested that the real function of theWord of God is to unfold the 
rationality existing in undevelopedform in each human being: at any rate it 
is stated that the Primal AOYOS bears the same relationship to rational 
beings ( A, yt Kd- as the Father does to the Son Who is His Image and 
to the images of His Son, because theFather is the Source of Divinity and 
(110) 
the Son of reason. Elsewhere Origen says that ever since the human race 
began, Christ the Word or Reason of God has spoken to everyone in their 
hearts, and has taught them about all the virtues, and has thus proved 
(111) 
His words "My sheep hear my voice" to be true. 
Perhaps the difficulty of separating creation from redemption may 
be to some extent solved by referring to the statement of Origen that the 
Father does not beget the Son by an act of separation, as the upholders 
(112) 
of the Valentinian heresy suppose. If that were so, the Son would not 
share the entire nature of the Father. No, the Word Who is the Wisdom 
of God is begotten in the way in which an act of will proceeds from 
(113) 
the mind: thus it is that the will of the Son is perfectly harmonious with 
(114) 
that of the Father. But it could surely be maintained that the method by 
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which the Father created other beings is analogous to the method of human 
pro-creation in so far as other beings display only certain aspects of 
(115) 
the Divine Nature, and not that Nature in its entirety. Even if the 
function of creation is reserved to the Father, none the less by asserting 
that the Father brings the Son into existence in a manner different from 
that in which He brings other beings into existence, the consubstantiality 
of the Son with the Father is surely safeguarded. The difference between 
the Divine generation of the Son and human pro-creation is well brought 
(117) 
out by a story told in the biography of Archbishop William Temple of how 
at a conference one speaker referred to what the Bishop's "revered father" 
had said, and the Bishop replied that if his revered father had said it, 
he himself entirely disagreed with it. A human father does not transmit 
his entire nature to his son; both simply manifest certain aspects of 
human nature as such. Whereas between the Divine Father and the Divine 
Son there is complete identity of nature and therefore complete harmony. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I 
Origen's view of the interpretation of Scripture 
It is worth observing that Origen takes the same view of the way 
in which we can acquire a true understanding of the written Word of God 
as of the way in which we can understand the relationship between the 
Son and the Father, namely that it is only possible when God sends His 
(118) 
Word to enable us to do this. The mystical meaning hidden in the words 
of Scripture can only be revealed through Christ 1.4 )(? tCrTt: ý'-U 
(119) 
in the Holy Spirit. The puzzling passages of Scripture can only be 
explained as a result of praying to God that His Word may come to us 
(120) 
and enlighten us as to the inner meaning of the events there narrated. 
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13. Hom. inExod. 1.5 (GCS 6.153.17-21). Cf. Hom. in Num. XII. 4 (GCS 
7.104.18-22). 
14. Comm. in Joh. II. 10 (GCS 4.64.29-31). Cf. also Contra Cels. VI. 60 
VI. 60 (GCS 2.130.19-25), and Frag-inEPh-I. 2-14 (JTS 3.235). Cf. 
also Frag. in Luc. 43 (GCS 9.244), where it is said (with ref. to 
Luke i. 51) that the Son is the Arm of the Father (though the 
reference here is primarily to redemption, not creation). Cf. also 
Comm. in Joh. I. 19 (GCS 4.23.15- 8), and 1.35 (4.45.11-13); Frag. in 
Joh. I. (GCS 4.485.2-4); Hom. in Gen. I. 11 (GCS 6.13.18-19); Hom. in 
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Matt. IV (GCS 12.268.31-33):.. Pitra A. S. III. 167 (LXXXIX. 4); Hom. in Num. 
XII. 2 (GCS 7.98.4). - 
15. De Princ. I. 7.1. (GCS 5.86.5-9). 
16. Ibid. I. Pref. 4 (GCS 5.10.6-9). 
17. Frag. in Joh. X (GCS 4.492.7-9). 
18. Frag. in Matt. 67.2.3 (GCS 12.42). 
19. Comm. in Rom. VII. 9 (PG XIV. 1129C): 
20. Comm. in M, ýtt. XVII. 14 (GCS 10.623.10-14). 
21. Frag. inVoh. I (GCS 4.485.8-12). In the Sources Chretiennes ed. of 
Comm. in Joh. (Vol. I, p. 121, cont. of n. 2 on p. 120) it is said that 
according to this passage the Wisdom of God was originally only 
related to God; but since that Wisdom resolved on the existence of 
creatures, it. took on a-relationship to creatures also, as is made 
clear in the passage in Proverbs (viii. 22) where it is said that 
"the Lord has established wisdom as the beginning of His ways with 
a view to His works. " 
22. Comm. in Joh. I. 6. (GCS 4.11.18); Frag. in Joh. CXXVII (GCS 4.570.24,25); 
Matt. Comm. Series 45 (GCS 11.92.22-27). 
23. Frag. in Joh. CXL (GCS 4.564.14-16). 
24. Comm. in Joh. 11.14 (GCS 4.71.2-11). 
25. John xv. 15. 
26.1 Cor. viii. 6. 
27. Comm. in Rom. VII. 13 (PG XIV. 1140 C-1141A). 
28. Genesis xii. 40-44. 
29. Frag. in Lam. XLVI (GCS 3.256.1); Frag. in Matt. 413.1,2 (GCS 12.172); 
Sel. in Ps. xvi; 8 (PG XII. 1220A); xvii. 36 (1237B); xliii. 3 (1423A); 
xliv. 5 (1429BC); x1vii. 11 (1440D); lxx. 18 (1521B); Pitra A. S. III. 108 
(lxxvi. 16). Cf. also Pitra A. S. II. 354, where, with ref. to Exod. xv. 
Ag 
te 
r 6, it is said that the Son is the & x6p of the Father 
Who dashed in pieces the enemy. Cf. also ibid. III. 99 (LXXIII. 1l)-' 
but it is there said that Christ is described as the kae of God 
when He takes action against the enemies of God's people, but the 
&ý(4- of God when He confers benefits on God's people. Cf. 
also-ibid. 134 (LXXIX. 18). 
30. Frag. in Matt. 242.2-5 (GCS 12.113). Cf. also ibid. 396 1,2 (12.168). 
31. Hom. in Matt. III (GCS 12.258.32-259.2). 
32. Pitra A. S. II. 384 (Frag. in Joh. xxxviii. 41). 
33. De Princ. I. 2.10 (GCS 5.43.14-22). Cf. Sel, in Ps. xxiii. 10 (PG XII. 1269B) 
xlix. 2 (1449A); Pitra A. S. II. 482 (Frag. in Ps. xxiii. 10). 
34. Comm. in Joh. II. 3 (GCS 4.56.7-9). Cf. also Contra Cels. VIII. 14 
(GCS 2.232.3-6), and Nemeshegyi, op. cit., p. 63, n. 2. 
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35. Hom. in Num. XXIV. 2 (GCS 7.229.28-230.4). 
36. Sel. in Ps. lxxiv. 3 (PG XII. 1533C). 
37. Sel. in Ps. cxxxv. 4 (PG XII. 1656B). 
88. Frag. XVII in Il Sam.: ývi. 10-12 (GCS 3.30.0.8-16). 
39. This subject is further discussed in Chapter II pp. 42-45. 
40. Comm. in Joh. II. 3 (GCS 4.57.10-12). 
41. Contra Cels. VII. 65 (GCS 2.215.13-15). Cf. Sel. in Ps. lxxvi. 14 
(PG XII. 1540C). In Comm. in Gen. III (Philocal. JAR 210) the angels 
-#I are on the contrary described as 
42. Comm. in Joh. II. 2 (GCS 4.54-12-17) 
43.4.24-27 (Scherer's ed., p. 62) 
44. Ibid. 3.12-4.9. (Scherer's ed., pp. 58,60,62). 
45. lbid. 2.11-13. (Scherer's ed., p. 56). 
46. Comm. in Gen. Tom. I. Frag. (PG XII. 45C). 
47. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 28 (GCS 4.474.7-12). 
48. Prol. to Cant. (GCS 8.71,4-13). 
49. Comm. in Joh. II. 14 (GCS 
.)e, 50. The Son is however referred to as ZYC-%/tjT0S in Contra Cels. 
VI. 17 (GCS 2.88.51). On the other hand, in Sel. in Ps. i. 2, (PG 
XII. 1080B) He is described as (--%f4r I -ro U 
51. De Princ. II. 2.1. (GCS 5.111.28-31). Lowry on p. 238 of; his article 
"Origen as Trinitarian" (JTS 37(1936)) says that "in attempting 
to give a rational account of the pluralistic side of Christianity, 
and in reaching out accordingly to his native Hellenism.... Origen 
is led unwittingly into the betrayal of the doctrine of a one only 
personal God. ' 
*I 
But he seems to be making an unwarrantable accusation, 
because orth9dox doctrine does not state that God is a Person, but 
rather that there is one God in Three Persons. 
The same criticism can be made of Vagaggini's view of Origen's 
subordinationism as stated on p. 186 of his article "La Natura della 
sintesi origenianall (SC 82(1954)) 
ý 11 Cf. Mme. Harl, Origýne et la fonction revelatrice du Verbe 
Incarn6 (Paris, 1958) p. 354, where she says that "the subordinationism 
of Origen is a subordination in the hierarchical sense, not one 
which implies a difference of nature. " 
In Comm. in Joh. II. 2 (GCS 4.54.16) and Comm. in Gen. III (Philocal. 
. .1 JAR. 208.32,209.1) the Father alone is referred to as 3Zy6VqToS - 
52. Exod. xv. 2. 
53. Pater noster, qui nos fecit et genuit, Christus est. 
54. John xx. 17. 
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55. Deum suum dicit, quem natura patrem vocat. Hom in Exod. VI. 2 (GCS 
6.193.20-194.1). 
Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit., pp. 369,370. "It is not only in relation 
to the Father that the notion of Fatherhood is valid. In so far as 
the First-born of the Father is the source of life to others, He 
too is Father, Father of all those to whom He imparts life, intelligence, 
and the other Divine attributes. " See. also p. 370, n. 112 
Cf. also Maydieu, I'La procession du Logos d1apres le Commentaire 
sur Jean" (BLE 35 (1934)) p. 10, where it is pointed out that the Father 
does not create by Himself, but it is rather the Son Who is in 
immediate contact with the matter which has the potientiality of 
existing. 
Christ is also referred to as the Father of created beings 
in De Princ. IV. 3.7, (GCS 5.333.21-24); Sel. in Ps. 111.2,3 (PG XII. 
1120D-1121A); Pitra A. S. 111.199 (CII. 13). 
56. Christum, qui eam ex initio ad imaginern suam creavit. 
57. Hom. in Exod. VIII. 4 (GCS 6.225.12-17); cf. also ibid. VIII. 5 (228. 
4-11), and X. 4 (250.10-14). 
58. Hom. in Exod. VI. 9 (GCS 6.200.16-24). Ita videtur tanquam suos quidem 
recepisse quos creaverat, tanquam alienos autem acquisisse, quia 
alienum'sibi dominum ......... quaesiverant. 
59. Comm. in Matt. XIII. 18 (GCS 10.227.2-11); cf. ibid. XIV. 3 (310.12-14). 
60. viii. 18. 
61. - Hom. in Num. XXVII. 2 (GCS 7.259.1-8). 
62. Isaiah ix. 6 
63. Ch. VII, pp. 270-. 272. 
64. Comm. in Joh. I. 19 (GCS 4.24.7-10). 
65.1.2.3 (GCS 5.30.9-11). Cf. Maydieu, op-cit., pp. 11 & 12, where it 
is pointed out that according to Origen, the Son of God is I.,. isdom 
in so far as He contains within Himself the archetypal pattern of 
the universe, and the Logos in so far as He brings that pattcrn to 
light in the created world. Cf. Nemeshegyi, op. cit., pp. 119 and 
126, where the intelligible world contained in God the Son is described, 
and Teichtweier's thesis, Das Sein des Menschen, p. 257. 
66. Comm. in Joh. I. 19 (GCS 4.24,3-7). So in Sel. in Ps. xxix. 8 (PG, XII. 
1296C) it is said that the causes( A of things on the 
earth express the nature of the Word ( XoyoV Who f; ýshioned 
them. 
Origen likewise states elsewhere that although human craftsmen 
CrIpX(OU FYOI share the creative activity of the Divine 
Son, He alone can be called /Gyos because Ile implants 
in matter the principles on which the -It-XV of human 
craftsmen is based (Frag. in Joh. I (GCS 4.4814-8)). 
67. Proverbs viii. 22. 
68. Comm. in Joh. I. 34 (GCS 4.43.16-30). 
69. Ibid. XIX. 22 (GCS 4.324.4-11). 
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70. Ibid. (GCS 4.324.16-25); De Princ-III. 5.4 (GCS 5.273.17-275.14). 
71. Per Filium etenim omnipotens est Pater (De Princ. I. 2.10 (GCS 5.43.4». 
72. Frag. in Matt. 163.1-3 (GCS 12.80). 
73. De Princ. 1.2.10 (GCS 5.42,1-4) and 1.4.3-5 (65.12-68.3). To quote 
-his exact words, cum sapientia semper tuerit, secundum praefigurationem 
semper erant "in sapientiall ea, quae protinus etiam substantialiter 
facta sunt (1.4.5 (68.1-3)). 
It is true that Origen also considers'the possibility that 
rational beings have existed from all eternity (De*Princ. I. 4.3 (GCS 
5.66.8-14) and 1.4.5 (68.10-12)): but it seems likely that he 
preferred the other solution to the problem as making clearer the 
distinction between the Divine Word and other beings possessing 
reason. For a different view, see Lowry, op. cit., pp. 233,234; cf. 
also Cornelis, "Les fondements cosmologiques de lleschatologie 
d'Origenell (RSPT 43,1959), p. 37. Nemeshegyi in pp. 113-124 of op. 
cit. inclines to our own view; so do Crouzel in L'Image, p. 124, n. 251, 
Dupuis in LIEsprit de 1'Homme (Bruges, 1967) p. 30, n. 14, Balas in 
"The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen's Thought" 
(M, 1973) pp. 6 and 7, and Burke in "Des'Origenes Lehre vom Urstand", 
P. 
Lieske on p. 176 of Die Theologie der Logos - Mystik bei. 
Origenes (Munster, 1938), says that according to Origen, "the 
everlasting begetting and existence of the Son is not demanded because 
the Son is required as the Instrument or Workman of an everlasting 
creation of the world. His theological argument", says Lieske, "is 
quite different; Fatherhood requires Sonship, and Sonship requi res 
the essential co-existence of the Father, without the necessity of 
an everlasting creation of the world being demanded as an additional 
presupposition of Fatherhood,. " (Cf. R. Boon, "De Spiritualiteit van 
Origenes", (NTT 14 (1959-1960)) p. 25. ) On the other hand, Lieske 
implies on pp. 182 and 183 that Origen believed in the eternity of 
the world itself. So do Wintersig in Die Heilsbedeutung der Menschheit 
Jesu in der vornizanischen Theologie (Tubingen, 1932), p. 74, H. Rahner 
in "Das Menschenbild des Origenes" (EJ 15 (1947)ý, p. 204, and Hal. 
Koch on pp. 24 and 25 of Pronoia und Paideusis (Berlin - Leipzig, 1932), 
where he wrongly, in the present writer's opinion, identifies the 
"intelligible world" with the world of rational beings instead of 
with the world of concepts or archetypes existing in the Divine 
Mind. 
Maydieu on pp. 64 and 65 of op. cit. says (wrongly, in my opinion) 
that the Son only receives the'Father's wisdom in order to bring into 
existence the beings whom the Father desires to create, the implication 
being that the Son only receives such knowledge as is essential for 
His creative function. But such a limited view of the Son's knowledie 
seems out of harmony with the main tendency of Origen's thought, which 
is to suppose that as the Son is of one nature with the Father, the 
Son receives all the knowledge possessed by the Father. On p. 70, 
Maydieu appears to suggest that the Father would not have brought 
forth the Divine Word from all eternity if He had not created the 
world from all eternity, because the Son is merely the Father's 
Agent in the creation of the world (contrast Cornelis, op. cit., 
pp. 37,38). Aeby in "Les missions divines de Saint Justin a Origeýnell 
(Paradosis 12 (1958)) pp. 155 and 156, appears to take the same view. 
He points out on p. 186 that this subordinationism goes back to the 
Apologist Justin, in so far as the Son is thought of as begotten by the 
Father for the sake of His external operations. Vagaggini on p. 185 
of op. cit. agree s with Aeby and Maydieu. 
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M. F. Wiles in his article "Eternal Generation" (JTS New Series 
12 (1961), P. 288) considers that Origen believEdin the Eternal gen- 
eration of the Logos and also the eternity of all spiritual beings, 
and goes on to say that "the idea of eternal generation as it stands 
in Origen's scheme of thought does not really have any effective 
anti-subordinationist significance at all. " But surely it does, 
even if we suppose Origen (wrongly, in my view) believed 
in the eternity of created spirits. The Logos is the personification 
of God's wisdom, and no created spirit occupies this role. 
Later on (p. 291) Wiles suggests that Origen need not have 
felt obliged to believe in the eternal generation of the Son by. a 
consideration of the Son in Himself, because (according to Origen) 
"the Son is not the truth when compared to the Father, but only a 
shadow and semblance of it on our behalf" (Jerome, Ep. ad Avit. 2 - (GCS 5.36, lines 3-6 of notes). (Cf. Ch. III, n. 47) But surely Origen 
is referring to the Incarnate Son, Who conveys the truth to human 
beings as fully as is possible in their state of weakness. This does 
not alter the fact that the Son possesses all the qualities of the 
Father, one of which is that of being the Truth. 
Rossi, in his article I'La dottrina delle creazione in Origene" 
(SC 20 (1921)), ignores the passage relating to the prefiguration of 
the created universe in the Word of God, and attributes to Origen 
the doctrine of the eternity of the created universe, or rather that 
of an eternal succession of created universes. He easily demonstrates 
(p. 345 sqq. ) that Vicenzi, in championing the orthodoxy of Origen 
in this matter, is trying to force the language of De Princ. to mean 
something other than what it appears to mean; but it is striking that 
when Rossi ultimately evaluates the thought of Origen, he ETomes to 
the conclusion that Origen ought to have held the view which Vicenzi 
credits him with having held, and indeed which he appears to the 
present writer to have in fact held, namely that the plan of the 
created universe existed eternally in the mind of the Creator, and 
that the will to create is independent of the carrying out of that 
will, so that the attribute of omnipotence could be safeguarded even 
if the universe had never been created (p. 356). Rossi seems to me to 
have failed to prove that if Origen's doctrine were what he claims 
it to have been, Origen could not be called a pantheist, because a 
universe eternally created is really indistinguishable in thought 
from one ahich is uncreated, and in the same way although in theory 
the universe according to Origen is dependent on God , in fact the 
universe and God would be necessary to each other and explain each 
other (pp. 432-434). 
74. Contrast the view of W. B. Taverner as expressed in his article 
"Unitarian Theology in Mid-Twentieth Century" (Faith and Freedom, 
Spring, 1953), where he says; "There is no knowable God apart from 
His Will, and God's existence is impossible apart from His creation. 
He exists by and in His act. He is a Creator or nothing ..... Man 
therefore is borne upon the eternal stream of the Divine Will, 
and since the Divine Will is formatively present everywhere, he also 
bears the will of God within himself. His duty.... is to come to 
some awareness of the Divine Will within him,. and to enact it, as 
he can, in his life". Cf. also Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, 
Vol. II (London, 1971), p. 138, where he says that "(for the Biblical 
writers) God is never merely the invisible ground of present reality, 
but the free, creative source of the even new and unforseen ...... 
Because the freedom of God in relation to the world necessarily 
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remains inaccessible to the inferential procedure that is fundamental 
to philosophical theology, neither could it grasp the fact that a 
special gift of God to man was necessary for the knowledge of God. " 
On p. 139 he says: "From all this it becomes evident that Christian 
theology can link up with the philosophical idea of God only by 
breaking through it at the same time"; and on p. 158: "Even in early 
Christian theology, the inferential procedure (from effect to cause) 
operated as a set of prior decisions about specific essential features 
of the concept of God, which consequently appeared to be knowable 
independently of historical revelation and not in need of any critical 
refraction. It was not seen that a constriction of the Biblical idea 
of God, an abridgement of His transcendent freedom and omnipotence, 
would necessarily be involved in the insistent working out of the 
philosophical formulation of the question about God. " 
75. Ep. ad Mennam (Mansi IX. 528), quoted in GCS 5.52, note on line 1. 
Cf. ibid. IX. 489B, quoted'in GCS 5.349, lines 2 and 3 of notes, 
and ibid, IX. 525, quoted in GCS 5.349.13, where the word tc ttrA-is 
used of the Son. 
t- 
76. See p. 8. 
77. De Princ. IV. 4.3 (GCS 5.352.11-13). Origen also declares that the 
grace of God itself is bestowed upon mankind through the / mediation of Jesus Christ, Who is described as the "minister" ( qaý? Evau 
of this boundless grace, and of the Holy Spirit (De Orat. Intro. 
(GCS 2.297.3-6)). 
78. Frag-in Joh. XXX (GCS 4.506.13,14). The fact that Origen can use 
the word KrierT S as well as Klr(aýý-L- of the Son shows 
that it is no conradiction, as Lowry appears to think (op. cit., 
JTS 37, p. 239, n. 1) "to attribute, as Origen did, an equal Divine 
essence to the Son, and, on the other hand, to subordinate Him so 
decidedly to the Father. " 
79. Comm. in Rom. VIII. 5 (PG XIV. 1170C). 
80. Frag. in Matt. 404.1-3 (GCS 12.170). 
81. Cf. Ch. V, p. 104. "' 
82. De Princ. II-1.5 (GCS 5.111.21-25). 
83. As Crouzel points out in L'Image, p. 93, n. 92. Cf. Cornelis, p. 38, 
where he says that Origen does not base the distinction between the 
Persons of the Father and the Son on any difference of action, and 
refers to Convs. with Heracl. 2.26,27 (p. 58, Scherer's ed. ). On 
the other hand Cornelis appears to take a different view in op. cit., 
p. 79, n. 143. Cf. Contra Cels. IV. 57 (GCS 1.330.22) where reference 
is made to the Divine Word Who changes the qualities (1r6c*T9T-iLS 
of matter. 
84. Comm-in Joh. VI. 38 (GCS 4.146.12-18). See Fitzgerald's comments on 
this passage on p. 229 of his typescript thesis, Christ and the Prophets. 
Cf. also Comm. in Joh. VI. 30 (GCS 4.140.9-13); Contra Cels. II. 9 (GCS 
1.136.14-29); ibid. V. 12 (GCS 2.13.10-18); De Orat. X. 2 (GCS 2.320.16-20). 
On the other hand, in Hom. in Num. III. 2 (GCS 7.15.12-24) Origen 
interprets John i. 26 differently, as referring to the fact that the 
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human Jesus always took the right course, turning neither to the 
right hand nor to the left, whereas His disciples, liable as they 
are to sin, cannot be said to "stand in the midst", but only to 
"have their dwelling in the midst of the people" (cf. II Kings iv. 13). 
85. Contra Cels. VII. 17 (GCS 2.168.14-23). Cf. Wm. Temple, Christus Veritas, 
(London, 1925) pp. 139-143. 
86. Ibid. VII. 35 (GCS 2.186. '8-11). Cf. ibid. VI. 78 (2.149.35-150.6), 
where it is said that God has always been doing good to mankind, since 
nothing good has happened among men apart from the Divine Word Who has 
visited the souls of, those who are able, if only briefly, to admit 
into themselves His operations. Cf. also De Princ. IV. 4.1 (GCS 5.350. 
26-351.6) and Comm. in Matt. XIV. 11 (GCS 10.302.20-24). 
Cf. Nygren, Eros and Agape, (tr. P. S. Watson, London, 1953) 
p. 384, where he says that "to this end (i. e. the return of all things 
to God) the Logos has been throughout the ages immanently active in 
man; to this end He has come to us in the fullness of time and become 
flesh. " 
De Faye (Origeýne, sa viei, son oeuvre, sa . pensee, Paris, 1923- 
1928) seems to suggest (Vol. III, p. 144) that it is only since the 
Incarnation that the Divine Word has been the Instructor and Guide 
--of Mankind. Whereas surely according to Origen the purpose of the 
Incarnation was simply to enable Him to do this work more effectively. 
In fact, later (pp. 217 & 218) de Faye quotes a passage in Contra Cels. 
(IV 3 (CCS . 1.275.26-29)) which expressly states that "at all times 
God through His. Word has restored-to the right path those who have 
lent their ears to His teachings". 
87. Comm. in Joh. VI. 38 (GCS 4.146.12-16). Cf. Pitra A. S. III. 33 (CXXXV. 4), 
and Comm. in Ps. I (Philocal. JAR 39.9-16). Cf. also our Lord's 
statement ! 'My Father wor ks unceasingly, and so do I" with reference 
to the man healed on the sabbath day' (John v. 17). 
On the other hand, Origen does not regdrd the Logos as a 
purely immanent principle which is the cause of all things. As 
Lieske says on p. 214 of op. cit., "our real participation in the Divine 
Sonship is in no way merely deduced from the idea thatwe are necessary 
expressions of the Logos as a mere intermediary of the Father Who 
necessarily reveals Himself to the world. 11 Likewise de Faye (op. cit., 
pp. 123,124) points out the similarity between Origen's view of the 
Logos and that of the Stoics, in so far as both. regard Him as the 
Divine power which pervades the universe and maintains it in a kind 
of tension (-ToVoS ); but de Faye also recognises that the Logos is 
the Fashioner of the universe under the Father's directions (ibid., 
p. 125). 
88. Luke i. 32. 
89. Frag. in Luc. 24.1,2 (GCS 9.226). Cf. Exhort. ad Mart. 47 (GCS 1.43.12 t- 13), 
where reference is made to "the all-pervading living Word" e ao'l 
'St 11 
a-j-rov 
9, 
pq)OXc%f )ZpV), and Frag. in Lam. VIII (GCS 3.237.20-25), 
where the same phrase, 
eý%PoXoS Ais-yoS 
9 is used. Cf. also the 
striking sentence in Hom. in I Sam. xxviii. 3-25 (GCS 3.290.15) "Every 
place desires Jesus Christ" ( Tr9, S -Tý'rtoS Xpr)fel -, crou I 
in 
90. VIII. 2 (PG XIV. 1163AB). Cf. Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CXXIV. 2 (p. 123), 
where it is said that the Lord encircles His own people, but does not 
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encircle those who do not know Him, but rather stands in the midst of 
them. Presumably this means that if they do not recognise Him, they 
are deprived of His protection. 
91. Frag. in_Jer. 18 (GCS 3.206.26-207.3). 
92. Comm. in Joh. VI. 39 (GCS 4.149.1-4). Cf. Contra Cels. V. 39 (GCS 2.43.22) 
where Origen says that "we may call Him a second God. " 
93. Hom. in Ex. VIII. 3 (GCS 6.223.2-6). Cf. Hom. in Num. XXIII. 4 (GCS 7.216. 
12-30), where Origen points out that we must not take literally the 
statement that "God rested on the seventh day from all His works" 
(Gen. ii. 2), because God is continually at work providing human beings 
with the things they need, and smiting and healing as necessary. 
He goes on to say that it was this activity in which Jesus Christ 
regarded Himself as sharing, as is clear from John v. 17. 
94. - Cf. Contra Cels. II. 71 
(GCS 1.193.13,21), and Chapter V, p. 103. 
95. Frag. in Joh. 1 (GCS 4.484.29-485.4). Cf. Comm. in Joh. XX. 18 (GCS 
4.350.26-29), and Contra Cels-II. 9 (GCS 1.136.5,6), where itis said 
that when the Word was commanded, He made everything that the Father 
epjoined upon Him. Cf. also. ibid. II. 31 (GCS 1.158.27-30). 
96. Frag. in Joh. 9 (GCS 4.490.20-491.1). Cf. Contra Cels. III. 34 (GCS 
1.231.7,8), where the Son is described as midway between the nature 
- 
of the underived God and that of derived beings I-CTA56 
8"V-rog -F, 'IS 
T-6 J ;L yev tLro -i 14A( -r? S (--'f r LroV IrAv-rj4. Cf. also Nemeshegyi, 
op. cit., p. 75.4 61 tr& -., 
97. De Princ. II. 8.5 (GCS 5.163,4-6). 
98. Frag. in Joh-109 (GCS 4.563.6-13). The Scriptural reference is to 
Ps. lxxxii. 6. 
99. Contra Cels. V. 37. (GCS 2.41.20-25). 
100. Col. i. 15. 
101. Gen. i. 26 
See p. 12. 
103. Frag. in Joh. 2 (GCS 4.486.3-9). 
104. W. Marcus in his book Der . ý!., 
Ibordinatianiusmus als historiologisches 
Phi; nomenon (Munich, 1963) ': -, ). 
157-160) well illustrates, with reference 
to various passages discuý;. --Jn-a whether it is lawful to pray to the Son, 
the difficulty in which Origen involves himself by thinking of the 
Word of God as both Divine and human. On the one hand, the Word of 
God cannot be thought of at, essentially subordinate to the Father, 
because He shares the Father's nature; but on the other hand, as 
Man, He is obviously subordinate. The question is, is not Origen 
trying to have it both ways? 
The same difficulty is brought to light on p. 161 of op. cit., 
where the author says that in the order of creation, not only the world 
of rational beings but tho entire created universe is subordinated to 
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the Divine Word 'and governed by Him. On the other hand, in the 
process of redemption the Word of God has a special relationship 
to rational beings, a relationship which is much more restricted 
and abbreviated than His function as Creator, but one which is 
calculated to bring the entire world process to its fulfilment. 
While what the author says may be true, it seems doubtful 
whether the distinction made between the sphere of activity of the 
Word as Creator and His sphere of activity as Redeemer can be 
rigidly maintained without making Him into two Persons instead of one, 
because it is the same Word of God Who according to Origen performs 
both functions. 
105. W. H. Vanstone, Love's Endeavour, Love's Expense, (Darton, Longman 
& Todd, 1977), p. 70. 
106. See Ch. V, pp. 161-164. 
107. De Princ. I. 3.5 (GCS 5.55.4-56.3). Cf. also Comm. in Joh. II. 35 
(GCS 4.94.12-15), and Kelber, Die Logoslehre von Heraclit bis 
Origenes, (Stuttgart, 1958) p. 242. (On the other hand there is a 
passage in Contra Cels. (VI. 71 ýGCS 2.141.22-25)) where it is stated 
that the Word of God extends not only to human beings but also to 
th 
Ie 
minutest of thingg made, so that all things may occur by means 
of the Word Myov 
Cf. also Mme. Harl, op. cit ., p. 371 Wlere she says that the 
mediation of the Son is eternal, seein g that the totality of 
Divine attributes present in Him is the means of access to the 
Father; historic as the result of His various manifestations, 
especially the Incarnation; and individual, by His presence as" 
intelligence in each ýuman being'. 
J. Dupuis also discusses De Princ. I. 3.5 in op. cit., pp. 111-116 
but tries to protect Origen against the accusation that he is ascribing a 
greater dignity to the Holy Spirit than to the Father and the Son, in so 
far as he thinks of the Spirit as conferring holiness, by saying that 
according to Origen, true existence is only possessed by those who 
are holy (cf. pp. 2 &3 of the present work), and true reason only 
by the person who lays himself open to the action of the Divine Word. 
Cf. also Balas, op 
, 
cit., pp. 12-14, 'and J. Rius-Camps "Comunicabilidad 
de la natureza de Dios segun. Origenes", OCP 36 (1970), p. 247, where 
he says that "in contrast to primary being, which is common to all 
creatures, Divine being does not come to us immediately from God. 
God, even if He brings into existence all that truly 'is', does so 
'by means of' the Word Who is Wisdom 'in' the Holy Spirit. " 
Cf. also Lieske, op-cit., ' pp. 156 & 157, where he discusses 
the Son as the Source of reason in created beings. To quote his 
own words: "Human beings are in possession of their facti3ly of 
reason in so far as the absolute Reason (Logos) exists personally 
within them, and they are thus as it were partial rays of the 
essential Brightness of the Father which flows through them. " 
Prat in his work on Origen (Paris, 1907) also discusses 
(pp. 64 sqq. ) De Princ. I. 3.5, and interestingly enough says that 
"in describing the operation peculiar to each of the three Divine 
Persons and the kind of inequality which results, Origen speaks as 
the other Fathers do. But more often than not, he forgets or 
neglects these subtle distinctions. " 
108. De Princ. I. 3.6 (GCS 5.56.20-57.1). 
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109. Ibid. (5.57.10,11). Cf. also Comni. in Joh. I. 37 (GCS 4.47.29-48.4). 
110. Comm. in Joh. II. 3 (GCS 4.55.15-23). Cf. also ibid. II. 2 (58.18-22), 
where it is pointed out that the Divine X""yos is the Source of 
AS (reason) in all rational beings. Cornelis, op. cit., 
p 2, n. 9, rEfers to the second passage, but also points out that 
Ors 
. the image of God present in all rational beings is only operative in 
those who also participate in the Holy Spirit. 
111. Comm. in Rom. VIII. 5 (PG XIV. 1167B). 
112. De Princ. IV. 4.1 (GCS 5.348.7,8): OLOU fr! -&rýc, 0u 
%I", c 7/ e6-ý 
. ý Fe- -D -ý-- -i I-) 
v "(- two, V, as 01OVIF-1-t rt-", 
113. Ibid. (5.349 7-9): velut si voluntas procedat e mente, and ibid. 
(349.11): Ou'ros, c Olds 
Cf. also Frag. in JohIO8 (GCS 4.562.16-. 5). y 
'0 
114. Cf. Nemeshegyi, op. cit., pp. 84-91. 
115. Cf. the observation of Eusebius in De eccl. theol. (GCS Euseb. 4.174. 
21-23), where he says that God will be all in all at the final 
consummation in so far as He will make Himself available to all to 
tiie extent that the ability ( A04e-tS ) of each can partake of His 
Divinity; and again (175.30-34) that God will lie all in all inasmuch 
as He will'supply to all, in accordance with the ability, of each 
to receive them, the different. aspects ( C'rVtVo'('. LS of His Divinity, 
even though He will reserve for His Only-begotten Son the distinctive 
and paternal glory and hanour and kingship which are incommunicable 
to the rest. 
116. Cf. Frag. in Heb. (PG XIV. 1307C), where Origen refers to the passage 
in Wisdom (vii. 25) where Wisdom is described as "a most pure effluence" 
(aporrhaea) of the glory of the Almighty, and says that an aporrhaea 
appears to be rj oouano3 with that body from which it proceeds, 
from which it fMows tEai. Uere is one substance common to the Father 
and the Son. It is interesting to observe that the same word ocroo6crLo. S 
is used by Origen in his account of Heracleon's interpretation of the 
sentence "You are of your father, the devil" (John viii. 44), in* 
so far as accoring to Heracleon the men. addressed are of another -> / "I el nature OUCIA ) than those called YuKtKat or lrvrvý-ý I K-- I 
(Comm. in Joh. XX. 20 (GCS 4.352.29-35)). It. is worth pointing out 
that Heracleon would be able to defend his assertion by quoting the 
words of Christ which follow: "It is your will CA Er& ) to carry 
out the desires of your father", just as Origen himself regards the 
uniqueness of the generation of the Son of God as proved by the 
identity of His will with that of the Father. 
Cf. also Sel. in Ps. xxxiii. 2 (PG XII. 1308A), where Christ is 
described as C rL TrrJ-J 1-0 5 "unchangeable. " 
Cf . also 
Muzel, 
L'Image, p. 105, n. 164: Mme. Harl, op. cit., 
p. 370, n. 113; Rius-Camps, Comunicabilidad, OCP 34,1968, pp. 10,11. 
117. p. 325 of F. A. Iremonger's biography of William Temple. 
118. Hom. in Jos. VIII. 2 (GCS 7.337.6-11). Cf. Comm. in Cant. III (GCS 8.208. 
1,2), where he says: "Let us call upon God, the Father of the Word, that 
He may reveal to us the secrets of His Word. " Cf. also Hom. in Jos. 
30 
XVII. 3 (GCS 7.405.19-22), where Origen prays that God may give us 
His Word as a lamp to our feet and a light for our path, that Word 
being Jesus Christ, the Light of the world. 
Cf. also the statement of Gregory Thaumaturgus that "the same 
grace is necessary to him who prophesies and to him who hears the prophet, 
and no-one can understand the prophet if the Spirit Who prophesied 
does not impart this understanding" (In Origenem orat. paneg. 15 (PG 
X. 1093)). 
Likewise in treating of prayer, Origen says that one needs the 
Father to enlighten, the Son to teach, and the Spirit to work within 
us in order to enable us to understand this subject (De Orat. II. 6 
(GCS 2.303.17-20)). 
119. Comm. in Joh. I. 15 
. 
(GCS 4.19.32-34). 
120. Frag. in Lam. 125.4-9 (GCS 9.278). 
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CHAPTER II 
The role of the Word of God as the Agent by Whom the 
knowledge of God is conveyed to human beings 
Origen regards the Son not only as operating in the creation of 
the universe, but also as announcing God's plan in creating the universe. 
Thexisions of truth which are contained in the Father's mind are conveyed 
to the Word of God, Who in turn passes them on to those to whom the Father 
deigns to grant them. There is, however, an important difference between 
the Father's mode of communicating His thoughts to the Son and the Son's 
mode of passing them on to others. The Son possesses all the knowledge 
which the Father possesses because of His unique status as the Word Who 
was always with God, whereas the Word only communicates that knowledge piece- 
(2) 
meal to the prophets and others as occasion requires. There is a striking 
(3) 
passage in which Origen says that only Jesus Christ, on whom the Spirit 
of wisdom rested, could show forth the mighty acts of the Lord, and only 
the Word Himself can make audible-the praises of God, by transforming those 
praises, which were formerly merely intelligible, into words and the 
things signified by words. Some of those praises have already been heard, 
but others may remain to be heard. 
Origen lays great stress on the fact that God's message is mediated 
(4) 
to the prophets through Christ. There is one passage where it is suggested 
that the Mediator of that message is not the Word of God, but the human 
. 
(5) 
soul which was inseparably united to Him. Fitzgerald makes much of Origen's 
insistence in this passage that when the Divine Word visited the prophets, 
He was already united to a human soul and therefore acted by means of that 
soul; but this suggestion on Origen's premises is ut,, necessary, because 
if that soul itself did not need any intermediary between itself and the 
Divine Word, it would seem to follow that the prophets did not need one 
either. When Fitzgerald tries to solve the problem of the "apparent fluct- 
uation in Origen's doctrine concerning the source of the prophets, illum- 
ination and sanctification" (i. e. between attributing them to the Word alone 
33 
and to the Word united to a human soul) by invoking the principle 
(7) 
of the communicatio idiomatum, so that operations referred to. the 
Word of God can by implication be understood of His human soul also, 
he seems open to the charge of special pleading. It is more natural 
to suppose that Origen did not really know his own mind on this 
matter, as on others. 
There is a passage which puts forward a doctrine which we shall 
(8) 
discuss more fully later, namely that although the prophets themselves 
understood what the Word of God revealed to them, they did not impart 
that knowledge in such a way as to be fully understood by their con- 
temporaries and those who followed them. Such is the implication of 
(9) 
the passage where it is said that "even though the Saviour came after 
the law and the prophets, He took precedence of them in so far as 
He fulfilled them by revealing the Divine element within them, and 
also in so far as He was revealed as the cause of the Divinely 
inspired writings of the Old Testament. " The same implication seems 
(10) 
to be contained in another passage where, with reference to Matthew 
ix. 37,38, Origen says that in calling His Apostles reapers, Christ 
showed that what the prophets brought about (i. e. the preparpLtion of 
the chosen people for His coming) came about through His own power 
and assistance, because He, as Lord of prophets and apostles alike, 
had sown the seeds of which the disciples were to reap the harvest. 
There are also two passages where Origen appears to interpret 
the words in John i. 16 "Of His fullness have we all received, and grace 
j% le for grace" Xdt(V &WI-I jro(pj-raý as meaning that the prophets I\ J. 
received an initial revelation from the Divine Word because they were 
predisposed to do so, and a second and clearer one as a consequence of 
the former by God's free gift. In one passage, after saying that 
Abraham saw "the day of Christ" even in his own lifetime (cf. John 
viii. 56), Origen says that the prophets first obtained an introduction 
through symbols 9V 1-01"S TUMIS ) to the truth residing in Jesus, 
and then obtained a full vision of it through the guidance of God's 
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(12) (13) 
Spirit. In another passage, where the virtue of faith is discussed, 
it is said that a person first possesses faith as a result of free 
choice (trrok(? c-Tj 
r' ) and then obtains a greater measure as a result KI-JS 
of asking God for it as the Apostles did. 
-But quite apart from the revelation of God which the Word 
gave to the prophets, that same Word of God acted in other ways so 
as to guide the nation of Israel to its appointed destiny. There is 
(14) 
a memorable passage in which Origen says that if the Lord had done 
nothing before His incarnation for the salvation of Israel, He would 
scarcely have said "How often would I have gathered thy children" 
(Matthew xxiii. 37). He goes on to say that this text must be employed 
against those who would separate the Divinity ( Tk'l'y 
D6a*'TrCr--X-) from 
the flesh of Christ and separate the Old from the New Covenant. 
Reference is made in various passages to specific visits by the Word 
of God to Old Testament personages: to Abraham and Sarah to give. them 
(15) (16) 
a son; to Jacob at Peniel when He wrestled with him; to Moses when 
(17) 
he was bidden to flee from Egypt; to Moses directing him to. instruct 
the Israelites to sacrifice the Passover Lamb as a-foreshadowing of 
(18) 
His own sufferings; to Elisha in order to enable him to cure Naaman 
(19) 
the Syrian of his leprosy. With specific reference to the salvation 
of the Israelites from Egypt, it is stated that it was the Divine Word 
Who said to the Hebrews when they were terrified of the advancing 
Egyptians: "The Lord will fight for you, and you will keep silence', 
(20) 
(Exod. xiv. 14). H. de Lubac is simply reproducing the thought of 
(21) 
Origen when he says that "there is an internal continuity and a genuine 
bond between the Old and the New Covenants, because of the same Divine 
Will which is at work in both, pursuing stage by stage the same design. 
If, recalling the events of the desert and the 'spiritual rock' from 
which the Israelites drank, St. Paul could say, 'That rock was Christ', 
that is because the event of the desert already proceeded under a 
supra-temporal impulse towards the event of Easter, and would only find 
(22) 
its true meaning in that event. " In fact de Lubac observes that we 
here join the thought of Origen, who saw the prefiguring of the New 
Covenant in the very means of preparing for it. 
Origen seems on the whole to regard the Jewish prophets as 
gifted with a special degree of insight in so far as they were granted 
a full awareness of the New Covenant, even though they lived under the 
(23) (24) 
Old Covenant. Thus in one place he says that even though-the Father 
can only be satisfactorily approached through Christ, none the less 
even before the Incarnation the prophets worshipped God in an accept- 
(25) 
able manner because they apprehended the as yet unseen Christ. Origen 
(26) 
likewise says that it was through'the Divine Word Who came to them 
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that they were able to utter the heavenlytruths which they saw and 
heard with the eye and ear of the inward man. Origen in fact considers 
that there was a mystical union between the prophets and the Christ 
Whom they foretold. He considered that even the saints who lived be- 
fore the Incarnation could speak of themselves as being "crucified with 
Christ", and could say that their life was the life of Christ in them, 
seeing that they had been spiritually buried with Christ and raised up 
(27) 
with Him. They were thus enabled to understand the mysteries of the- 
Godhead, because the Word of God taught them these mysteries even 
before His Incarnation. Inasmuch as they saw the Son, Who is the image 
of the invisible God, they are recorded as having seen and heard God 
(28) 
Himself. 
(29) 
Mrs. Williamina. Macaulay poses the question why according to 
Origen there should have been an Incarnation, seeing that the pre- 
Christian saints were taught by the Word of God in His pre-incarnate 
state, and answers it by saying that the Incarnation was needed by 
the state of the world, sunk as it was in sin. But the reply could 
be made that even in the Christian era there are many unbelievers, and 
many Christians who do not according to Origen pass beyond the stage of 
(30) 
apprehending Christ as a man rather than as the Divine Word. 
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(31) 
E. Fitzgerald makes a similar point in suggesting that "this very 
distinction between the two economies of Christ (i. e. His activity 
in His pre-incarnate state and His acti vity in His incarnate state) 
tends inevitably to lessen Origen's emphasis on the Incarnation; 
Christ's 'economy in the flesh' is no longer for him, as it is for 
Irenaeus, the sole economy of the God-Man. " 
On the other hand, Origen at times betrays an uneasy awareness 
that he may be making too sharp a distinction between the prophets 
and other Jews by assuming that the prophets had a clearer insight 
into what they were foretelling than we have any right to assume. 
In one place, indeed, he says that the prophets anticipated the 
Christian dispensation in so far as they lived not under law, but under 
faith, and had thus escaped from the state of transgression in which 
(32) 
all lay who lived under the law. But elsewhere he says that if those 
who lived before Christ's coming were partakers of the Holy Spirit, 
01 they did not partake as believers ( t4S lKtcrTb( ), because they 
were not raised to the rank of adopted sons and thus still had the 
(33) (34) 
"spirit of slavery" (Rom. viii. 15). In another passage Origen expounds 
this point of view more fully by saying that it was indeed true that 
I 
God entered into a special relationship with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, 
and also with prophets such as Elijah, but it was also true that 
(35) 
until the Resurrection He was not their Father as well as their God. 
On the whole, however, Origen takes the view that Abraham and 
the prophets anticipated the Incarnation. He thus interprets the 
passage "Many prophets and kings have desired to see the things which 
you (the apostles) see" (Luke x. 24) by saying that there were some 
righteous men and prophets who like Abraham "saw the day of Christ and 
rejoiced" (John viii. 56) and thus anticipated the disciples, whereas 
others who were of inferior insight and perception did not attain to 
(36) 
this state of bliss. Elsewhere he says that we must not deduce from 
the statement that "no one knows the Father except the Son and him to 
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whom the Son chooses to reveal Him" that the Father was unknown to 
the Old Testament saints, because the statement can refer to the past 
as well as to the future. Moreover, when Christ said "Before Abraham 
wa s, I am", He made it clear that when He said "Your father Abraham 
saw my day and rejoiced", His meaning was that that He revealed 
(37) 
Himself to Abraham during Abraham's earthly life. In a rather odd 
passage, Origen points out that when God promised Abraham that He 
would give the Promised Land to him and to his seed (Gen. xiii. 15), 
Abraham himself understood "his seed" to refer to Christ, and is 
therefore said by St. Paul to have "given glory to God" (Rom. iv. 20), 
not so much for the birth of Isaac as because he realised that the 
(38) 
Christ was going to be born out of his purified and sin-free body. 
Origen likewise says, that when Abraham was ordered to offer up Isaac, 
he not only believed that God would raise him from the dead, but also 
saw in this event a foreshadowing of the Resurrection. That is one 
way of interpreting the text "Your father Abraham saw my day and 
rejoiced. " Abraham's faith in fact anticipated the Resurrection of 
Christ, whereas the faith of believers is posterior to it (quod ille 
(39) 
futurum credidit, a nobis creditur factum). 
There are two very puzzling passages in Comm. in Joh. where the 
uncertainty of Origen's thought becomes very apparent in the matter of 
the degree of spiritual discernment. in Abraham and the prophets. In 
(40) 
the first, with reference to the Psalmist's statement "Be still, and 
know that I am God" (Ps. xlv. 11), Origen says that this was addressed 
to a people (i. e. the Jews) who believed in God as Creator (cFjtctcDqryo\/) 
and that it is not possible to progress from faith to knowledge with- 
out inward purification. At the same time, it is made clear in 
Scripture that no one knows the Father except the Son, whereas it is 
also stated that it was Abraham's belief in God which was reckoned to 
him for righteousness. The suggestion seems to be that full knowledge 
of God had to wait for the revelation given in the incarnate life of UNIVERSIR' 
LI P)R A P. Y 
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(41) (42) 
Christ. In the second passage, Origen refers to the two Scriptural 
passages "The harvest is plenteous, but the labourers are few" (Matt. 
ix. 37) and "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto 
life eternal, that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice 
together" (John iv. 36). He suggests that the sowing and reaping - 
which of course he interprets as the preaching of the Word and the 
conversion of those to whom it is preached - were not confined to 
the Christian era, but went on in Old Testament times, because it 
would be absurd to suggest that such people as Abraham and Moses and 
the prophets did not hear the Word of God and impart it to others; and 
so, says Origen, the incarnate life of Christ simply continued a 
process which had already been going on beforehand. Likewise in a 
('43) 
Frag. in Luc., where Origen makes adistinction between "knowing God" 
and believing in God", he asserts that it is heretical to assert that 
(44) 
Abraham believed in Goa without knowing Him as Father. 
But even if Abraham and the prophets anticipated the Incarnation, 
their message was not so clearly proclaimed that others were able to 
receive the knowledge which they possessed. To such lengths must 
Origen go in order to assert the continuity between the Old-and the 
New dispensations! There is a passage in which he says that though 
Moses and the prophets sowed the Word of God (cf. John iv. 36), they wrote 
what they did write, not for the benefit of their contemporaries, but 
for our benefit, because their message, described by Origen in St. Paul's 
words as the mystery which in other generations was not made known to 
the sons of men but has now been revealed to God's holy apostles and 
prophets (cf. Ephes. iii. 5), had to await the bodily appearance of 
(45) 
Jesus Christ in order to be fully understood. In a striking metaphor, 
Origen says that in Christ the true light shone upon the field where 
the prophetic seeds had been sown, and thus made the fields "white to 
(46) 
harvest" (John iv. 35). Again, Origen says that Moses had a spiritual 
perception of the truth underlying the Jewish law and of the allegorical 
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meaning of the historical events he recorded, and that Joshua was 
better able than we are to understand the truths which his achieve- 
ments foreshadowed. In other words, the fully mature men of earlier 
generations received from Christ the same instruction in "the ineffable 
00 I^. UWrkIe lak- 
mysteries of religion" (-T: ýk v4lCbfrqý TIIS -) as the 
(47) 
Apostles did. Origen goes on to say quite roundly with reference to 
Rom. xvi. 25,, 26 that if the mystery originally hidden was revealed to 
the Apostles through the prophetic writings, it follows that though 
the prophets understood what they were saying, their contemporaries 
(48) 
did not. 
(49) 
In another passage Origen seems. to suggest that although it 
might appear that Moses and the prophets did not know God as Father, 
it may be that even though, left to themselves, they would not have 
known God as Father but simply as Master ( CT(-d*vC0'r*U none the less, 
because they were acquainted with Christ, they were acquainted with 
(50) 
the Father also. He goes on to suggest that even though the prayers 
recorded in the Old Testament writings are not directed to God the 
(51) 
Father, that does not prove decisively that they had to wait till 
the Incarnation for the spirit of adoption; it may rather have been 
the case that they experienced the intelligible coming ( r\ Val-rvl 
2 
4EKIE of Christ and thus received the spirit of adoption, but 
none the less did not through their. writings allow others to become 
aware of this, because otherwise the incarnate Christ would not have 
(52) 
had the opportunity to pour out His grace upon the whole world. 
(53) 
In one place Origen explains the appearance of Moses and Elijah 
with the transfigured Christ as indicating that the glory of the Law 
and the Prophets only appeared with the glorification of Christ, be- 
cause only as the result of the removal of the veil of the letter could 
the Law and the Prophets be understood in a spiritual fashion. This 
seems to mean that the visible glorification of Christ was a parable 
of the spiritual glorification which results from His being recognised 
(54) 
as no mere man, but as the Word of God. Elsewhere Origen interprets 
the Transfiguration (with reference to John iv. 36) as a kind of 
harvest in which the sowers who were Moses and Elijah, and the reapers 
who were the Apostles, rejoiced together in so far as both sowers and 
40 
reapers rejoiced at seeing the glory of the Son of-God. It might 
appear that this passage'contradicts the former in so far as it implies 
that Moses-and Elijah themselves had not previously seen the glory of 
the Son of God: but it may simply mean that only at the time of the 
Transfiguration did they behold the outward glory which was symbolic 
of the invisible glory of the Word of God. In a difficult passage in 
(55) 
Frag. in Lam., where Lam. iv. 20, "Under His shadow we shall live among 
the nations", is quoted, it is stated-that "the breath of our counten- 
C 
ance" -rop ae-OIT'00 VLJ%O referred to in the first 
part of the verse is none other than Christ, in so far as Christ 
bestows the grace which makes prophecy possible, 'the 
"shadow" being the Law whiC*h dimly adumbrates the mysteries expounded 
in prophecy. He then says that Christ is not only the Inspirer of the 
(56) 
prophets but also the Goal of prophecy. 
There is however one passage in which Origen finally succumbs to 
the recognition that the prophets cannot really be assumed to have 
been on an intrinsically higher spiritual level than their contemporaries, 
but like them had to wait till the Incarnation for a full and final 
(58) 
revelation of the Divine nature. Once more he refers to John iv. 36, 
and points out that it would be unfair if only the reaper received the 
wages of the harvest and the fruits thereof, so that it must be assumed 
that in order that both sower and reaper may rejoice, the sower must 
share in both these things. If the sowers are Moses and the prophets, 
and the reapers are the Apostles, the message of Moses and the Prophets 
was the seed sown, that message being necessarily somewhat enigmatic, 
and requiring to be understood in a spiritual manner. But the Apostles 
did more than understand this message; through the help of the incarnate 
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Christ, they were introduced by the message of the prophets to still 
more profound and varied truths, and these truths were the harvest 
which they reaped. But it was also the case that Moses and the prophets k 
reaped the same harvest, -because they too benefited from the special 
(eý64 e 
ý'rau 
coming of Christ into the world in the form of a 
(59) (60) 
servant in order to reveal things hitherto unknown. Another passage 
underlines this attitude, inasmuch as Origen there says that the ancients 
who lived under the Law possessed only a partial knowledge of the 
Trinity, because the Incarnation had not occurred in their time. 
Granted, they believed in the Incarnation and believed in and proclaimed 
the gifts which it was intended to bestow, but they could not see and 
obtain the things in which they believed, as is clear from Luke x. 24, 
(61) 
because their faith had not been broughtto perfection by the Incarnation. 
From what has been said about God's self-disclosure through the 
Son in various ways, it is evident that we speak of "the Word of God", 
we have in mind something different from the words we speak to convey 
our thoughts to others. We have in mind One through Whom God's wisdom 
is displayed, just as when we speak of "the powers of God", we have in 
mind those beings, of whom the Saviour is the chief, through. -whom the 
(62) 1 
power of God is exercised. Origen-likewise says elsewhere that the 
. 
Word of God has characteristics which distinguish Him from all other 
words, namely that of being Divine, that of being alive and subsistent, 
(63) 
and that of ministering to the Father. Again, Origen says that the true 
followers of Christ do not include those who suggest that the Father 
^ 
'C CY 
and the Son are one person CVý, L and only disting- 
uish the one underlying reality in respect 
0 
(64) 
of aspects ( 6trtVotw- and names. Again, he says that the Word L 
e7 
Who was of God in His entirety (0 jr6LS 
GE-O'U% 
a CS 
C 
in the beginning with God, is not a multitude of words (c)4u' -roXjAo7%-1- 
for He. consists, not of words, but of concepts (OC-4q- 
A4-tjv'), each of which is part of the total Word of God 
(65 In 
fact, 
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since all concepts are contained in the Saviour, it may be that 
certain concepts cannot be comprehended by beings brought into exist- 
ence other than Himself ýOrw -Makc 04 Vra V evvil-rl JDV at I YL 
(66) 
and that He keeps the knowledge of these to Himself. The suggestion 
seems to be that as He is of one substance with the Father, beings 
inferior to Him are incapable of receiving all the knowledge which He 
shares with the Father; indeed for one brief moment Origen doubts 
whether even the Son Himsel f is completely conversant with the thoughts 
(67) 
of the Father. 
But it is also true that the universe itself bears, however 
imperfectly, the impress of the Father, in so far as created things are 
fashioned in His likeness, not directly, but through the agency of the 
(68) 
Son, Who is par excellence the Image of the Father. It is said in one 
place that God is seen in bodily substances by means of the Word ( 
StOl 
e, '. 
, rou Aoy'ou ) if from the beauty of created things their Originator (69) 
is discerned. But more often it is rational beings who 
(70) 
are said to be made in the Divine image, as in the passage where Christ 
is said to have been brought into being in the image of God and then 
rational beings are sa id to have been brought into being inýthat image, 
and Christ is said to have left for their sakes the Father with Whom 
He was when He was in the form of God,: so that He might be joined to 
(71) 
those who had fallen to the material level of existence. Origen explains 
(72) 
his meaning in more detail in another passage, where he takes account 
of the danger apprehended by some of so magnifying the Son as inadvert- 
ently to assert the existence of two Gods. The result is that th--, se 
people are guilty either of denying the separate existence of the 
Son (this is Sabellianism) or else of denying His full Divinity (this 
(73) 
is Arianism). Whereas Origen claims that a distinction can be made 
between the underived Divinity of God the Father (Who can thus alone 
be called o Oe, S ) and the divinity of other beings, including God 
the Son Himself, to whom, ý)e. / strictly speaking, only the word oS can 
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(74) 
be applied, inasmuch as their divinity is something imparted to 
them. 
(75) 
The Son, Who is termed by St. Paul "the First-born of all creation" 
(Col. i. 15), was the first to receive the Father's Divinity, and then 
imparted it to others to whom the word 
94ý"S is applied. This 
(76) 
statement might appear to be inconsistent with another passage in which 
it is stated that those who are called "gods" in heaven and on earth 
are so called because of their participation in Divinity (1-6160CAA 
re whereas the Saviour is God not by participation, but 
IN .4 *% A in His own nature (ou KATA re-VcsUcn. LV OLILA- K : r2 ou4rt--LV); but 
H. Crouzel seems right in pointing out that the inconsistency is 
more apparent than real, because the manner in which the Son receives 
the Father's Divinity may'not be the same as that in which created 
k (78) 
beings receive it. This thought is more explicitly expressed by D. Balas 
when he distinguishes between what he terms "horizontal" and "vertical" 
participation. The same thought seems to be expressed in another pas- 
(79) 
sage of Origen, where it is said that no human being, even if he speaks 
the words of God, possesses the Spirit of God otherwise than in part; 
whereas the Saviour, Who Himself speaks the words of God on earth, 
does not receive the Spirit Himself in order to impart it toýothers, 
but imparts it rather as One Who is Himself the fount (Irrl, ( 11 ) of 
the Spirit. This presumably means that Christ, in so far as He 
possesses the nature of the Father, ýLlso possesses the Spirit as an 
inherent endowment, not a transitory gift. 
Thus there are many beings deserving of greater honour than 
men, and these beings can be called "gods", though they are not the 
gods worshipped by the heathen. Human beings should try to attain to 
the likeness of these beings, in so far as they manifest the goodness 
(80) 
which is characteristic of God Himself. In fact Origen even asserts 
that Jewish legislators were called "gods" because of the purity of their 
(81) 
character. The angels themselves are called "gods", though not in 
the sense that they deserve our worship, even though they convey to us 
(82) 
the benefits which God wishes to bestow upon us. Again, Origen refers 
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to beings who by the agency of the Divine Word have been granted the 
privilege of sharing in the Divine nature and are thus granted the 
(83) 
name of "gods. " Similarly, in discussing the sentence in Exodus 
"Who is like unto Thee, 0 Lord, among the gods? " (xv. 11), he says that 
reference is here made to those who are called "gods" by virtue of 
(84) 
their participation in Divine grace, as is also done in Ps. lxxxii. 1,6. 
(85) 
But, he says, though they are capable of receiving the grace of God, 
none of them resembles God in essence or in power. In fact he compares 
the relation between them and God to the relation between a picture and 
(86) 
the living being whose characteristics it reproduces. Likewise, in 
discussing the commandment "Thou shalt have none other gods but me", 
(87) 
Origen explains that, as St. Paul says, there are those who are called 
"gods" (I Cor. viii. 5,6), but are only allowed that name because the 
supreme God has appointed them as governors of peoples other than His 
chosen people. They have in fact been created by the supreme God, 
(88) 
and this name "gods" comes to them, not by nature, but by grace. Indeed, 
in Hom. in Jos. Origen speaks of Jesus Christ, "the captain of the 
Lord's host" (cf. Josh. v. 14), as having brought into being all heavenly 
and earthly potentates and as having invested them with their spheres 
(89) 
of government. 
(90) 
There is a notable passage in Comm. in Joh. in which we are 
reminded that on one occasion Moses was called by God to stand "on 
the rock" (Exod. xxxiii. 21). Origen identifies the rock with Christ, 
(91) 
and therefore with the truthseeing that Christ is Truth. But he 
points out that many people are prisoners of false doctrines, so that 
they cannot easily stand in the truth. However, once they attain to 
this state, they have outgrown human status, and they are thus addressed 
1 (92) 
as "gods" by the supreme God. Elsewhere, Origen says that the human 
state is the result of a declension from an original state of divinity, 
and then says that when God says "You shall die as men" (ut homines) 
(Ps. lxxxii. 7), He means that those addressed will be destroyed so 
far as they are men, inasmuch as their sins will be blotted out, ýind 
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they will thus be made once more divine. (Incidentally, those human 
beings who receive Divine grace can be called not only "gods", but 
(93) 
"Christs", in so far as this grace is imparted through Christ, and also 
(94) 
"sons of God", in so far as they come to have Christ's sonship. In one 
place Origen even says that those who set their hope on the Word of 
God and the words of God can themselves become "words of 
(95) 
God. ") 
None the less, the ultimate Divinity of the Father is safeguarded 
inasmuch as it is from the Father that the Son receives the power of 
imparting divinity to others. It follows that though there are many 
beings who bear a likeness to the one true God, the Archetype or Model 
from Whom this likeness is derived is the Word of God, Who was "with 
God" in the beginning, and by continuing to gaze steadfastly into 
(96) 
the depths of the Father's being remains Divine in the full sense. 
(97) 
A. Lieske asks whether this passage implies a subordinationist defin- 
ition of the being of the Divine Word as the top of the pyramid of 
created 
A'*%fcPj Is it simply because He contemplates the Father 
that He is Son? Or is the union of a deeper kind, that which springs 
from the begetting of the Son by the Father? This is the answer which 
(98) (99) 
Lieske himself gives. J. Maydieu. charges Origen with inconsistency 
in his account of the way in which the Word of God retains His Divinity, 
but ignores the fact that contemplation is not a mere matter of the 
exercise of the Son's will (a Pelagian attitude), but springs from 
the very nature of the Son Himself. In De Princ. Origen likewise. 
says that .,,, e have been made in accordance with the Image of God Who 
is the Son, and have Him as the Archetype and truth of the good qual- 
ities which we possess. Our relation to the Son is thus the same as 
(100) 
the relation of the Son to the Father, Who is theTruth par excellence. 
Thus Origen can say that he who has the virtues is a son of Christ, 
and therefore also a son of God the Father, because Christ and the 
(101) 
Father are one in nature. Elsewhere, varying the metaphor, Origen 
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says that by having the Divine virtues we become the brothers of 
(102) 
Christ (cf. Ps. xxii. 23 and John xx. 17). Yet again elsewhere Origen 
employs the analogy of husband and wife by saying that the individual 
soul (anima) is united to the Word of God in a union resembling 
marriage, but can be led astray by her Husband's adversary. ; If, how- 
ever, the soul conceives by her Husband, she brings forth the fruit 
which consists in the virtues of justice, self-control, patience, 
(103) 
and so on. Again, with reference to the prince of Tyre, described by 
Esekiel as being "the seal of the likeness of God" (signum similitudinis), 
Origen says that those who have made real progress in virtue receive 
the stamp of the Divine likeness bestowed by Christ, but only because 
(104) 
Christ Himself is sealed with the Divine seal. Again, with reference 
to the coming of the Word of God to Ezekiel, Origen says that the Word 
Who was in the beginning with God "makes believers into gods" (credentes 
efficit deos). If it is said that "they shall die like men" (Ps. lxxxii. 7), 
that is not the fault of Him Who invites us to share in His Divinity 
(105) 
and so become the adopted children of God: it is due to our own sins. 
Elsewhere, Origen also points out the necessity of human co-oper- 
ation in the process of being transformed into the Divine likeness; for 
he says that although Christ is Wisdom, He can only impart His wisdom 
(106) 
to those who are anxious to receive it. Again, Origen says that if a 
person follows the sayings of Christ, he ceases to be human and becomes 
divine. Christ the Firstfruits of the dead is also the Firstfruits of 
(107) 
those urho have been transformed by Him into the Divine nature. Again, 
Origen points out that the "inward man" is said to have God for his 
Father if he lives and acts in accordance with God's will, and that the 
Divine seed is said to remain in us when we preserve within ourselves 
(108) 
the Word of God and so do not sin (cf. I John iii. 9). 
Origen in fact says that at the beginning, before the material 
world came into being, the Only-begotten Son granted invisibly to 
each rational creature a degree of participation in His own Divinity 
47 
(109) 
corresponding to the loving affection with which it had clung to Him. 
(110) 
This statement is amplified elsewhere, when Origen says that when God 
made man in the beginning, He made him in His own image and likeness, 
in the sense that man's resemblance to God was not only latent, but 
manifest. But gradually alien elements crept into human nature, with 
the result that the likeness was lost and only the unseen image re- 
mained. Not until the defilement existing in human nature has been 
removed by the Word of God can the heavenly image become resplendent 
again. In brief, the Divine image can be obscured by neglect, but not 
(111) 
destroyed by sin. On the other hand, a difficulty arises here, in so 
far as Origen claims that since all things were made through the Divine 
(112) 
Word, there was nothing unrighteous in the things which were made, and 
I 
that all that was made can be demonstrated to be in accordance with the 
(113) 
principles of equity and righteousness. But as things are, there is 
from the superficial point of view great diversity and variety amongst 
(114) 
rational natures. How is it possible to reconcile this state of affairs 
with the perfect wisdom and righteousness of God? The answer lies, says 
Origen, in the freedom of the human will, which is itself -a Divine 
endowment. This freedom enables rational creatures to turn-aside from 
the highest good and so be involved in evil. The resulting declen- 
sions from the highest good are the hidden causes from which all the 
(115) 
inequalities of human conditions Pro. ceed. To quote his own words, 
"These were the reasons which gave rise to the diversity existing in 
the world, because Divine providence arranges each creature in accord- 
(116) 
ance with the varied character of the movements of its mind. " Thus it 
is that the Last Judgement, which will assign to each soul its deserts, 
will already have been anticipated at previous stages of the history 
of the universe; "for we must believe that God organises the universe 
(117) 
by judgement at all times. " 
But this does not answer the question how it can be regarded 
as in accordance with the Divine goodness that rational beings should 
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have been created with the propensity to go astray from what is good. 
If these beings had possessed this goodness in its perfection ab initio, 
there would have been no possibility of their sinking to a lower level. 
Origen does not in fact reconcile his doctrine of human freewill with 
his doctrine of the omnipotence of God. H. Koch takes the same view 
(118) 
when he says that whereas Origen's insistence on human freewill is 
in one way a strength, as upholding the oneness of God and yet main- 
taining the reality of evil, in another way it is a weakness, because 
it implies that the creature is so made as to be self-supporting over 
(119) 
against God. It seems more in accordance with the facts to say that 
the very possibility of developing from near-animality to the full 
stature of human beings is a greater good than an originally perfect 
creation could ever have been. Thus Dr. E. W. Barnes can say that 
"man's creation was not a quite incomprehensible and wholly improbable 
consequence of the properties of electrons and protons .... ; it was 
the result of some cosmic purpose. And the end towards which that 
Purpose acted must be found in man's distinctive qualities and powers. 
In fact, man's moral and spiritual capacities, at their highest, show 
(120) 
the nature of the Cosmic Purpose which is the source of his: being. 1' 
But whatever the defects of Origen's doctrine of creation, it at 
any rate enables him to uphold the statement of the Saviour that "the 
Father Who sent me is greater than I", and His refusal to allow Himself 
to be called "good" in the absolute sense, on the ground that this 
epithet is reserved for the Father, Whose goodness is merely communicated 
(121) 
to the Son. In the same way, Origen says elsewhere that although the 
Son is good, He is not good purely and simply (aaX cis ý-rrevýs 4 
as the Father is, because just as He is the Image of the Father, so 
(122) 
His goodness is merely the image of the Father's goodness. There are 
two passages in which Origen seems to put forward contradictory views 
as to how the superiority of the Father to the Son is related to the 
(12 
superiority of the Son to other beings. In one Place38rigen first points 
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out that since the Son is the image of the Father's goodness, the 
word "good" as applied to the Son is different in meaning from the 
same word as applied to any inferior being, because the goodness of 
the Father has more in common with the goodness of the Son than the 
Son's goodness has with the goodness of a man or an action or a tree. 
In fact it is true to say that in view of His unique relationship 
to the Father, the superiority of the Son to other good beings is 
greater than the superiority of the God Who is supremely good to 
(124) 
the Saviour Himself. Whereas in another passage Origen says that 
although the Son and the Holy Spirit are immeasurably superior to 
all created beings, they are themselves surpassed to an equal or 
even greater extent by the Father; for the Son is no more than the 
image of the Father's goodness and the effulgence of the Father's 
glory and the unspotted mirror of the Father's energy. He is thus 
the means whereby, as He Himself pointed out, the Apostles were able 
to gain a vision of God Himself. The former passage stresses the 
extent to which an image resembles its original, whereas the latter 
stresses the difference between the image and its original. It is 
no matter for surprise if the Arians thought that Origen had prepared 
the way for them, if one judges by this passage alone. It would be 
possible to contend that the former passage referred: to the Son in 
His Divine nature and the latter to the Son in His human nature, 
were it not for the fact' that in the second passage the Holy Spirit 
is coupled with the Son. 
Origen has stated that since the Son is the Image of the Father, 
He was the means whereby the Apostles could gain a vision of God 
Himself. On the other hand the vision gained was not complete, but 
only partial. This was made clear to Moses, when he was told by God 
that he would be set in a "hole of the rock" and thus see the back of 
(125) 
God, but not His face (Exod. xxxiii. 21-23). The rock is said to be 
Christ, and the hole in the rock is said to be the Incarnation; hence 
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by seeing the Incarnate Christ one sees the back of God, i. e. obtains 
(126) 
an incomplete vision of Him. In the same way, Isaiah in his vision 
only saw the back of God, because His face was veiled by the wings 
(127) (128) 
of the seraphim. The same interpretation is put forward elsewhere, 
inasmuch as it seems to be suggested that the rock is the pre-existent 
Christ, and the hole in the rock is the Incarnate Christ as the 
(129) 
Revealer of God to man. There are two passages where the words 
addressed to Moses "No man shall see my face and live" (Exod. xxxiii. 20) 
are ascribed to the Son of God, and the disciples who saw His face 
shine as the sun at. the time of the Transfiguration are therefore 
said to have fallen on their faces because they could not bear the 
(130) 
rays of the Divine Word. On the other hand, Origen says with refer- 
ence to the scarlet cord let down through Rahab's window that the 
Incarnation of the Saviour does not provide us with the complete and 
entire vision of God, but allows us to behold the light of Deity as 
it were by means of a window, which does not permit all the light to 
(131) 
shine through. 
It seems clear that in these passages Origen is not entirely 
consistent with the view he expresses elsewhere of the role pf Christ 
(132) 
as the Revealer of God to man. In an earlier section of this chapter 
he is shown to have expressly said that it was the pre-existent Word 
of God with whom the Old Testament saints entered into fellowship, 
with the result that they thereby entered into fellowship with God 
the Father Himself; it is not just a matter of obtaining an anticip- 
(133) 
atory glimpse of the incarnate Christ. In Chapter VII we shall 
endeavour to show that Origen regards the apprehension of the Word of 
God as obtained after an initial stage in which the incarnate Christ 
is understood after a human fashion only. Once that stage is left 
behind, the believer is introduced ever more fully to the Father by 
the Divine Word, until in the end he obtains the same clear vision 
of the Father as the Word Himself has. 
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righteous men of the Old Covenant the opposite occurred to what 
occursto the imperfect inheritors of the New Covenant. In 
spite of Christ's coming in the flesh, there are many today who 
have not arrived at the fullness of time. The Word of God 
endowed with Divine glory has not come and disclosed to them 
the glorious mysteries seen by the righteous men of the Old 
Covenant through the intelligible coming of Christ. They lack 
the spiritual maturity which enabled the patriarchs and prophets 
to contemplate the glorified Son of God. " Cf. also de Lubac, op. cit 
p. 572, and Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 71-74. 
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27. Comm. in Joh. XX. 12 (GCS 4.342.11-21). Cf. Frag. in Rom. XI 1-6 
WTS 13.218). 
28. Ibid. VI. 4 (GCS 4.110.3-24). Cf. Frag. in Rom. XXXI. 19-28 (JTS 
13.366). Cf. J. Maydieu, op. cit., pp. 54,55, where this-passage 
is discussed, and note 8 on p. 55, where he says that "for Origen, 
the Incarnation is an abasement and an inferior knowledge, 
for it is more valuable, to know the intelligible Word of God in 
an intellectual manner than to know the Word made flesh-in 
the manner employed by the senses. " Cf. also J. Rius-Camps, 
Comunicabilidad, OCP 36,1976 pp. 244,245. 
29. On p. 185 of her article "The nature of Christ in Origen's 
Commentary on John" (SJT 19 (1966). 
30. This matter is discussed at length in Chapter VI, pp. 207-210,215-222 
and also in Ch. VII, pp. 239: -242. 
31. Op. cit., p. 139. 
32. Comm. in Rom. IV. 4 (PG XIV. 973B). 
33. 
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in Matt. 401.1-3 (GCS 12.169), with reference to Matt. xx. 8. 
Cf. de Lubac, op. cit., p. 551, n. 3., where he quotes S. Thomas 
Aquinas as saying that a Scriptural writer is a "defective 
instrument" in God's hands, and only has an imperfect knowledge 
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to convey through their visions, words, and deeds. " On the 
other hand, in n. 4 on p. 573 S. Thomas is curiously enough 
referred to as taking the opposite view. 
34. Comm. in Matt. XVII. 36 (GCS 10.702.19-703.6); cf. Frag. in Eph. 
XVII. 5,6 (JTS 3.413). 
35. Kme. Harl, op. cit., p. 273, seems to have misunderstood this 
p, issage; for-she says that "for those who were mature the 
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already 'God the Father' for Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, because 
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Ccmm. in'Joh. VI. 4 (referred to in note 28 on this chapter). 
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ývere able to recognise the personal distinctions in God, even 
though for His higher purpose the manifestation of them to the 
mL.: ss of people was reserved for the Word made flesh", and 
(1). 221) that according to Origen "our actual knowledge of the 
Divine Trinity can in no way be superior to that of the prophets. " 
As so often, Origen makes large assumptions which he later 
feels obliged to qualify as the result of being faced with 
facts which controvert them. Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 357, 
where she says that according to Origen, "God was not really 
unknown, nor even unrecognised in any of His essential aspects, 
before the coming of Jesus Christ .... Thus the incarnate Word seems, 
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God.... The only exception is the teaching that God is Spirit and 
that He must be worshipped in spirit. " Cf. also Crouzel, La Conn. 
. pL109, and 
Aeby, op. cit., pp. 169,170. 
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Christ. " Crouzel states later (p. 301) that "just as Abraham 
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knowledge of Moses remained imperfect because it was only 
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at times inclined to think of spiritual perception as being 
in fact possession (i. e. of the truth discerned). 
The seesaw tendency in Origen's thought on this point 
is well illustrated by referring on the one hand to A. Lieske, 
op. cit. ', p. 35, where he points out that in one place (Comm. in 
Cant. II (GCS 8.157.23-158.8))Origen states that the relationship 
of love between the Church (considered as the whole company of 
saints) and Christ attained its completion only after the Incarn- 
ation, and on the other to Molland, op. cit., p. 109, where he 
remarks that "Origen's own attitude implies a conception of 
history which makes it very difficult to attribute a unique 
significance to the Incarnation" (see also pp. 110,111). 
38. Comm. in Rom. IV-6 (PG XIV. 983BC). 
39. Ibid. IV. 7 (PG. XIV. 985AB). 
40. XIX. 3 (GCS 4.301.15-302.2). 
Cf. Lebreton, "Les degres de la connaissance religieuse dlapres 
Origene" (RchSR 12 (1922)), p. 281, where this passage is 
quoted, and J. Rius-Camps, "Origenes y Marcion", p. 20, where 
it is referred to. 
4, --'. 
Comm. in Joh. XIII. 44 (GCS 4.271.1-14). 
43.162.17-25 (GCS 9.292). 
44. On the other hand J. Dupuis, op. cit., p. 244, n. 16S, interprets 
this passage as meaning that Abraham merely "believed in" the 
Father, even though he "knew" God (presumably as Creator). 
45. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 46 (GCS 4.272.34-273.11). Origen does not 
seem to recognise that the prophets referred to by St. Paul 
are Christian prophets. Cf. Comm. in Matt. XVI. 10 (GCS 10.505. 
7-11), Frag. in I Thess. (PG XIV 1302CD), and Comm. Series in Matt. 
50 (GCS 11.112.15-18 (Greek text)), where the prophets are 
compared to the clouds on which the Lord will come in His final 
manifestation in glory. 
46. Ibid. VI. 4 (GCS 4.111.6-11,18-23). Cf. Koch, op. cit., p-59, 
n. 3, where this passage is referred to. 
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p. 307, Rius-Camps, "Origenes y Marcion", pp. 23,24, and Orbe, 
op. cit., pp. 210,317,218, and n. 101 on p. 218. Cf. also Comm. in 
Rom. X. 43 (PG XIV. 1290C), and Frag. in Rom. XXXVI 75-80 (JTS, 
14.13). 
49. Comm. in Joh. XIX. 5 (GCS 4.303.20-304.5). Cf. Comm. in Rom. 
X. 43 (PG XIV. 1291A-1292A). 
50. Such is Huet's interpretation of lines 20-29 in the above 
passage (see PG XIV. 523,533, n. 5). 
51. He seems to leaveout of account Isaiah lxiii. 16. Cf. also 
De Orat. XXII. 1 and 11 4 (GCS s. 346.12-19 and 302.18-24). 
52. Cf. the discussion of this passage in Nemeshegyi, op. cit., 
p. 162, Rius-Camps, op. cit., pp. 17 & 20, and Molland, op. cit., 
p. 122. Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 79-81, discusses this passage, 
and says in particular (p. 80) that "Origen puts this more 
moderate and safer opinion (i. e. that the prophets did not 
know God as Father) in the first place, as though he had been 
forced by the evidence of the Scriptures to admit at least 
this distinction between the just of the Old and the New 
Dispensation. " 
53. Comm. in Rom. II. S (PG XIV. 881B). 
54. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 47 (GCS 4.273.27-274.1); cf. Comm. in Matt. 
XII. 42 (GCS 10.166.26-167.2). 
55. CXVI (GCS 3.277: 7-14). 
56. CroVzel, La Conn., p. 327, comments that "the mysteries which 
the Incarnation shows to have been foreshadowed, in the Law 
are those of the eternal Gospel, perceived by way of the 
realities of the temporal Gospel"; but this does not make it 
clear whether the prophets themselves fully foresaw the 
Incarnation and experienced the disclosures which it made or 
not. 
57. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 48 (GCS 4.275.13-276.2). 
58. Cf. Hebrews xi. 39,40. 
59. Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 163, where it is pointed out that 
Origen considered that Christ's teaching was superior to that 
of Solomon, and p. 164, n. 18, where it is pointed out that 
Origen also said that the Old Testament worthies had the 
"key of knowledge. " 
Crouzel, La Conn., pp. 308,309, tries to explain the 
contradiction between Comm. in Joh. XIII. 48 (referred to in 
n. 57) and ibid. VI. 4 (referred to in n. 46). by saying that 
"the equality of the prophets and the apostles does not relate 
to the extent and depth of their knowledge, but to their 
possibilities of obtaining knowledge by virtue of their holiness. " 
This explanation seems extremely forced, and does not really 
harmonise with the natural interpretation of Comm. in Joh. VI. 4. 
Rius-Camps, 6p. cit., p. 23, says with reference to this 
passage that the knowledge of the Apostles was superior in 
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Orbe, op. cit., does not take account of Comm. in Joh. 
XIII. 48 at all, and so gives a one-sided description of 
Origen's attitude to the prophets. See Fitzgerald, op. cit., 
pp. 63-66, for a discussion of this passage. 
60. Hom. in Jos. III. 2 (GCS 7.302.10-21). 
61. Contrast the interpretation of Luke x. 24 given in Frag-in Luc. 
165 (referred to in n. 36). Fitzgerald, Christ and the Prophets 
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finally to the admission that the actual realisation of a 
mystery in time not only brings with it an increase in interior 
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62. Comm. in Joh. I. 39 (GCS 4.51.16-27). Cf. Crouzel, La Conn., 
p. 119, where he says that "the role of the Son does not limit 
itself to His quality of being the Image of God; He is the 
Agent Who transmits the knowledge of God. ". Cf. also Teichtweier, 
oo. cit., pp. 256,257, where there is a discussion' of the. develop- 
ment of'the meaning of the word 
63. Hom-in Jer-XIX-1 (GCS 3.176.24-177.2). Cf. Maydieu, op-cit., 
. pp. 10 & 11, where he points out that according to Origen, it 
is in order to emphasise the independence of the Logos that 
He is spoken of in the Prologue to St. John's-Gospel as "the 
Word" by itself, and not as the Word of God. There is one 
Logos both for angels and men, just as there is one Truth for 
God, for angels, and for men. 
Cf. Hom. in Num. XII. 1 (GCS 7.95.10-13), where Origen says 
that the Son is distinct in personality from the Father, but that 
one substance is common to both. Later however (GCS 7.97.22-24) 
Origen (or rather his translator) uses the word-substantia to 
mean "individual being, " when he says that though the Son 
originates from the Fountain of Deity together with the Holy 
Spirit, He exists in His individual being (propria quidem 
substantia subsistentem). 
64. Comm. in Matt. XVII. 14 (GCS 10.624.8-16). 
65. Comm. in Joh. V. 5 (GCS 4.102.28-31). Cf. Maydieu, op. cit., 
p. 14, where this passage is quoted. 
66. Ibid. II. 18 (GCS 4.75.19-21) also reforred to in Ch. III, n. 58 
Cf. W; lker, Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origenes (Tubingen, 
1931), P. 132, n. 3, where this passage is referred to, -and 
Maydieu, op. cit., p. 11. 
67. See Ch. III, p-70. 
68. Comm. in Joh. I. 17 (GCS 4.22.19-26). Cf. Frag. in Luc. 16.4 
;f (GCS 9.233), where Christ is described as 
3 -% K.. A. k b&OINt qIj V Sel. in Ps. XVII. 32 (PG XII. 1236CD), 
where it is said that the words "Who is God but the Lord? " 
can only refer to God the Son; Frag. in Luc. 175.1-5 (GCS 9.200), 
where it is said that we must pray that the term "God" will 
eventually be applied to the Lord alone; Frag. in Gal. (PG XIV. 
1294 & 1295AB). 
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6.193.22-24), 
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De Faye (op. cit., pp. 121 & 123) says that according to 
Origen, "the Logos is a god of the second rank, and cannot be 
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other being is. D'Ales (I'La Doctrine d'Origene d1apres un 
livre recent" (RchSR 20,1930), pp. 235,236) echoes de Faye's 
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influence of a Platonic and Stoic environment, and projected 
on to the Christian datum the shadows of a profane philosophy.. 
Origen's education conceals from his eye the full majesty of 
a Son Who is consubstantial with His Father. " Cf. also pp. 241 
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truth? 
75. The phrase "advanced in days", originally applied by God to 
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(PG XIV. 1103C); Sel. in I Reg. (PG XII. 996). Cf. Nemeshe*gyi, 
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criticises Vo'lker for ignoring this; but in fact Výýlker 
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in Exh. ad Mart. 43 (GCS 1.40.14-16); De Orat. XV. 4 (GCS 2.335. 
24-336.4); Comm. in Joh. I. 35 (GCS 4.45.33-46.4); Sel. in Ps. 
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CHAPTER III. 
The gifts which the Son receives from the Father - light, 
glory, wisdom, judgement. 
There are various passages in which Origen enlarges on the good 
things which Christ receives from the Father, some for Himself alone, 
(1) 
and others for Him to impart to human beings also. 
Let us first discuss the benefits which the Son receives 
for Himself. He is spoken of as "Light" in the Gospels, and also 
as the light which shines in the darkness and is not taken captive 
by it; whereas the-Father is said to be One in Whom is no darkness 
(I. John i. 5). The being of the Father is-Ahus shown to be distinct 
(2) 
from that of the Son. Origen appears to mean'that God the Father 
(3) 
is unaffected'by the vicissitudes of, the temporal order, whereas 
the Son, in so far as He became incarnate, allowed Himself to be 
subjected to these vicissitudes. Archbishop Temple in his Readings 
_(4) in St. John regards St. John as referring in i. 5 of his Gospel 
not just to the incarnate life of Christ but to His entire activity 
as the Enlightener of mankind; but this seems to ignore the fact 
(5) 
that (as Origen emphasises elsewhere) the Word of God is all-pervading 
(6) 
and therefore ultimately responsible for all that occurs. 
The Son is also spoken of as being "the true Light"; but the 
Father cannot be spoken of in this-way, because He surpasses the 
state of being the true Light in the same way as He is greater 
(7) 
than truth and surpasses wisdom. On the other hand, the Son as 
Light reveals the Father Who is the primal Light. The words "In Thy 
light shall we see light" (Ps. xxxv. 10) are quoted in support of this 
(8) 
view. In fact the begetting of the Son by the Father is compared to 
the way in which brightness proceeds from light. Since God is Light 
(9) 
by nature, the begetting is therefore eternal. Elsewhere, Origen says 
that the Only-begotten Son is the brightness of the Light which is God 
Himself (cf. Heb. i. 3), proceeding from God without separation, as bright- 
ness does from light, and illuminating the whole created universe. 
(10) 
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The intellectual light of sun, moon, and stars has been given to them 
by participation in the true Light, and they must therefore not be worshipped 
by anyone who sees the true Light, nor by anyone who sees God, the Father 
of the true Light. The light of the sun, moon, and stars is in fact 
like a dim speck compared with God Who is Light of the true Light. 
It is elsewhere said that although our light can shine before men, it 
cannot shine before Christ, because just as the light of stars fades 
at the dawning of the sun, even so the light of the Church, like the 
light of the moon, grows dim when the light of the Sun of Righteousness 
(12) 
arises, even though it is resplendent before men. (On the other hand, 
(13) 
there is one passage in which the Divine Word is compared to a candle 
and the Churph to the candlestick on which it is set, so that it may 
give light to ail, and so enable them to conduct themselves in accord- 
ance with the demands of reason. ) 
(14) 
Elsewhere, Origen points out that thetruth which resides in Jesus 
now shows up the shadows for what they are, the shadows consisting of 
the Jewish Law and the outward accompaniments of Jewish worship. He 
quotes the verse of the Psalm which states that "truth has sprung up 
out of the earth, and righteousness has looked down from heaven" (Ps. 
(15) 
lxxxvi. 12). He later states that Moses was not a minister of the truth, 
but of the "shadow and imitation" of the truth (cf. Heb. viii. 5). Else- 
where he compares the glory resting*on the faces of Moses and the prophets 
to the lamp which is needed till the rising of the sun. Through that 
glory we are led to see the surpassing glory of Christ Himself, even 
though the first glory is destroyed by the second, just as we need the 
partial knowledge which is destroyed by perfect knowledge (cf. II Cor. 
(17) 
iii. 10 and I Cor. xiii. 9,10). There is a curious fragment in which it 
is states, with reference to the statement in Luke viii. 16 that a candle 
is put on a candlestick to give light to those who enter the room in 
which it is, that the Lord compares Himself to this candle and His 
de to the wick, in so far as He employed His ý 111K as 
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the intermediary by which the light of His presence could be transmitted 
without restriction and without being overcome by the body in which 
His 10 resided. In this passage it seems to be suggested 
that only the Incarnation can transmit the full Light, in spite of 
what has been said in Ch. II, pp. 49,50. 
There are many passages in which the effect of the coming into 
the world of the Divine Light in the person of Jesus Christ is said 
to be the creation of spiritual day for those who receive. that light. 
(18) 
Thus in one passage Origen says that just as there ar. e lights in the 
firmament of heaven to divide the day from the night (cf. Gen. i. 14), 
even so there can be in us lights to illuminate us, namely Christ 
and His Church, although it is Christ from Whom the Church derives 
its own light, just as the mcon derives light from the sun, so that 
those who walk in the night of ignorance can be illuminated. The 
person who makes such progress as to walk honourably as in the day 
(Rom. xiii. 13) is enlightened by Christ directly as the day is by the 
sun. The Church seems here to be conceived of in a fashion analogous 
to the way in which the Jewish Law was conceived of by St. Paul, namely 
(19) 
as a preliminary teacher who introduces us to Christ (cf. Gal. iii. 24). 
But there are also degrees in the illumination afforded by Christ, 
depc: nding on the progress of the human mind in its ascension towards 
Him, just as the human eye can appropriate the light. of the sun more 
(20) (21) 
fully from a height. Elsewhere Origen says that the Saviour in His 
capacity as the Light of the world does not illuminate corporeal things, 
but rather illuminates the incorporeal YoV-5 by His own incorporeal 
power, so that each of us can thus see things which are apprehensible 
by the mind ( VvqT I c4. Origen also regards the spiritual day 
brought about by the Light of Christ as coming into being in two ways 
(the reference being to the words "The night is far spent and the 
day is at hand" in Rom. xiii. 12). This day in the universal sense 
will only come about in the future age after the darkness of this 
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present world has come to an end; but individuals can anticipate the 
coming of this day in so far as they receive Him into themselves and 
(22) 
are thus enabled to do what is good and honourable. 
It is worth mentioning that Origen contradicts himself in two 
ways in connection with his doctrine of Christ as creating spiritual 
day. In the first place, he says, with reference to John xi. 9, that 
the number of the Patriarchs and the Apostles symbolises the twelve 
hours of the day, because they have seen the Divine Christ who is 
the "intelligible day" ( %lo in so far as we v-q 
(23) 
obtain an understanding of God's message through Him. The implication 
is that the Patriarchs had knowledge of Christ before the Incarnation. 
(24) 
Elsewhere it is stated that the penitent thief on the Cross was enlightened 
I 
by the Word of God, as was Paul later on after he had persecuted Him. 
(25) 
Whereas in another passage it is said that the Lord pointed out that 
it was in the night that the disciples were made to stumble (Matt. 
xxvi. 31), because the Resurrection had not yet occurred and the disciples 
were thus unable to recognise fully Who He was and what He had come 
(26) (27) 
to do. Secondly, it, ihýsuggested in one passage that the righteous man 
will be in perfect day all his life, because he will have ascended 
above this world which was created in six days, and will thus praise 
(28) 
God "seven times a day" (Ps. cxix. 164). * But in another passage 
it is pointed out that according to Ps. i. 2 the man who is going to 
be blessed by God-must meditate on the Divine Law "day and night", 
whereas in Ps. cxix. 97 it is said that "I meditate on Thy law all the 
day. " Origen says that the reference in the second passage is to 
the future life, when we shall attain to perfect holiness, because 
man's life here is a mixture of virtue and its opposite, in so far 
as there are bound to be times when he either performs God's will 
(29) 
half-heartedly or else transgresses it. 
It would seem that Origen did not always distinguish between 
the knowledge which the disciples had of the earthly Christ and the 
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knowledge which the Christian believer can gain of the unseen Christ. 
(30) 
Thus in one passage it is stated that the disciples enjoyed the brightest 
day when their feet were being washed by Jesus in the upper room, 
because the stains in the feet of their souls were being cleansed 
and removed; but there was night when they forsook Him and fled. 
Nor was there darkness for Peter when he acknowledged His Master to 
be the Messiah; but there was night, for him when he denied his Master. 
!. 
Likewise, as St. John says (xiii. 30), the night supervened for Judas 
when having received the sop he went out of the upper room, because 
he had in so doing forsaken the Sun of Righteousness. It seems more 
in accordance with Origen's teaching to say that in the earlier stages 
of spiritual growth the Light only fitfully appears, but when it dawns 
in its full brilliance it can never fade away. To receive the Light 
momentarily is not really to receive it at all, because it is not 
(31) 
merely an object of contemplation, but rather a transforming power. 
The same confusion between the work of Christ on earth and His unseen 
(32) 
influence is shown in another passage, where it is said that when 
S. CA 
the "intelligible sun" ( VOVII'os 
ýýIo& ) appeared in the world, 
the Divine and inexplicable wonders which flashed forth revealed still 
more the darkness and blindness which had taken captive the souls 
of those Jews who remained unbelieving. Surely if the Light had shone 
forth in the full sense, the Jews would have been converted. Another 
(33) 
passage gives an insight into '. Origen's real doctrine of the Divine 
Light. He there says that we should try to spend three days being 
buried with Christ and so receive full knowledge of the Divine Trinity, 
-seeing that the Father is light, and in the light of Him Who is the 
Son we see the Holy Spirit. This passage is a very striking illustration 
of Origen's twofold doctrine of the knowledge of Christ, the first 
being "knowledge after the flesh" (II Cor. v. 16), and the second a 
higher kind of knowledge. The consequences of that knowledge are 
(34) 
indicated in another passage, where it is said that now that the Word 
69 
of God has appeared, each of those who believe in Him kindles in himself 
from the Word, without its being in any way diminished, the Light 
which It gives, with the result that from one Light many lamps come 
into being. Origen goes on to say that having received the Word once 
for all, we must make use of this Light continually, whether in action, 
or in word, or in thought. 
But it should always be remembered that it is from. the Father 
alone that the Son receives the enlightenment which He then imparts 
(35) 
to other beings. This seems implied in the passage where Origen says 
that the Son of God Himself is in need of the intellectual nourishment 
supplied by the Father, Who is alone self-sufficient; only after having 
received such nourishment Himself can the Son then impart it to men 
-, (36) 
and angels. Origen also says elsewhere; "Just as my food is the Word 
of God Who said 'I am the liVing Bread Who gives life to the world", 
so the food of Wisdom is the Father Himself. " 
Let us now consider the distinctive glory of the Son. Origen 
suggests that it consists in His being acquainted with the Father, 
with reference to the passage "Now is the Son of Man glorified, and 
. 
God is glorified in Him" (John xiii. 31). The Father being the highest 
Good, the Son is glorified by the. very fact of knowing Him, 
_and 
thereby 
(37) 
knowing Himself. For although a derived knowledge of the Father is 
possessed by those whose minds are illuminated by the Divine Word, 
absolute knowledge and understanding of the Father is possessed by 
(38) 
the Word alone in accordance with His merits. Elsewhere, Origen also 
says that it is the Son alone Who knows the Father, and that the pure 
(39) 
in heart will only see Him because Christ reveals Him to them. Again, 
Origen says that since God is Charit y, and "no-one knowsthe. -Father-. 
except the Son, and him to whom it shall please the Son to reveal 
him" (Matt. xi. 27), it follows that no-one knows Charity. except the Son, 
and no-one knows the Son, since He Himself is also Charity, but the 
(40) 
Father, On the other hand the Holy Spirit, Who is also called Charity, 
continually searches for souls to whom He can reveal the surpassing love 
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(41) 
which comes from God. 
But in so far as the Father is known by the Son, the Father can 
Himself be said to be glorified in the Son. But, Origen goes on to 
say, it may be that God is more highly glorified in Himself than He 
is in the Son, in so far as He knows and contemplates Himself more 
(42) 
fully than the Son can contemplate Him. This text is referred to by 
(43) (44) (45) 
Maydieu after he has quoted another passage which suggests that the 
Son, being the Truth, knows all that the Father knows. The. only way 
of reconciling these two passages would seem to be to distinguish 
between what the Son knows in His Divine Nature and what He knows in 
His humanity. But that tends to make of the Son two persons. This 
(46) (47) 
difficulty is discussed more fully later on. In De Princ. it is stated 
that the Son, although He is the Image of the invisible Father, is not 
the truth when compared with the Father; but He conveys to us the truth 
which we are able to receive, seeing that we cannot receive the full 
truth of God Almighty. Origen can only avoid the charge of Arianism 
in the passage if it is taken as referring to the Son in His human 
(48) (49) 
nature. The same comment can be made on the passage where it is stated 
that God the Father is known more fully by Himself than by the Son, 
thus exemplifying the truth of the statement made by the Son that "the 
(50) 
Father Who sent me is greater than I" (John xi, ý. 28). 
But the glory of the Son has another aspect, in so far as He is 
vz 
fully acquainted with the universe itself TZ-f -rov c)Ljv yvtjcr-tS 
'ro 
ýOtojS 
AUT*U), knowing as He does alike 
(51) 
what is open and what is secret. Thus Origen says in one place that 
the beginning and end of all things can only be understood by Jesus 
Christ and the Holy Spirit, and that this is why the prophet Jeremiah 
speaks of two seraphim only as standing in the immediate presence of 
God, veiling His face with two wings and His feet with two other wings 
(52) 
(Is. vi. 2,3). But the wisdom this displayed by the Son is granted to 
Him by the Father, from which it follows that His glory is granted to 
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Him by the Father alone. 
-In several passages the Son's knowledge of the universe is connected 
(53) 
with His activity as Creator. Thus in one passage Origen suggests that 
the devil, when he described the world in the third temptation, thought 
I 
that he was in some way revealing it to Christ, whereas the 1--ruth was 
(54) 
that Christ, as Maker of all things, was ignorant of nothing. Elsewhere 
it is said that if the Father were to announce His deeds to the Son, 
He would be speaking to One Who was posterior to the deeds, whereas 
the Son is the Father's Agent and is thus fully aware of the Father's 
deeds. Origen also says that our Lord's knowledge of human nature is 
(55) 
simply part of His universal'knowledge, and that the only reason why 
He asked who-had touched His clothes was that the woman who was cured 
I 
of the issue of blood should make the admission of her cure openly tD 
(56) 
all. 
Elsewhere, Origen makes a distinction between knowledge of actual 
fact and knowledge of what is possible, when he says that not only is 
the knowledge possessed by God unattainable by any derived being other 
(57) 
than Christ and the Holy Spirit, but the Saviour contains within Himself 
a complete assemblage of concepts (tror-r i ra rac 
&W 
M r4wj%h, not 
all of which can be grasped by the things brought into being apart from 
(58) 
Himself. On the other hand-the Only-begotten Son-imparts to other beings 
such a share in this knowledge as they are worthy to receive. He Himself, 
as Truth, understands the significance (At"51oV ) of all things; otherwise 
He would not be the Truth in its entirety; that is the significance 
of the statement regarding the heavenly Horseman in the last book of 
(59) 
the Bible that "He has a name written which no one knows but He Himself. " 
On the other hand, those who participate in Him as the supreme Reason 
(60) 
are admitted to knowledge from which others are shut out. 
(It is interesting, however, that Origen in one place observes 
that God is said in Scripture to be ignorant of what is not worthy of 
(61) 
His knowledge. This would seem to mean that in so far as His will is 
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transgressed, His knowledge of such transgression only extends to persuading 
or compelling the transgressor to mend his ways. ) 
But the glory of the Son is derived not only from His universal 
knowledge, but also from His sinlessness. Origen begins by saying that 
through being without sin the Son gives glory to the Father to a greater 
extent than any other being does. But being thus glorified, the Father 
gives back to the Son a glory greater than He receives from the Son; 
for it is a greater thing for the Son to be glorified in the Father, 
the lesser in the greater. It befitted Him. Who is the greater to return 
the glory with which the Son glorifies Him by granting to the Son the 
(62) 
privilege of being glorified in the Father. Origen also says that the 
right to receive honour has been granted to Jesus by God "so that all. 
men may honour the Son as He honours the Father" (John v. 23). The 
prophecies which occurred before His birth, and the miracles which He 
. 
(63) 
performed, were confirmations of His right to receive honour. It is 
elsewhere said that our Lord is never found in Scripture to have said 
(64) 
"I am Christ. " It sufficed for the faith of believers that He should 
do the works of God and display the power of God. Thus it was that 
He could pronounce Peter blessed as one who had not heard from Himself, 
but had 16arnt from the Father, that He (Christ) was the Son of the 
(65) (66) 
living God. In the same way Origen says that though Christ was greater 
than Abraham and the prophets, He did not elevate Himself to that sLatus, 
but received it from the Father, so that when the Jews asked Him `Jhom 
makest thou thyself? " (John viii. 53), they showed themselves unaware 
that Jesus did not make Himself what He was. That was why He replied 
to this question by saying "If I honour myself, my honour is nothing: 
(67) 
it is my Father Who honours me" (viii. 54). Elsewhere Origen says that 
when it is said that it is God's intention that all should honour the 
Son as they honour the Father (John v. 23), this means that prayer must 
be made to Christ in the same way as to God the Father, Christ must 
be invoked in the same way as the Father, and requests and thanksgivings 
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must be addressed to the Son in the same way as to the Father. It will 
(68) 
be pointed out, however, in a later section that Origen does not always 
suggest that prayer be made directly to the Son in the same way as to 
the Father, because this would ignore the fact that the Son is not the 
ultimate Giver of benefits, but merely transmits them from the Father. 
Another of the gifts bestowed by the Father on the Son is that 
of judgement. Thus with reference to the advice given by Jethro to 
Moses to appoint subordinate officers to make decisions on minor matters 
(Exod. xviii. 22), Origen declares that "though the Father has given all 
judgement to the Son" (John v. 22), the Son is not the only judge, but 
has also appointed other superintendents to judge human beings in matters 
(69) 
of minor importance, while reserving major matters to Himself. Origen 
(70) 
says in fact that the Father has given to the Son the authority to assign 
to each human being his deserts by-virtue of the fact that He (the Son) 
is the personification of righteousness and judgement. Origen thus 
reveals the defects of all merely human justice: no other judge than 
the Son of God, he says, can so impress the marks of righteousness and 
justice on his soul as not to stand in need of righteousness and justice 
ih their ideal forms, just as a painter cannot reproduce alLthe features 
of the thing painted. Elsewhere Origen says that justice in itself 
(. 1 E`)VO 
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t<A (0 d-O"Irl. justice which is real is Christ, 
"Who is made for us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, 
and redemption" (I Cor. i. 30); and from that justice the justice in each 
(72) 
person is imprinted. This statement is echoed in a passage where Origen 
says that what St. Paul means by saying that the Son of God "subdues 
all His enemies under His feet" (I Cor. xv. 27) is that "He restores the 
(73) 
corrupted laws of ruling and reigning" by teaching earthly rulers how 
(74) 
to exercise their office. The opportunity is thus obtained of pointing 
out that when Jesus stood before Pilate, He Who was appointed Judge 
of all creatures by the Father, and can thus be called King of kings 
and Lords of lords, humbled Himself to the extent of standing before 
74 
(75) 
the judge of the land of Judaea. 
(76) 
Elsewhere, Origen interprets the words "The Lord brings the counsel 
of the nations to naught, and frustrates the plans of the peoples" (PS. 
xxxiii. 10) by saying'that the Divine power of Jesus can, when He Wi4hes, 
quench the anger of His enemies and scatter the counsels of the 
ýebellious 
-1 by the grace of God ( 
Gel. 1- J This statement is explained 
(77) r. 
X1 
in another passage where Origen says that the Father, having give n us 
the Son, seeks the glory of the Son in each of those who have reýeived 
Him. That glory will be found in those who attend'to themselves and 
(78) 
cultivate the rudiments of virtue implanted within them. But in 6thers 
He will not find it, and will'judge them accordingly. But the Father 
exercises such judgement through the agency of the Son, Who said not 
only "The Father has. committed all judgement to the Son"-(John v. 22), 
but also "I can of my own self do nothing: as I hear, I judge; and my 
judgement is just, because I seek not my own will, but the will of Him 
Who sent me" (ibid. v. 30). This being so, the judgement exercised by 
the Son is not His in the last resort, but that of the Father Who speaks 
(79) (80) 
through Him. The same sentiment is expressed when Origen says that 
to discern the merits of men and to see who has guile in himself and 
who has not belongs not to any of the many sons of God, but solely to 
the Only-begotten, the King of the chosen race, and that Jesus showed 
that He w-is Son of God by being ablq to do this. 
On t! it_l other hand, it would appear that there is a judgement ex- 
(81) 
ercised d4Lrectly by the Father; for Origen says that it did not befit 
the Saviour to seek His own glory and thus to pass Judgement on those 
who refused to give it to Him; it was rather a matter for the Father, 
Who had Himself glorified the Son, to demand the glory due to the Son 
from human beings, and to judge them if they refused to give it to Him. 
Likewise, the Son expects those to whom He imparts the knowledge of 
God the Father to give the Father the glory which is due to Him; and 
if His expectation is disappointed, He will eýercibe the authority given 
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(82) 
to Him to pass judgement upon them. In the same way Origen says that 
because God is Love (caritas), and the Son, Who derives His being 
from God, is likewise Love, God requires in us something like Himself. 
Having shown to us His love in Christ Jesus, He requires that we be 
united to Himself through this love in a relation of kinship. 
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NOTES ON CHAPTER III. 
Comm. in Joh. I. 10 (GCS 4.15.26-28). Cf. Comm. Series in Matt. 121 
. (GCS 11.256.19,21,22 and 12,13). Ubi autem est Jesus.... ibi 
sunt omnia simul bona, et innumerabiles divitiae spiritales 
in manibus eius, et pax. And above: Jesus.... quasi Filius 
Dei, et pax constitutus, -et verbum, et sapientia, et omnia bona. 
Cf. also Contra Cels. III. 34 (GCS 1.231.8,9), where it 
is said that "Christ brings to us the benefits of the Father" 
(4 6e ; ýTcý. -re"a Tcd-TyOK e eci,. q r G 
Cf. also Hom. in Num. XII. 1 (GCS 7.9ý, 
"9, 
lyu & 96.9,10 & 94. 
22-25); XII. 4 (7.104.28-105.1); XX. 2 (7.190.22-24 & 191.4,5); 
XXIII. 4 (7.216.5-11). 
Cf. also Mme. Harl, op. cit., pp. 290-292. 
2. ; Comm. in'Joh. II. 23 (GCS 4.80.1-6). 
3. Cf. I. Tim. vi. 16. 
4. pp. 7 -& 
5. See Ch. I, pp. 12,13. 
6. Crouzel, L'Image, p. 103, would appear to agree with the present 
writer; for he suggests that the word ovcnl- as used in 
the passage referred to in n. 2, may either mean "individual 
existence" or else refer to the entire reality of the Word of 
God, i. e. not only His Divine Nature, but also His position 
as Mediator between the Father and the world. (Crouzel also 
points out that the Word in His Divine Nature acted as Mediator 
even before the Incarnation: but this fact seems irrelevant 
to his contention. ) In La Conn., p. 132, Crouzel explains this 
passage of Origen by reference to the Incarnation. Cf. also 
Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 132. See also Comm. in Joh. II. 26 (GCS 
4.83.1-31), where it is said that it is not strictly true to 
say that there is "no darkness" in the Incarnate Son, because 
in His benevolent activity towards mankind He took the darkness 
of our souls upon Himself in so far as He was subject to distress 
and tribulation (Mark xiv. 34). 
7. Comm. in Joh. II. 23 (GCS 4.80.12-15). See also Balas, op. cit., 
p. 9. On the other hand, Origen in one passage applies to the 
Father the phrase "the true Light which enlightens every man" 
(John i. 9), when he says that after death the soul traverses 
the various "resting-places" and is increasingly enlightened 
until the time when it can endure to behold "the true Light, 
which enlightens every man" (Hom. in Num. XXVII. 5 (GCS 7.262.28 
-263.4). The same idea is expressed in ibid. XXVII. 6 (264.8- 
12), where the goal of the soul's journey is described as "the 
Father of lights" (James i. 17). 
8. De Princ. I. 1.1 (GCS 5.17.12-14). Cf. J. Rius-Camps, "Comunicab- 
ilidad", (OCP 38,1972), p. 432. 
9. De Princ. I. 2.4 (GCS 5.33.1,2), and Frag. in Heb. (PG XIV. 1307BC). 
Cf. Nemeshegyi, op. cit., pp. 70 & 71, and R. Boon, op. cit., p. 29. 
10. De Princ. I. 2.7 (GCS 5.37.7-9). Maydieu, op. cit., p. 68, suggests 
that the metaphor of brightness proceeding from light is avoided 
by Origen in Comm. in Joh. so as to avoid the suggestion of 
emationism or modalism. Origen does not restrict himself to 
this extent in De Princ. 
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ii. Contra Cels. V. 11 (GCS 2.11.19-23 & 12.3-5). 
12. Hom. in Ezek. IX. 3 (GCS 8.411.17-27). Crouzel, L'Image, p. 109, 
N. 186, and La Conn, p. 134, quotes this passage as referring to 
the Second Coming; but why should it not refer to the personal 
knowledge of Christ which the believer gains after initial instruction 
by the representatives of the Church? 
. 
13. Frag-in LUC. 123.3-5 (GCS 9.277). 
14. Hom. in Jos. XVII. 1 (GCS 7.400.19-401.5). 
15. Ibid. XVII. 2 (GCS 7.403.14,15). 
16. Comm. in Matt. X. 9 (GCS 10.23-26,28-30). Cf. Comm. in Joh. II. 17 
(GCS 4.74.11-18); ibid. XXXII. 27 (GCS 4.473.3-9); Frag. in Joh. VI 
(GCS 4.488.9-16); ibid. XVII (GCS 4.496.23-25); ibid. CXVII (GCS 
4.556.15,16); Hom. in Lev. XIII. 2 (GCS 6.468.23-269.8); Comm. in 
Matt. XVI. 3 (GCS 10.470.21-26); Frag. in Matt. 43 (GCS 12.33.1). 
Cf. also de Lubac, op. cit., pp. 575,576, where he says: - 
"Is it the case that no-ray of the light which was going to shine 
in Jesus filtered through under the Old Law? Indeed not. But 
these rays, like those of the dawn, proceeded already from the 
Sun which was to'come. One could thus, like Origen, call them 
a shadow. " Cf. also Crouzel, La Conn., pp. 140-142). 
17. Frag. in Luc. 122.1-4 (GCS 9.276). 1 adopt Fruchtels's conjecture 
ev % -% -% 10 .1 It i'l 4 'rýJ. S 6-ýAf Kt%_5; C3CT'*re; A. KLJ See Ch. V, PP-128-130 
, x, je 
18. Hom. in Gen. I. 5 (GCS 6.7.11-21). Cf. Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. III. 9(PG 
XII. 1344A-C); Hom. in Ps. xxxviii. I. 8 (PG XII. 1398D-1399A); Sel. 
in Ps. ci. 25 (PG XII. 1560A); Sel. in Ps. cxvii. 24 (PG XII. 1584B); 
Pitra A. S. III. 540 (in Jer. xvii. 21-26). 
19. Cf. Ch. VI, - p. 215 and Ch. VII, pp-242,243 where the Christian 
Gnostic is disýinguished from those who simply receive the testimony 
of others. 
20. Hom. in Gen. I. 7 (GCS 6.9.10-18). 
21. Comm. in Joh. I. 25 (GCS 4.31.17-20). Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit. 1 p. 108, 
where Origen is quoted as saying that Christ is the Light which 
at the same time enables the eye to see and the object to be seen. 
Cf. also Mersch, I'Le Corps Mystique du Christ" (Louvain, 1933), 
p. 356. 
22. Comm. in Rom. IX. 32 (PG XIV. 1233A-C). Cf. Pitra, A-S-II. 382 (in 
Job xxxv. 10). Cf. also Frag. in Joh. XXXIV (GCS 4.509.25-510.1); 
Hom. in Jud. I. 1 (GCS 7.464.9-16,465.21,22); Frag. in Luc. 100.10- 
14 (GCS 9.267); Sel. in Ps. cxix. 5 (PG XII. 1629D, 1632A). 
23. Frag. in Joh. CXXXVII (GCS 4.573.6-10). 
24. Frag. in Joh. CXII (GCS 4.564.19-565.4). 
25. Comm. Series in Matt. 87 (GCS 11.201.5-12). 
26. Cf. Ch. II, P. 36where something similar is said of the Old Testament 
prophets. 
27. Sel. in Ps. cxviii. 164 (PG XII. 1624C). Cf. Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CXVIII. 
91 a (1), p. 113, where it is said that for the saints, their sun 
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does not set, since the Lor d is to them an everl. asting light. 
Cf. also ibid. C. 8, lines 1-6, p. 86, and also Frag. in Apol. of 
Pamph. on Ps. XVIII. 6 (PG XII. 1241-1244), where it is said that 
the Church. is set in that Sun which brings about eternal day. 
28. Sel. in Ps. cxviii. 97 (PG XII. 1605BC). 
29. Cf. Ch. VII, pp. 240 , 
249 where it is pointed out that Origen 
at times suggests that the full vision of God is only obtainable 
in the after-life. 
30. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 24 (GCS 4.469.1-14). 
31. See Ch. VII, p. 271,272. 
32. Frag. in Joh. XCIV (GCS 4.. 557.3l.. 558.6). 
33. Comm. in Rom. V. 8 (PG XIV. 1040C). 
34. Pitra A. S. III. 292 (CXVIII. 105). 
35. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 34 (GCS 4.259.17-25). Cf. Crouzel, La Conn., 
p. 168. 
36. Hom. in Is. III. 3 (GCS 8.256.29-257.1). 
37. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 28 (GCS 4.473.10-15). 
38. Contra Cels. VI. 17 (GCS 2.88.16-21). Cf. Matt. xi. 27. Cf. also 
Crouzel, La Conn., p. 513, and Maydieu, op. cit., pp. 52,53, where 
- he says: "The procession of the Son is unique because the Son 
alone sees the Father. It is purely intelligible because the 
Son is the thought of the Father; by a kind of dynamic current 
which is effected by a permanent rhythm of coming and going in 
the sphere of the Divine Life enfolded in itself, the Father 
apprehends the Son and the Son apprehends the Father. " 
Cf. also Frag. in Joh. XIII (GCS 4.495.20-ý5), and Maydieu, 
op. cit., pp. 51-53, where this passage is discussed. 
39. Comm. in Cant. III (GCS 8.215.1-3). 
40. ý Cf. Hom. in Num. XIV. 4 (GCS 7.128.12,13). 
41. Prol. in Cant. (GCS 8.74 
, . 
21-30). See Teichtweier, op. cit., p. 268, 
where this passage is quoted. 
42. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 28 (GCS 4.473.22-31). 
43. - Op. cit., p. 65 
44. On. p. 64. 
45. Comm. in Joh. I. 27 (GCS 4.34.19-31). 
46. See Ch. V, -p. 110. Cf. also Aeby, op. cit., pp. 159-161. 
47. De Prin c. I. 2.6 (quotation from Jerom. ad Avitum 2 (GCS 5.36, 
lines 2-6 of notes). Cf. Ch. I, n. 73. 
48. Cf. Aeby, OP-cit-, pp. 159-161. 
49. De Princ. IV. 4.8 (GCS 5.360.2-7). 
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50. On the other hand F. Prat, op. cit., p. 66, quotes a passage from 
Hom. in Reg. I. 13 (PG XII. 1009) which suggests that there is no 
distinction to be made among the three Divine Persons so far as 
greatness is concerned. He remarks: "We are here far from the 
language of subordination. It is forgotten when it does not 
serve to solve exegetical difficulties ('! ). There is no longer 
any hierarchy among the Persons ... they are so uhited amongst 
themselves in the same Divine essence that the distinction of 
Persons seems compromised. But the accusations of Sabellianism 
and Arianism levelled against Origen cancel each other out. It 
is simply that having in mind the heresies he had to combat, he 
emphasised now the union and now the distinction of Persons. " 
I think that Prat is too concerned here to defend Origen; hld: ý 
is not prepared to recognise the inner contradiction in Origen's 
thought arising from his having made too sweeping assumptions 
which were afterwards called in question by the facts. 
51. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 28 (GCS 4.473.17-22). Cf. on this point 
Nemeshegyi, op. cit., pp. 110.111. 
52. - De Princ. IV. 3.14 (GCS 5.346.11-17). Cf. Hom. in Num. XVIII. 2 
(GCS 7.169.4-13), where it is said that only the Son and the 
, Holy Spirit know the plan and purpose of the Father. Cf. also 
Sel. iri Ps. IX. 2,3 (PG XII. 1188A). 
53. Frag. in Luc. 97.2-4 (GCS 9.266). 
54. Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. XLIV. 2, p. 77. Cf. Frag. in Jer. 17 (GCS 3.206. 
13,14) and Pitra A. S. II. 383 (Frag. in Job xxxviii. 5). 
55. Comm. in Joh. X. 46 (GCý 4.225.11), with reference to John. ii. 25 
56. Frag. in Luc. 127.8-10 (GCS 9.280). Cf. Ch. V, pp. 116,117, wherethe extent 
of our Lord's knowledge is also discussed. 
57. Comm. in Joh. II. 28 (GCS 4.85.4-8). 
58. Ibid. II. 18 (GCS 4.75.19-21) also referred to in Ch. II, n. 66. 
It is to be noted that Origen uses the word ym-m'tS to mean 
"derived beings" in the previous quotation and YC-%fqFjQq Co. i -, -' L 
ý a' 
with the same meaning in the present one*, both words being intended 
to include Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
59. Rev. xix. 12. 
60. Comm. in Joh. I. 27 (GCS 4.34.19-31) and 11.8 (4.62.14-19). Cf. 
Pitra. A. S. III. 160 (LXXXVIII. 9). 
61. Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. III. 9 (PG XII. 1343f)). 
62. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 29 (GCS 4.475.12-25). Mumm on p. 182 of his 
thesis, A Critical appreciation of Origen as an exegete of the 
Fourth Gospel, remarks that "in spite of Origenýk emphasis on the 
equality of the Father and the Son, a decided note of subordin- 
ationism appears as he discusses the comparative glory of each. " 
Cf. also Sel. in Ps. IV. 9,10 (PG XII. 1168B). 
63. Contra Cels. VIII. 9 (GCS 2.227.20-26). 
64. Origen seems to have overlooked John iv. 26. 
8C. 
65. Comm. Series in Matt. 33 (GCS-11.63.23-64.3). 
66. Comm. in Joh. XX. 44 (GCS 4.388.17-29). 
67. Comm. in Rom. VIII. 5 (PG XIV. 1166A). 
68. See Ch. V, pp. 108-110. 
69. Hom. in Exod. XI. 6 (GCS 6.259.13-16). Constituit sibi et alios 
principes, qui judicent populum de minoribus causis, Verbum 
autem, quod gravius fuerit, referant ad ipsum. Cf. Comm. Seri es 
in Matt. 62 (GCS 11.143.8-16) and Frag. in Matt. 202 (GCS 12.493.1- 
5). 
70. Comm. in Joh. II. 6 (GCS 4.60.24-31). Cf. Frag. in Rom. XV. 3-5 (JTS. 
13.221). 
71. Ibid. VI. 6 (GCS 4.114.34-115.5). Cf. also Pitra A. S. III. 268 
(CXVIII. 40), and 301,302 (CXVIII. 142). 
72. Cf. Nemeshegyi, op cit., p. 76, where he discusses the meanings 
0f t4%1'ro 
EL Kd-t 15 cr-U %r and other abstract nouns to which 0/-LyrD 
, 
is prefixed. Cf. also p. 109, and Crouzel, L'Image, p. 231. 
73. Regendi ... regnandique corruptas restitueret leges. 
74. De Princ. III. 5.6 (GCS 5.277.7-11). Cf. also the words in 111.5.7 
(278.15,16): regendi ac regnandi summam, quam in universa 
emendaverat creatura. Cf. Pitra, A. S. III. 104 (LXXIV. 3), and 
Frag. in Eph. IX. 90-95 (JTS 3.401). 
75. Comm. Series in Matt. 118 (GCS 11.250.15-29). 
76. Comm. in Joh. II. 25 (GCS 4.197.28-34). 
77. Ibid. XX. 38 (GCS 4.379.7-26). 
78. Cf. Ho. -, i. in_Je_r. V. 8 (GCS 3.38.8-13), where Origen says that if 
we wish to lay aside the covering which comes from dishonour, 
we must hasten to perform honourable deeds, in accordance with 
the Saviour's words "That all--may honour the Son as they honour 
the Father" (John v. 23); for the righteous honour the Son as He 
honours the Father. 
79. In Hom. in Num. VIII. 1 (GCS 7.50.34-51.7), Origen also quotes the 
text "Lhe Father has committed all judgement to the Son" as indic- 
ating Lhat only the Son is aware of the length of the penalties 
which liuman sins require, and how far those penalties can be counter- 
acted by the good deeds and sufferings which have been performed 
and endured on earth by the same individual. In Hom. in Num. XXI. 1 
(GCS 7.199.27-200.5), Origen also says, quoting the same text, 
that the Son is authorised by the Father to assign to each individual 
the type of blessedness which he deserves in the future life, 
whether it be a share in the "land of the living", or simply a 
share in the wisdom of God. The second class of individuals is 
said to share the glory conferred on Jesus Christ Himself, reference 
being made to John xvii. 24 (ibid. XXI. 3 (7.203.7-20)). Cf. Ch. VI, 
PP-219-222, where the same suggestion seems to be made in other 
language, namely-that Christians can be divided into two categories, 
depending on whether or not they are able to appreciate Divine 
- mysteries. 
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80. Frag. in.. ýJoh. XXVI (GCS 4.504.1-4). 
81. Comm. in Joh. XX. 38 (GCS 4.379.33-380.6). 
82. Prolýin Cant. (GCS 8.70.12-17). 
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CHAPTER IV. 
The gifts which. the Son receives to bestow on human beings - 
reason, sanctification, and wisdom. 
When we turn to consider the gifts bestowed by Christ on human 
beings, we discover that the fundamental gift is reason. Thus Origen 
says that natural law and reason and freewill are betrothal gifts of 
the Word of God to the individual soul, bestowed so that it may later 
(2) (3) 
on be more fully enlightened by the Word Himself. Elsewhere,. with 
reference to John the Baptist's statement about Christ "In your midst 
stands One whom you do not know" (John i. 26), Origen says that the Word 
of God is present to every rational being, in so far as the faculty 
of thought is in the midst of us; for it is there that the indwelling 
reason ( Oc Agyos is present, this being the 
faculty which the Word of God Who came to be baptised supervises (Arc(- 
irKorCrct). Origen appears to mean that the personal Word of God aims 
to bring into consciousness and activity that aspect of Himself which 
(4) 
lies dormant in individual human beings. The same idea seems expressed 
(5) 
in the passage where the statement "If I had not come and spoken to 
them they would not have had sin" (John xv. 22) is interpreted to mean 
that by virtue of that power by which Christ is said to fill the. world 
(i. e. thepower of reason), He visits each man and speaks to him inwardly 
(6) 
and teaches him'to distinguish good from evil. Elsewhere, Origenmakes 
the somewhat cryptic remark that it is possible for one who is a "seed 
of Abraham" to become his child ( Ir&t<VoV through diligence. This 
would seem to mean that just as Abraham used to the full his inborn 
(7) 
ability to become acquainted with Christ, so others can do the same. 
On the other hand, Origen also says that it is possible through neg- 
ligence and lack of cultivation to cease even to be Abraham's seed - 
a suggestion which seems to contradict his doctrine of universal redemp- 
tion, in so far as it implies that the gift of reason can be so atrophied 
as to become unusable. 
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But the chief gift which Christ bestows is sanctification, i. e. 
(8) 
being made like God so far as holiness is concerned. Thus Origen says, 
with reference to Hannah's declaration that "there is none holy like, 
the Lord" (I Sam. ii. 2: non est sanctus nisi Dominus), that however much 
progress in holiness (sanctitate) a man may make, no-one can be holy 
in the same manner as the Lord, because He is the Giver of holiness, 
(9) 
and man is'the receiver (ille sanctitatis largitor est, iste susceptor). 
(10) 
Elsewhere Origen says that however righteous, however holy, a being 
may be, not only among men but among higher and more distinguished 
creatures, he cannot be considered righteous when compared with God. 
Only our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is accounted righteous (justificatur) 
in the sight of the Father, because "whatever the Father does, these 
I 
things the Son also does in like manner" (John v. 19). Origen also 
(11) 
says that it is through the agency of the Divine Word that human beings 
become righteous, both before and after the Incarnation. But the power 
to do what is praiseworthy is only bestowed on those prepared by faith 
(12) 
and virtue to receive it. 
Elsewhere he points out that it cannot be said of men and angels 
that goodness resides in them as part of their nature (non substantiale 
sit in ipsis bonum), because that is only the case with the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in Whose nature there is nothing compound, 
so that goodness cannot be said to belong to it as a consequence of 
(13) (14) (15) 
anything, nor can it be taken away. Thus it is said elsewhere that 
God does not love righteousness as man does, so that he may possess 
it within himself and act in accordance with it. In a curious interpret- 
ation of Mark xi. 2, where reference is made-to an ass "upon which no 
man has yet sat", Origen declares that this means that those who event- 
ually believed in Jesus never subjected themselves to reason before 
He came to dwell in them 0d 16V ow I (. s U 
'0, 
(16) 
6 (C( tc,? -C .). 
Elsewhere, the kingdom of heaven referred to in Matt. 
iii. 2, is said to mean the presence ( lTakeouclot- ) of Christ, because 
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this grants to us a share in the Holy Spirit and access to the 
(17) 
unchangeable goodness in store for the saints in the coming age. 
Again, Origen says that the righteous are so called after the righteousness 
q 
of Christ, and the wise after the wisdom of Christ, just as those who 
(18) 
are members of Christ are called Christs after Him. 
It follows that all beings other than the Persons of the Divine 
Trinity only possess goodness accidentally, and they are therefore 
liable to lose it, because they on 
: 
ly receive it as something imparted 
(19) 
by the Divine nature. In the same way, Origen elsewhere says that there 
is no nature which is not capable of receiving both good and evil, with 
the-exception of the nature of God, which is the source of all good 
(20) 
things, and the nature of Christ and the Holy Spirit. Other beings 
only become holy as th6 result of receiving the Holy Spirit, and thus 
do not possess it as something natural to them, but as something added, 
(21) 
something therefore which can also disappear. Again, he says that no 
rational being, of whatever kin. d, possesses by nature ( oucrtc. JOS 
blessedness of which it can never be deprived. For if the highest 
form of life V 1-teOVIYOU VIV CJrLý 
), were something of which 
it could never bedeprived, how could it then be true that God alone 
(22) 
has immortality (I Tim. vi. 16)?. (on the other hand Origen confuses 
"life" in the sense of "spiritual life" and "life" in the sense of 
"natural life" when he says that whqreas God alone possesses the life 
which is unchangeable and unalterable Me C-rCrkD\f (Ca"fTJ K,, Lt 
f(-#IAV), 
Christ Himself did not possess the Father's immortal- 
(23) 
ity, seeing that He tasted death on behalf of all (Heb. ii. 9). Origen 
has in fact said earlier that no one can be called "living" unless 
(24) 
he has holiness together with life. ) Again, when our Lord called the 
disciples "evil" (Matt. vii. 9,10), He meant that even if they chose to 
follow Him, they still possessed the changeability ( po' erj C-Wrov 
of the hunian mind, whereas only the Son of God was unchangeable 
(25) 
both in His Godhead and in His manhood- Elsewhere, Origen points out 
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that it depends on man's own efforts to imitate God whether he acquires 
thE: virtues which exist in God essentially (per substantiam), because 
whereas in God these virtues exist for ever, in man they are only 
(26) 
acquired gradually and individually. In a striking passage, Origen 
compares thc- city of Jerusalem to the individual soul ((Poxq ), whose 
magnificence derives from wisdom and the virtues, but whose virtue is 
(27) 
changeable, with the result that she can be deserted and widowed. 
But just as the Son imparts sanctification and righteousness to 
hunian beings, so the Father imparts sanctification and righteousness 
(28) 
to the Son. The Son prepares all creatures in one way or another - 
whether by admonition or by chastisement - to receive the sanctific- 
ation which the Father desires to bestow; and in-particular the Son 
tasted death apart from the Father (, ýWe 
&Ga'13 on behalf 
(29) (30) 
of all men. Thus Origen says that when it is stated that "God renders 
to each man what he deserves", this does not mean that God punishes 
human beings because he hates them; He is simply applying remedies 
which, even though their purpose is the improvement of the sinner, none 
(31) 
thE! less cause feelings of pain at the time. Elsewhere it is stated, 
with reference to the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, that the Word of 
God, as a physician of the soul, 'employs remedies of various kinds, 
depending on the condition. of those who are spiritually sick. If the 
disease has penetrated into the inmost parts, thE. doctor has to draw 
it out by administering greater pains and inflammations than were pre- 
viously experienced, as with those bitten by a mad dog. In another 
(32) 
passage it is also stated that God hardened Pharaoh's heart in the sense: 
ef'refraining from inflicting severe punishment until his wickedness 
had reached its peak, so as to give him the opportunity of repenting. 
To quote Origen's own words, "it is not the case that God hardens him 
whom He wishes to harden, but thE! person who refuses to submit to God's 
patience is hardened. " (This explanation seems rather far-fetched, 
and takE! S inadequate account of God's uriversal operations, both out- 
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(33) 
side and within human beings. ) There are two passages where God is 
said to be "cruel in order to be kin d", as the common phrase has it. 
There is a mercy which is so overcome by the prospect of the distress 
which would be caused to the patient that it refrains from taking the 
measures which would be needed to cure the disease. Such mercy is. not 
(34) 
characteristic of God. 
The wrath of God is in fact not the same as human wrath - an 
emotion - but rather His reaction to those who do not submit to being 
guided by His Word. Thus Origen says that though Jesus brings to per- 
fection every rational creature, He does so in different ways. For 
those who obey reason are perfected by reason alone, whereas those 
disobedient to reason need hardships so that after those 
I 
hardships they may be. assisted by resson and so finally attain perfection. 
(35) 
10 in this way. Elsewhere, it is said that God's anger bum-ac) is a T-- 
manifestation of His. goodness, because it accomplishes a salutary work 
by chastening thE! offender. Origcn goes on to say that thE: abundance 
of GcdIs gocdness and kindness is stored up for those who fear Him and 
for them alone, because if they did not fear Him they would lay up wrath 
(36) 
for themselves through despising the riches of His kindness and patience. 
Origen interprets the words "Our God is a consuming fire" (Heb. xii. 29) 
as meaning that in so far as there exist in us those things which deserve 
to be consumed, God is a fire which consu-mes them; but when they have 
been consUME-d, God will cease to be a consuming fire and will becone, 
(37) 
as St. John says, Light. 
As has been said the wrath of God is not a feeling; indeed that 
is made evident bý- the fact that He foreknows everything. The same 
is true of His so-called "repentance", whereby he changes from one 
course of action to another in His deal-irigE. with human beirgs. There 
is no question of His havitig, been mistaken., -because this change of 
action is in accordaMe with His Ore-determined plan.. God knows whether 
(38) 
human beings will show themselves unworthy of His kindness. 
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Tt is thus true that even though God is not affected by any emotion, 
we can none the less lay up wrath for ourselves by our sins (cf. Rom. 
(39) 
ii. 5). We can therefore say "Lord, do not rebuke me in Thy anger, nor 
chasten me in Thy wrath" (Ps. vi. 1), and "Chasten us, Lord, but with 
judgement, and not in Thine anger, lest Thou make us few in number" 
(40) 
(Jer. x. 24), in so far as we are prepared to see the error of our ways. 
It is also possible to distinguish between the "perfect will of God" 
(Rom. xii. 2) and His will as related to our own c ondition, even though 
His will is always good. Origen addpces as an example the will of God 
that Saul should be made king of Israel. This was not His acceptable 
and perfect will, but arose from His displeasure with the people of 
Israel for refusing to have Him as their sole King (I Sam. vii. 7 sqq. ). 
The will of God is thus sometimes accomplished in granting our desires, 
(41) 
so that we may be punished by reaping the bitter consequences. This 
is one way in which God acts in a human fashion, bearing with His people's 
(42) 
moods as a man bears with the moods of his son (cf. Deut. i. 31). In 
fact, the incarnate Son of God pursued the same course, in so far as 
He carried out this plan of God in governing human beings, and was thus 
called the Son of Man (the man standing for, God, as is often the case 
(43) 
in the parables). 
On the other hand, His patience is not inexhaustible. He is 
C_/ jc,. s liable to act as a rod ). towards those who are selfwilled 
(44) 
and thus do not accept the love and gentleness of the Father. But 
once a person accepts the chastisement inflicted-by Christ as Rod, He 
ceases to be a rod but ascends and becomes a flower, in the sense that 
(45) 
He enables the person chastened to bring forth the fruit of good works. 
(46) 
Origen likewise says elsewhere that Christ becomes different things 
to different people according to their spiritual state. A slothful 
and negligent person needs Him as "rod", because he needs the compulsion 
of the rod to transfer him to a different state; whereas the person 
(47) 
who has made progress in good living displays Christ as "flower. " 
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The curious situation thus arises that sinners are not only doers 
of wrong but also victims of wrong, inflicted by their own sinful tend- 
encies. Hence those who are punished are avenged at the same time as 
they are punished. They are punished in so far as they have done wrong, 
but avenged in so far as they are wronged by their own wickedness. 
That wickedness is blotted out by the punishment, but those who are 
(48) 
wronged are set free from it. 
What has so far been said is summed up in the passage which says 
that although the Word of God bestows the gift of reason on all beings 
which are rational, there is yet a second gift which He bestows on them, 
that of righteousness and wisdom, though this is only bestowed on those 
(49) 
who have been sanctified by the Holy Spirit. But all this is ultimately 
I 
ascribable to the Father, Whose work of bringing creatures into exist- 
ence is perfected when those creatures make the progress they are intended 
(50) 
to make by receiving Christ in His characters of wisdom and sanctificati6n. 
It is worth observing that the wisdom imparted throuiýh Christ is said 
by Origen to have been at work to a lesser extent in notable men of 
previous generations, e. g. Solomon. In other words, although Christ 
as Wisdom pervades the universe, it is only through the incarnate Chrlst 
(51) 
that this wisdom is fully appropriated by human beings. Elsewhere, 
Origen says that there is in each of us a well of living water which 
is equivalent to the hidden image of. God, a well which has been filled 
with earthly thoughts and desires; but now that our Isaac has come, 
we have the opportunity to dig these wells and remove the earthly element 
from them so as to find in them living water (the reference is to Gen. 
(52) 
xxvi. 18). Elsewhere, Origen pays that He who said "I am the living 
Bread which came down from heaven" is the Word of God by which souls 
(53) 
are fed and with which the righteous man continually fills his soul. 
Elsewhere, again, Origen says that the words "Repent, for the kingdom 
of heaven is near" can be taken to mean that the Christ Who includes 
all the virtues within Himself has taken up residence among us and speaks 
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(54) 
to us, and therefore the kingdom of heaven is within (dO:,: V-r6S ) His disciples. 
It is passages such as these, and also the one referred to in 
note 29, which lead one to wonder whether Anders Nygren is liable to 
be charged with over-simplification when he suggests that the love 
(agape) of God shown in Christ's life and death was intended not for 
the philosophically minded, because these could ascend to God in spirit 
without such earthly aids, but for those less intellectually gifted 
to whom the truth 
, 
could only be conveyed by means of events discernible 
(55) 
by the senses. Granted that Origen did distort the Faith by viewing 
it through. Platonic spectacles, it could still be argued that for both 
classes of men - intellectuals and others - the saving acts of God in 
Christ were in Origen's view required for bringing home the real nature 
of God to them. 
(56) 
On the other hand Koch seems justified in saying that Origen's 
Christianity was not the kind to which we are accustomed, nor for that 
matter is it that of St. Paul or of the Gospels. The concepts of love 
(agape) and of the forgiveness of sins, and the eschatology of the 
Gospels, lay outside Origen's own outlook. Origen was convinced that 
Christianity was of much greater practical utility than phil-'osophy, 
but its purpose was merely that of. leading souls upward to the knowledge 
(57) 
of God. 
(58) 
M. Hirschberg remarks that I'Kpch has made it clear that the Greek 
motive of Providence stands out too strongly against the Christian 
motive of Love" (i. e. in God's dealings with men). The two motives 
are surely not irreconcilable, but at the same time Origen's idea of 
the purpose of the love of God seems to have been that it was intended 
to lead to a fuller knowledge of God, whereas the authentic Christian 
view is that it enables human beings to carry out the purpose of God. 
(59) 
Odo Casel brings out the underlying tension in Origen's thought. He 
first says that for the higher knowledge called "Gnosis", the exercise 
of the human intellect is insufficient; the decisive factor is Christ, 
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i. e. the Divine revelation of the Father through the Incarnate Son, 
Who now fills the Church with His spiritual presence. But Casel then 
g oes on to say that by "Christ" we must understand not merely the Teacher 
of the Gospel Who lived in the flesh, but Christ in His entire reality, 
in His Divine being as the Word of God, in His pre-existence as the 
Giver of the ald Law. Hence when Casel goes on to say that according 
to Origen "Jesus Christ is the Truth, and men can only participate in 
the Truth through Him", that statement is ambiguous: Origen in a number 
of passages declares his belief that the Old Testament prophets themselves 
- (60) 
attained to the vision of Truth apart from the Incarnate Christ. 
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NOTES ON CHAPTER IV. 
Comm. in Joh. II. 3 (GCS 4.55.20,21). Cf. R. Franco's thesis, p. 60, 
where this passage is quoted. 
Comm. in Cant. I (GCS 8.91.4-17) 
3. Frag. in Joh. CXVIII (GCS 4.566.24-30). 
4. Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 94, where it is said that according 
to the philosophers of the 2nd. century, "man receives the light 
of reason (logos), but darkened by the descent to a bodily state. " 
Cf. also Kelber, op. cit., pp. 243,244, and especially the 
following passage: "Origen is here (i. e. in Frag. in Joh. CXVIII) 
saying that'an experience of the Divine Word corresponding to 
the historical Baptism in Jordan is to be looked for in the principal 
part Yj of each person. We could express 
it in mod rn terms as the breakthrough of the higher self into 
the self - an experience occurring in the natural process of earthly 
life. Just. as the self of Jesus of Nazareth gave place to the 
Christ-s 
, 
elf in the Jordan Baptism, so each man is confronted with 
his Christ-self on his way through life, so that in the sphere p j-t 'A 
of his natural gift of reason, his Ao"Yog. C\1 ý_6ciczv 
and in his lower self, he may give place to Christ. " Cf. also 
Fitzgerald's typescript thesis, pp. 229 and 230, where this passage 
is quoted, and where the author comments: "Here we find Origen 
using the common Stoic terminology to explain the presence of 
Christ in mankind prior to the Incarnation in terms of the uni- 
versal presence of the Word in mankind as taught by St. John in 
the prologue of his Gospel, and by the philosophers of the Stoic 
school. " 
5. Comm. in Rom. III. 2 ( PG XIV. 931C). 
6. Comm. in Joh. XX. 5 (GCS 4.332.19-21). 
7. Cf. Ch. VII, p. 270 xý, here a similar idea is expressed. 
8. Hom. I in I Reg. 11 (GCS 8.20.4-13). In Hom. in Num. XI. 8 (GCS 7.90 
10-15) Origen likewise insists that it is only the being (subst- 
antia) of the Divine Trinity which is by nature holy and'does 
not receive holiness from any other source. 
Cf. the discussion of this passage in Dlhýýtells article 
"La sanctification du Christ d'apres Heb. ii. 1111 (RchSR 47 (1958)), 
pp. 518-520. *Cf. also Rius-Camps, "Comunicabilidad" OCP 34,1968, 
pp. 7 and 23,24. 
9. Cf. Mme. Harl, op-cit., p. 136, where she says that "under the 
title of logos .... Origen speaks of the Divine wisdom imparted 
to man at the time of his creation, placed in him as a source 
of virtue and knowledge, a germ which can be developed. " 
10. Comm. in RomIII. 2 (PG XIV. 932AB). 
Contra Cels. VI. 78 (GCS 2 . 150.1-6). Cf. Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. 11.4 
(PG XII. 1333B) and Comm. in Rom. III. 6 (PG XIV. 939C). 
12. Frag. in Joh. XLIV (GCS 4.519.5-10). 
13. De Princ. I. 5.3 (GCS 5.72.23-73.1). Cf. R. Cadiou, 
Introduction au systeme d'Origene (Paris, 1932), pp. 52,53. 
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14. - Ibid. I. 5.5 (GCS 5.77.19-23). 
15. Frag. in Joh. CXXVII (GCS 4.570.20-22). Cf. ibid. L (524.24-525.1), 
and Sel. in Ps. XVI. 1 (PG XII. 1217A). 
16. Comm. in Joh. X. 32 (GCS 4.206.11-15). Cf. Contra Cels. 1.57 (GCS 
1.108.8-10); Sel. in Ps. IV. 2 (PG XII. 1136C); ibid. VI. 1 (1217A). 
Kelber, op. cit., pp. 255,256, quotes Contra Cels. 1.57 wrongly 
(unle 
' 
ss the reference is mistaken), and also says, wrongly, that 
in this passage, as in others, sonship in relation to God the 
Father is ascribed to the Divine Word and not to Christ, who is 
distinguished from Him by Origen. Even if-in certain passages 
such a distinction is made, the unique sonship of the Divine 
Word overflows, as it were, to Christ regarded as the soul perfectly 
united to the Word. 
17. Frag. in Matt. 38 II (GCS 12.31) Cf. Comm. in Joh. I. 10 (GCS 4.16.8- 
18. Comm. in Matt. XII. 11 (GCS 10.88.15-31). Cf. Contra Cels. VI. 64 
(GCS 2.134.25ý135.2) and Sel. in Ps. III. 8 (PG XII. 113A). 
19. De Princ. I. 6.2 (GCS 5.80.10-14). Cf. Rius-Camps, "Comunicabilidad", 
OCP 38,1972, p. 434, n. 3, where a distinction is made between the 
possession of reason by created incorporeal beings -a possession 
which is substantial - and the possession of holiness, which is 
accidental. 
20. De Princ. I. 8.3 (GCS 5.100.18-21). 
21. Ibid. (GCS 5.100.18-21). Cf. Balas, op. cit., pp. 18,19. Cf. 
also Rius-Camps, "Comunicabilidad", OCP 38,1972, p. 443, where 
he says: "The gratuitous presence of the Spirit 'of God in 
'spiritual' beings and its radical separability from rational 
beings confirms the unique character of the Divine nature, in 
so far as it is invisible and incorporeal, immaterial and 
intelligible. " 
22. Comm. in Joh. II. 18 (GCS 4.75.4-11). 
23. Ibid. II. 17 (74.29-75.3). 
24. Ibid. 74.2,3. See Rius-Camps, "Comunicabilidad", OCP 36,1970, 
36, pp. 226,227, where he points out that Gruber , op. cit.,. p. 96, 
solves the problem by invoking the idea of the interchange of 
qualities between the incarnate Christ and the Word of God. 
2S. Frag. in Matt. 141.1-3 (GCS 12.72). 
26. De Princ. IV. 4.10 (GCS 5.363.20-29). It may be questioned, however, 
whether it is true that in man the virtues are only acquired sep- 
arately, if it is true that they are bound up with each other 
as various aspects of the Divine Nature. See also V61ker, op. cit. 
pp. 216,217, and Crouzel, La Conn., p. 146. 
Cf. also Nemeshegyi, op. cit., p. 195, where he says that 
"though Origen and Plato both employ the words 'assimilation' 
and limitation' to describe their religious ideal, Origen's 
'assimilation' is not the same as that of Greek philosophy, 
because it consists in charity, and in particular the charity 
which loves its enemies.,, Cf. also pp. 199 & 200, where it is 
said that "the spirit who possesses the least degree of goodness 
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is to that extent the object of God's fatherly bounty. On the 
other hand, the Son of God is the Only-begotten Word, who receives 
that bounty in its fullness. There is an infinite scale between 
these two extremes. Origen would thus say that the soul, in so 
far as it bears an indestructible mark of goodness, is already 
the child of God .... but one cannot become a 'son' in the full 
sense except by a kind of 'communication of qualities', through 
assimilating and uniting oneself perfectly. to the Only-begotten 
Son. " 
Cf. also Lot-Borodine, op. cit., (RHR, 106,1932), p. 565, 
where he describes the "synergism" characteristic of the Eastern 
outlook, according to which grace re-inforces our human efforts. 
He says in particular that "each virtue has its interior double, 
which is a supernatural virtue which increases it and raises it. " 
27. Frag. in Lam. VIII (GCS 3.237.27-238.11). 
28. Comm. in Joh. I. 34 (GCS 4.44.1-30) 
29. Comm. in Joh. I. 35 (GCS 4.45.6-24). Cf. Rius-Camps, "Origenes 
y Marcion", p. 25. 
30. De Princ. II. 5.3 (GCS 5.135.29-136.12). 
31. Ex. Comm. in Ex.. (PG XII. 269A-271C). Cf. Pitra, A. S. II, 356, Frag. in 
Rum. xxii. 7, and'III. 38 (XLI. 10,11). 
32. Comm. in Rom. VII. 16 (PG XIV. 1146-1147A). 
33. Cf. Nemeshegyi, op. cit., p. 230, where he says that "Origen lacked 
the experience of overwhelming convers-ion, of dazzling grace. 
That is why he does not think of God as electing and predestinating 
man to salvation in the way Augustine does ... Universal Father 
and the God Who elects, these two aspects of God's nature must 
be reconciled to give a correct impression of God's mysterious 
operations'. " 
. 
Cf. also the discussion of. the hardening of Pharaoh's heart 
in Koch, op. cit., pp. 128-131, in Rius-Camps, "Origenes y Marcion", 
pp. 8 & 9, and in Gronau, Das Theodizeeproblem in der altchristlichen 
Auffassung (Tubingen, 1922), p. 37 and n. 1 thereon (though there 
the hardening of Pharaoh's heart and the consequent punishment 
are merely represented as being for the warning of others). 
34. Comm. in Ezek. vii. 4 (PG XIII. 789C), and in Ezek. vii'i. 18 (799BC). 
Cf. Pitra A. S.. III. 265 (CXVIII. 29) and 274 (CXVIII. 58). Cf. also 
Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CXVIII. 29, p. 106, wher e it is said that God 
shows pity in accordance with law ( K. LToL %f A person 
is pitied according to law in so far as he lrives according to 
law after mercy has been shown to him. This is the pity shown 
by Christ the Word of God. Cf. also Pitra. A. S. II, Frag. in Ps. II. 5, 
where it is said that the anger of God is heavy punishment inflicted 
for the benefit of the sinner. Cf. also A. Primmer's thesis, 
"A "9 r- t -L- und. 'V61i-OS im Gottesbegriff des Oripenes, p. 56, where he says that "for Origen, law and punishment have no value (? f 
their own, but they have as their goal the correction of the sinner. 
When this has been successful, mercy is in place. " 
35. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 37 (GCS 4.263.5-11) (surely6U should be supplied 
ýefore Ir, 
"V 
. 4, jl-; V 'rp-OTTOV in line 7). 
Cf. also Frag. in Jer. 16 (GCS 3.206.2-4); ibid. 52 (224,12-225.7); 
Contra Cels. V. 15 (GES 2.16.22-25); Sel. in Gen. xlix. 9 (PG XII. 145AB); 
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Cadiou, Frag. in, Ps. VII. 12 
c (p. 73); CV. 4 (p. 91); CXVIII. 65 (p. 110); 
Pitra A. S. III. 13,14 (XXXVII. 1,2) and 11.169 (LXXXIX. 12); Frag. in 
I Cor. X-2-5 (JTS 9. p. 239). 
Cf. also Koch, op. cit., pp. 143 & 144. 
I think: Hirschberg on pp. 203 & 204 of his thesis Studies 
zur Geschichte der simplices in der Alten Kirche goes too far 
when he says that the fear of God is the only notion whereby the 
"simple" disciples are influenced. In quoting Contra Cels. VI. 13 
(GCS 2.83.28-84.1), in support of this view, he takes liberties 
with the text in so far as he imports into it the idea of the 
"fear of God" which is absent from the original Greek. In other 
words, even those believers who are incapable of appreciating 
the rational grounds of faith need not simply be under the sway 
of fear of the consequences of disobedience. 
36. Comm. in Matt. XV. 11 (GCS 10.379.12-380.3). Cf. ibid. XvI. 21 (548.22- 
28). 
See Primmer, op. cit., p. 60, where he says that according 
to Origen, "God manifests His goodness precisely in so far as 
He sometimes withdraws it .... Origen is not so much concerned to 
deny the mercy of God as to champion His goodneps. 11 The author 
distinguishes on p. 62 between the'mercy shown to those worthy 
of it and the mercy shown to all men. I suppose the former. is 
mercy ý. hown directly, and the latter is mercy shown indirectly 
(through punishment). 
37. Comm. in Matt. XVII. 19 (GCS 10.639.23-640.6). Cf. Comm. in Rom. VIII. 
12 (PG XIV. 1198A); Hom. in Jud. III. 2 (GCS 7.482.1-6); Pitra A. S. III. 
79 (LXVII. 3). 
Cf. also Crouzel, L'Image, p. 258, and Cornelis, op. cit., 
p. 205, where it is said that "God is a fire, but one which acts 
in the sphere which may properly be called divine, the incorporeal 
sphere. This divine fire can be said to be primarily the fire 
of the Divine Word, of the Divine Reason immanent in rational 
beings, which never ceases to endeavour to restore them to their 
original fiery purity. " 
Cf. also Rius-Camps, "Origenes y Marcion", p. 10-, where 
he says, with reference to bodily and natural evils (so-called), 
that according to Origen, "before participating in the V. Iord made 
flesh, it is necessary to be purified in the appropriate manner 
from any obstacles interposed by one's previous sinful life. " 
38. Frag. in I Sam. xv. 9-11 (GCS 3.296.1-3,12-15,25-28). Cf. Pitra 
A. S. III. 215 (CV. 45). 
39. Hom. in Jud. II. 4 (GCS 7.477.25-478.2). Cf. Frag. in Joh. LI 
(GCS 4.526.4-8); Comm. in Rom. I. 16 (PG XIV. 862C-863A); Pitra 
A. S. III. 130 (LXXVII. 65). Cf. also Primmer's discussion of this 
topid in op. cit., pp. 24-26. 
40. Contra Cels. iV. 99 (GCS 1.375.13-P-1); Frag. in Eph. XXII. 9-14 (JTS 
3.556). - Cf. Primmer, op. cit., pp. -48 & 49, and Pannenberg, op. 
cit., Vol. II, pp. 161 & 162. 
41. Comm. in Rom. IX. 1 (PG XIV. 1207C, 1208A). Cf. Ruth Carter Stapleton, 
ýhe Experience of Inner Healing, (Hodder & Stoughton, 1978), p. 37 
where a distinction is made between "the perfect will of God" 
and "the circumstantial will of God" .... "The perfect will of God 
is that sickness be replaced with health in everyone. But human 
factors such as faithlessness, carelessness and sloth can block 
'this perfect will, so God's circumstantial will is that the 
condition remains unhealed. Under the circumstances, God cannot 
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h. eal. But given man's faith and faithfulness, healing would 
be realised. 11 
42. Comm. in Matt. XVII. 17 (GCS 10.635.16-30). 
43. Ibid. XIIII. 20 (GCS 10.641.10-22). Cf. Crouzel,. L'Image, p. 260. 
44. Comm. in Joh. I. 36 (GCS 4.46.13-15). 
45. Ibid. (46.17-23); Comm. in Ezek. vii. 10 (PG XIII. 791AB). Cf. Sel. 
in Ps. xc. 10 (PG XII. 1552C). 
46. Hom. in Num. IX. 9 (GCS 7.67.12-18). Cf. also ibid. XVII. 6 (GCS 
7.166.11-14), where, with reference to Num. xxiv. 9, Christ is said 
to be a "lion" in those who are mature, and a "young lion" in 
those who are as yet immature in the Faith. 
47. Cf. Koch, op. cit., p. 118, where E. Hatch is quoted as saying that 
". the cosmology of Origen was a theodicy. 11 On the other hand, 
the present writer considers that Koch goes too far in saying 
(on P. 139) that the educative value of punishment is the key to 
Origen's whole theological system, from the creation of the visible 
world to its disappearance and the. continuation of instruction 
in future worlds. Surely punishment is not in Origen's view the 
highest mode of instruction, but only a preliminary mode. This 
is made clear by E. de Faye when he says (op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 
216,217) that whereas the Christ of the Gnostics is Revealer 
rather than Instructor; the Christ of Origen is par excellence 
Instructor. De Faye also says (op. cit., p. 50) that "Origen-saw 
a purely punitive infliction of punishment as a form of vengeance 
unworthy of God. In his opinion, suffering only has meaning if 
it is intended to bring about the amendment of the sufferer. " 
48. Comm. in Ezek. vii. 3 (PG XIII. 789AB). 
49. Cf. Crouzel, La Conn., p. 455 
50. De Princ. I. 3.8 (GCS 5.61.5-11,16-20). Cf. Balas, op. cit., pp. 
14,15, and J. Rius-Camps, "Comunicabilidad", (OCP 36,1970), p. 219 
51. De Princ. II. 3.1 (GCS 5.256.19-257.8). Cf. Mme'. Harl, op. cit., 
pp. 163,164, where this passage is quoted, and Koch, op. cit., p. 65. 
52. Hom. in Gen. XIII. 3 (GCS 6.118.11-26). Cf. ibid. XIII. 4 (6.119.5-8). 
53. Hom. in Lev. XVI. 5 (GCS 6.500.13-18). Cf. also Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. IV. 3 
(PG XXII. 1357B). 
54. Comm. in Matt. XII. 14 (GCS 10.97.17-30). 
55. Op. cit., p. 377: 'For Origen, Platonism and Christianity differ 
not so much in religious theory .... but rather in manner of expos- 
ition, which is dependent upon their respective audiences. Platonism 
speaks to a little, select company, Christianity to all men. " 
Again, p. 379: "According to Origen, Christianity and Platonism 
both represent ideally the same lofty standpoint; but Christianity, 
to its great advantage, is able to express this in such a way 
as immediately to capture even the masses .... Christianity simply 
says what is both true and seems to be clear for the many, though 
naturally it is not as clear for them as for the few who devote 
themselves to a philosophical study of these things. le 
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56. Op. cit., pp. 318,319. 
57. See also on this subject Ch. VI, pp-207-214. 
58. Op. cit., p. 177. 
59. In his article "Glaube, Gnosis, und Mysterium" (JLW 15 (1941)), 
p. 171. 
60. See on this subject Ch-II, PP. 35-37. 
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CHAPTER V. SECTION 1. 
The self-humiliation of the Divine Word 
For the purpose of redeeming mankind the Divine Word took upon 
Himself the form of a slave, with the result that the words "You are 
my slave" recorded in the Book of Isaiah could be addressed to Him 
by the Father. The goodness of the Son is thus seen to resemble that 
of the Father more fully in so far as He humbled Himself even to death 
(1) 
than if He had thought equality with God a thing to be clutched at. 
In a very striking passage in Hom. in Lev., Origen points out that when 
Christ assumed a servant's form, the Immortal died, the Incapable of 
suffering suffered, the Invisible One was seen, and since death and 
every other. fleshly weakness resulted from our state of sin, He Who 
was made in the likeness of man offered His unstained flesh as a victim 
(2) 
to God. For although He suffered death, He did so willingly, and not, 
(3) 
as we do, by the necessity which sin imposes. In humbling Himself 
in this way as in others, He fulfilled the will of the Father Who gave 
Him up on behalf of sinners rather than His own will, and in this way 
(4) 
showed Himself to be the image of the Father's goodness. Thus Joshua 
foreshadowed Jesus the Christ as "the servant of Moses" in so far as 
Jesus the Son of God was born "under the law" (Gal. iv. 4), and thus 
(5) 
became "the servant of Moses. " 
In fact it was only because Jesus-Christ took human nature upon 
Himself and thus adopted a status different from that which was His in 
the beginning that He was able to bestow the help which the Father 
(6) 
desired to impart through Him. Origen also says that if sin had not 
entered the world, the Son of God would not have needed to take upon 
Himself human flesh and be crucified, but would have remained what 
(7) 
He was in the beginning, the Word of God. Thus it is said elsewhere 
that although there was originally only one nature in Christ, namely 
His Divine nature as the Only-begotten Son of the Father, none the 
less in recent times He took upon Himself human nature in order to 
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(8) 
fulfil the Divine purpose. It is likewise said that the Son of God 
emptied Himself and took the form of a servant in order to teach 
obedience to those who could be saved only by the example of the 
(9) 
Incarnate Son. 
So far, what Origen says is in accordance with traditional 
doctrine; but now comes a statement which betrays his distinctive 
outlook: "The man whom He assumed was the most honourable and purest 
of all, and was thus qualified to receive Him, just as we can, if 
(10) 
we make sufficient room for Him in our own souls. " This strange language 
expresses Origen's notion, expounded more fully in De Princ. that 
the Son of God did not become incarnate directly, but united Himself 
to a soul which had never become rebellious, and finally became in- 
carnate in order to act as an instrument of the Word of God. It was 
possible for this soul to act thus because it had so firmly chosen 
to love righteousness that it became no longer capable of a change 
of attitude, or in other words what had formerly depended upon the 
(11) 
will was as the result of long custom changed into something natural. 
This soul is in fact said to have "become the image of the Image of 
S %, 11> 
-/ 
(12) 
God" because of its virtue ( 
itj 
Origen thus suggests that the followers of Christ do not in 
fact receive the pattern by which their lives are moulded from the 
Divine nature of the Word of God, because that is far superior to 
all the actions and attitudes which require imitation, but rather 
from the soul which He assumed (anima quae assumpta est ab eo) and 
(13) 
which was characterised by the highest perfection. This is the exp- 
lanation which Origen gives of why St. Paul speaks of being "conformed", 
not to the Son of God, but to "the image of the Son" (Rom. viii. 29). 
To quote Origen's own words, "he who desires the fullness of perfection 
and blessedness must aim at attaining a likeness to that anima which 
(14) 
is chiefly and above all others the imago Filii Dei. 11 
The same doctrine also underlies the statement elsewhere that 
10'2 
those who sought to kill Jesus, even though they might succeed, could 
only kill a man, and that any who thought that the being against whom 
they plotted was Divine would scarcely continue to plot against Him, 
(15) 
because they could do nothing more than kill His body. This statement 
is repeated in De Princ. where it is said that the invisible spirits 
who rule over the nations saw that the Saviour had come to abolish 
the doctrines which they had implanted in the minds, of their subjects, 
and thus laid snares for Him, not knowing Who was concealed within 
(16) 
Him (quis obtegeretur intrinsecus ignorantes). Elsewhere Origen suggests 
that the Lamb of God spoken of by John the Baptist as destined to 
take away the sins-of the world was the man assumed by the Son of 
God, and He Who led the Lamb to the sacrifice was the God Who resided 
in the man an d uttered the words "No one takes my ýUKvý from me, but 
I lay it down of my lown accord, just as I take it up of my own accord. " 
Origen even suggests that what appears to be the same person can speak 
at one time as a man and at another time as a Divine being, inasmuch 
as He can say at one time "Now you seek to kill me, a man who has 
told you the truth", and at another time "I and the Father are one", 
(18) 
"I am the Truth and the Life", "I am the Resurrection. " 
It is-worth referring to the passage in Comm. in Rom. where Origen 
or interprets St. Paul's words "whom God set forth IrpoE&C-CO to be a 
propitiation" (iii. 25) as meaning that God "arranged beforehand" that 
the soul of Jesus should be a propitiation, i. e. before that soul 
existed, whereas this could not be said of the Word of God, Who has 
(19) 
existed eternally. It must be admitted, however, that this is a con- 
spicuous. instance of Origen's tendency to twist the natural meaning 
of words so as to use them in support of ideas formed independently. 
It is passages such as the ones just referred to which led de Faye 
(20) 
to say that according to Origen "the victim who died. on the cross 
was npt the Word of God Who was in Jesus Christ, but exclusively the 
man Christ Jesus. " I feel that D'Ales' criticism of de Faye's statement 
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shows that he has not really grasped Origen's Christology in the way 
de Faye has. D'Ales seems content to interpret that Christology in 
the light of the later Conciliar definitions, according to which the 
incarnate Word of God had two natures, Divine and human. But that 
does not seem to have been Origen's real view, whatever certain passages 
might suggest, When D'Ale's says that there is no reason to make Origen 
into a Nestorian, he is taking the easy way out. A careful study 
of such texts as have been quoted would seem to give considerable 
ground for that suggestion, in so far as the Word of God and the man 
Jesus seem to be presented as two distinct beings. 
It is indeed true that there are passages where Origen seems 
to say roundly that the Word of God Himself was subject to mortality. 
For instance, in Comm. in Joh. the blood-dipped robe with which the 
Word of God seen on a horse is clothed is regarded as a symbol of 
the death of the Word on the Cross and the subsequent piercing of 
(22) 
His side by the soldier's spear. In other words, Origen finds it 
difficult to emancipate himself from the traditional doctrine of the 
Incarnation, as he also does when he says that even during His incarnate 
life the Son was still as closely united to the Father as He was before 
(23) 
He became incarnate. It is true, says Origen, that from one point 
of view the Son of God in becoming incarnate came, as it were, out 
of Him Who sent Him; but from another point of view the Father remained 
(24) 
with the Son and was in Him as the Son was in the Father. (On the 
other hand, unless the Son could be thought of as being in the Father 
in a manner other than He was before He came forth from God, there 
would appear to be a contradiction in the*statement that He both came 
forth from God and yet remained in God even after coming forth from 
Him. ) It is in conformity with this outlook that Origen says in Comm. 
(25) 
in Rom. that St. Paul speaks of the Son of God as having the likeness 
of sinful flesh (Rom. viii. 3), but not sinful flesh itself, because 
although he possessed a human body, He did not contract the defilement 
of sin which is caused by the sexual desire from which conception 
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normally results. 
One paradoxical result of the Incarnation is that during the time 
of our Lord's life on earth He became inferior to the Holy Spirit, 
even though by nature He is not so. Origen applies to Christ the 
words of the prophet Isaiah (xlviii. 16) which state that "the Lord 
(26) 
and His Spirit have sent me. " Origen is no doubt thinking of passages 
in the Gospels where our Lord is said to have been full of the Holy 
(27) 
Spirit or led by the Spirit. Thus it is said in one place that after 
His Baptism our Lord was led by the Spirit into the wilderness because 
He was the unique Son of God, just as (according to St. Paul) all 
those who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God. Elsewhere 
it is said that the Holy Spirit would not descend on us if He had 
not first descended (at our Lord's baptism) on One Who shared in His 
(28) (29) 
own nature. Likewise in Comm. in Matt., in the passage where the little 
child set by our Lord before His disciples is compared to the Holy 
Spirit, it is said that the Holy Spirit humbled Himself for the salvation 
of mankind, and the passage from Isaiah is quoted as evidence that 
the Spirit was sent as well as the Son, although Origen admits that 
(30) 
the passage is ambiguous. In Contra Cels. it is also said that the 
episode of the Spirit descending upon Jesus in the form of a dove 
is enough to show that Isaiah's words mean that the Father sent both 
Christ and the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, the tension existing 
in Origen's mind between the idea of the Son as becoming incarnate 
in one place and the doctrine of the Son's omnipresence becomes evident 
when he suggests that the account of the descent of the Holy Spirit 
in the form of a dove is not to be interpreted literally, because 
the Holy Spirit is inseparable from the Son and therefore cannot pass 
(31) 
from the Father to the Son. 
It, is made perfectly clear that in His incarnate life the Son 
(32) 
derives all the powers that He possesses frqm the Father. Origen 
says that if our Lord had replied to the question put by the Jewish 
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priests "In what power do you do these things? " (Matt. xxi. 23), He 
would have explained in what surpassing power He did 
the marvellous things witnessed by the people, a power given to Him 
(33) 
not by any being inferior to God, but by the Father Himself. Again, 
Origen says that when the crowds praised the God of Israel for Christ's 
miracles, they showed that they were unaware that Christ Himself poss- 
essed all the power possessed by the Father, in so far as it is through 
Christ that the Father performs all things. An ordinary man who per- 
forms a miracle does so simply as God's instrument, whereas Christ 
performs miracles in the power inherent in His own nature as God's 
(34) 
Vicegerent. Origen recognises that the Son of God only claims to 
be able to give life (whether spiritual or physical) by virtue of 
the power which the Father has given to Him: after all, the Son Himself 
states that the life which He has in Himself is imparted to Him by 
the Father. Origen thus deplores the mistake of those who condemned 
to death the Source and Origin of all life, and did not recognise 
through the testimony of so many who had risen to new life the Fountain 
from which life flows to all that live, a life which none the less 
(36) 
is given by the Father (St. John v. 26). But even in other matters, 
the Son declares that He does nothing of His own accord, because He 
(37) 
seeks not His own will, but the will of the Father Who has sent Him. 
When the Pharisees asked Him, "Whom makest Thou Thyself? ", they displayed 
a failure to recognise that the Father alone had accorded to Him the 
status He occupied; accordingly, He replied that He was in no position 
(38) 
to give honour to Himself, but merely received it from the Father. 
Origen admits that it might be inferred from the text "Destroy 
this temple, and in three days I will raise it up" that the Son is 
able to act on His own initiative; indeed, says Origen, some might 
derive from this saying the Sabellian doctrine of a God Who appears 
in different aspects and so is spoken of as Father and Son at different 
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times. But in fact, says Origen, Christ's words must be understood 
as implying that He was able to raise up His body from the dead only 
because the Father granted Him this privilege ( erou f-ico., r aS v4,3rtJ -MUTZ> 
XOL? VOO so that the Father remained the principal Agent 
(39) 
in the raising up of Christ from the dead. In the same way, Origen 
compares the Son of God to a lion's whelp who lay down and slept but 
(40) 
was afterwards aroused by the Father (with reference to Gan. xlix. 9). 
In another passage, Origen explicitly states that the reason 
why the Son is able to claim identity with the Father is that the 
Son's will differs in no way from that of the Father. It is not that 
the Son obeys particular commands of the Father; it is rather that 
the Son is always in harmony with the Father, and so transforms the 
world into what the Father would have it be. Origen even goes to 
the length of saying that the will of the Father "takes up its seat" 
0 d1% C 0% in the Son (Y6VOrC-kf(7N( 6V *r(. j UE (Ij and so brings it about 1. L 
that the Father's will is accomplished. It is thus because the entire 
will of the Father is carried out by the Son and by no one else that 
(41) 
the Son can be called "the Image of God. " (There are in fact various 
passages in Origen's works where the Father is described as "dwelling 
(42) 
in" Christ, or having Christ for His temple or His throne. ) Thus 
elsewhere Origen says that the Father's image is reproduced in the 
Son by the very fact that the Son does all things just as the Father 
does, quoting St. John v. 19 "All things that the Father doeth, these 
(43) 
also doeth the Son likewise. " The task of Christ Incarnate may in 
fact be said to be that of bringing human wills into conformity with 
(44) 
the 
_Divine 
Will. 
(45) 
Maydieu, in his discussion of the passage referred to in note 41, 
appears to make an unwarrantable distinction between the way in which 
the Son resembles the Father through carrying out the Father's will 
and the resemblance resulting from the bringing forth by the Father 
of the Son as His Word or Self-expression. It is not just a matter 
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of the Son's voluntarily acting in conformity with the Father's purpose: 
such action is inevitable because of the unique derivation of th e 
Son'. At least, that is what Origen would say. Thus it is not really 
true that at one time Origen appears to maintain the identity of Image 
and Model while preserving the separate reality of each, and at another 
(46) 
regards the First-born Son as only a defective image of the Father. 
Rius-Camps appears likewise to credit Origen with an Arian view of 
(47) 
the Son's relationship to the Father when he says that "Origen makes 
use of certain terms such as a-fo r dL L X, 
to preserve on the one hand the transcendence of God, and on the other 
hand to express a certain degradation inherent in all intermediate 
A 
beings", apparently including even the Only-begotten Son. 
There-is one passage in which Origen stresses that the Son alone 
has a perfect knowledge of the Father's will. In Hom. in E7. ek., he 
says that the Saviour eats food which no one else can eat, this food 
being the knowledge of the Father's will, but that He invites others 
to share a meal with Him, at which He bestows such food as His guest 
is capable of receiving (excellens quippe ab-universa conditione natura 
eius, et ab omnibus segregata, facit eum quotidianum panem de Patris 
natura comedere). Each of us desires daily bread, and in doing so 
doeýs not receive the same bread or bread in the same quantity as the 
Son of God, but in sincere prayer and in a clear conscience and in 
righteous actions we all receive our daily bread. But if anyone is 
less pure, he eats his daily bread differently. It is also said, 
with reference to the closed door mentioned in Ezek. xliv. 2, that 
there are certain facts known only to the Son of God, and not to any 
creature. For the Son does not reveal to this world all that He Him- 
self knows (non capit creatura quod capit Deus). Nor is every creature 
capable of receiving an equal amount of knowledge: Paul could receive 
more than Timothy, and Timothy more than I. There are certain things 
. 
(48) 
which Christ alone can receive. 
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But Origen has to face the fact that there is one famous occasion 
when the will of the Son appears to have been out of harmony with 
that of the Father. Hence in Exhort. ad Mart. he insists that the 
Son has on occasion to defer to the will and judgement of the Father, 
as proceeding from superior knowledge and wisdom, as when He asked 
that the cup of suffering of which He was about to drink might be 
(49) 
taken from Him, but was denied His request. In Comm. in Matt. Origen 
underlines this fact with reference to the same episode, when he says 
that the cup could pass from Jesus in two ways, inasmuch as if He 
were to drink it, it would afterwards pass from Him and from all mankind, 
but if He were not to drink it, it would perhaps pass from Him, but 
not from mankind, but would remain with them until it had made an 
end of them (donec perficeret eos. ). He therefore wished to drink 
it so that it might pass from Him and from the whole human race, rather 
(50) 
than to act against His Father's will by evading the drinking of it. 
(51) 
V'dlker, in discussing this passage, points out that Origen contradicts 
himself in the matter of Gethsemane. He admits that it is difficult 
to harmonise with the nature of the Divine Word, and so attributes 
it to the human side of the Incarnate Word. Even so, he tries to 
diminish the element of fear implicit in the request of Jesus by sugg- 
(52) 
esting that He was really asking for a severer form of suffering. 
In another passage, Origen seems to try to have it both ways when 
he suggests that our Lord asked that the cup might pass from Him be- 
cause of the immediate consequences, i. e. the disciples' abandonment 
of Him, Peter's denial of Him, and the rejection by God of the Jewish 
nation (the implication being that He did not know the ultimate conse- 
quences). But He preferred the Father's will, in so far as all were 
allowed to disobey so that as the result of the successive disobedience 
of all, mercy might be successively shown to all, and that through 
(53) 
the fall of Israel salvation might come to the Gentiles. 
It was because the will of the Son was in entire harmony with 
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the will of the Father that the Son did not need to utter explicit 
prayer, because the Father foresaw what that prayer would be. It 
can indeed be said to those who pray in a Christian manner, "While 
you are yet speaking, I will say, Here I am" (Is. lxv. 24); but the 
Father would have said to His Son "Before you are speaking, I will 
say, Here I am. " Hence at the raising of Lazarus from the dead, an 
act of thanksgiving took the place of the prayer which Christ might 
have been expected to make for the raising of Lazarus, because before 
He uttered His prayer, He saw in His spirit that Lazarus' soul was 
(54) 
restored to his body. 
Sometimes, Origen almost seems to suggest that Christ prayed 
(55) 
in order to present the appearance of being human. Thus he says that 
the Lord gave thanks to the God Who is His Father (with ref. to Matt. 
xi. 25) in so far as He was fashioned in like manner to His slaves 
and transmitted the thanks of the slaves to the Master. Elsewhere 
Origen says that the Saviour lifted His eyes to heaven before the 
feeding of the five thousand so that we may believe in Him as Divine 
C 
t4 eq from the wonderful thing which He did, but admit Him 
(56) 
to be human because He gave thanks and looked up. -to 
fieaven. 
On the other hand Origen takes a different view in De Oratione 
of the place which prayer occupied in the life of the Incarnate Christ. 
It is there said that Jesus might not have obtained His requests with- 
out prayer 6'tkrýtOS ýVJf(, c OJKqSý 
and then follows a list of the Gospel references to, the occasions 
when Jesus is said to have spent time in prayer. The final reference 
is to the act of thanksgiving uttered before the raising of Lazarus, 
in which the Lord said that "the Father always hears Him" ( John 
xi. 41), astatement which Origen here (as distinct from the former passage 
referred to! ) interprets as meaning that hewho always prays is always 
P .1 "1 $ 
(57) 
heard ( Tk-d_%(T-oI'K- 6_1, \ot. _cjaS Else- 
where it is said that Christ in His human nature was heard at the 
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very time He invoked God, not after He had invoked God; for to those 
who are holy and listen to the Divine commands, the promise is made 
(58) 
"While you are yet speaking, I will say, Here I am. " (Is. lviii. 9). 
Again, with reference to St. John i. 51, Origen says that it was likely 
that the Saviour actually prayed that Nathanael might have such faith 
(59) 
as to see the heavens opened, etc. Again, Origen says that after 
the feeding recorded in St. Matthew, our Lord went up a mountain by 
Himself to pray (Matt. xiv. 23), probably both for the crowds, that 
they might continue to behave as His followers should, and also for 
the disciples, that they might have a safe journey to the other side 
(60) 
of the lake. In yet another passage Origen actually suggests that 
at certain times the Son may not have needed to pray for the granting 
(51) 
of His requests, but may have needed to do so at other times. 
Perhaps the dilemma which is thus presented to us as to whether 
the Son of God needed to pray or not is resolved by thinking of Him 
as needing to pray in so far as He is human, and therefore partly 
ignorant of the Father's will, but as not needing to pray in so far 
as He is Divine and therefore fully cognisant of the Father's will. 
It was in His Divine capacity that He said to the palsied man "Son, 
thy sins are forgiven thee" (Matt... ix-2). Origen thus says that others 
could obtain remission of sins by their prayers, but Christ alone 
(62) 
by His power (ceteri .... precibus peccata, hic solus potestate dimisit). 
On the other hand one cannot help observing that it is hard to see 
how these two states of mind could really co-exist in the same person. 
He cannot surely change from being Divine to human, and then from 
being human to Divine, because that is almost what Origen's theory 
of our Lord's prayer life amounts to. 
ill 
CHAPTER V. SECTION 2. 
The Kenosis doctrine in Origen's thought. 
No discussion of the self-humiliation of the Divine Word in Origen's 
thought would be complete without an examination of the doctrine of 
the Kenosis. This is based on St. Paul's well-known statement in 
Philippians (ii-6.7) that Jesus Christ was originally in the form of 
God, but did not regard equality with God as something which He should 
hold on to, but "emptied Himself" by taking the form of a servant and 
(63) 
becoming like other human beings. This statement appears to be echoed 
by Origen in one or two passage, in the sense that our Lord is thought 
of as having literally divested Himself of some of His attributes as 
a man might take off a suit of clothes, with the result that He became 
inferior to what He originally was. Thus in Comm. in Cant. Origen com- 
pares our Lord to the stone said by the prophet Daniel (ii. 34) to have 
been cut out from the mountain without hands, and to the "drop" which 
according to his version of Micah ii. 12 would gather together the nations 
(64) 
which could themselves be compared to a drop in a bucket. In Hom. in 
Josh., the knives made of rock used by Joshua to circumcise for the 
second time the Israelites who had come from Egypt are said to stand 
for the Word of God which cleanses the hearts of its hearers from spir- 
itual impurity and is derived from that Rock which was cut from a moun- 
tain without hands and has filled the world and bestowed its spiritual 
(65) 
gifts on believers. 
After all, says Origen, what was the Lord not made for our 
salvation? We were void of understanding (inanes), and He emptied 
Himself (exinanivit seipsum), taking the form of a servant. We were 
a foolish and senseless people (Deut. xxxii. 6), and He was made "the 
foolishness of preaching" (I Cor. i. 21), so that "the foolishness of 
(66) 
God might be made wiser than men" (I Cor. i. 25). 
But Origen stresses that whatever other qualities the Divine 
Word might have put off, His goodness and honour were unaffected, 
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because goodness and honour are part of His essential nature. And 
even though He came to this vale of tears and woe, He was not in fact 
(67) 
unhappy, because He was thus carrying out the Father's will. Origen 
instances a doctor who has to familiarise Himself with the less 
pleasant aspects of human life in the form of diseases and wounds. 
From one point of view he would naturally prefer not to have anything 
to do with such things, but none the less he concerns himself with 
them so as to bring healing to his patients. Moreover, since he 
himself shares in human weakness, it is always possible that he may 
be infected with the diseases which he tries to treat. Not so the 
Word of God, Who is only able to heal the wounds of our souls because 
(68) 
sin is Utterly foreign to His nature. 
Elsewhere, Origen suggests that it was really a matter of our 
Lord's bringing with Him into the world as much of the Divine wisdom 
and power as was necessary for Him to fulfil His purposes, just as 
a person might pack as much of his property as possible into a trunk 
(69) 
before going on a journey. Origen thus feels able to say that the 
wisdom brought by Jesus Christ into the world, though vastly inferior 
toAhat which He possessed by nature, and therefore deserving the 
name of the "foolishness of God", was immeasurably superior to the 
wisdom possessed by any human being, with the result that St. Paul 
q (70) 
could say that "the foolishness of God*is wiser than men" yes, than 
(71) 
the very wisest men, such as Peter and Paul and John. Thus Origen 
asserts in two. passages that Christ's Divinity was shown by His 
(72) 
extraordinary awareness of what was going on in people's minds. 
He likewise emptied Himself of the fullness of His power, but none 
the less brought with Him enough power to enable Him to perform actions 
which no ordinary man could have performed - the actions we call (73) 
miracles. This power, being limited, was liable to fail as the 
result of the cruelty of His enemies, with the result that the prophet 
ý, 74) Isaiah could say, "With His stripes we are healed. On the other 
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hand, if He did succumb to the plots of His enemies, that was only 
because He was willing to do so, because He could have overcome them 
(75) 
if He had wished. 
Origen thus feels able to say that the power and glory with 
which our Lord first came, even though they enabled Him to work 
miracles, were vastly inferior to the power and glory which will 
attend Him at His Second Coming; for the power which marked His First 
(76) 
Coming was the power of one who had emptied Himself. Origen likewise 
says elsewhere that in condescending to our poverty, the Lord obscured 
(77) 
His unique glory, but none the less the Lord is His Name; for even 
(78) 
though He became man, God did not cease to be the Lord. There is 
also a curious passage in which, -in reply to the suggestion that 
our Lord could easily have supplied food miraculously to His disciples 
instead of leaving them to go and buy it (Johfi iv. 8), Origen says 
that though our Lord had become a man, He woold not have been recognised 
(79) 
as such if His Divinity had overshadowed all that He did as man. 
It is with these considerations in mind that Origen interprets 
the words in the song of triumph over Pharaoh which run: - "Let us 
sing to the Lord, for He has been outstandingly glorified. " (Exod. 
xv. 1). He says that in taking flesh from His Virgin Mother for our 
salvation, and also in submitting to the Cross, Jesus Christ has 
been glorified, but not outstandingly; but when He shall come in 
the, glory of His Father and the holy angels to judge the world, then 
He will be outstandingly glorified, and "all will honour the Son 
(80) 
as they honour the Father" (John v. 23). It was because His glory 
was veiled in His incarnate state that the devil underestimed His 
power to resist temptation, supposing that He had attained to the 
(81) 
status of Son of God through His own merits. Again, Origen speaks 
of the First Coming of Christ as being likened to a "shadow" in 
Scripture (Lam. iv. 20), and as providing us with hints and foreshadow- 
ings of those things which we shall only experience fully 'when He 
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(82) 
comes again. In De Princ, Origen elucidates this statement by saying 
that though the Son of God was brought within the very narrow limits 
of a human body, He yet gave indications, through the likeness of 
His power and works to those of God the Father, of the unbounded 
(83) 
and invisible greatness that was. z. in Him. The passage in Lamentations 
is also quoted in another place, where Origen suggests that just 
as the shadow of our body is inseparable from our body, so the earthly 
actions and movements of Christ can be regarded as His I'shadow", 
and that the truth to which they are intended to lead us will only 
be fully apprehended in that state where the glory of God and the 
causes of His actions will be fully revealed, although even in this 
life we can obtain an inkling of that revelation in so far as St. 
Paul says that even if we have formerly known Christ after the flesh, 
(84) 
yet henceforth we know Him no more in this fashion (II Cor. v. 16). 
Origen likewise explains the apparent contradiction between the pass- 
age in Romans (v. 2) in which it is said that "we rejoice in the hope 
of the glory of God" and the passage in II Cor. (iii. 18) where it 
is said that "we with unveiled face behold the glory of the Lord" 
by saying that the latter glory was revealed in the Incarnation of 
the Saviour, whereas the former is the glory which will be revealed 
at His Second Coming.. It follows that those who have already seen 
the glory of the Only-begotten Son with the full understanding of 
faith must none the less direct their minds to the glopy of the Second 
Coming of Christ, and so progress from the prEsent glory to the future 
(85) 
glory which is the object of their hope. Origen also says that the 
Second Coming of Christ will be the prelude to the state in which 
His disciples will live in accordance with the laws of the "eternal 
gospel", which will supersede the laws and the Modes of worship at 
. (86) 
present binding on Christians. 
When discussing the cry of dereliction uttered on the Cross, 
Origen interprets it as meanink; that our Lord had in fact descended 
from the condition of being in the form of the invisible God and 
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in the likeness of the Father when He took the form of a servant, 
(87) 
and that the extremity of His humiliation occured when He was crucified. 
Thus it is said elsewhere that Christ implores the Father to have 
(88) 
mercy upon Him, because man tramples upon Him, although-. -He is God. 
Origen even goes to the length of saying that it is true that God 
alone possesses immortality, because Jesus Christ died for all apart 
1% el 
(89) 
from God ( t\cJp IS Coo 
(Heb. ii. 10). It was in fact supremely 
at the time of the Crucifixion that it became true that, in Origen's 
J. -, W words, our Lord "assumed human nature in all respects" ( ft-. L-. rT q Imc-3V 
9 . 01 1% 
&*4 Lot 
A V14 by "descending as far as human flesh" 
(90) 
WT-Lý41 Kelalo. Origen asks why, if Chirst did not experience 
hunian infirmity in the very act of dying, was His soul (anima) troubled, 
and sad even unto death? Surely, he says, it was as a genuine man 
(91) 
that Christ said: "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. " 
In fact, those who try to explain away His Crucifixion as only appar- 
"I X_ 
ent, on the ground that He was incapable of human feelink: (16 vtrozczlý 
and so superior to all human calamity, are in fact depriving us of 
(92) 
our only means of salvation, because they deny His true humanity. 
It was for the sake of souls still in a state of growth that He con- 
descended to be cruclfied, so that these souls might love Him and 
draw Him to themselves after He ha6 emptied Himself of His Divine 
(93) 
glory. 
So far, Origen appears to take St. Paul's words about Christ's 
self-emptying literally. Jesus Christ did not come into this world 
in the fullness of His Divine MaJesty, but laid aside some of it 
so that those to whom he came might be able to endure His presence. 
Thus Origen says that "if the Only-begotten Son had not emptied out 
the fullness of the Divine Spirit and humbled Himself to a servant's 
form, no one would have been able to receive Him in the fullness 
(94) 
of His Deity. " Origen likewise says elsewhere that the brightness 
of IhE: Divine Light, this brightness being the Son (Heb. i. 3), at 
first falls softly and gently on the weak eyes of human beings, and 
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then gradually trains and habituates them, so to speak, to en6ure 
the Light in its full glory by removing all that obscures and hinders 
(95) 
their vision (cf. Matt. vii. 5). Origen elsewhere points out, with 
reference to the statement that 'Inc one knows the Son except the 
Father" (MELtt. Xi. 27), that no one can fully know the Son in His various 
aspects of wisdom, truth, and reason except Him from Whom thE bE*ir)g 
of the Son is derived. For this reason it was necessary that the 
Son of God should Ilempty Himself" of His majestic condition so as 
to become a man, and give evidence of His Divinity through thE words 
(96) 
of grace which He spoke and the extraordinary acts which He performed. 
But there are other passages Which seem to indicate that in 
OrigeD's view the self-emptying of the Divine Wcrd was on'y apparent. 
To put it crudely, it was not so much a case of trcivelling light 
as of travelling incognito, in the sense that a king remains what 
he is even though he disguiSE: s hin,; Eýlf for the purpose of kE-eping 
(97) (98) 
his subjects in ignoiýwmr. (Ie of His identity. In one passage the Divine 
nature of our Lord is regarded as in no way affected by thE' Incarnation, 
that is, by His assumption of huniar. nature and of the flesh whichi 
OSO 
according to St. Pat. ] lusts against the spirit. It is ýere as much 
as anywherE that Origen reveals hirtself as not being a systematic 
theologian, because he does not really attempt to reconcile the 
disparate elements of His thinking. I carl thus hardly agree with 
(100) 
Mme. Harl that "in Origen's coherent (if not organised) system, the 
lines of thought reveal themselves regarding alý-important problems. 
whatever may be the fluctuations or contradictions which the writer 
allows to exist among secondary hypotheses. " 
There are numerous examples of the way in which the Divine Nature 
of our Lord could exercise itself at will. Thus in various passages 
it is implied that He knew all the time what was going on in men's 
(101) 
minds, and therefore did not ask questions (when He did) in order 
(102) 
to gain information, but for some other reason. Thus when at Lazarus' 
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graveside He asked Martha whether she believed that He was what He claimed 
(103) 
to be - the Resurrection and the Life - He did not ask because He did 
not know, but so that we and those present could learn her state of 
(104) 
mind from her reply. Again, when He sat weary with His journey by the 
well of Sychar, although He thus showed that His body was liable to 
experience the feelings common to all human bodies, He was not ignorant 
of the impending arrival of the woman of Samaria who drew water from 
(105) 
the well, nor of the benefits which He was going to confer on her. 
Again, with reference to the statement in St. Matthew (xxiv. 36) that 
the Son of God does not know the hour when the final judgement will 
take place, Origen says that it is only as man that He does not know 
it, speing that He has the power not to know it. just as He has the power 
(106) 
to eat or drink! 
So far as human feelings are concerned, Origen in at least two 
passages takes refuge in paradox by asserting that the Word of God, 
though not liable to such feelings, did in fact experience them,. whether 
(107) 
they were feelings of compassion or feelings of pain. Indeed in another 
passage Origen roundly asserts that just as a shepherd will naturally 
feel compassion towards his own sheep, eve n so it is'characteristic 
of the Saviour of the world to be compassionate towards the product 
(108) (109) 
of His-=fashioning. As we shall see later, the problem of how feelings, 
however commendable, can be reconciled with the uachangeability of the 
Divine Word is one with which Origen never adequately copes. 
Again, it was only the flesh of Christ which was born of the 
Virgin Mary, just as it was only the flesh of Christ which suffered 
(110) 
death. Even when apparently in the womb of the Virgin Mary, He trans- 
mitted power through her to his cousin who was also in his mother's 
womb. When tempted, He made it clear to the devil that to Him, the 
OnlY-begotten Son of God, the prophecy that Divine protection would 
be afforded in the ýour of danger did not apply; if it applied at all, 
(112) 
it was to His human nature only. Likewise, even though it might-appear 
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that it would be easy for His enemies to arrest Him, they were incapable 
of doing so until the predestined time arrived (John vii. 30). And even 
when it did arrive, it is made abufidantly clear in the Gospel that if 
He had not wished to be taken ; captive, He would not have been taken 
captive; for when He announced to those who confronted Him that He was 
Jesus of Nazareth whom they were looking for, they went backward and 
(114) 
fell to the ground. 
Again, it was by the hidden power of His Divinity that He was 
(115) 
able to bend the elements of nature to His will. In a passage comm- 
enting on the stilling of the storm on the Lake of Galilee, Origen 
asserts that in the body Christ was asleep, but so far as His Deity 
was concerned, He was awake, and in fact caused the sea to be troubled 
so as to have the opportunity of displaying His power to His Apostles 
(116) 
by calming it again. So far as His own body was concerned, although 
He was prepared for food to be brought to Him, He did not Himself need 
(117) 
the nourishment which He bestowed on others. 
Finally, - and this is in some ways the most significant of Origen's 
attempts to assert the complete independence of the Divine Nature of 
Christ - Origen declares that Christ only gave up His life when He wished 
to give it up, unlike other men, who give up their life because it is 
(118) 
required of them. It was because He wished to make it clear to His 
disciples that the manner of His decease was exceptional that He said: 
"No one takes my vxrý from me, but I lay it down of my own free 
will" (John x. 18). None of the Old Testament worthies could have 
(119) 
said this: Jesus alone could say it. In fact His final words "Into 
Thy hands I commend my spirit" show that He gave up His life of His 
(120) 
own free will. 
All these considerations go to show that, as Origen says expli- 
(121) 
citly in one passage, He regards the Divine Nature of our Lord as 
in no way affected by the Incarnation, that is, by His assumption 
of human nature and of the flesh which according to St. Paul lusts 
(122) 
against the spirit. We can thus scarcely fail to agree with Eichinger 
119 
when he says that "there is no real unity in Origen's thought between 
the Divine Word and the human nature which He assumed. Hence in 
his Christology there is no real inner tension between the Divine 
and the human elements in Christ. In the last analysis the Divine 
Word, even in His revelatory function, remains unaffected by the 
(123) 
human nature which He assumed. " Or in Wintersig's words: "The 
Incarnation of the Word of God is for Origen not a genuine entry 
of the Word into the company of fallen humanity. " What Grillmeier 
(124) 
says of Clement of Alexandria is in fact equally true of Origen. 
He says that "if the Divine Word has personally taken up his dwelling 
in (the human) Christ, He must according to the Stoic-philonic teach- 
ing of Clement about the soul be the all-powerful Controller of the 
human nature of Christ. But where the prototype (i. e. the Word) 
appears, the image (i. e. the human soul) must necessarily lose its 
place and function. The TV 
/, 
the lower soul of Christ, remains Kýv 
entirely an instrument in the service of the governing Word of God... 
The power of the Word invades the corporeal nature of the Lord and 
transforms it .... The human soul of Christ can no longer have any 
genuine theological significance in such a presentation of Christ. 
A full understanding of the role of the humanity of Jesus in the 
work of human salvation is absent from the works of Clement. " 
In fact, 'dUring the incarnate life of Christ the Divine Nature 
was in control all the time, operating the human nature in the way 
in whic a marionette is operated. He thus did not need to discipline 
(125) 
Himself in the way in which John the Baptist needed to. Indeed, in 
one place Origen interprets the white horse on which the Word of 
God is said to ride in Rev. xix. 11 as being the body which He assumed 
and used for His own purposes, or else as being the life which He 
said Himself that He was able to lay down and take up again at will 
(126) 
(John x. 17). The purpose of this activity was that human beings 
should gradually come to recognise the Power that had descended into 
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human nature and human circumstances ( Irf(jrTAo-F4S and 
had assumed a human soul and body together with the Divine character- 
(127) 
istics in order to bring salvation to believers. Thus, with reference 
to the passage in Joshua where the Lord is said to have "exalted 
Joshua in the sight of all the people" (iv. 14), Origen says that 
in the presence of the Father Christ was always exalted and set on 
high, but that it was needful that He should be exalted in our sight 
also. This comes about when the sublimity of His Divine Nature is 
(128) 
revealed to us. 
Elsewhere, Origen asserts that though the immortal Word of 
God assumed both: ýa human body and a human soul, and might thus appear 
to be subject to change, the Word none the less. remains essentially 
the same, and undergoes none of the experiences of the body or the 
soul. In other words, the Divine Word cannot possibly experience 
the development of mind and spirit which marks the career of a normal 
human being. It is a matter of His coming down to the level of those 
who cannot look on the radiance of His Deity, and thus so to speak 
becoming flesh, until those who have accepted Him in this form are 
uplifted by Him so as to be able to contemplate Him in His chief 
%. "1 
(129) 
form (, fqý Elsewhere, Origen says that 
whereas it is chiefly the Father Who remains unchangeable (oýTpf-trq-o. S 
. "' 4k / and unalterable (CIAV a( tj -COS the Word of God also retains 
these characteristics, even if He becomes incarnate and lives amongst 
human beings. He is thus neither taken captive nor ever seen, but 
simply continues to urge everyone to drink of that inexhaustible 
(130) (131) 
fount of wisdom which He Himself is. Prat in his book on Origen 
remarks that "the distinction of the two natures Divine and human 
could not be more clearly expressed. The eternal Divine Word remain- 
ing what He was, and without any change on His part, takes a mortal 
body and a human soul capable of suffering. " Prat then goes on to 
say that "the interchange of qualities (communicatio idiomatum) which 
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is established between the two natures shows that the union is not 
accidental, but has for its result the bringing into being of a single 
(132) 
Person. " Mme. Harl on the contrary observes with some justice that 
Origen seems to evade rather than answer the question how the Incarn- 
ation can be reconciled with the changelessness of the Divine Nature. 
In fact, it is not really true that the Word became flesh: 
the Word of God, according to Origen, simply disguises Himself as 
a person made up of flesh and bones so as to enable those capable 
of it to penetrate beneath the imposture and discover the real Person. 
(133) 
Thus in Contra Celsum while he at first rejects the suggestion 
of Celsus that the Divine Word gives a false impression to those 
who see Him, he goes on to suggest that just as in medicine the patient 
may lawfully be misled for his own sake, the same may be true in 
(134) 
the process of salvation. Thus Origen states that in his exposition 
of doctrine it is his custom to say that Jesus Christ is not simply 
a man (Christum non purum hominem dicimus), but rather both God and 
Man. The suggestion is that Divinity and humanity are separate ele- 
- (135) 
ments which are somehow brought together in Jesus Christ. A striking 
(136) 
illustration of this view is forthcoming in the passage where Origen 
says that if the Saviour associates Himself. with those who are ignorant 
of the day and hour of the end of the world, that may be because 
the Son on His human side (homo, qui secundum Salvatorem (est)) is 
understood to have made progress beyond all others in knowledge and 
wisdom, but did not attain full maturity until He had fully accompl- 
ished His appointed task. Hence it is not remarkable if the day 
and hour of the end was the only thing He did not know before His 
final exaltation. Thus to the extent that the soul (anima) of Christ 
(137) 
was capable of developing, it was of one kind with all human souls. 
From what has been said so far, we can infer that, as Origen 
says, even though the prophets foretold that a certain "offulgence 
(138) 
and image" of the Divine Nature would come into human life together 
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with the incarnate soul of Jesus, these rays were not enclosed in 
the human Jesus alone, so that the light of the Divine Word, from 
(139) 
which these rays proceed, existed nowhere else. (Curiously enough'., 
Origen slips into the more primitive way of thinking about the Heavenly 
Christ when, in discussing the soul's progress through the heavenly 
spheres, he says that in fact Jesus Christ is everywhere and pervades 
all things, and we must thus no longer (nec ultra) think of Him as 
(140) 
being restricted to the limits within which He once lived on earth. 
This statement, taken by itself, appears to ignore the original omni- 
presence of the Divine Word before the Incarnation, and also to leave 
it an open question whether the omnipresence continued throughout 
the Incarnate Life. ) Likewise in De Principiis, Origen declares 
with reference to the Incarnation that we must not suppose that the 
Word of God, Who is also the Wisdom, Truth and Life of God, was separ- 
ated from the Father and confined within the compass of a human body 
in such a way that He existed nowhere else. Origen quotes the state- 
ment of John the Baptist "There stands one among you whom you do 
not know" (John i. 26) as showing that even though Jesus might not 
(141) 
be present in the body, He would be present invisibly. Likewise, 
if our Lord had asked the centurion why he had not brought his paralysed 
servant to be healed (Matt. viii. 6), the-centurion would have replied 
that there was no need to show his servant to One Who sees everything, 
nor to bring him into the presence of One Whose power is not limited 
(142) 
or enclosed or excluded from anything. Again, once our Lord had 
declared that the Canaanite woman's request on behalf of her sick 
daughter was granted, the healing was not delayed, for since He was 
e. 
(143) 
Divine, His word was effective everywhere Again, 
if Mary, the sister of Lazarus, said to our Lord "If you had been 
here.... 1.1, that shows that she and her sister had not made sufficient 
spiritual progress to know that He was in fact present invisibly; 
(144) 
for whether human beings are aware of it or not, He is among them. 
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Likewise, when discussing-the parable of a man going into a far 
(145) 
country, Origen says that although our Lord is compared to such a 
man, that does not contradict His omnipresence, because it was only 
as embodied that He became absent; as the Only-begotten Son of God 
Who is not confined within a body, He is present with all who are 
gathered in His Name (secundum hanc divinitatis suae naturam non 
peregrinatur, sed peregrinatur secundum dispensationem corporis 
(146) 
quod suscepit). When St. Paul says that while we are at home in 
the body, we are absent froM the Lord (II Cor. v. 6), it is only His 
humanity which is absent, for His Divinity is always with us, although 
(147) 
we may not be aware of it. Even when Jesus went away to suffer on 
the Cross, He remained invisibly with His disciples in order to keep 
(148) 
alive their faith even after they had seen Him die. 
Mme. Harl sums upývery-effectively what has been. said 
(149) 
in this section when she observes that Origen tends to think of the 
Incarnation as intended to be a sign of the spiritual activity of 
the Divine Word rather than a full realisation of that activity; 
indeed she goes so far as to say that Origen finds it hard to think 
of the Word of God as being genuinely present in the humanity of 
Christ. In fact, Origen's doctrine of the Incarnation appears to 
be of a definitely Docetic character, in so far as the Divine Word 
appears in different forms in the way in which an actor may change 
(150) 
from one suit of clothes to another. The strange conclusion is thus 
reached that the Transfiguration as narrated in the Gospels is the 
exact opposite of the truth, which was that so far from being changed 
into a more glorious form, the Divine Word allowed His true form 
to appear to those of His disciples who were qualified to apprehend 
it; whereas the people down below, who were unable to receive Him 
as He was, were content to say: "We saw Him, and He had no form or 
(151) 
beauty. " Thus Eichinger observes that Origen does not allow for 
the possibility of an actual process of Transfiguration in the case 
of our Lord, but only of a spiritual progress of human beings from 
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the apprehension of "the form of a servant" to that of "the form 
(152) 
of God. " He likewise says elsewhere that "the distinction affirmed 
by Origen between the forms of the Divine Word is not to be understood 
as a statement about the constitution of the Word Himself, but as 
a closer definition of the Word with reference to His revelatory. 
(153) 
function. " Miura-Stange puts the matter even more vividly when she 
says that "the true self-emptying of the Divine Word consists in 
the fact that He continually abandons His own Divine Being for in- 
dividual men, and takes on veil after veil of lowliness in order 
to minister to His creatures with a being which is not His own being. 
He is thus a complex formation of appearances which have only a rel- 
ative value; His true and absolute appearance we understand as little 
as we understand God Himself.... (Thus) the final form is always the 
Divine Word, which acts through all things and so shines through 
. all forms. A 'Gnostic' could always have seen God in the Jesus of 
the gospels. The Man would have dissolved as a cloud before his 
(154) 
deeper glance. " 
Origen himself says roundly that "the Word appears to each 
individual in the way most beneficial to the person himself, and 
(155) 
does not reveal Himself more fully than the viewer can. see. -, Him. II. _-__"_ 
Hence Peter was not allowed to stay on the mountain side in contemp- 
lation of the Divine Word, but was required to descend together with 
his Master so that His Master might be seen in the form in which 
(156) 
those below were able to see him - those who called Him "Son of David" 
and regarded Him indeed as the Christ, but knew Him only after the 
(157) 
flesh because they were still "babes" (VITIat). In fact the natural 
way in which Christ could begin to be known is as the Power and Wisdom 
of God; but because of our frailty we cannot begin to know Him in 
(158) 
that way, but only as the incarnate and crucified Christ. (It is 
to be observed, however, that in at least one passage Origen declares 
that it was only after the Crucifixion and Resurrection that Jesus 
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appeared in a way adapted to the capability of each person who saw 
(159) 
Him; before those events He appeared in the same way to all. On 
the other hand, this statement may simply be a concession to the 
traditional view of Jesus Christ. ) 
Origen elsewhere declares that the Word became flesh for the 
sake of those who through cleaving to the flesh had become us' flesh, 
and were thus incapable of seeing Him as He actually is - namely 
(160) 
as the Word Who is with God and is God. Grillmeier thus seems right 
(161) 
in observing that because in Origen's thought the Divine Word was 
regarded as the governing principle in the incarnate Jesus, "the 
genuine manhood of Jesus could never be fully appreciated. Body 
and soul appear in the last resort as transitory realities which 
are swallowed up in the Divinity. They were to so great an extent 
taken up into the Divinity of the Word of God that the Word ceased 
to be human. In particular, the distinctive act of the human Jesus, 
the saving death, was depreciated. " 
Again, Origen says that the Christian preacher needs to adapt 
his message to the state of mind of his hearers. If they are fleshly- 
Oe *% 
minded KIVOI we must preach the bodily gospel (e%jýýtt<, oV 
e-U, 4. in so far as we preach the Christ Who became incarnate 
and was crucified; but when they have progressed spiritually and 
desire heavenly wisdom, we must reveal to them the Divine Word Who 
(162) 
has been restored to His pre-incarnate state. In another passage, 
it is stated that those who are spiritually mature apprehend the 
glory of-the Divine Word and the fullness of the grace and truth 
with which He is endowed; but these things cannot grasped by those 
who require "the foolishness of preaching" (I Cor. i. 21) in order 
(163) 
to believe. 
(164) 
Crouzel seems to minimise the extent to which the Incarnate 
Christ should according to Origen be transcended in the spiritual 
progress of the believer. He says, in contradiction to Hanson, that 
religious experience does not dissolve the Incarnation, and that 
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"the Incarnation is not simply a means, a mere stage in the process 
of the Divine plan, but rather the unique fact whose consequences 
unfold until the second Coming of Christ.... If the facts of Christ': § 
life should be interpreted with reference to His presence in the 
heart of the Christian, if, that is, Jesus must be born and grow 
in each person as He was born and grew in His body and His human 
soul .... what is more appropriate than this to make plain the unique 
character of the Incarnation? " On the contrary, it appears to the 
present writer that the genuine development of the incarnate Jesus 
is something which it would be so awkward for Origen to admit that 
(165) 
on the whole he prefers to allegorise it. 
It is curious that Origen is prepared to admit that Judas himself 
recognisqd his Master's greatness, that is, the greatness of the 
wisdom and grace that was in Him, but none the less says that Judas 
did not see the full extent of it; otherwise he would not have betrayed 
(166) 
Him to His enemies. It is difficult to see how Origen can be acquitted 
(167) 
of the charge of trying to have it both ways in this passage. Crouzel, 
when he refers to Origen as saying that neither Pilate nor Judas 
nor the Jews who clamoured for our Lord's crucifixion saw God in 
Jesus, does not seem to have fully weighed the purport of this pass- 
age. 
But it is not just a matter of apprehending the Word as He 
originally was and as He again became after His earthly life: it 
is also a matter of being transformed into His likeness. The "meta- 
morphosis" which occurred in the case of the Son of God must also 
occur in the life of the believer. Thus Origen says that the Son 
assumed a physical form so that He might transform those whom He 
calls to Himself, first into the likeness of the Word Who became 
(168) 
flesh, and then introduce them to Himself as He was in the beginning. 
Thus it was that even during His sojourn on earth, He did not limit 
(169) 
Himself to His primary form, but led those who were qualified to 
the spiritual high mountain and showed them His glorious form and 
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(170) (171) 
the radiance thereof. There is a striking passage in Comm. in Rom. 
in which, with reference to the phrase "conformed to the likeness 
of the Son of God" (Rom. viii. 29), Origen says that those who love 
God and for whom all things therefore work together for good are 
conformed to the likeness of the Son in so far as He is in the form 
of God; in them are implanted the Divine qualities of Christ, His 
truth and wisdom and righteousness and all the others. Whereas those 
in the early stages of discipleship are conformed to the Word of 
God in so far as He is in the form of a servant,, because they "receive 
the primary elements of Divine knowledge in a spirit of fear. " Origen 
actually suggests that though Jesus Christ was still in His mother's 
womb when she visited the mother of John the Baptist, He conferred 
His own Divine form on His cousin, with the result that later on 
(172) 
one was confused with the other. In another passage Origen says 
that it was necessary for the Son of God to come in a lowly form 
so that He might introduce human beings to His glorious form and 
(173) 
indeed assimilate them to that form. For those who experience this 
second coming of the Word, the present age comes to an end, because 
in St. Paul's words "the world is crucified to the, and they to the 
(174) 
world. " 
The Transfiguration in fact seems to be treated allegorically 
rather than literally by Origen, in so far as he takes it as symbol- 
ising the spiritual ascent of the believer to a more enlightened 
(175) 
apprehension of the Divine Word. In fact any suggestion that God 
descended to this world should be interpreted as meaning that He 
concerned Himself with human problems. Thus the Divine Word did 
not really abandon His invisible condition when He took the form 
of a servant; even then He could be seen as what He really was by 
His chosen Apostles, but was seen as a mere man by the crowds and 
(176) 
Pharisees whose sins He reproved. Again, with reference to Matt. 
xvi. 28, Origen says that not all who stand by Jesus are said not 
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to be destined to taste death till they see the Son of Man coming in 
His kingdom. For when people are first introduced to Him, He does not 
appear glorious or great: only if they are prepared to follow Him up 
(177) 
the high mountain do they see His kingly glory. 
The full extent of Origen's Docetism is clearly seen when he states 
that the very body of Jesus appeared in such a form as was appropriate 
(178) 
to the individuals who saw it. The extraordinary result of this outlook 
is that Origen considers that the crowd led by Judas failed to recognise 
our Lord in the Garden of Gethsemane because He appeared in a form diff- 
1 (179) 
erent from that to which they were accustomed. Eichinger justly asks, 
(180) 
when discussing this passage, why our Lord should not have appeared 
to His captors in a form appropriate to them. It seems to be going 
(181) 
beyond the evidence, however, to say with Hanson that Origen thought 
it possible that "the Jesus of history could during His life on earth 
occasionally dissolve into the Jesus of religious experience. " That 
would be Docetism in a more extreme form even than that which Origen 
seems to adopt. 
It is also the case that in many passages Origen declares that 
it was not the Word of God Who became incarnate at all, but rather the 
pre-existent soul who had become spiritually united to Him, and to whom 
(182) 
alone it really appertained to be united to a human body. Only through 
the hypothesis of a pre-existent soul could Origen attempt to take account 
(183). 
of the human development of Jesus. In one fragment Origen says that. 
"there is such a Person as the Son of God, Who is the Image of the 
invisible God, and there is also an image of the Son of God, which we 
consider to be the human soul which the Son of God assumed, and which 
became through its virtue (AA -rrl, ( 
ýpC-rvj%l the image of the image 
(184) 
of God. " In another fragment he applied the first Psalm to the man 
%, -, eN 
Av&r6mu 
unmited to the Saviour ( -rou veL-r. Z. -rov 
Xru-r I? Pk / ), inasmuch as 
he abstained from evil and practised goodness, and hence became like 
(185 ýrouzel 
is really whitewashing iýo 4ý. oj 6j 6-6rl ) the Only-begotten Son. 
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(186) 
Origen when he says that "he has no clear idea of the concept of 'per- 
sonality', and therefore could not foresee the criticism which would 
be made of his conception of the soul of Jesus, in so far as he attr;, ib- 
uted to the Incarnate Word a double personality, that of the Word on 
the one hand, and on the other that of the man whose chief part is the 
soul as possessor of free will. " There is really no reason why we 
should regard Origen as incapable of understanding the meaning of 
(187) 
"personality. " Crouzel also says that although Origen's speculations 
about the soul of Jesus have a Nestorian appearance, that soul is no 
more than a metaphysical principle which does not imperil the unity 
of Christ's Person, as many passages bear witness (though the present 
writer would say that many passages would suggest the opposite). 
(188) 
A. Lieske seems to have grasped Origen's thought more fully when he 
says that "since the soul (of Christ) is one with the Divine Word, 
its entry into the material world implied the incarnation of the Son 
of God. " Through the soul the Divine Word. took human nature from the 
(189) 
Virgin Mary and was thereby united to a body. " As A. Grillmeier says: 
(According to Origen) the unity of Christ comes about in so far as the 
soul of Christ acts as intermediary between flesh and the Word, because 
these two cannot otherwise be united by the Platonic dualism of Origen. 11 
(190) 
In one passage Origen says that whereas the Word of God as spir- 
itual Bridegroom may havea number of brides, in so far as all rational 
beings have the power to apprehend Him, with the result that He takes 
them to Himself, none the less there is one soul which is called the 
perfect dove ( -Fele/ts-1- TCý&etc-C'Cre t-) because it receives special honour. 
(191) 
In another passage we learn that Origen considers that the man who was 
united to the Divine Son of God existed prior to his birth from the 
(192) 
Virgin Mary. Elsewhere, Origen says that "the man thought of as Jesus" 
A le (1-0 [XO<Tvt, To%-v 
')T 
6-01U'4 Voou rE: VL. S ) was not merely united with 
the Firstborn of all creation but in every respect became one with Him, 
inasmuch as he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit ITVC-ý 
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(193) 
with Him. ' Origen also says that since it is reasonable to suppose 
that each soul enters a body appropriate to it, it is probable 
that the soul of Jesus, seeing how beneficial its incarnate life was 
going to be, needed a body superior to all others. 
(194) 
In Hom. in Num. Origen compares Jesus Christ to Aaron who as priest 
"stood between the living and the dead" when a plague had broken out 
among the Israelites (Num. xvi. 46-48),: and likens the censer which Aaron 
held to the human flesh which Christ assumed, and the fire from off 
the altar which was put into the censer to "that stupendous human soul" 
(anima illa magnifica) with which He was born, and the incense to His 
(195) (196) 
"immaculate spirit. 11 Origen says elsewhere that this soul was inýits 
nature like our souls, but in intention and virtue like the Word of 
God Himself, and therefore such as could unfailingly carry out the 
plans and wishes of the Word Himself. It was this soul which Origen 
in one passage declares to have emptied itself and to have taken the 
form of a servant, "so that it might be restored to the form of God 
by superior examples and teachings, and recalled to the fullness of 
(197) 
which it had emptied itself. " This statement is somewhat puzzling, 
because it could be taken to emply that this soul became incarnate 
as a punishment for its disobedience, whereas in fact it descended 
to the human state for the sake of those who had fallen to that state. 
Presumably Origen means that though this soul became incarnate without 
being obliged, none the less it could not resume its original state 
until it had done all that was required for the salvation of human 
beings. 
It is to be observed, however, that Origen does not always express 
himself in such a way as to emphasise that it was not the Word of God 
Himself, but only the soul united to Him, which assumed a human body. 
Thus in one passage the Virgin Mary is spoken of as the mansion of 
(198) 
the Only-begotten Son and the house of God (domumý Dei). Elsewhere 
there is a reference to "Jesus the God" Who has arisen as a Light for 
131 
(199) 
those who sit in darkness. Again, Origen speaks of the just men of 
the Old Dispensation. as desiring to see what the Apostles saw, that 
is "God Who took human flesh" 6C-av evoc\f (, j tT vicr-AVToq , and to 
e% rVjo ' hear "the voice of God substantially united to flesh" ( 
Ocoo C F. %Iro 
IC -' 
(200) 
C"t, C t<L ý<OZ UT(0CrT-"k. C-(, 
/ ). Again, Origen declares that 
it must not be thought that He Who took human nature upon Himself is 
someone other than Him Who is invisible and extends to every man and 
zV (201) 
even to the whole world Ko VT-d- -ir-AVT-t- Z6f w lTo\, ' etc. . (202) 
There is one passage where the two ideas - that of God becoming man 
and that of a man being united to God - are combined inexplicably, 
as though Origen did not really know his own mind on this matter. 
First, he refers to the Word of God as having taken human flesh and 
having become to each created being what each required in order that 
the Word might gain them all, and then as having been restored to His 
original state of glory; but then he refers to "the man thought of 
as Jesus" \1 V, a (> U(ý--Cro who TO Vt --LTPI. -q 
became united to the Word of God to a-greater extent than anyone else 
did. 
One wonders whether the distinction made betwe, en the Son of God 
as Doctor and Shepherd and Redeemer on the one hand and Wisdom, Reason 
(203) 
and justice on the other corresponds to the distinction-between the 
human soul of Christ and the Divine Word Himself. I do not feel that 
(204) 
Laeuchli is right in dismissing this conjecture as readily as he does 
when he says that "the Son of God as Wisdom and Reason and Justice 
is only a part of Him Who made Himself incarnate in Jesus", and asserts 
that there is no question of "the incarnate Christ being subordinated 
to the timeless Word of God. " In fact Laeuchli hints at the end of 
the very same sentence that the reason why the Son of God bestows His 
help in different ways to different people is that the soul of Jesus 
is united to the Divine Word, the soul of Jesus assisting those at 
a lower stage of spiritual development, and the Divine Word assisting 
those at a higher stage. 
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Strictly speaking, however, it is inaccurate to speak of the 
"soul of Christ", although Origen freely uses the word "soul" 
n 
or anima), because according to him the "soul" is "mind" (""OuS) in 
its degenerate form, that is, mind which has gone astray from its Creator, 
or to put it another way, has "grown cold" in its love towards Him 
(hence the word ýJpj , derived, according to Origen, from 
ýU/X C- er IP "t 
(205) 
to grow cool). Whereas the soul of Christ had never lost its original 
(206) 
fervour, and hence remained united to Him. So it is only by an extension 
I 
of the meaning of the word 
TLWI, to indicate "mind" or "spirit" 
that the word can be used of the earthly agent of the Word of God at 
(207) 
all. 
The highest element in human nature is in fact called by Origen 
(208) 
indifferently TEV(;, jrýL or Vou-C. Thus he says that those who excelled 
in virtue are said in Scripture to have become Xot ý-CO-J& and to act 
no longer according to reason, and to have made earthly 
e% 
(209) 
the 1116-1 which is the chief part of them. Again, he asserts 
that the ýut which becomes because of sinj can be changed 
210) 
and become irVEorAcl. . He likewise asks what is more seemly than a I 
which is joined to the 1TVC--ircl, and united to it in, such a way that 
eN 
it no longer remains ýLI)C. Abut becomes what the -rC4C-Ur--I- is, Again, 
(211) 
it is said that the just man, though distinct from Christ, can be said 
to be one with Christ, the reference being to I Cor. vi. 17. For even 
though the just man is of an essence inferior to that of Christ, none 
-% 9% the less they form ev ITUC-Ut"d, Again, Origen says with reference 
to John xi. 38 that our Lord was distressed in spirit IrJe 
when he was at a distance from the tomb of Lazarus, but on drawing 
near to the tomb, He kept His distress within himself, so that we, may 
(212) 
learn that He became a man who was unchangeably like us. Again, when 
in I Sam. xxviii. 13 the witch of Endor stated that "she saw gods ascending 
(213) 
out of the earth", Origen refers to these beings as 
There are also passages where the highest element in man's nature 
is termed VOV5. Thus Origen says that "the tabernacle of the name 
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of God" is the VoGS of the individual, and that this is polluted when 
F 
(214) 
it becomes earthy ( Y)j01o5; in, -ýtead of heavenly (C-%ToueA, ýOcS 
Again, with reference to Luke xii. 35 "Let your lights (Av)(Vot 
be burning", Origen says that since our earthly life is as night, we 
need a candle or lamp, and this is provided by the VoVS., which is the 
(215) 
eye of the This statement is repeated and amplified 
in another fragment, where, with reference to Matt. vi. 22.23, Origen 
says that the VvG-9 is the eye not only of the rest of the tkuq but 
(216) 
of the body itself. Elsewhere Origen says that the Vovg only acquires 
full perception when it is a partaker of Him Who said "I am come into 
(217) 
the world as light. " In fact, it is incumbent upon us to take care 
'0 qC C% ?e 
of our faculty of understanding ( 'TýJý E-1( lirl\f voiTtK; 
ýý JJvA 
rk 
so thatthe VoOS may perform its intended function of enlightening 
(218) 
soul and body alike. How, asks Origen, did the two blind men recognisE 
Christ, if they did not have the mind (VoG%1) which led them to follow 
(219) 
the Gocd Shepherd? The Saviour Himself, says Origen, did not experience 
/I T6JN/ A', 101-k for even when the mindless state of infants (-rfe' 'c, 3, fý 
He was being suckled, He knew how to place His hope in Him Who had 
(220) 
taken Him from His mother's womb. 
It would seem that Crouzel does not fully establish his contention 
.1 el that Origen distinguishes -M4futx, -A. from VvVS in the sense that he regards 
(221) 
as "the Divine element present to the soul. " The passages 
just referred to hardly seem to give him much support. He says elsewhere: 
"We scarcely any text which attributes intellectual functions to the 
. fr ^ 4E or- d, it is represented as exterior to the soul which should 
be conformed to it. The VOUS and the ýro/o_ý in each person stand 
for the superior and spiritual (11pneumatique" in the French) part of 
n 
(222) 
the soul, that which conforms itself to the The passage 
(223) 
which Crouzel quotes from De Oratione which appears to distinguish 
V005 from Vr'ffuý, Asurely means by%touS something different from what 
Origen normally means, i. e. it means "intelligence" in the ordinary 
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(224) (225) 
sense. Nor do I think that Dupuis really proves that there is a firm 
q 91 distinction between 1CV(: L1t-AandVauS in Orjgc: n's thought. He asserts, 
with Crouzel, that the ITV6u(---l- is "the Divine element present to 
(226) 
the soul", and also describes it as "a gift of grace. " But surely 
whether the Divine gift is present to the soul depends on whether the 
soul is prepared to receive it. It can thus be bestowed or withdrawn; 
(227) 
it is certainly not an inalienable part of the human personality. 
(228) 
Dupuis similarly tries to have it both ways when he says that "on the 
one hand, thE: 1XVfCV(--tCX- is the Divine element present in man, and on 
the other, as the highest element in his threefold constitution, it 
(229) 
belongs to him as his own. " Rusche, in his "Das Seelenpneuma", rightly, 
in my view, identifies VVEv tl-4" with VoVS. He also does this in 
(230) (231) 
his "Blut, Leben, und Seele. 11 Ruis-Camps says that Origen, even when 
he uses Platonic terms, confers a new content on them, and thus, by 
% .1 "1 z 
identifying T-4, VOJTr-1- with he makes the Biblical 
(232) 
sense prevail over the philosophical. 
It is also worth referring to Origen's two interpretations of 
the parable of the unjust stewards, who are said to be "cut asunder" 
and "their portion" to be "placed with the unbeliever's" (Luke xii. 46). 
In the first interpretation, he again uses the word "soul', of the spirit 
of man in its unfallen state, when he says that if a spiritual gift 
has not been used as it should be, the gift of the Holy Spirit will 
be withdrawn from a man's "soul", and the portion which remains, i. e. 
the essence of the soul, with be placed with the unbelievers, now that 
it has been cut asunder from that Divine Spirit with which it ought 
(233) 
to have been united. But it is surely a straining of language to suggest 
that the spirit of man and the Divine spirit are united in such a manner 
that the resultent entity can be split into portions; in fact this 
is a thoroughly materialistic attitude. 
In the second interpretation, he makes a distinction between 
the two portions of the soul itself, the better portion being that 
which was made in the image of God, and the other portion being that 
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which "was received" (adsumpta est) in a condition contrary to the 
(234) 
nature of its original purity. But here again, it is utterly incongruous 
to conceive of the spirit of man as itself divided into portions; Origen's 
avowed doctrine in fact is that the spirit itself degenerates through 
the misuse of freewill, and is thus changed into something which can 
be called "soul", because the ardour of its love for Gcd has cooled. 
Once again, Origen slips into the habit of naming "soul" what was orig- 
(235) 
inally unfallen. 
(236) 
Verbeke refers to this passage in his book, but in my opinion 
does not draw the right conclusions from it. It is not the case that 
n 
a portion of the TT%-ff-Ur, -A, becomes cold and is thus imprisoned in 
(237) 
the body: the entire becomes cold in the love of God, 
and the lower soul is thus added, i. e. that element which is susceptible 
Ift to higher and lower suggestionE., i. e. from the TrV&O r-1-- and from 
(238) 
respectively. The lower is not "the source the 
(239) 
of evil tendencies"; Origen makes it clear that the source of these 
tendencies is the flesh, and the lower soul simply responds or not 
as it is inclined. It might indeed appear that according to Origen 
(240) 
the lower soul is a "material breath" if attention be'paid only to 
(241) (242) 
De Princ. III. 4.2; but if we read further on in the chapter, we realise 
that it is only called "material" because it comes into being toget. hE: r 
with the body, and we also realise that in fact it is not the seat 
of the bodily desires; it simply responds to them favourably or unfav- 
ourably. 
There are two other passages in which Origen overlooks the strict 
doctrine that the spirit of man in its unfallen state should be termed 
and only becomes when its love of God has grown 
cold. In one of them, with reference to Lamentations i. la, he ccmpares 
the city of Jerusalem to thE rjxvt the multitude of its people 
to the richness of its contemplations, and the multitude of the nations 
to the abundance of its good deeds. The nc-w sits solitary, 
because she, thE! bride, is separated from the Word, her Bridegroom, 
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(243) 
and has thits become avidow. Again, the di-s-cil-les of Christ arc- said 
to have been, so to speak, His q)-Jýk and thus at. the time of His 
Passion they are said to have grown sick and thus to have sinned by 
(244) 
forsaking Him, and Peter in particular by denying Him. 
On the other- hand, in De Orat, Or-jgc! n states that. the soul which 
ascends to a higher 1E-vel an6 follows afier thE Spirit of God and is 
emancipated from the body ceaE; es to be a soul an6 becomes spiritual 
(245) (246. ) 
I VV &, )r .1 T- IK). V81ker quotes this passage as showing 
that the same thing happens to the fully-developed Christian as to 
thE! Lord Himself, in so far as the Lord's became -Fl/%_oýj. And 
I 
yet it had never really degenerated into. the ccDdition of being a 
. ý. j tII the because its original ardour continited unabated. Anu 
conclusion certainly dces nct follow that th(! Lord's 4 lost its 
identity and was absorbed into His Divinity, any more than the hunian 
/ 
(247) 
_rpý is. Again, in Exhort. ad Mari-.. Origen reccmmends those to whorr. 
he writes to lose their souls by enduring martyrdom so as to save them 
(248) 
and even receive them back as scmething better than a soul. Elsewhere 
in the same treatise, he asks; "How can the soul be slain when it has 
(247) 
been given life by the very fact of max-tyrdom? " 
However, in one Greek passage which refers to what is commonly 
called "the soul of Cbrist" the word VoV. 5 (mind) is actually used, 
as appropriate to a b-E: ing who "remainE! d steadfast ir the love, and contemp- 
(250) 
lation of God. " It is also worth noticing that Origen mcd-ifies his 
strict doctrine of the placing of individual spirits in positions of 
service appropriate to their degree of nearness to God or departure 
from God when he says that "some beings who are of higher merit are 
required to suffer with the rest and to perform a duty to those below 
them for the sake of improving the state of the world (ad exornandum 
(251) 
mundi statum)-11 In certain places this seems to be asserted of the 
heavenly bodies; but with vastly more reason could it be asserted of 
the "soul of Christ", which of all creatures did not deserve of itself 
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(252) 
to enter the material world and endure the hardships resulting therefrom. 
On the other hand,. some of the statements which Origen makes about 
the incarnate soul of Christ are not very easy to reconcile, at any rate 
if taken in their prima facie sense, with the statements he makes about 
that soul in its pre-incarnate state. Thus he says that after the Incarn- 
ation the soul and body of Jesus became very closely united with the 
Divine Word. Origen cites the instance of the believer who according 
to St. Paul is "one spirit" with the Lord (I Cor. vi. 7), and then suggests 
that in a superior and more Divine way, that which was at one time a 
(253) 
composite being in relation to the Word of God became one with Him. 
This statement only becomes compatible with Origen's doctrine of the 
indissoluble union existing between the pre-incarnate soul of Jesus and 
the Divine Word if we understand it as meaning that before the Incarnation 
the Divine Word did not use the soul and body of Jesus as His instrument 
in the way He did afterwards. 
(254) 
Aeby in his article "Les missions divines", while he refers to the 
chapter in Contra Celsum in which this statement is contained, does 
not attempt to deal with the difficulty which the statement raises: he 
contents himself with saying that "by the entire adhei3ence of the soul 
of Christ to the Divine Word, it becomes the indispensable link which 
unites the Divine and human natures of Jesus. " P. Nemeshegyi-interprets 
this passage as meaning that the union of the soul of Christ with the 
Divine Word was increased by the accomplishing of Christ's redemptive 
(255) (256) 
work. But Origen has said in De Princ. that the human soul of Jesus 
(257) 
was fully united to the Word of God even in its pre-existent state. 
(258) (259) 
Refoule refers to the excerpt from Justinian's letter to Mennas 
where the human Jesus is said to have "become Christ" by reason of his 
goodness (Ps. xlv. 7 is quoted here) as proving that he was anointed with 
the oil of gladness because he loved righteousness and hated iniquity. 
But whereas this passage by itself might naturally be interpreted of 
the incarnate Jesus, the context shows that it refers to the pre-existent 
soul which continued steadfast in its adherence to the Divine Word. 
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Such a notion appears to leave no room for the idea of development of 
(260) 
character in the incarnate Jesus. 
It is curious that Origen regards the human Jesus as at certain 
times speaking in his own person, and at other times as a mouthpiece 
of the Divine Word. Thus Origen regards our Lord's words "I am the Way, 
the Truth, and the Life" as only referring to the Divine element of His 
nature; whereas when He said "But now you seek to kill me, a man who 
has told you the truth", He was referring to Himself as a man enclosed 
(261) 
in a fleshly body. In fact, our Lord is described in this passage also 
(262) 
as a "composite being", but here in the sense that He was not a single 
personality, but rather consisted of the Word of God and a human soul 
(263) 
used as His agent. The same idea seems to be suggested in the passage 
(264) 
in Contra Celsum, where the Being to Whom the wise men offer6dgifts 
is said to have been "a combination of God and mortal man" (--j (6L 
(265) 
k< 6 ro) eýýt It-40P*, JTTO'-) ý91e, JTOr, )). Nemeshegyi seems to be in error when 
(266) 
he suggests that whereas the Father is a Being distinct from the Son 
and vice versa, the "man" in Jesus is not a being other than the Word, 
i. e. they are not distinct in essence, but only as different aspects 
of the same being. Some passages in Origen's works rhight suggest this 
(267) 
view; but it certainly does not appear to be the main outlook of either 
De Princ. or Contra Cels. Indeed, Nemeshegyi himself suggests that Origen 
(268) (269) 
thought otherwise at times. The same criticism can be made of Lieske, 
when he asks the question whether the union of the soul of Christ and 
the Divine Word is a matter of the union of the Divine and human natures 
in a single person, or whether it is a matter of a moral union of two 
persons, the Word of God and the man Jesus? The phrase C'"06TOV K 
as used in Contra Cels. I. 66 (referred to in n. 263) suggests the second 
answer. 
Again, Origen points out that although the Synoptists represent 
Jesus as being tempted by the devil, St. John, who described His "spiritual 
nature", does not speak of Him as being tempted, because the Truth, 
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the Life, and the Resurrection cannot be tempted. He was tempted in 
(270) 
the human nature which He had assumed (secundum hominem quem susceperat). 
Likewise, in reply to the suggestion of Celsus that a man who was Divine 
could not be led away under arrest or be betrayed and deserted by His 
companions, Origen asserts that neither the body nor the soul 
of Jesus was Divine, the soul of which He said "My soul is exceeding 
sorrowful even unto death"; it was rather the Word Who spoke in Jesus, 
(271) 
saying "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life", Who was Divine. The 
suggestion seems to be that the human Jesus was a uniquely inspired 
man through whom the Word of God spoke, just as He spoke through the 
Jewish prophets. This is presumably the notion which prompted Origen 
to interpret as referring to Christ the passage in Psalm x1v where 
the tongue of the person addressed is said to be "the pen of a ready 
(272) 
writer", and "grace" is said to have been "poured on his lips. " 
(On the other hand, in one passage Origen appears to accept the view 
that it was the Divine Word Himself Who towards the time of His death 
(273) 
was so distressed as to utter the words quoted above; but perhaps 
Origen is simply stating the apparent meaning of the Gospel in order 
to introduce his own interpretation later in the same chapter. ) 
Again, it seems obvious, says Origen, that when the prophets 
spoke of the Suffering Servant as "having no form of comeliness" and 
as "a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief", they were not foretell- 
(274) 
ing the crucifixion of God Himself. Likewise, Origen says elsewhere 
that although the Saviour suffers all that His Body the Church suffers 
- hunger, thirst, sickness - He cannot suffer anything so far as His 
(275) 
Divinity is concerned. In another passage, Origen quotes the text 
"He Himself took our weaknesses and bore our diseases" (Matt. viii. 17), 
and interprets these weaknesses as being those of the hidden man of 
our heart (I Peter iii. 4), but at the same time says that it was His 
which was distressed and troubled (Mark xiv. 34) as the result 
(276) 
of the weaknesses and diseases of which He has relieved us. With 
reference to the parallel passage in St. Matthew (xxvi. 37), where 
140 
it is said that "He began to be sad and distressed", Origen agr 
% 
ees 
that our Lord shared in human nature to the extent of beginning : to 
Iýe distressed and afraid, so that He might show His. disciples ýhat 
He Himself needed the help of God because of the weakness of the flesh; 
but Origen none the less stresses that His Divine Nature was far removed 
(277) 
from feelings of distress or fear. -In the same way, although Origen 
thinks that the words of Jeremiah "Woe is me, mother, that you have 
borne me as a man who is condemned and judged by all the earth! " (xv. 10) 
can fittingly be applied to the Saviour, none the less it is as man, 
not as God, that He says this, 'because His soul was human, 
and could therefore be troubled and distressed, whereas the Word Who 
(278) 
was with God in the beginning could not undergo'these feelings. Again,. 
(279) 
Origen. 
-states 
that when at the time of His Passion Satan and his minions 
made war against the Saviour, His soul was distressed in 
a human fashion not because He feared death, th6ugh 
this would have been human, but because He feared defeat. Fbr 
Christ allowed this to undergo the feelings natural to it, and 
therefore His ftyk was grieved and distressed, though not overwhelmed 
by the distress, because it was only momentary. 
Again, in, Comm. in Matt. Origen goes to great pains to point out 
that it was our Lord's human nature which quailed at the prospect of 
the Passion. It was because of His human nature that he began to be 
sorrowful and afraid, and it was because of His human nature that He 
asked for the cup of suffering to be taken from Him. Origen interprets 
the crucial passage 11 .... not as I will, but as Thou wilt" 
(Matt. xxvi. 39) 
by attributing it not to His Divine and impassible nature, but to his 
(280) 
human and frail nature. Origen has already said that Christ led His 
three disciples near to where He prayed in Gethsemane so that they 
might recognise that human power to endure suffering comes from God 
(281) 
alone, and is only bestowed in answer. to prayer. 
Origen also makes it clear that after the death of our Lord on 
the Cross, it was His which entered the realm of departed spirits. 
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Even if the Saviour appeared to sleep in death, that sleep was not 
a state in which His y1VXj was inactive; it was only His body which 
(282) 
ceased to be used. It was thus as adisembodied that He associated 
(283) 
with departed spirits and converted some of them. This ministry of 
reconciliation, says Origen, was actually suggested to the Saviour 
(284) 
by the Divine Word. And even now it is the of Jesus which complains 
(V 51) 
of the ingratitude of those for whom He died. 
It is worth remarking that in De Princ. Origen points out that 
the intervening agent through whom the Son of God entered into human 
life is differently referred to in different contexts. When it is 
a question of suffering or distress befalling Him, the name used is 
I'soullf, as in John xii. 27, Matt. xxvi. 38, and John x. 18; but when the 
reference is to something unconnected with suffering or distress, the 
word used is "spirit", as in Luke xxiii. 46 and Matt. xxvi. 41. On the 
other hand, the words which follow, i. e. "From which it appears as 
though the soul were something intermediate between the weak flesh 
and the willing spirit", suggest that the word "soul" may here be used 
as meaning one part of a tripartite personality; but that is not the 
way in which the phrase "the soul of Christ" is normally used in Origen's 
(286) 
writings. Curiously enough, in one passage Origen makes use of the 
idea of the idea of the soul as something liable to suffer as a means 
of suggesting that "the soul of God", which is occasionally mentioned 
in the Bible, is His Only-begotten Son, in so far as it was He Who 
descended to this vale of tears and woe. But that immediately brings 
back the idea of the Word of God as having directly become incarnate 
(287) 
as the Father's Representative. 
So far as his general outlook is concerned, however, Origen does 
(288) 
not altogether escape the reproach levelled by Nemeshegyi against 
the God of the Platonists in so far as that God was thought of as "lack- 
ing a genuine love of the world, and a genuine personal interest in 
human affairs .... He resembles a splendid object of which one takes 
possession, rather than a living God-Who makes an appeal to us.... 
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The idea that this God should reveal Himself to man by a personal 
intervention in history was inconceivable for Greek philosophy. " 
Nemeshegyi later in his book displays the ýontradiction in Origen's 
thought on this point when he says that according to Origen, "even 
to this perfect God one thing is lacking, i. e. the salvation of man 
(289) (290) 
and of all other rational creatures. " Miura-Stange points out that 
the manhood of Jesus was an embarrassment to Origen when it was a matter 
of proving His Divinity, as is shown by his complaint against Celsus 
(291) 
that Celsus keeps silence about what reveals His Divinity, and yet 
continually reveals what appertains to the manhood (in particular, 
the Agony in Gethsemane), even though the Gospel writers could have 
(292) 
kept silent about it if they had not been such lovers of truth. 
It is thus not surprising that Origen should make the very reveal- 
ing statement that "there is a quite different account to be given 
of the Divine Person and His essence from the one to be given of His 
(293) 
human nature. " This suggests the Nestorian doctrine of a human being 
united spiritually to the Divine Word, with the exception that in Origen's 
view the human soul of Jesus was already united to the Divine Word 
before the Incarnation, whereas in the Nestorian view this union only 
gradually came about during the earthly life of Jesus. Origen thus 
declares that although originally there was a distinction between the 
soul of Jesus and the Divine Word, they became joined together so clesely 
that the relation of the one to the other is no longer that of two 
(294) (295) 
separate beings. VO'lker uses this passage as a means of establishing 
his contention that the union between the Word of God and the soul 
of Jesus was more than purely ethical; but the metaphor used by Origen 
and quoted by V61ker on the very same page, that of marriage, to describe 
that union, would seem to show that in Origen's view the two entities 
retained their separate natures, the soul not being absorbed into the 
Word, even though it is in perfect harmony with the Word. Refoule 
(296) 
observes on the contrary that "it was not possible for Origen to explain 
satisfactorily the union of the human and Divine natures of Christ. 
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In the Conversations with Heraclides he criticises Adoptionism as 
an impious doctrine. He also affirms in various places that 'the 
man in Jesus' is not a being other than the Divine Word, that they 
are not distinct from each other except as different 'aspects' of 
the same unique being .... Itremains true, however, that Origen could 
not conceive the union of the pre-existent soul of Chirst with the 
Divine Word otherwise than on the lines of mystical union .... This 
union attains in Chirst so high a degree of intensity that the soul 
loses its individuality and is blended with the being of God; but 
it does not appear that Origen regarded this union as strictly speaking 
ontological. He remains dynamic in his outlook. To put it another 
way, the union between Christ and the Word is, when strictly defined, 
(297) 
a moral union. " 
This is certainly the impression we gain from the statement 
by Origen that in so far as Jesus was a man who above all others 
was "adorned by sublime participation in the very Word and Wisdom 
(298) 
Himself, He endured as a wise and perfect man all that was needed 
(299) 
for the sake of human beings. " In the same way, when it is stated 
that the Word of God came to the prophet Ezekiel, Origen declares 
that this formula can be used of the Saviour Himself, if one thinks 
of the Word of God, Who always remained in the Father, as coming to 
him who was born of a Virgin, i. e. the man Jesus, so that both might 
be one, and so that the man whom He had put on (induerat) for the 
sake of the salvation of mankind should be united to the nature of 
(300) 
the Only-begotten Word of God. 
Curiously enough, when Origen discusses the Incarnation in De 
Princ. he claims that his purpose is not to divide the personality 
of Christ, but rather to show how each nature - Divine and human - 
can exist in one and the same person ( in uno eodemqu ), without 
anything incongruous being ascribed to the Divine nature, and without 
(201) ' 
regarding the events of His earthly life as being illusory. In fact, 
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however, Origen cannot manage to bring the two elements together without 
interposing a "soul" Which can somehow reconcile them within itself. 
Thus Origen says that this soul is entitled to be called both "Son 
of God" and "Son of Man", both "Christ" and "Jesus", according to 
the aspect from which it is viewed. In particular, it can thus be 
said that the Son of God died, and that the Son of Man will come again 
(302) (303) 
in the glory of the Father. On the other hand, in Exh. ad Mart. Origen 
quotes our Lord as saying in St. Matthew's Gospel with reference to 
the man who acknowledges Christ by dying for His sake, I will also 
acknowledge him before my heavenly Father" (x. 32), whereas the words 
as given in St. Luke are "Him shall the Son of Man also acknowledge 
before the angels of God" (xii. 8); and he thus concludes that it is 
the Word Who is the Image of God Who will acknowledge His disciple 
before the Father, whereas it is the man who was born of human stock 
and became the agent of the Word who will acknowledge his disciple 
before the angels. 
(304) 
As has already been stated, Origen also believed that the Divine 
Word did not cease to be omnipresent because of the Incarnation, which 
is another sign that Origen did not regard any genuine "self-emptying" 
as having taken place. ' Thus he states that He Who said "I am the 
Way, the Truth, and the Life" was not circumscribed in such a manner 
that the Word did not exist anywhere outside the soul and body of 
(305) 
Jesus. Elsewhere, it is suggested that Jesus has not been assigned 
any particular place like the gods mentioned by Celsus who possess 
(306) 
human form, but rather "pervades the entire world", and gathers together 
by the power of His Divine Nature any whom He finds to be inclined 
(307) 
towards living the good life. 
There are numerous passages which emphasise a cardinal element 
in Origen's thought, namely that it is degrading for an immaterial 
spirit to become encased in a body and experience the feelings associated 
with the body, but that none the less the soul of Jesus consented 
to do so, seeing that it was inconceivable that the Divine Word Himself 
1 14') 
should descend to such a state. 
Thus Origen speaks of the Divine Word as "bringing down" a Saviour 
to the human race, that Saviour being the soul of Jesus, which did 
not undergo any change of essence, but was none the less affected 
by the body and the surroundings which it entered. That soul was 
not, however, brought down without it-- own consent; rather, of his 
own free will he descended into our midst and accepted the miseries 
(308) 
of humanity for our sakes. We may observe that this can be regarded 
as the supreme example of what OrjVt. n describes as the appointed 
destiny of certain superior souls, namely that they should descend 
to a lower level than that to which their merits entitle them in order 
to minister to the needs of souls inferior to them, so that (in Origen's 
words) "they may thus become sharers in the endurance (patientiae) 
(309) 
of the Creator. " Elsewhere, Origen says that the words recorded in. St. 
(310) 
John's Gospel "I did not come of my own accord, but the Father sent me, " 
were spoken by the soul of Jesus, who, though it left nothing to be 
desired, none the less came forth from God as God's messenger, and 
took human flesh; whereas other souls do. not c, ome in this way 
from God, that is, they are not sent in a. ccordance with God's 
(311) 
will. For instance, those unseen powers who lead astray those little 
ones who believe in Jesus are liable to be saddled with a mortal body 
which weighs down the soul, so that in this way their pride may be 
(312) 
humbled and they may thus derive spiritual profit. 
It was thus from the Divine Word that the human soul of Jesus 
derived the power of converting and healing and improving the human 
(313) 
race. In discussing the utterance 110 my Father, if it be possible, 
let this cup pass from me" and the words-which follow, an utterance 
which above all others bears witness to our Lord's participation in 
feelings natural to human beings, Origen stresses that the Lord was 
speaking in His humanity, and thus revealing both the weakness of 
(314) 
the flesh and the willingne ss of the spirit. Elsewhere, Origen makes 
the significant statement that Pilate had power over Chrýistls human 
(315) 
nn-17--alone- hP-r-allse it was not consistent with the diqnity of the 
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(316) 
Divine Word to become subject to a human governor. Likewise, Origen 
condemns the suggestion of Celsus that Christians consider Jesus 
as God when He is being tortured and punished. The truth rather 
is, says Origen, that the Divine Nature of Jesus is not susceptible 
(317) 
to these experiences. 
On the other hand, Origen seems on occasion to think that it is 
to make too great a dichotomy between our Lord's Divine Nature and 
His human nature to say that as Divine He is devoid of feelings. 
For the Saviour, he says, descended to the earth out of pity for 
mankind, and thus underwent our feelings before He condescended to 
take upon Himself our flesh. His precise words are: "Primum passus 
est, deinde descendit et visus est. " Origen goes on to say that 
the Father Himself is not without feelings, because if prayer is 
made to Him', He feels our pain, and experiences those feelings which 
are strictly out of keeping with the grandeur of His Nature - feelings 
(318) 
which are properly human. 
(319) 
Adolf Primmer discusses at length the whole subject of the 
(320) 
impassibility of the Father and the Son. Primmer seems to think that 
this quality is safeguarded if Divine compassion is not thought of 
so much as a feeling, but is rather thought of as an attitude which 
shows itself in action; but is it possible to make an absolute dis- 
(321) 
tinction of this kind? It is interesting that he points out that 
the Stoics insist on the universal activity of the Logos as Reason, 
and thus deprecate emotion as irrational and therefore as hindering 
the undisputed sway of the Logos; but surely emotion is one aspect 
of the activity of the Logos itself? 
(322) 
Later in the thesis Primmer shows how Origen is as it were 
caught on the horns of a dilemma. In so far as he starts from the 
conception of an impassible God, he must inevitably think of the 
Son as also impassible. Whereas if he thinks of the Son aS affectiýd 
by the sin and suffering of the world, he is bound to transfer these 
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feelings to the Father Himself, because Father and Son co-operate 
for the salvation of the world in the closest possible manner. This 
realy shows the fatal defect in Origen's soteriological system, in 
so far as he starts from assumptions which do not harmonise with 
(323) 
all the facts. Perhaps the solution of the dilemma (which Primmer 
does not seem to indicate) is that although there is feeling in God, 
it is always obedient to right reason, and is therefore not allowed 
to manifest itself in an uncontrolled manner, as it so often does 
(324) 
in-human beings. 
Fannenberg likewise indica tes the dilemma in which Origen involved 
(325) 
himself when he says that "the concept of a God Who is by nature 
immutable ... constitutes the background for the idea of the impassibility 
of God which so fatefully determined the Christology of the early 
Church right down to the theopaschitic controversy. " Later on, Pannenberg 
(326) 
observes that "immutability, timelessness, simplicity, propertylessness, 
and. namelessness have repeatedly forced the concept of God into an 
unbridgeable distance from the contingent changes of historical reality 
in which the salvation of man is decided, and. the assertions of faith 
regarding God. 1s historical acts of salvation were pur6hased only 
at the expense of violating the strict sense of those attributes. " 
It seems at this point worth analysing further Origen's concep- 
tion of the personality of the Incarnate Jesus with reference to 
(327) 
the chapter in De Princ. discussing the question whether each individual 
has two souls. It is true that Origen does not profess at the end 
(328) 
of the chapter to come to any definite conclusion; but his outlook 
as expressed elsewhere seems to necessitate the doctrine of two souls, 
It 
the higher of which can be called "spirit" and existed 
before the body, and the lower of which is produced by the generative 
(329) 
processes by which the body itself was produced. Origen's discussion 
of the way in which this doctrine can be reconciled with St. Paul's 
statement that flesh and spirit war against each other (Gal. v. 17) 
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is extremely involved and difficult; but it does seem to emerge that 
in Origen's view the lower soul has no will of its own other than 
the desire to remain inactive, and thus either conforms to the will 
of the spirit or else yields itself up to that of the flesh, the, 
will of the flesh consisting not only of the desires closely associated 
with the body but also the other feelings listed by St. Paul under 
(330) 
the heading of "works of the flesh" (Gal. v. 19-21). 
It remains to indicate in more detail by reference to other 
passages in the works of Origen how -TrVC-Uý&ý and are related 
(331) 
to each other. In Comm. in Joh. he enquires why in one place it 
is said that our Lord was troubled in, 
. 
His ýUX'rj 
(332 
and in another 
r% 
(333) 
that He was troubled TTý TTV6V(, -LT-L He first says that 
Scripture makes a distinction between. ff%fc-ut-ot- and uprL (one 
wonders whether the distinction is everywhere observed! ) and that 
whereas the JTVEur, ý- does not admit of anything evil, the is 
regarded as morally ambiguous, i. e. as admitting of both virtue and 
vice, for the noblest things are said in Scripture to be the "fruits 
of the spirit" (which Origen interprets here as meaning the human 
spirit), whereas the "works of the flesh" carried out as the result 
of the subservience of the to the flesh are said to be altogether 
blameworthy. Now in the Incarnate Jesus the jX\rCUtx-L- was in 
perfect control of all the other elements of His nature; and so when 
it is said that "He was troubled q-L-1 <Nf the meaning 
L 
is that the feeling of distress was perfectly under the control of 
His jrVI-U A. Granted, the feeling itself could be said to have r 
originated in His To )(Vý but it was not allowed to develop 
(334) 
beyond due limits. 
There are also certain passages in Comm. in Rom. where Origen 
expounds the view of the q)u)(vk as being intermediate between 1-kTf-ýVtLOL- 
and In one place he says roundly that the spiritus is 
a higher part of human nature than the anima, and it is thus the 
spiritus to which the Spirit of God is said to bear witness in Rom. viii. 
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(335) 
16; elsewhere he declares that the anima, which is intermediate between 
(336) 
flesh and spirit, can ally itself to either of these two elements. 
Again, with reference to Rom. i. 9, Origen points out that St. Paul 
says that he serves God not in the body, nor in the anima, but in 
(337) 
the highest part of his being, i. e. the spiritus. Again, Origen 
identifies "conscience" to which St. Paul refers as that which rebukes 
deeds that are bad with the spiritus which co-exists with the anima 
and is meant to instruct it and to rebuke it when necessary. In 
those who are righteous, the anima is joined to the spiritus and 
is obedient to it in all things; but where the anima is disobedient 
and insolent towards the spiritus, it is divided from it at death. 
This is how Origen interprets the passage in Luke xii. 46, where it 
is said of the evil servant that the Lord on His return will divide 
(338) 
him and appoint his portion with the urbelievers. In a curious 
interpretation of Rom. xiii. 1, Origen suggests that only the anima, 
not the spiritus, could possibly be recommended to be subject to 
earthly powers; it is only to the Lord Himself that the spiritus 
can be said to be subject. The anima is only bidden to be subject 
to the powers of this world if our anima is still linked in some 
way to this world and so not completely under the dominion of the 
(339) 
spiritus. 
Origen also has much to say about the problem of freeing the 
anima from its entanglement with the flesh and subordinating it to 
(340) 
the spiritus. It almost appears from some passages as though the 
anima is like a rope in a tug-of-war, in so far as both spiritus 
and caro seek to gain possession of it. The is also compared 
to a woman who is the object of seduction, in so far as Origen thinks 
of the "law of the flesh" mentioned in Rom. vii. 23 as something which 
, 
(341) 
commits adultery with the UX 'I' . But Origen elsewhere represents 
the anima as capable of making its own decisions, in so far as it 
is regarded as capable of guarding against the attacks of the flesh, 
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and thus making such progress as to be held fast to God by the sweetness 
(342) 
of His love. On the other hand it is the Word of God Who takes the 
initiative in severing the connexion between U and r)LJ so 
that the ýJxq may surrender itself to the and so be reconciled 
(343) 
to God. In fact Origen suggests that the measures taken for this 
purpose may be painful, even though they are taken with the best 
(344) 
intentions. After all, says Origen, "it can never be that the anima 
is without a king; and it must be ensured that it has Christ as King, 
(345) 
Whose yoke is easy, and Whose burden is light. " Elsewhere Origen 
varies the metaphor, saying that "the souls of the impious are widows, 
(346) 
since they are deprived of the bridegroom who is Christ. " On the 
other hand, Origen also ascribes to the Holy Spirit a share in the 
Iq from evil i, nfluences; for in a note on work of freeing the 
Eph. iv. 30 (a reference to being "sealed with the Holy Spirit") he 
says that we were sealed with the Spirit so that we might become 
ei 
holy as the Spirit is holy, and this applies to both 
(347) 
and q )oK. Likewise, with reference to the passage in I Cor. v. 5 
where St. Paul says he has judged it right to deliver the immoral 
Corinthian to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, so that his 
r, 
JTA%yý may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus, Origen suggests that 
e% 
St. Paul is referring to the salvation of the whole man, 
and nAt-,, -; ý, alike, by referring to his highest part, because 
it is not the flesh itself which is destined to be destroyed, but 
e-% z 
(348) 
only the "mind of the flesh" ;; 6- 
ýA? 1,,, C '0 'rýý349) 
' 
There is however a passage in Comm. in Joh. where Origen appears 
to make no distinction between the IC16i i 4, 
Aand the 'j, jk'V but 
4 
simply contrasts our main substance (7 '1 IY 0.110J tLf%f 
which is made in the Divine image with the substance deriving from 
our (pre-incarnate) guilt, which consists in the material element 
of our nature. It is "our superior nature" ( Kf err-r:. j \f o 
which will take on the image of the earthly if we forget it and become 
subject to our material nature; but if we incline ourselves towards 
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Him in Whose image we were made, we shall attain to the Divine likeness, 
inasmuch as we shall have abandoned all affinity with any created 
thing. In this passage Origen inclines towards the more usual view of 
(350) 
the soul as a single entity composed of various elements. But else - 
where he reverts to his distinctive view of regarding a human being 
as composed of different entities which are in a state either of 
tension or of harmony with each other. He says that when the flesh 
is said to lust against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh 
(Gal. v. 17), the anima is intermediate between the two and inclines 
itself to one or to the other. The spirit is said to recall to itself 
the anima which is intermediate between spirit and flesh, and to 
be aidpd by all the good angels and by the Lord Himself, Who laid 
down His own anima for His sheep. Such is the result of Origen's 
theory of a pre-mundane fall; it involves him in the fanciful suppos- 
ition of two entities, TT'Aý, j and which exist in each 
(351) 
individual person and act independently of each other. 
(352) 
There is also a passage where the trichotomist and dichotomist 
views of human personality appear to exist side by side. Origen 
begins by saying that in inferior human beings the is dominated 
by sin and simply carries out the desires of the body. It is only 
when sin has been ousted from its supremacy that "the trA lusts 
against the q4Cýý and the TN-Cjri- against the But when 
the I-LAv has won the victory it imparts its own life to the body, 
and a harmony begins to exist between them, with the result that 
a prayer is. sent up alike from the heart which believes unto right- 
(353) 
eousness and from the mouth which makes confession unto salvation. 
(354) 
Elsewhere, however, it would appear that Origen regards the VAY1 T" 
as ultimately responsible for its own destiny. With reference to 
the text in Galatians (vi. 6) where St. Paul says that "he who sows 
in the flesh shall reap corruption from the flesh, and he who sows 
in the spirit (interpreted by Origen as the human spirit) shall from 
the spirit reap eternal life, "Origen says that it is the anima which 
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sows either in the spirit or in the flesh and can thus either fall 
into sin or be converted from sin. "For the body is the agent of 
the anima in doing whatever it appoints, and the spirit leads the 
anima to virtue, if the anima desires to follow it. " 
Origen feels able on the strength of the foregoing exposition 
A 
of the relationship between <, ICc and to explain in his 
own way the passages of Scripture in which sin is said to have deall -h 
for its result. He explains the fragment of the early Christian 
hymn preserved in Eph. v. 13 "Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise 
from the dead" as not addressed to one being, as might at first appear, 
IIN but rather as addressed to the Ti"V and the qIL) since the JT\f GcýAc,?, ý1-1 
cannot die, though it can fall asleep, whereas the 'o is liable Ir XII 
to die, in accordance with the Scriptural dictum "The soul that sinneth, 
(355) 
it shall die. " This death is the opposite to that which in I Cor. iii. 22 
is said to belong to Christians, because the latter death is the 
(356) (357) 
death to sin which results in living with Christ. In Comm. in Joh. 
Origen suggests that the life which the 1TV4-wt, -ý (here interpreted 
as the. human qf-AO r-"" is said to give is not the ordinary kind of 
life but the Divine life *letter 
.; 
just as the death which the L, causes 
is not the ordinary kind of death which consists in the separation 
of the from the a"Wrý, but that which consists in the 
separation of the jJKvj from God. 
There are however other passages where the function of the ITIAIUP-01- 
in imparting the Divine life is not mentioned, and where the suggest- 
tion seems to be that the can enter into direct fellowship 
with Christ. Thus in commenting on the word "death" as used in Rom. vii. 
38, he says that the death to which reference is there made is that 
(358) 
which separates the anima from the love of God. In the same way 
he elsewhere says that those who put a stumbling-block in the way 
of others. and so cause their anima to be separated from God can 
be called homicides, in so far as they cut off the anima of others 
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(359) 
from its true source of life. Indeed, in another passage Origen 
explicitly says that the life of the anima is derived from Christ, 
(360) 
Who is Himself Life; not that the substance of the anima can be destroyed, 
but it can none the less turn away from the source of the true life 
(361) 
and so make itself mortal. 
From the above survey it will be clearly seen how great are 
the difficulties in which Origen lands himself as the result of his 
peculiar doctrine of "two souls", the higher and the lower. He cannot 
come to a distinct conclusion as to how harmony between the two is 
brought about, i. e. whether it is as the result of the initiative 
of the IrN(<-u tkol- or that of the Of course the dilemma stems 
from his equally strange doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, 
f% 
according to which thel'C\Mtol-becomes incarcerated in a body as the 
result of its premundane fall from grace, and in the process acquires 
a lower soul to which alone the name of YyKrý is strictly applicable 
and which is liable to link itself either to the or to the -TCV6, T-O-. 
The question now arises: If the 1-t%feut&oý is itself in a defective 
state, how can it reconcile the Uyn to itself? On the other hand, 
if it is the which is liable to sin, must it not be the -Rveýý 
which recalls it from sin? 
There are certain passages where Origen appears in the light 
of these considerations to abandon his doctrine of an individual Ir 04. 4,6'r 
appertaining to each person and to understand the word TZVEurAin 
the senseof. mere. ' "inspiration" or "influence. " Thus, with reference 
to the statement that John the Baptist would go forth "in the spirit 
and power of Elijah" (Luke i. 17), Origen says that 
the <VCEvr&AT01- of the prophets are spoken of as the possessions 
of the prophets because they are given to them by God, as is clear 
from the texts "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets" 
(I Cor. xiv. 32) and "the spirit of Elijah has rested on Elishall (II 
Kings ii. 15), and that therefore there was nothing absurd in speaking 
154 
of John as Elijah who was to come, because it was in the spirit and 
power of Elijah that he reconciled fathers to children and children 
(362) 
to fathers. In the same way he says elsewhere that the TW60to4A 
*1 
of Elijah can be regarded as so to speak the clothing (CV %JtkcA, ) of 
(363) (364) 
the U%.. A of John the Baptist. In another passage he interprets + Kv I 
the words in Genesis which state that "God breathed into the first 
man's face the breath of life, and he became a living soul" as refer- 
ring to the Divine JrVrl-11, ý which confers life on the 2 
and states that he who is deprived of the Divine becomes 
r', 
earthy Q\V'I*KA5) , but he who is qualified to receive it is renewed (365) 
and thus saved. We may compare the Frag. in I Cor. where Origen states 
that only with the aid of DivineK\JC-tr-, O, (without the article) can 
the human ýU)11 explore the depths of God's own nature (the reference 
is to I Cor. ii. 10). 
Indeed, there are various passages in which Origen uses the 
word Om to refer to the chief element in the soul, the element 
normally called ITIAjr-4- Thus he says in Convs. with Heracl. that 
the image of God in which we are made resides in the 
/ 
(366) 
Again, IjKq - 
Christ is said to have given His disciples power over unclean spirits 
in order that as a result of their. expulsion 
tZq) 
and r0ro, might 
be in harmony and praise the God Who united them. Again, with reference 
to Eph. v. 28,29 Origen says that just as Christ nourishes and cherishes 
the Church, so animae cherish the bodies over which they are set 
so that they may follow their husbands without being bowed down by 
(368) 
e 
any weakness. Origen in two passages explicitly identifies the 
(369) 
with what he normally calls thelMu r4 In one, he describes the 
ýVxq 
as containing "the faculties which perceive Divine and intelligible 
(370) 
10 things", and in the other Origen says that the VO-Kv I was made by 
. -I I OP God alone, and was made "free from wickedness" K*4K; AS f-t-(T*S 
(371) 
Finally, in a most curious passage in Frag. in Matt., the last words 
of Christ on the Cross "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit" 
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are taken to mean that the of the saints are no longer in 
Hades but are with God, because this happened in the case of Christ 
as first fruits. 
From what has been said so far, it would appear that Crouzel 
(372) 
is correct in suggesting, in his diagram showing the relationship 
between the part of a human being created in the Divine likeness 
and the earthly part, that in the works of Origen the word 
is used in two senses, namely that of the TWCVre,,, which is the highest 
part of human personality, and that of the animal soul which is the 
seat of impulse and perception, and which is associated with the 
body. Crouzel has pointed out on the previous page that the earthly 
part of man was acquired as the result of the (premundane) fall, 
and thus although it is not evil in itself, it is a means of testing 
the individual, in so far as the highest part of man - that made 
in the Divine image - is meant to control it, and not be controlled 
(373) (374) 
by it. But neither Crouzel nor Rahner really brings out the fundamental 
discrepancy between the two accounts which Origen gives of the way 
in which sin originates. On the one hand, he depicts it as resulting 
from the rebellion of pure spirits against their Creaior, and on 
the other, he suggests that it is due to the animal soul making common 
cause with the body against the spirit. The second would appear 
to the commonsense account of evil; the first is purely theoretical, 
and involves Origen in difficulties regarding the way in which man 
comes to be as he now is. The T111EQ1, Kýaxes cold in its love of God, 
and so becomes but another the animal soul, 
needs to be added to the higher soul so as to, complete the constitution 
of man as it is on earth. 
(375) 
Býrke says that (according to Origen) "in the transition from 
vous to there is in no way involved a substantial alteration 
of the being of the subject in question", and goes on to say that 
q) uxi 
is nothing other than a defective mode of being of 
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That is true of the in one sense, but not of the 
in another sense, and it cannot really be said that Burke effectively 
(376) (377) 
distinguishes the two senses. On the previous page Burke seems to 
have contradicted himself by first pointing out that according to 
Origen the is the f%-\t6 ý whose love of God has become cold, 
and then going on to say that the soul is intermediate between 'J- 
r 
and and follows either one or the other. To quote Burke 
himself: "(According to Origen) the U&A is the meeting place of 
el 
and 614tlcý- and is thus the place of freedom and decision. " 
Origen's outlook is in fact defective in so far as whereas 
11) 
in the pre-existent state the is thought of as exercising 
choice-either by adhering to God or by departing from Him, in the 
incarnate state it is the lower part of the VO&I which chooses 
(or at least this seems to be his normal viewpoint). While it may 
(378) 
be true to say of the incarnate state, as does Dupuis, that in the 
thre. efold structure of man it is only "the (lower) soul .... which 
represents the person... for this soul chooses, and on its choice 
depends its eternal destiny", that is not true of the pre-incarnate 
state, because the lower soul had not then come into being. In fact 
(379) 
Dupuis himself says elsewhere that the in its pre-existent state 
represented the person by itself, and only after the fall was it 
(380) 
amalgamated with new elements. 
It is now time to show how the two elements known as 
and found their place in the personality of the incarnate 
(381) 
Jesus. The most noteworthy passage is in Convs. with Heracl., where 
it is paid that our Lord and Saviour, because He wished to save man 
in his entiretY, took on all the elements of human nature - -nVeý cL, , jr 
and These three elements were separated at 
the time of the Passion, and brought together again at the time of 
the Resurrection. At the time of the Passion, each element went 
its separate way - the a-Lit-ot- to the tomb, the to Hades, 
the world of departed spirits, and the -1TV&3(-oL to the Fathe r, 
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with Whom the Lord had deposited it just before He expired on the Cross. 
On the other hand, it had been said in the Psalms, "Thou shalt not 
leave my in Hades"; and if the had been deposited 
with the Father, the intention was that it should be received back. 
But this took place shortly after the Resurrection, for when Mary Magdalene 
met Him, He bade her not touch Him, because He desired that He should 
be touched in His entirety, so that the person touching Him might be 
benefited in all three elements of human nature by coming into contact 
with all three elements of the Saviour's nature. In fact it was only 
(382) 
after ascending to the Father that He reclaimed His 
(383) V 
After all, says Origen, can the Divine Nature of the Word of 
God have been given as ransom to the devil: would the devil have been 
capable of receiving it? It was only His tPO)ýýj which was given 
as a ransom by the Saviour; but that does not alter the fact that Jesus 
Christ and His q)oyA and His cyzj A were united to the First-born 
of all creation in a closer manner than that in which the believer 
is united to His Lord so as to form one spirit with Him. 
On the other hand, we encounter the same confusion in the use 
of the words v(VEu- and q)LPKVý with reference to Jesus Christ as we 
(384) 
did in the general discussion of human nature. In one passage the 
words are actually used interchangeably. Origen says in that passage 
that when Christ commended HistfVc7c'ýýJnto the Father's hands, He intended 
to indicate on what terms the departure of His Oj 
/ 
occurred; 7 X1 
/of 
-0, Tt for "I comme, nd implied that He would receive 
it back again. Again, Origen refers to the visit of Christ to the 
spirits imprisoned in Hades "with His spirit" 
(385) (386) 
quoting I Peter iii. 18-20. Dupuis does not really overcome the contrad- 
iction between this passage and the one from Convs. with Heracl. by 
saying that according to Origen, it was after the price of redemption 
had been paid by the YJXA of the Saviour that His -tcV6, Vý. ý- announced 
deliverance to the spirits in the prison of Hades: for in the latter 
passage it is clearly stated that it was after the Resurrection that 
He claimed back His qx\iC-:, ' -. ý- I t (3 87) 
There is one passage in Comm. in Rom. where Origen interprets 
Rom. i. 3,4 on his own lines. He first makes a distinction between what 
is born of the seed of David, and is therefore "according to the flesh", 
and what is appointed in power according to the spirit of holiness, 
i. e. the Son of God Who is of one substance with God. He then asks 
why the anima of Jesus is not mentioned in this passage together with 
the flesh and the spirit of holiness - the anima which was at one tiiioe 
troubled and at another time sorrowful unto death, the anima which 
He separated from-Himself after His death and which descended to thý! 
7 
lower regions. Origen says that since the anima cannot be thought 
of as included in what is according to the flesh nor in what is app- 
ointed to be the Son of God with power, the Apostle is simply bearinp 
in mind that the anima is placed between the flesh and the spirit and 
joins itself either to the one or to the other, and he thus refrains 
from mentioning the anima in the case, of Jesus Christ, because that anima 
is joined to the Lord and is thus made one spirit of holiness with Him. 
It would indeed appear to be the case that in Origen's view the 
lower part of the soul,. called anima or would of necessity 
have been assumed by Christ at the time of His Incarnation, but would 
at all times have been submissive to the will of Christ's spirit 
d-), 'that spirit which was perfectly united to the Word of 
(388) 
God. We may compare Origen1p insistence in 96m. in Num. that the Holy 
Spirit not only descended upon the human Jesus, as He did upon others, 
but "remained upon Him", with reference to the statement of John the 
Baptist in John i. 33. It is to be noted that in the passage in Comm. 
in Rom. referred to above Origen applies to the spirit of 
Jesus language which strictly only refers to the Divine Word, e. g. 
"the Son of God in the substance of God", and there he speaks of the 
anima of Jesus as "joined to the Lord" (sociata Domino).. But this 
is only in accordance with the principle of "interchange of -4ttributes" 
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(communicatio idiomatum) which Origen declares to be legitimate so far 
(389) 
as the (higher) soul of Jesus and the Divine Word are concerned. 
From what has been said it would appear that Origen's Christology 
is profoundly affected by his attitude to the body and the material 
(390) 
world. Although there is a section in Contra Cels. in which he is 
less inclined to think of matter and its manifestations as merely the 
result of the fall of immaterial spirits, he cannot be said to have 
entirely emancipated himself from the outlook which caused him to deprive 
himself in his early manhood of hisvirile powers, namely the feeling 
that man's true destiny is to escape to a higher sphere. He is thus 
torn between acceptance of the passages in St. Paul which envisage 
a Divine self-emptying, and reluctence to admit that the Word of God 
could ever have undergone the changes and limitations involved in becoming 
incarnate. 
(391) 
Mrs. Williamina Macauley states that "the idea of Incarnation 
in Origen's thought is not inconceivable in view of the peculiar quality 
of the Logos-Son to transmit divinity to lesser beings. " But surely 
such transmission does not involve self-emptying, whereas a true Incarn- 
ation does. Mrs. Macauley goes on to say that"eVen on grounds of 
pure logic as opposed to faith, one could well postulate as the ultimate 
hypothesis of such a system (what system? ) a perfect human being able 
to participate fully in the Godhead offered to him. " But the idea 
of a human being participating in Divinity is surely the exact opposite 
of the idea of the Divine Word becoming human. Mrs. Macauley does 
not really explain how according to Origen a Divine being can become 
(392) 
genuinely human. 
It would perhaps be true to say that there is a tension in Origen's 
mind between the idea of the Word of God as becoming personally incar- 
nate and the idea of His using His human soul as a mediator between 
Himself and human beings. This tension corresponds to th e tension 
between two divergent ideas of the ultimate destiny of bodily matter. 
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Has it a permanent place in the scheme of things, or it is a temporary 
feature of the universe, brought into existence as the result of the 
(393) 
fall of immaterial beings? J. Armantage is inclined to think that 
Origen held the first view. But though passages suggesting this can 
be found in De Princ. and elsewhere, his main view appears to be the 
second one. Armantage says that "for the opponents of the resurrection 
of the body, to define religion as the involvement of God in the this- 
(394) 
worldly life of the individual violated the fundamental canons of divinity. " 
But this in fact appears to be the view of Origen himself: man's destiny 
is the contemplation of the immaterial Divine Word, and thus ultimately 
of the Father Himself, and a body is not needed for this purpose. 
Origen seems at heart to agree with the Hellenistic outlook that 
(395) 
salvation consists in being emancipated from bodily entanglements. 
Armantage appears right in saying that according to Origen, "the correct 
view does not extend the present into the future, but rather brings 
(396) 
the future into' the present. " But this future is a future in which 
the body has no place; it is only anticipated here and now in so far 
as the individual sits loose to the demands of the body as far as 
possible. Armantage, in order to defend his view of Origen's outlook, 
credits Origen with a totally unnatural conception of the body, in 
so far as he sees Origen as not regarding it as necessary to limit 
the notion of the body by the character of corporeality as understood 
(397) 
in this life. He adduces as an argument for this view Origen's ref- 
erence to the eye of the person who endeavours to apprehend spiritual 
truth as being something other than the eye of the flesh. But the 
fact that Origen regards the bodily senses as having spiritual faculties 
corresponding to them has nothing in itself to do with his notion of 
the body, and certainly does not justify Armantage's assertion that 
(398) 
according to Origen, body is defined by function, not by substance. 
It may be true, as Armantage says, that it is the body which according 
(399) 
to Origen offers to each soul its own path back to the source of nature; 
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but that does not alter the fact that Origen's main view seems to be 
that the body will be annihilated when it has served its purpose. 
And so the lines of the Christmas hymn which tun- - 
The Word in the bliss of the Godhead remains, (400) 
Yet in flesh comes to suffer the keenest of pains. 
are lines with which Origen's distinctive philosophy of matter and 
spirit would never have allowed him to concur. 
I would conclude by suggesting that although Origen departs from 
traditional Christology in one direction by separating the Divine Word 
from human experiences, he also indicates a defect in traditional Christ- 
ology itself, in so far as if the Divine Word is what He is, the possessor 
of Divine attributes, any real Divine self-emptying is logically incon- 
ceivable. It seems to me fantastic to suppose that during the incarnate 
life of Christ the Divine Word remained on the one hand at the helm 
of the universe, ordering it and guiding it, and on the other hand 
reduced Himself to the compass of a human being and underwent the devel- 
(401) 
opment natural to such a being. As a matter of fact, many distinguished 
Christian theologians who in theory have adhered to the Christological 
statements contained in the Nicene Creed have in fact considered that 
the Incarnation of the Word of God was only apparent, because he retained 
all the qualities bound up with His Divinity. It was not that He really 
developedas a human being, but rather that He gave the impression 
of doing so. And that, I submit, is all that we can say, if we adhere 
to the traditional view of our Lord's Person. 
(402) 
This is a difficulty not really faced by J. C. Dlhb)tel, who is 
at pains to point out that in Origen's view only the human nature of 
the Incarnate Lord can be said to have been sanctified, whereas the 
Divine nature possessed sanctification by nature. In his own words, 
"the Saviour needed to be sanctified in His humanity, that is, to, receive 
from the Father the Holy Spirit, so as to be able in His turn to sanctify 
His brothers by giving them the same Spirit in the manner in which 
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(403) 
He Himself received it. " But we are still left wondering how the 
Incarnate Lord can really be said to have "grown in grace" as every 
normal human being has to do, if He were already perfectly holy by 
nature? How can growth and perfection be ascribed to one and the same 
(404) 
Person? D11; '6tel says that Nestorius rightly saw that "sanctification 
. (405) 
is the transfLrmation of a person and not of a nature", and so regarded 
the Word of God and the human Jesus as two separate persons: but none 
the less DIhotel appears to adopt the Nicene point of view regarding 
the Incarnate Christ. 
(406) 
T. E. Pollard rightly points out that Origen never really explained 
the Person of Christ in such a way as to bring out the soteriological 
aspect. of His Nature as distinct from the cosmological. And although 
Arius, in his modification of Origen's outlook, failed to give a satis- 
factory account of the Son as Saviour in so far as he distinguished 
Him from the Divine Word and so made Him a creature (albeit one created 
before the universe came into being), neither did Athanasius, in spite 
of his identification of the Incarnate Son with the Divine Word, really 
explain how the Word could become truly human. Pollard asserts that 
according to Athanasius, "only one who is eternally G6d and yet at 
(407) 
the same time really incarnate can save mankind"; but how can the 
same Person be thought of in both ways? 
(408) 
R. L. Wilken, when he describes the course of the dispute between 
Cyril and Nestorius about the Person of Christ, rightly points out 
that it will not do to say with Athanasius that the passages of Scripture 
which atribute human feelings and experiences to Christ are to be ascribed 
to His human nature only. If Christ is one Person, they must be ascribed 
to the Divine Word, and that makes Him inferior to the Father. The 
view of the Nestorius is more consistent with logic, but at the same 
time one wonders whether the hypothesis of a pre-existent Divine Word 
is really necessary on his view (i. e. would it not suffice to say that 
the human Jesus entered into ever closer fellowship with the Father? )'. 
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Wilken regards Nestorius as in effect asserting that "the uniqueness 
of Christ does not lie in some innate quality or capacity, for he is 
like other men in every respect. Rather, his uniqueness lies in what 
(409) 
he did; he lived a perfect life and offered to God a perfect sacrifice. " 
This statement would appear to need qualifyingin so far as all human 
beings are not alike; each one is unique, though all have certain qual- 
ities in common. And so it is true to say that Christ, although a 
man, was unlike any other man in so far as he performed what no other 
man could perform - the saving-work of reconciling man to God. 
It cannot be denied that if we treat Him as-. a genuine man, we 
can more easily conceive of Him as gradually entering into fuller union 
with God, so that in the end His personality was completely expressive 
of the Divine Nature, so far as it can be expressed in human terms. 
We could thus apply to Him the analogy employed by Origen in describing 
someone who desires to obtain Divine truth. Origen instances a man 
wishing to paint a picture, who first sketches the outline of what 
he proposes to depict, and then inserts the detailed features, so that 
the resultant portrait may be balanced in character. Even so, says 
Origen, the faint form and outline of Divine. truth is 'inscribed on 
"the tablets of our heart" (II Cor. iii. 3) by the pencil of our Lord 
(410) 
Jesus Christ.. But if this is the spiritual history of the believer, 
how can it fail to have been that of his Lord, if the Lord Himself 
was truly human? 
I would even make bold to say that twoof the main schools of 
thought in the Church of England - the Tractarian and the Evangelical 
are based, even though unconsciously, on two opposed conceptions of 
our Lord's Nature. To speak of our having been made partakers of the 
Divine Nature through Baptism is to hold the Monophysite view of Christ's 
own Person, according to which His Divinity was unaffected by His 
assumption of humanity. Whereas to hold that baptism is a sign of 
the grace of God which is thereafter given in so far as it is desired 
164 
is to take the Adoptionist view of Christ Himself as having become 
progressively united to God as the result of His aspirations towards 
such unity. 
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APPENDIX TO Chapter V 
Origen's conception of the relation between the various 
disclosures of the Law of God . 
It is noteworthy that in at least one passage the Law of Moses 
is said by Origen to hold a "shadow" of'the "good things made known 
(411) 
at the Coming of Christ. " The Mosaic Law is said to have contained 
the truth, but hidden as it were under a veil, in so far as the spiritual 
(412 ) 
nature of that law was not yet understood. Hence, according to Origen, 
there are three stages in the apprehension of Divine truth: first, 
the understanding of the Mosaic Law in its obvious sense; secondly, 
the understanding gained by acquaintance with Christ's earthly life; 
and thirdly, the full understanding to be gained in a future state 
ý (413) 
of being. But he would doubtless agree that the three stages cannot 
be strictly distinguished, but rather shade off into one another. 
There is a striking sentence in Hom. in Nun.. where Origen says 
that the Old Covenant is not to be regarded as a legal code if it is 
spiritually understood (nec Vetus Testamentum tunc nomino legem, si 
(414) 
eam spi ritualiter intelligam). But oddly enough he states elsewhere 
that it is the spiritual interpretation of Scripture which has "the 
(415) 
shadow of good things to come. " In a comment on St. John's words "Of 
His fullness have we all received" (i. 15), he says that those in this 
life share Christ's fullness in the sense that they know in part and 
prophesy in part, but will not possess that fullness (if they ever 
(416) 
do) until after this life is over. Likewise in Hom. in Lev. he says 
with reference to Ps. cxix. 105 that the "lamp" of the Divine Law is 
lit for those in this present world, whereas the "eternal light" is 
(417) 
reserved for those who are entitled to it in the future age; and in 
a note on the Psalms he says that only when we live with the angels 
of God shall we meditate on the commandments of God, not in a shadowy 
(418) 
fashion, but in accordance with the truth. In another passage he says 
that the person who is free from sin and no longer requires the sacri- 
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fices prescribed by the Law may, when he is perfect, transcend even 
"I %_ r the spiritual law ( TbV -tTVF-U dT-1 Kc>V N/) and dwell with 
(419) 
the Divine Word Who is above that law. And yet Origen asserts else- 
where that by the precepts of the Gospels, as contrasted with the 
Law of Moses, ' all things are brought to perfection, thus appearing 
to imply that there is no need for any further disclosure of Divine 
(420) 
truth, and that the "good things to come" consist in the spiritual 
(421) 
interpretation of the Mosaic Law. He likewise asserts in another 
passage that whereas Christ spoke in the Law and the Prophets as well 
as in the Gospels, He teaches beginners through the Law, and those 
(422) 
who are mature through the Gospels. 
Perhaps the contradiction in Origen's thought can be explained 
in so far as he had to take account of the traditional doctrine that 
Christ will be revealed in glory at some future date, but on the other 
hand thought of that glory as revealed in this life as a result of 
the progress of the Christian believer in spiritual insight. 
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NOTES ON CHAPTER V. 
Comm. in Joh. I. 32 (GCS 4.41.7-16). Cf. Nemeshegyi. op-cit., 
p. 51, where this passage is quoted. Cf. also Frag. in Luc. 210. 
7.8 (GCS 9.318); Comm. in Matt. XVI. 8 (GCS 10.40.23-32); Frag. in 
Matt. 52.1-3 (GCS XII. 36); Hom. in, Gen. I. 13 (GCS 6.17.1-3). 
2.111.1 (GCS 6.300.15-32). 
3. Comm. in Cant. III (GCS 8.222.25,26). 
4. Comm. in Joh. VI. 57 (GCS 4.166.3-7). Cf. Hom. in Num. XXVII. 3 
(GCS 7.260.6.7), where it is said that Christ descended to our level 
not as a matter of necessity, but because He deigned to do so 
(non necessitate, sed dignatione). Cf. also Comm. in 
Rom. V. 2 (PG XIV 1022C) and Sel. in Gen. XXII. 6 (PG 
XII. 117B). C also Primmer, op. cit., p. 90, where, after quoting 
the passage in the text , he says that the Father is thus cre- 
dited with the quality of 2ýX&oS and the idea of Divine 
impassibility is. thus modified. On the other hand, Primmer has 
said on p. 4 that "God's highest display of love for mankind, 
the offering of His Son, iS uite irreconcilable with the cate- 
gories of -rL64_kJoS or it is rather on the level 
6f cosmic compassion. " 
On the other hand, there is a sense in which Christ died 
of necessity nj "' ), in the sense that if He had not 
tasted death on our behalf, we should not have been saved. This 
is what we are taught by the words "if it be possible" (Matt. 
xxvi. 29) (Frag. in Matt. 531.1-3 (GCS 12.218). 
5. Hom. in Josh. II. 2 (GCS 7.297.23-298.1). 
6. Cf. Hom. in Luc. XI. 6, where it is said that Christ was willing to 
submit to being enrolled at the time of the universal census 
of the Emperor Augustus so that He might sanctify all men 
and ofter them fellowship with Himself (GCS 9.81.26-82.16). 
Cf. also. Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 297, where the pAssage in the 
text is quoted. 
7. Hom. in Num. XXIV. 1 (GCS 7.226.7-10). Se on this passage Riviere, 
"Theologie du sacrifice redempteur" , 
(BLE (1944)), pp. 8-11. 
8. De Princ. 1.2.1 (GCS 5.27.21-28.1). Cf. Frag. in Matt. 11.21- 
27 (GCS 12.19,20); Frag. in Joh. I (GCS 4.483.11-16); Hom. in 
Matt. I (GCS 12.243.8-11); Cýntra Cels. 1.68 (GCS 1.123.4- 
7) and 111.29 (GCS 1.226.26,27). 
9. De Princ. III. 5.6 (GCS 5.277.3-7). Cf. Rahner, op. cit., p. 200 
where he says that according to Origen "not a self-initiated 
turning to God, but the gracious des'Cent of God to us, is 
the central point of a true doctriDe of man. " Cf. also p. 218. 
Cf. also Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 3 (GCS 4.431.12-27); Comm. in Rom. 
VII. 9 (PG XIV. 11? 9A); Frag. in Luc. 151.14-24 (GCS 9.287); Matt. 
Comm. Series 75 (GCS 11.176.20-25); Matt. Comm. XIII. 8 (GCS 
10.202.11-34); ibid. XIII. 8 (GCS 10.200.17-29); Comm. in Joh. 
XXVIII. 9 (GCS 4.414.5,6). Cf. also Hom. in Ps. xxxvii. I. 2, 
where an unusual interpretation is given of the statement 
"The spirit is ready, but the flesh is weak", inasmuch as 
the weakening of the flesh is understood to mean self-denial 
and self-mortification (PG XII. 1375D-1376B). 
10. Comm. in Joh. X-6 (GCS. 4.176.21-26). 
168 
De Princ. 11.6.5 (GCS 5.144.24-145.2). Cf. also Comm. in Joh. 
XX. 26,27 (GCS 4.377.10-25),, and Comm. in Rom. III. 8 (PG XIV. 947B- 
948B), where the measurements of the mercy-seat. described 
in Exodus are said to apply to the soul of Jesus, which is 
said to be midway between the Divine nature of the Trinity 
and the weakness of humanity. Crouzel in L'Image ... p. 134 
refers to the passage in Comm. in Rom., but says that the Word 
and the Holy Spirit, represented by the Cherubim whose wings 
stretch over the mercy-seat, seem to take the place of the 
spirit of Jesus. On the contrary, one would have thought 
that the word anima, as here used, is equivalent to the spirit 
(as distinct from the lower soul). Such also appears to be 
the opinion of Dupuis, op. cit.., p. 79, n. 115. 
Lieske, op. cit., p. 130 says that "Origen thinks of a 
kind of hypostati. c union of the created spirit with the Divine 
Word in the final stage of full perfection. But there are 
essential differences between the God-Man and the created 
spirit which has the vision of God, in that while the soul 
of Christ is absolutely sinless, there is a possibility of 
sin even in a state of pure spirituality. " This seems an 
illogical element in Origen's thought, because the soul of 
Christ is itself a created spirit, and to say that it is so 
closely united to the Word as to be incapable of falling away 
from God is simply to beg the question. 
Cf. also p. 169 of op. cit., where Lieske says (n. 9) that 
"our union with the Son is the likeness or extension of the 
hypostatic union between the soul of Christ and the Divine 
Word. " But the phrase "hypostatic union" does not correctly 
describe the thought of Origen, "because according to him the 
soul of Christ and the Divine Word were still two separate 
beings even after their union, which was a union of wills 
(Boon makes the same mistake in op. cit., p. 26). Vý; lker, op. cit., 
pp. 111-113, also seems mistaken in thinking of the union between 
the Word and his human soul as anything more than a moral 
and ethical union. Knittel, as referred to in n. 4 on p. 112 
of op. cit., seems to want to have it both ways, in so far 
as he says that the ultimate union was not mork, but physical,. 
and yet seeks to preserve the distinctive features of the 
two natures, Divine and human. - 
Kelber, op. cit., pp. 258,259, rightly points out that 
while Origen insisted that the soul of Christ was human, in 
fact he ascribed to it qualities which made it more than human, 
in so far as it only became incarnate out of pity for mankind, 
not because that was its own destiny, and could only become 
known by other human beings by emptying itself of its own 
being in order to become incarnate. 
When Mrs. Macaulay, op. cit., p. 184, says that Origen 
does not say that "there is any essential difference between 
the Incarnate Word or Christ Crucified and the Logos-Son", 
she shows that she has not studied all Origen's works, and 
not even the Comm. on John itself, as fully as she might have 
done. But in fact she says at the foot of that very page 
that the soul of Christ was pre-existent (i. e. not simply 
assumed in order to become incarnate! ). 
12. Comm. I in Ep. ad Rom. (Philocal. JAR 228.1-5). Cf. Crouzel, 
L'Image... p. 226, and Mme. Harl., op. cit., p. 281. Cf. P-128. 
13. Comm. in Cant. II (GCS 8.153.14-19). 
14. Comm. in Rom. VII. 7 (PG XIV. 1123C-1124A). 
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15. Comm. in Joh. XX. 11 (GCS 4.340.8-17). Cf. Contra Cels. VII. 16 
(GCS 2.167.12-22). Cf. also Nemeshegyi, op. cit., p. 79, where 
it is said that if Christ is said to suffer death, that is 
because the attributes of the human Jesus are assigned to 
the Divine Word on account of their personal union (cf. Contra 
Cels. 111.4 (GCS 1.237.7-10). . 
16. De Princ. III. 3.2. (GCS 5.258.1-8). 
17. Comm. in Joh. VI. 53 (GCS 4.161.30-162.1 and 162.9-12). 
18. Ibid. XIX. 2 (GCS 4.299.14-21). Cf. ibid. XXVIII. 18 (GCS 4.412. 
27-413.7), and XX. 11 (GCS 4.340.29-341.10), and XXXII. 25 
(GCS 4.469.29-470.12). Cf. also Crouzel, L'Image..., p. 79; 
Dupuis, op. cit., p. 77; Boon, op. cit., p. 26. 
19. Comm. in Rom. III-8 (PG XIV. 949C-950A). 
20. op. cit., p. 224. 
21. on p. 264 of op. cit.. 
22. 
-Comm. 
in Joh. II-8 (GCS 4.62.19-26). Cf. also Contra Cels. 
1. -61 (GCS 1.113.1,2); Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. V. 4 (PG XII. 1362A); 
Hom. in Gen. VIII. 8 (GCS 6.84.5-9); Comm. in Cant. I (GCS 8.102.14, 
15). The passage in Comm. in Joh. 11.8 is in contradiction 
to Comm. in Joh. XX. 11(GCS 4.341.1-5), where Origen does 
not allow the expression "God the Word died" (quoted by Dupuis, 
op. cit., p. 77, n. 107). See the discussion of this passage 
in Volker, op. cit., P. 103. 
23. It was this fact which Origen doubtless had in mind when 
he suggested that Jesus remained in the Temple because He 
held His true Father in higher honour than His earthly kinsmen 
(Frag in Luc. 77 (GCS 9.259)). 
24. Comm. in Joh. XX. 18 (GCS 4.350.23-351.4). Cf. C8ntra Cels. IV. 
5 (GCS 1.277.27-30), where it is said that'when the Word 
of God comes to us, He does not leave His former abode, as 
though vacating one place and, occupying another which He 
had not occupied before. Cf. also Hom. in Matt. I (GCS 12.239.12- 
16 and 240.12-17)i Sel. in Ps. 1.3 (PG XII. 1088D); Frag. in 
Ps. CVIII. 29-31 Witra A. S. III). Cf. also the picturesque 
passage in Frag. in Luc. (59.7,8 (GCS 9.252)), which runs "When 
He was still an infa. nt, the heavenly powers sang His praises 
as being in the bosom of the Father", on which Crouzel (S. C. 
87, pp. 290,491) comments: "The Word of God in one way descends 
to the earth with His soul, but in another way He remains 
always in God Who is His abode. " Cf. also Hom. in I Sam. xxviii. 
3-25-(GCS 3.292.5-7), where Origen says that "Christ was 
still Christ, even when in Hades, and if I may so put it, 
even when He was below so far as place was concerned, He 
was above so far as His purpose was concerned 
X, U 
Cf. also Primmer, op. cit., pp. 35,36, and Schendel, 
Herrschaft undJnt@rwerfung Christi (Tubingen, 1971), pp. 85, 
86, and EichinRer, *Di6 Verklarung-'Christi bei Origqnes, (Vienna, 
1969), pp. 148-150. 
25. VI. 12 (PG XIV. 1094D-1095A). 
26 Comm. in Joh. II. 11 (GCS 4.66.17-21). On the other hand, in 
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ibid. 66.28-67.8 it is said that although the Spirit as well 
as the Father sent the Son, the Spirit-promised that He would 
descend at the appropriate time to co-operate with the Son 
for the salvation of mankind. 
27. Hom. in Luc. XXIX. 1,2 (GCS 9.178.9-15). 
28. Hom. in Ezek. I. 6 (GCS 8.331.4-7). 
29. XIII. 18 (GCS 10.227.27-228.24). Cf. the discussion of this 
passage, and that referred to in n. 26, in Dupuis, op. cit., 
n. 131, P. 119. 
30.1.46 (GCS 1.96.19-25). 
31. Frag. in Joh. XX (GCS 4.501.15-23). See Aeby, op. cit., pp. 153, 
154, for a discussion of the points raised in this paragraph. 
32. Cf. Frag. in Luc. 96 (GCS 9.265.18-21), where it is said that 
the devil, when he tempted Christ, recognised that Christ's 
power of changing stones into bread came from God. 
33. 
.. 
Comm. in Matt. XVII. 2 (GCS 10.584.16-25). 
34. Frag. in Matt. 339.1-9 (GCS 12.146,147); cf. ibid. 154.6-14 
(GCS 12.77). 
35. Comm. in Joh. XX. 44 (GCS 4.388.20-29). 
36. Comm. Series in Matt. 112 (end) (GCS 11.233.31-234.2); cf. 
Comm. in Matt. XII. 2 (GCS 10.72.9-12), and Comm. Series in 
Matt. 132 (GCS 11.269.19-21). 
37. Cf. Comm. Series in Matt. 113 (GCS 11.235.6-10), referring 
to His teaching, and ibid. 99 (GCS 11.217.7-22), referring 
to His escape through the Father's help from His enemies 
when they threatenend to cast Him down from theý top of a 
Hill. 
38. Comm. Series in Matt. 33 (already referred to in n. 65 of Ch. III. 
Cf. Ch III PP-72 and73 where this matter is dealt with more fully. 
39. Comm. in Joh. X. 37 (GCS 4.212.8-24). Cf. also Contra Cel-s. 
11-58 (GCS 1.181.28-182.2), where it is said that the Resurrection 
of Jesus from the dead was more remakable than the instances 
of boys raised from the dead by Elijah and Elisha, because 
the Agent Who raised Him was His heavenly Father. Cf. also 
Comm. in Joh. XXVIII. 12 (GCS 4.403.33), and Sel, in Ps,. 111.8 
(PG XII , 1129C). In Sel. in Ps. XXI. 10 
(PG XII. 1253D) it 
is said that it was Christ alone Who was taken by the Father 
out of His mother's womb, because Christ alone was conceived 
through the Holy Spirit, whereas other men are not taken 
out, but come out. 
40. Comm. in Cant. II (GCS 8.162.12-14). In Hom. in Num. Origen 
also recognises that in certain places (e. g. Romans vi. 4), 
Christ is said to be raised by the Father, but that He else- 
where says that He is able to raise "the temple of His own 
body" after three days (XVII. 6 (GCS 7.166.14-17)). 
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41. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 36 (GCS 4.260.29-261.20). Cf. also Contra 
Cels. VII1.12 (GCS 2.229,230) discussed by Lowry, op. cit., 
j-T-S37 (1936) pp. 234,235: Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 270; Crouzel, 
'L'Image... , pp. 91,92; Ruis-Camps, ', CommunicabilidadotOCP T6-, 1970, pp. 209,212,213; Nemeshegyi, op. cit., pp. 88, j-9--, Lieske, 
op. cit., pp. 198-200. 
Cf. also the letter of Archbp. Wm. Temple to Ronald 
Kno-x set out in full in the former's biography (p. 165), where 
Temple replies to Knox's criticisms of his explanation of 
our Lord's Divinity in terms of will. Knox has suggested 
that the distinction between the form and the content of 
a will (i. e. between that which wills and that which is willed) 
is a distinction which can only be made in thought, so that 
in however close agreement two individuals might be their 
wills would not be identical. Temple replied that ýince 
the form and the content of a will are inseparable, the form 
must be affected by the identity of content with that of 
another will. 
42. Comm. in Ezek. III. 12 (PG XIII. 775A); Sel. in Ps. XVIII. 6 (PG 
XII. 1241CD); Sel. in Ps. XXVI. 5 (PG XII. 1280D, 1281A); 
Sel. in Ps. L XIV. 5 (PG XII. 1493D) ; Sel. in Ps. XXVII. 2 (PG 
1285A); Sel. in Ps. XLVI. 9 (PG XII. 1437Eý--, Sel. in Ps. IX. 5 
ýPG XII. 1188C). - 
43. De Princ. I. 2.6 (GCS 5.35.1-4). Cf. Lieske, op. cit., pp. 192- 
194, and also 195, where he says: "Because the Son is only 
begotten by the Father in so far as the Father conveys to 
Him His perfect likeness, because moreover this likeness 
consists in perfect knowledge and fulfilment of the Father's 
will, it follows that the Son is only begotten by the Father 
as His Likeness and Wisdom in so far as the Father imparts 
to Him the perfect vision and fulfilment of His will with 
the likeness. " 
44. Cf. Hom. in Is. IV. 4 (GCS 8.261.26-262.5), where, our Lord 
is compared to the seraph with a live coal in his hands sent 
for the purpose of purging away the sins of the prophet's 
lips. Cf. also Sel. in Ps. X. V. 3 (PG XII. 1212A) and LXXXVIII. 32 
(PG XII. 1549B). 
45. op. cit., pp. 57-59. 
46. Op. cit., p. 61. Cf. ChII, P-459 where Maydieuls article is 
quoted as suggesting that Origen adopted an Arian view of 
Christ in so far as He is said to have become Divine by con- 
tinually gazing into the depths of the Father's being. 
47. "Communicabilidad", OCP 34,1968, pp. 7 and 8. 
48. XIV. 2,3 (PG XIII. 767A-768C). Cf. Crouzel, -La Conn. , pp. 86, 
87, and pp. 168,169. Cf. also Ch. II, p-42, and Ch. III, 
p. 71, where the extent of the Son's knowledge is discussed. 
49. Section 29 (GCS 1.26.10-13). 
50. Comm. Series in Matt. 95 (GCS 11.213.5-15,17-27). 
51. Op. cit., p. 26, n. 5. 
52. Exh. ad Mart. 29 (GCS 1.25.2-23), to which (oddly enough) 
Vý; lker does not explicitly allude. 
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53. Frag. in Matt. 530 II. lst. col. 1-6 (GCS 12.217). 
54. Comm. in Joh. XXVIII. 6 (GCS 4.395.9-32). 
55. Cf. p. llý where the veiling of Christ's DivinitY is discussed. 
56. Frag. in Matt. 239.3-5 (GCS 12.112), and ibid. 321.2-4 (GCS 12.141). 
Cf. C. J. Cadoux, T. he Case for Evangelical Modernism, (Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1938) p. 85, where he says: "Thomas Aquinas 
taught that the prayers of Jesus were intended merely for 
didactic and examplary purposes. What are we to say of a 
doctrine (i. e. of our Lord's Person) which necessitates such 
a conclusion as that? " 
57. XIII. 1 (GCS 2.325.20-326.11). 
58. Sel. in Ps. ! V. 2 (PG XII. 1133D. 1136A); cf. FraR. in Jer. 68 
(GCS 3.231.20-2ý). 
59. Frag. in Joh. CXX (GCS 4.567.19-21). 
60. Comm. in Matt. XI. 6 (GCS 10.43.15-24). 
61. 'Ibid. XVI. 5 (GCS 10.480.23-481.1). 
62. Hom. in Num. XXIV. 1 (GCS 7.227.7-9; cf. 226.15-19). 
63. Cf. II Cor. viii. 9. 
64.11 (GCý 8.169.17-170.3). Cf. also ibid. III (206.11-14); 
Hom. in Cant. II. 3 (GCS 8.45.3-9); Hom in Lev 
, 
VII. 2 (GCS 6.375. 
8-11). Cf. also Lomiento, article "Cristo didaskalos di 
pochi e la Comunicazione ai molti secondo Origene" (VC 9 
(1972)), pp. 25,26. 
On the other hand, Origen is not everywhere consistent 
in his interpretation of the text in Daniel about the stone 
cut out of the mountain without the work of hurhan hands. 
In Hom. in Cant. II. 3 it is made clear that the mountain is 
understood as our Lord's Divine Nature, whereas in the sixth 
Homily on Exodus it is interpreted as human flesh and human 
nature as such, from which the Lord took a small portion 
at His Incarnation (istud est sanctimonium carnis assumptae 
et sine manibus, id est, absque opere hominum, de monte humanae 
naturae et substantiae excisum (Hom. in Ex. VI. 12 (GCS 6.230.1- 
6). 
The subject of the Kenosis of the Divine Word is discus- 
sed by Mme. Harl, op. cit., pp. 229-233. I cannot help feeling 
that she misrepresents Origen by asserting that "Origen does 
not consider that the Divine Wordis stripped of His Divinity, 
but interprets the Kenosis either in the sense of the accommo- 
dation of the Divine to the human, or else by referring it 
to the man Jesus, who did not claim immediate equality with 
the Father, but chose to die in order to be exalted afterwards. " 
How can "the Divine be accommodated to the human" without 
a measure of self-emptying? 
65. XXVI .2 
(GCS 7.459.22-240.2). 
66. Hom. in Cant. II. 3 (GCS 8.44.20-45.18). Cf. Sel. in Josh. 
V. 2 (PG XII. 821C). Cf. also Crouzel, L'Image, p. 141. Cf. 
also p. 125. 
173 
67. Cf. P. 106 . 
68. Contra Cels. IV. 15 (GCS 1.384.29-285.14). Cf. Hom. in Matt. 
II (GCS 12.248.16-21), and Hom. in Lev. VIII. 1 (GCS 6.393.18-21 and 394 
4-6,; 14-19).. Cf. also Frag. in Matt. 11.14-21 (GCS 12.19), 
where, with reference to the distinction between the two 
words ý6%(C-crjS and Y&, 1j, -, K , Origen declares that although 
Christ possessed the sinlessness of Adam as he originally 
was, He also shared in the suffering which Adam subsequently 
underwent because of his sin. Two other passages declare 
that Christ was born of a Virgin because He was sinless (Hom. 
in Matt. I (GCS 12.240.9-11) and Frag. in Matt. 14 (GCS 12.21). 
69. Cf. p. 115. 
70.1 Cor. i. 25. 
71. Hom. in Jer. VIII. 8.9 (GCS 3.61.32-63.11). Cf. Hom. in Is. VI. 1 
(GCS 8.280.5-13). Crouzel in La Conn., p. 344, says that 
Origen is developing St. Paul's thought in speaking of "God's 
foolishness" in this way, and not misrepresenting it; but 
in fact St. Paul is not contrasting the entire wisdom possessed 
by Jesus Christ with that wisdom which He brought into the 
world; he is imply contrasting human so-called "wisdom" with 
the Divine wisdom which appears to be foolishness to those 
content with human wisdom (cf. also op. cit., pp. 482,483). 
See also Molland, op. cit., p. 148, where he says, referring 
to the passage in Origen quoted above, that "Origen does 
not hear the irony in these words, nor does he hear the paradox 
in the Apostle's mouth. " 
72. Comm. in Joh. X. 46 (GCS 4.224.34-225.3), and Comm. in in Matt. 
XII. 6 (GCS 10.77.18-25). 
73. Comm. Series in Matt. 50 (GCS 11.110.7-11). Cf. Hom. in Matt. 
III. (GCS 12.261.33-262.1); Comm. in Matt. XI. 17 (GCS 10.64.1- 
4,7-9); Sel. in Ps. XXIX. 8 (PG XII. 1296A); Commý. in Joh. X. 27 
(GCS 4.200.28-31). Cf. also Mme. Harl. op. cit., p. 247, where 
she says that according to Origen, "the miracles reveal the 
Word'by way of Jesus. They serve to underline the astonishing 
character of the man who is Jesus, but they should also lead 
to the discovery in Him of the Son of God. " 
74. Hom. in Jer. XLV. 9 (GCS 3.113.25-114.15). 
75. Cf. Comm. in Joh. XIX. 7 (GCS 4.309.24-310.1), and XXVIII. 12 
(GCS 4.402.30-403.15). 
76. Comm-Series in Matt. 50 (GCS 11.110.11-17). Cf. Hom. in 
Cant. II. 3 (GCS 8.44.20-45.11). It is noteworthy, however, 
that Origen asserts in the Hom. in Num. that the Saviour 
will have the same form at His Second Coming as at His First, 
in so far as He will possess a human body and a human soul 
(IX. 5 (GCS 7.61.1-3)). Cf. also Matt. Comm. Series 70 (GCS 
11.164.6-9). On the other hand, in another passage, it is 
said that the First Coming of Christ was accompanied by human 
feelings (-ý1J0fcj1TofTA&4, nei4, whereas at His Second Coming 
He will have no human feelings bound up with His Divinity 
(, v"Je, ' e-1C1TCKkC-Yf16V-V Trj GeWr' (Contra 
Cels. I. 56 (GCS 1.107.1-8). 
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77. V 01KC-1-44 'T-U \tC-Lr KI OU5-G 
78. Sel. in Ps. LXVII. 5 (PG XII. 1505C). Cf. also ibid. IV. 9,10 
(PG XII. 1168C), and Frag. in. Luc. 140.5-8 (GCS 9.283). 
79. Frag. in Joh. LIII (GCS 4.527.3-23). Cf. p. 109. 
80. Hom. in Exod. VI. 1 (GCS 6.192.10-193.3). Cf. Pitra, A. S. 
111.195 (CI. 16,17), where it is said that when Christ became 
flesh and dwelt among us, He built the Church, the spiritual 
Sion; but He will be seen in His glory, when after He has 
dwelt among us we shall behold His glory, full of grace and 
truth. Cf. also Molland, op. cit., p. 156. 
81. Frag. in Luc. 96.1-11 (GCS 9.265). 
82. Hom. in Josh. VIII. 4 (GCS 7.339.12-20). Cf. De Princ. IV. 3.13 
(GCS 5.343.23-344.7). Cf. Dani&lou, IILIUnit6 des Deux Testa- 
ments" (RvSR (1948)), pp. 53,54. Origen also quotes Lam. iv. 
20 in Hom. in Num. XXVII. 12, but there understands the "shadow" 
which Christ affords as protecting us against the heat of 
temptation (GCS 7.277.13-16). 
83.1.2.8 (GCS 5.39.6-8). 
84. De Princ 
, 
11.6,7 (GCS 5.146.10-19,147.7-14). Fitzgerald, 
op. cit., p. 188, understands this statement of the soul of 
Christ in its pre-incarnate state. Admittedly, it is the 
present writer who has inserted the adjective "earthly" 
before"actions and movements" on p. 114; but surely it is 
impossible for this phrase to have any real meaning when 
applied to a disembodied spirit. Cf. Crouzel, L'Image, 
pp. 139 and 251, and Dupuis, op. cit., p. 194. Cf. also Hom. 
in Ps. XXXVIII. II. 2 (PG XII. 1402D-1403A); Sel. in Ps. LXXVI. 11 
(PG XII. 1540B); Comm. in Rom. VII. 4 (PG XIV. 1109AB); ibid. VI. 3 
(PG XIV. 1061C-1062B). On the last passage referred to, see 
Crouzel, LLITagp, p. 231; Mme. Harl, op-cit-, pp. 147,198,212- 
214; Dupuis, op. cit., p. 195, n. 147; Crouzel, La Conn., pp. 340, 
341; Molland, op. cit., p. 150; Gruber, op. cit. pp. 58,59. 
Cf. Ch. VI, pp. 215-218 where the distinction betweenthe 
knowledge of the earthly Christ and that of the heavenly 
Christ is more fully expounded. 
85. Comm. in Rom. IV. 8 (PG XIV. 991B-S92D). 
86. De Princ. IV. 3.13 (GCS 5.343.20-24), and also Jerome, Ep. ad 
Avitum 12, which purports to quote Origen's own words (lines 
1-8 of note immediately under text on p. 344). Cf. also 
Comm. in Rom. I. 4 (PG XIV. 847B); Comm. in Joh. I. 7 (GCS 4.12.8- 
. 16), and Molland, op. cit., p. 147, where this passage is referred 
to. It will be pointed out in Ch. VI, pp. 207-221 and 
Ch. VII, pp. 239-245 , that Origen seems to suggest that some 
of Christ's disciples can even now have experience of His 
Second Coming, in so far as they progress from knowledge 
of the Incarnate Jesus to knowledge of the Eternal Word of 
God. Cf. also p. 127 and the Appendix tothis Chapter. 
87. Comm. Series in Matt. 135 (GCS 11.279.5-16,21-24). 
88. Sel. in Ps. IV. 2 (PG XII. 1469B). 
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89. Convs. with Heracl. 27.4-8 (Scherer p. 106). Cf. Comm. in 
Joh. I. 35 (GCS 4.45.19,20) and XXVIII. 18 (GCS 4.412.18-20). 
Cf. Ch. IV. p 86 where the passage in Comm. in Joh. I. 35 is 
also referred to. 
90. De Princ. IV. 2.7 (GCS 5.319.8,9). 
91. Frag. in Gal. (PG XIV. 1296D). Cf. the further discussion 
of this subject on pp. 138-140. 
92. Comm. in Joh. X. 6 (GCS 4.176.16-21). Cf. P-111,112. 
93. Comm. in Cant. I (GCS 8.102.2-8). Cf. on this subject Ruis- 
Camps, "Comunicabilidad", OCP 36,1970, pp. 226,227. 
94. Comm. in Cant. I (GCS 8.107.25-108.2), Cf. Vý; lker, op. cit., 
pp. 898.899, and Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 201, section headed 
"La chair comme Ivoilel. " On the other hand, His "fullness" 
can be understood in more than one sense, as Origen makes 
plain. It. can on the one hand mean all the Divine attributes 
which He laid aside at the Incarnation; it can on the other 
hand mean the fullness of grace which He came to impart to 
.. all men, with 
the result that St. John could say that "of 
His fullness we all have received" (i. 16) (cf. Comm. in Cant. I 
(GCS 8.107.19-25)). It is the second type of fullness to 
which Origen alludes when he interprets the words "Thy Name 
is as ointment poured forth" as alluding to the activity 
whereby the Gospel of Jesus Christ is proclaimed to the world 
(Hom. in Cant. I. 4 (GCS 8.33.11-13,21-30 and 34.7-9)). Origen 
thus says elsewhere that the anointing of Christ with the 
oil of gladness is not the same as the anointing of His "com- 
panions" (Ps. xlv. 8), that is the prophets and apostles. The 
soul of Christ contained the ointment of whose odour the prophets 
and apostles partook, in proportion to their spiritual closeness 
to the soul of Christ (De Princ. II. 6.6 (GCS 5.145.24-146.9)). 
95. De Princ. I. 2.7 (GCS 5; 37.14-20). cf. also ibid. I. 2.8 
' 
(GCS 
5.38.26-39.4), where it is said that the Son becomes the bright- 
ness of God'to us by emptying Himself of His equality with 
the Father, so that through looking on the brightness we may 
have a means of viewing the Divine Light. Cf. also Mme. Harl, 
op. cit., pp. 114 and 309. 
96. De Princ. II. 6.1 (GCS 5.140.2-18). 
97. Cf. pp . 112 and 123.124 
98. Contra Cels. IV. 15 (GCS 1.285.14-22). 
99. Cf. Laeuchlils thesis, Probleme des Geschichtlichen bei OrigeneS, 
in which (p. 225) he says that "for Origen, the abstract Word 
of God is a metaphysical entity which, as in Philo's thought, 
reveals itself now more and now less in a personal manner 
on earth. In this case we are imprisoned in the Greek cycles 
once again. We encounter the continually repeated manifest- 
ations of the Word of God in different ways, 'and behind this 
naturally stands the Platonic presence of the Ideas in the 
world of the senses. '! Laeuchli quotes in support of this 
statement Hom. in Jer. XIV. 7 (GCS 3.112.11-13), where it is 
stated that the Word of God does not admit of death, and that 
it is only the human element (-ro ZCýCc4rrtvý)V ) which does. 
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100. Op. cit., p. 333 
101. Frag. in Joh. XXXIII (GCS 4.508.22-509.3); Frag. in Matt. 70. 
1-6 (GCS 12.44). 
. 102. Frag. in Matt. 344.4 
(GCS 12.149); Hom. in Matt. II (GCS 12.251.25- 
28); Comm. in Matt. X. 14 (GCS 10.16.13-15; Frag. in Joh. LXXXIII 
(GCS 4.549.8-12). 
103. John xi. 25,26. 
104. Frag. in Joh. LXXXI (GCS 4.548.14-17). 
105. Frag. in Joh. LII (GCS 4.526.11-21). 
106. Frag. in Matt. 487 (GCS 12.200). 
107. Comm. in Matt. X. 23 (GCS 10.33.3,4), and Sel. in Ps. XXI. 2 
(PG XII. 1253A). 
108. Frag. in Matt. 188 (GCS 12.91). 
ý 
109. 
., 
See pp. 146,147. 
110. Frag. ex Tom. I. Matt. Comm. 2.8-11 and Frag. in Matt. 8 (GCS 
12.4 and 18); Hom. in Gen. VIII. 9 (GCS 6.84.18-85.2). 
111. Comm. in Joh. VI. 49 (GCS 4.158.24-29); cf. Sel. in Ps. LXX (PG 
XII. 1517D, 1520A). 
112. Frag. in Matt. 65 (GCS 12.41,21); Comm. Series in Matt. 102 
(GCS 11.223.11-15). 
113. Frag. in Joh. LXXV (GCS 4.542.7-9); Comm. in Joh. XXVIII. 23 
(GCS 4.418.16-24). 
114. Comm. in Joh. XXVIII. 23 (GCS 4.419.15-28). 
115. Hom. in Matt. III (GCS 12.259.13,14). 
116. Hom. in Matt-II (GCS 12.257.24-30). 
117. Frag. in Joh. LIX (GCS 4.531.18,19). In Grillmeier, Das Konzil 
von Chalkedon Vol. I (WurzbUrg, 1951), p. 63, Clement of Alexandria 
is quoted as taking a similar view, viz. the view that in 
the Lord the food assimilated did not undergo the normal procees 
of dýgestion and consequent breaking-down into its component 
parts. 
118. Comm. in Joh. XIX. 16 (GCS 4.316.8-13). 
119. Ibid. (GCS 4.316.13-27); cf. Contra Cels. II. 16 (GCS 1.145.22- 
146.1) and 111.32 (GCS 1.229.2-13). Cf. also pp. 101, loa. 
D'Ale*'s (on p. 234 of op. cit., ) misunderstands de Faye 
when he criticises him for saying (op. cit., pp. 118,119) that 
according to Origen "the Divine Word leaves and returns to 
the body of Jesus at will, on the ground that the Lord says, 
according to St. John, that He has power to give up His Y-Y-. k 
and power to reclaim it. " How, asks d'Ales, can the giving 
up of His be equivalent to a departure from the body 
of Jesus? Has de Faye confused the Divine Word with the soul 
which He gives up and receives back? The answer is that de 
Faye's words must not be taken too literally. The Word of 
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God is surely not thought of by Origen as actually entering 
and leaving a human body; it is rather a matter of using the 
body of Jesus as His instrument for as long as He sees fit. 
Admittedly, de Faye has expressed himself rather carelessly. 
See also the passages from de Faye quoted on pp. 239 and 240. 
At the foot of p. 240, the statement of de Faye is quote 
'd 
that 
there is an organic union between the Word of God and the 
man Jesus, as the result of which the nature of the man undergoes 
a transformation. Yes, but that must not be interpreted, 
as d'Ales does, as a hypostatic union; the Divine Word and 
the man Jesus still retain, according to Origen, their separate 
identities. 
120. Frag. in Luc. 253,9,10 (GCS 9.334). 
121. Contra Cels. IV. 15 (GCS 1.285.14-22) (already referred to 
in n. 98). 
122. op. cit., pp. 201,202. 
123. op. cit., p. 76. Cf. also Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Trad- 
ition, 2nd ed., (London, 1975), p. 148, where he s Ws that 
""Origen exposed himself to the charge that his system left 
no room for a full appreciation of the humanity of the Lord. 11 
124. In Das Konzil von Chalkedon, Vol. I pp. 62,63. 
125. Frag. in Matt. 235.1-3 (GCS 12.111). 
126. Comm. in Cant. II (GCS M52.11-16). It is interesting that 
this metaphor of a rider on a horse is applied also tb-. the 
relation between Christ and His disciples, and also tozthe 
relation between the devil and those who serve him (Hom. in 
Exod. VI. 2 (GCS 6.193.5-19), and Comm. in Cant. II (GCS 8.153.10- 
14). From this point of view, Judas changed riders. The 
metaphor is inadequate because it suggests that those regarded 
as "horses" are bereft of the power of judgement, just as 
the comparison between the human nature of Christ and the 
"white horse-" of the Apocalypse is inadequate because it 
does not make allowance for the normal development of human 
personality. It is worth mentioning that in Hom. in Num. 
the Church is compared to the ass on which at first Balaam 
sat and which Christ instructed His disciples to set free 
so that He might mount it and upon it enter the heavenly 
Jerusalem (XIII. 8 (GCS 7.119.10-29)). 
127. Contra Cels. III. 28 (GCS 1.226.9-13). Cf. Eichinger, op. cit., 
p. 189, where he says that "the revelation of the Divinity 
of Christ in all its glory is not the result of a movement 
ascending from the humanity of Jesus to His Divinity, so that 
the humanity could express the Divinity, but it is the result 
from the movement from the Divinity which encroaches on the 
humanity and lifts it up and transfigures it, so that the 
Divinity gives itself expression in the humanity. " 
128. Hom. in Josh. V. 3 (GCS 7.317.2-11). 
129.. Contra Cels. IV. 15 (GCS 1.285.14-22); cf. ibid. VI. 67 (GCS 2.137. 
18-21), and VI. 68 (138.6-17). 
130. Comm. in Joh. VI. 38 (GCS 4.147.7-11). But contrast ibid. II. 17,, 
where it is said that none but God possesses oYTe6IV(-Wand a4Vc4ý0 (LJTZ)N 
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yc, Aýý , for. not even Christ possessed the Father's immortality 
(GCS 4.74.34-75.3). See also Ch. IV. p. 85, where this passage 
is also referred to. 
131. p. 49, n. 3. 
132. opcit., p. 310. The same point is made by Hal Koch, op. cit., p. 71. 
Cf. also the discussion of this matter in Eichinger, op. cit., 
pp. 170,171, and Loofs, I'Das altchristliche Zeugnis gegen die 
herrschende Auffasswng der Kenosisstelle Phil. ii. 5-11.11 TSK 100 
(1927-28), pp. 10 sqq., where Origen is seen as appearing to suggest 
in a few passages that "the form of God" was abandoned when "the 
form of a slave" was assumed, but on the other hand his main 
view is seen to be that "the form of a slave" is L means whereby 
human beings could first become acquainted with the Divine Word 
and then finally be introduced to His Divinity. Loofs sees Origen 
as viewing "the form of a slave" in two ways. He sometimes regards 
it as simply veiling the Divinity. But elsewhere he thinks of 
it in a more positive manner as a means whereby the Divine Word 
performs His saving activity among human beings. Loofs actually 
seems to suggest that Origen interpreted the statement of St. 
Paul that the Divine-Word "emptied Himself" and became obedient 
, 
unto death as meaning the exact opposite of what it appears to 
mean, because despite all appearances the Divine Word does not 
suffer what His human nature suffers! 
133. IV. 19 (GCS 1.288.18-25). 
134. Cf. Hanson, Allegory and Event, (London, 19.59), p. 285, where 
he quotes with approval Crouzells statement that Origen envisaged 
the mediatorship of Jesus Christ as lying in His Divine Nature, 
quite apart from the Incarnation, with the result that the 
Incarnation was simply "a device adopted to transfer souls 
from involvement in matter to a post-material existence. " 
135. Hom. in Jos. VII. 7 (GCS 7.33.5.19-21). 
136. Comm. Series in Matt. 55 (GCS 11.124.20-125.16). 
137. Hom. in Lev. XII. 5 (GCS 6.464.11,12). 
138. Wisdom vii. 26. 
139. Contra Cels. VII. 17 (GCS 2.168.14-23). Cf. also ibid. V. 12 
(GCS 2.13.1,2), where it is said that "when God in His goodness 
descends to-mankind, this occurs not spatially, but in accordance 
with His plan. " Cf. aso Hom. in Lev. IX. 5 (GCS 6.427.20-428.8); 
Comm. in Rom. VIII. 2 (PG XIV. 1162A); Hom. in Matt. I (GCS 12.240. 
19-24); Frag. in Joh. XL (GCS 4.515.22-24). 
See Marcus, op. cit., p. 163, where, after quoting the 
passage first referred to, he goes on to say: - "That this 
is a matter of the subordination of the Son to the Father in 
pursuance of the Divine plan, is clear 
(a) from the natural subjection of all things created 
out of nothing to the God Who exists by virtue of His own 
nature; 
(b) from the fact that to the Divine Word is assigned 
the saving function of being a cause of judgement to all 
created rational beings as a result of His Kenosis, in so 
far as they must decide either for truth and knowledge or 
else for falsehood and darkness; 
(c) from the fact that to the Divine Word is assigned 
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the saving function of displaying the Divine immanence in 
all created things, whereas the Father performs the saving 
function of displaying the Divine transcendence over all 
created things. " 
140. De Princ. II. 11.6 (GCS 5.190.15-191.4). Mersch, op. cit., p. 358 
n. 2, interprets this passage as referring to the human nature 
of Christ, which was not fully united to the Divine Word till 
the time of the Resurrection, but was then in so perfected 
a state that the Divine attributes were communicated to it, 
and through it spread abroad in human beings. Mersch seems 
to read far more into this passage than is warranted by the 
text; no distinction is there made between the Divinity and 
the humanity of Christ. 
141. De Princ. IV. 4.3 (GCS 5.352.14-29). Cf. Contra Cels. 11-9 (GCS 
1.136.14-24). Cf. Kelber, op. cit., p. 263; "For Origen, the 
Divinity of the Word of God remains, even in respect of the 
quality of omnipresence, during His incarnate existence. " 
Cf. also Ch. IV, p. 8: ý 
142. Hom. in Matt. II (GCS 12.251.21-25); cf. ibid. 252.23-25. 
143. Frag. in Matt. 338 (GCS 12.146). 
144. Frag. in Joh. LXXXII (GCS 4.548.25-549.5). 
145. Matt. xxv. 14 sqq. 
145. Comm. Series in Matt. 65 (GCS 11.152.23,23). See Mme. Harl, 
op. cit., p. 239, where this passage is quoted (in n. 84), and 
Aeby, op. cit., pp. 152,153. 
147. Frag. in Matt. 504 (GCS 12.206,207). 
148. Comm. Series in Matt. 83 (GCS 11.195.9-18). 
149. Op. cit., p. 154. Cf. also Aeby, op. cit., pp. 162,163. 
150. Cf. Miura-Stange, Celsus und Origenes; das Gemeinsame ihrer 
Weltanschau ung (Giessen, 1926), p. 148: "At any rate Origen 
has certainly found a possibility of dissolving the corpor- 
eality (of Jesus) which he could so realistically understand, 
as we see in his teaching about the various ways in which Jesus 
appeared, teaching which comes near to Docetism. 11 Contrast 
the view expressed in the S. C. edition of Hom. in Luc., p. 125, 
n. 1, where it is said that "Origen's conception (of the Incarnate 
Christ) bears no trace of Docetism: before the Resurrection, 
the body of Jesus is a human body like all others. " Surely 
a careful study of the relevant texts hardly supports this 
assertion!. 
151. Contra Cels. IV. 16 (GCS 1.285.26-286.6). Cf. ibid. II. 64,65 
(GCS 1.185.26-187.19), and Comm. in Cant. III. (GCS 8.175.8- 
14). Cf. also Kelber, op. cit., pp. 265-7. 
152. Op. cit., p. 167. But see Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 251, first para. 
153. Op. cit., p. 164. See also pp. 52,53. Cf. also op. cit., pp. 250- 
254, and Crouzel, La Conn., p. 471. 
154. Op. cit., pp. 153,154. 
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155. Comm. in Matt. XII. 36 (GCS 10.152.9-13). Cf. Koch, op. cit., p. 69, 
especially n. 1, where this passage is quoted in Greek. Cf. also 
Hirschberg, op. cit., p. 209, and Mumm, op. cit., pp. 78,79, where 
Origen's treatment of the Transfiguration is discussed. 
156. Comm. in Matt. XII. 41 (GCS 10.163.30-164.5). 
157. Frag. in Matt. 187.1.1-3 (GCS 12.89). Cf. Miura-Stange, op. cit., 
pp. 159,160, where she says: "The open lack of embarrassment with 
which Origen occasionally pronounces his judgment (sc. that Jesus 
won over the multitudes by the fascination of His personality) 
shows that he in no way thinks that he is degrading Christ Himself 
thereby. In so far as the Word of God reveals Himself in differ- 
ent presentations to different levels of mankind, these presentat- 
ions are themselves limited and relative, and the true and genuine 
appearance of Christ is not affected thereby. Thus the radiation 
emitted by Christ in His various forms enabled Origen to include 
the form of the historical Jesus in a remarkably unrestricted 
way. " 
158. Comm. in Joh. 1.18 (GCS 4.22.31-23-5). Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit., 
p. 228, where Origen is quoted (Comm. in Joh. 11.8 (GCS 4.62.24- 
. 26), as saying that even if we arrive at an exalted contemplation 
of the Divine Word, we must not neglect the introduction which 
is given by His assumption of a human body. Cf. also Hirschberg, 
op. cit., pp. 218 sqq; G6gler, "Die christologische und heilstheo- 
logische Grundlage der Bibelexegese des Origenes" (TQ (1956)), 
pp. 4&5; Refoul-9, op. cit. , 
(OCP (1961) ), pp. 236,23-7, where Origen Is 
influence on Evagrius, in this respect as in others, is emphasised. 
Cf. also FraR. in Matt. 54.7-9 (GCS 12.37). 
159. Contra Cels. II. 66 (GCS 1.188.16-20); cf. Frag. in Luc. 225.2-6 
(GCS 9.335). 
160. Contra Cels. VI. 68 (GCS 2.138.6-11). Cf. Sel. in Ps. CýVII. ý7 
(PG XII. 1584C-1585A), and Frag. in Joh. XVIII (QCS 4.498.12-17). 
Cf. also Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 114, where she points out that 
Origen seems to declare that the Incarnate Christ only conveys 
the truth by way of image, since the world of sense into which 
He entered itself belongs to the order of image, and-not that 
of intelligible reality. Cf. also Rius-Camps, "Comunicabilidad, " 
OCP 38,1972, p. 448, where he says that according to Origen, it 
is not because the Only-begotten Son is in Himself any easier 
to comprehend that God the Father. that He became incarnate. 
(But the question then arises, how do we pass from the comPre- 
hension of the Incarnate Word to that of the Divine Word? Origen 
nowhere satisfactorily answers this question. Surely the only 
intelligible way of thinking is to regard God as manifested by 
way of the Incarnate Jesus, rather than as being revealed af7ter 
the veil of the humanity of Jesus has been removed. ) 
161. Op. cit., p. 66. 
162. Comm. in Joh. I. 7 (GCS 4.13.3-10). Cf. Lebreton, "Les degres 
de la connaissance religieuse dlaprýs Origene" (RchSR 12 (1922)), 
pp. 273,274, where this passage is quoted. Lebreton appears just- 
ified in suggesting that Origen's attitude savours of Gnosticism, 
because it is impossible to separate people into rigid categories 
in this way. Such a passage as this casts doubt on the accuracy 
of Crouzells description of Origen's outlook (in "Origene devant 
l'Incarnation et devant 11histoirell (BLE 61,1960), p. 104) as 
not being concerned with the Word from whom His flesh has been 
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removed, but with the Word Who appears by way of (a travers), 
His flesh. The passage in Comm. in Joh. II. 8 (quoted in note 
22, and also quoted by Crouzel) does not really lend itself to 
Crouzel's interpretation. See Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 74 & 75, 
for a discussion of the passage. 
163. Comm. in Matt. XII. 30 (GCS 10.133.15-134.5). Cf. Comm. in Joh. 
1.37 (GCS 4.48.30-49.2), and Frag. in Matt. 464.2-4 (GCS 12.191,192). 
Cf. Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 194, where she says that the two real- 
ities which are "above" and "below" do not constitute, for Origen, 
"two Christs. 11 If he distinguishes the Word Who was with God 
and His shadow here below, that is through an analysis of the 
internal structure of Christ. Lebreton, in his I'Degres de la 
Conn. ", p. 286, after quoting Comm. in Matt. XII. 30, comments (justly, 
in my opinion) that "it displays the rash idealism which thinks 
it can approach God while losing sight of the humanity of Christ. " 
Cf. also Ch. VI, p. 209 .. 
164. In his article 110. dev. l'Inc. et 11hist. ", p. 95. 
165. E. g. Hom. in Lev. XII. 2 (GCS 6.456.18-24); Prol. in Cant. (GCS 
8.85.10-16); Comm. in Cant. I (GCS 8.111.17-19); ibid II (GCS 
8.164.2-10); ibid III (GCS 8.206.6,7); Comm. in Matt. XIII. 26 
(GCS 10.250.24-251.9). In Hom. in Jer. I. 7 (GCS 3.6.20-21), and 
Hom. in Luc. XX (GCS 9.123.3-14), Origen seems to suggest that 
our Lord's development was only apparent. Origen however takes 
it literally in Hom. in Jer. XIV. 10 (GCS 3.114.27-115.1), and 
Comm. Series in Matt. 55 (GCS 11.124.27-125.3). 
. De Faye , op. cit., p. 160, likewise says that "the thought 
of Origen owes nothing to the Jesus Who lived, spoke and acted. " 
166. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 18 (GCS 4.457.17-27). 
167. In La Conn., p. 111. 
168. Cf. Crouzel, La Conn. p. 108, and Koch. op. cit., p. 70. Cf. also 
Mme. Harl, op. cit., p. 255, where she says thatýit is on the 
distinction of the humanity and the Divinity of JesusýChrist 
that Origen bases his certainty that there is a progress in the 
knowledge of Christ. If Christ reveals God in the manner of 
an instructor, that is because of the interplay of the human 
and Divine elements united in Him. Cf. also pp. 282-285. On the 
other hand Wintersig, op. cit., p. 77, points out (justly, in the 
present writer's opinion) with reference to Contra Cels. VI. 68 
(mentioned in n. 170 below) that "the humanity of Jesus has in 
Origen's system only a transitory significance; it serves above 
all else to make the Invisible One visible, so as to give emphasis 
to His esoteric instruction. " Cf. Kelber, op. cit., pp. 263,264. 
Cf. also Hanson, op. cit., p. 284, where, after quoting the passage 
from Contra Cels., he says that one must conclude that "the 
Incarnation was to Origen no more than a necessary device employed 
by God as an important stage in the process of fully revealing 
Himself. " 
169. ou"K 0A1r-(-fe4 F--ffl 'TrIS tq& 
170. Contra Cels. VI. 68 (GCS 2.138.18-21). Cf. the discussion of this 
passage in Eichinger, op-cit., pp. 177-179. The passage is also 
discussed on pp. 39 sqq., with particular reference to the meaning 
of "being transformed into the likeness of the Word Who became 
flesh. " It is to be doubted whether Origen means, as Eichinger 
asserts him to mean, that the Divine Word deters men from sin 
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in the first place by threatening them with the consequences 
of sin. That conception indeed appears in Origen's writings, 
but it does not seem to be what he has in mind here. It is in 
fact not part of the work of the Incarnate Word. Origen appears 
to mean rather that men first recognise the Incarnate Word as 
expressing in His life the principles of action to which they 
acknowledge that they should themselves conform. Cf. also pp. 59- 
61, and Crouzel, La Conn. p. 472. 
Cf. Pitra, A. S. 111.245 (CXVII. 25-27), and Hom. in Luc. III. 3 
(GCS 9.21.12-22.4), where Origen says that not all who saw Christ 
in His earthly life saw the Word of God - not Pilate or Judas 
or the multitude which thronged Him, but only those whom He thought 
worthy of contemplating Him. 
171. Comm. in Rom. VII. 7 (PG XIV. 1122A-C). 
172. Comm. in Joh. VI. 49 (GCS-4.157.27-158.1). 
173. Comm. in Matt. XII. 29 (GCS 10.132.21-133.14). 
174. Comm. Series in Matt. 32 (GCS 11.58.16-59.3). Cf. p. 114. 
175. Frag. in Luc. 140.8-11 (GCS 9.283), and Comm. in Matt. XII. 39 
(GCS 10.156.3-11). Cf. Ch. VII, p. 244,245. 
176. Hom. in Gen. IV. 5 (GCS 6.55.15-28). Cf. Origen's attitude to 
the prophets (Ch. II, pp. 35-38. 
177. Comm. in Matt. XII. 32 (GCS 10.139.19-140.6,20-27); cf. Excerpt. 
in Cant. VI. 4 (PG XIII. 207C), and Frag. in Matt. 357.11-15 (GCS 
13.153). Cf. also Crouzel, La Conn., p. 486. 
178. Contra Cels. VI. 77 (GCS 2.146.14-29). Cf. Comm. Series in Matt. 
35, where it is said that "perhaps the Word appears with diverse 
kinds of glory, depending on the capacity of the soul which sees 
Him"(GCS 11.65.28-30). 
179. Comm. Series in Matt. 100 (GCS 11.219.7-17). 
180. Op. cit., pp. 106 & 107, n. 193. 
181. Op. cit., pp. 274-276, where this matter is discussed. 
182. De Princ. II. 6.3 (GCS 5.141.25-143.2). 
183. Frag. in Rom. I. 38-41 . 
(JTS 13.211). 
184. Cf. p . 101. 
185. Sel, in Ps. I. 1 (PG XII. 1085A). Cf. ibid. XLII. 3 (PG XII. 1421A). 
186. In L'Image, p. 135, first pam . of n. 44. 
187. On p. 243 of op. cit. 
188. p. 125. 
189. In Das Konzil von Chalkedon, Vol. I p. 64. 
190. Excerpt. in Cant. vi. 7 (PGXIII. 209B). Cf. Pitra, A. S. 111.173 
(XCII. 1,2). 
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191. Comm. in Joh. I. 32 (GCS 4.42.10-14). 
192. Comm. in Matt. XIV. 7 (GCS 10.290.16,17,24-31), and ibid. XVI. 19 
(GCS 10.540.23-29). Cf. Pitra A. S. III. 46 (XLVII. 3), where it 
is said: (i. e. )c , rrou e, ýc Ala'y os, C -2 ,e tfi 3qý - C-V Cf. also ibid130 (CXXXI. 7), where it is said that 'by Christ I here refer KYJ to the yon 
which together with the Word of God entered e life of men. " 
193. Contra Cels. I. 32 (GCS 1.84., 19-26). 
194. IX. 5 (GCS 7.60.18-24). 
195. It does not seem clear, however, that there is, any firm 
distinction to be drawn between the "soul" and the "spirit" of 
Christ, as will shortly appear. 
196. De Princ. IV. 4.4 (GCS 5.353.10-13). 
197. Ibid. IV. 4.5 (GCS 5.355.14-356.5). See Fitzgerald's discussion 
of this passage in op. cit., pp. 190-192. It is however to be 
observed that Fitzgerald seems to contradict himself when he 
, 
denies on p. 191 that the Word Himself became incarnate, and yet 
on p. 192 asserts that the Word was involved with Christ'shuman 
soul in the "self-emptying" entailed in the Incarnation. 
198. Hom. in Matt. I (GCS 12.242.27). 
199. Contra Cels. VI. 66 (GCS 2.136.28). 
200. Frag. in Matt. 288.2,3 (GCS 12.128). 
201. Comm. in Joh. VI. 30 (GCS 4.140.17-22). 
202. Comm. in Matt. XV. 24 (GCS 10.419.30-420.13). 
203. Comm. in Joh. I. 20 (GCS 4.25.16-20). 
204. pp. 227,228. 
205. De Princ. II. 8.3 (GCS 5.156.22-26, and 157.12-158.2). Cf. also 158.22- 
159.2T. Cf... Cadiou, op. cit., p. 8. 
206. Ibid. II. 6.3-(GCS 5.142.2-10). 
207. Indeed, Origen has to admit that certain passages of Scripture 
speak of the "soul of God" (Lev. xvii. 10, Is. i. 13,14 and xlii. 1), 
so that his derivation of the word "soul" does not harmonise 
with all the uses of it (De Princ. II. 8.1 (GCS 5.153,25-29)). 
In fact, the idea of the soul as something which has lost its 
original perfection is introduced quite abruptly in De Princ. 
11.8,2, where reference is made to the "soul-like man" whom St. 
Paul contrasts with the "spiritual man" in I Cor. ii. 14 (GCS 5. 
154.18-24). Cf. Eichinger, op. cit., pp. 87 sqq., and Gruber, 
op. cit., P. 150. 
208. In Frag. in Lam. LIII (GCS 3.258.10,11). 
209. Sel. in Ps. LXIV. 3 (PG XII. 1493B). 
210. Frag. in I Cor. XXXIX. 57-59 (JTS 9.510). 
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211. Convs. with Heracl. 3.12-20 (Schererls ed., pp. 59,60). 
212. Frag. in Joh. LXXXIV (GCS 4.549.17-21). 
213. Hom. in I Sam. xxviii. 3-25 (GCS 3.290.1-10). 
214. Sel. in Ps. LXXIII. 7 (PG XII. 1529D). 
215. Frag. in Luc. 195.1,2 (GCS 9.310). 
216. Frag. in Matt. 125 (GCS 12.65). 
217. Frag. in Luc. 121.20-25 (GCS 9.276). Cf. Lieske, op. cit., p. 104. 
218. Ibid. 186.1-5,17-24 (GCS 9.305,306) Cf. Frag. in Matt. 265.1-3 
(GCS 12.121). 
219. Frag. in Matt. 187. IT. 3,4 (GCS 12.89). 
220. Sel. in Ps. XXI. 10 (PG XII. 1253D-1256A). 
221. See Crouzel, L'Image, pp. 131 & 157. 
222. 'Ibid., n. 86 on p. 159. 
223.11.4 (GCS 2.301.25-302.6). 
224. The same applies to the distinction made between 
and licU-S in the passage from the De Orat. (XIV. 5 (GCS 2.332.18- 
25)) referred to by Dupuis on p. 74, n. 80, and in Frag. in Eph. 
XIX. 42-48 (JTS 3.419). 
225. Op. cit. pp. 10-13. 
226. Op. cit., p. 12. 
227. Cf. also Crouzel, La Conn., pp. 463,464, where he makes the same 
distinction between WVE-tA-1- and Vo'us', and declares that the 
-tr4rz%^Jt--t- is "grace. " Lieske in n. 56 on pp. 143 & 144 similarly identi- 
fies ' with "the grace bestowed by the Holy Spirit", even 
though he admits that Origen treats the -nvco' as V6"vS. 
228. On p. 256 of op. cit., 
229. pp. 40,41, and 45. 
230. pp. 414,415, and 417. 
231. In "Comunicabilidad, " OCP 38,1972, p. 433. 
232. The same view is taken by Teichtweier, op. cit., p. 270: the whole 
chapter entitled "Der Geist des Menschen" is relevant to this 
theme. Cf. also p. 253 of op. cit., where the author says that 
"in general it must be said that Origen understands by the term 
jr, rEAj(--C; -- that element in man which is directed to God and 
enlightened by Him and strives to free itself from evil. " H. 
Rahner also appears to identify -rC\fC-%Grd- with vovýS; see op. cit., 
p. 209. 
233. De Princ. II. 10.7 (GCS 5.181.1-13). Crouzel in L'Image, p. 145, 
does not interpret this passage in the way I do; he appears to 
suggest that the "spirit" of those who have not used the gifts 
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of the Holy Spirit aright will return to the God Who gave it, 
whereas the rest of the soul will go to hell. But surely Origen 
means that the entire soul (including the "spirit") of these 
persons will be separated from God. The same criticism can be 
made of Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 213,214. 
234. De Princ. II. 10.7 (GCS 5.181.13-19). 
235. Cf. the quotation from Iranaeus given on p. 65 of Crouzel, op. cit. 
236. p. 457 of L"Evolution de la doctrine du Pneuma du Stoicisme a 
Saint Augustin (Paris-Louvain, 1945). 
237. p. 459. 
238. De Princ. III. 4.3 (GCS 5.267.23-268.17). 
239. pp. 457,467,468. 
240. p. 458. 
241. GCS 5.265.6-13, referred to in n. 130 on p. 458 of op. cit. 
242. " 111.4.2 (GCS 5.266.27-267.5). 
243. Frag. in Lam. VII (GCS 3.237.10-28). 
244. Sel. in Ps. XL. 6 (PG XII. 1413B). 
245. IX. 2 (GCS 2.319.4-8). Cf. Rahner, op. cit., pp. 219 & 220, where 
this passage is quoted. Crouzel in La Conn., pp. 145 & 146 under- 
stands the word "spirit" (-rC4(Fircý-) in this passage to refer 
to the human spirit. The quotation from Ps. xxiv. 1 in the passage 
would seem to indicate that it is the Divine Spirit Who is ref- 
erred to. Cf. Comm. in Joh. I. 28 (GCS IX. 36.12-14), where Origen 
refers to the soul becoming united with the Holy Spirit, with 
/ the result that each of the saved becomes spil-itual (rkte, 7, -Lrt Kai). 
Cf. Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CXVIII. 81, where it is said, with reference 
to the verse "My YcJKkfades away CKý, ett%( for Thy salvation", 
that the writer would not have said I'My-rVi5ýtý. J_ fades away"; 
for the I yd&vý which is joined to the -rTVE: ar_. A_ 
ceases to be a and becomes one with the 
246. Op. cit., pp. 115,116. 
247. Cf. also op. cit., p. 125, where it is said that "the stage of 
mystical union with Christ corresponds to the future close contact 
with the Ascended Lord which in the condition of the soul of 
Christ and its full blending (Verschmelzen) with the Divine Word 
is clearly expressed. " Cf. also the last sentence of the para. 
ending on p. 130 of op. cit. 
Cf. also Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 65, where it is suggested 
first that the union of the soul of Christ with the Divine Word 
is "eine wirklich ontische Einheit", which presumably means that 
the soul loses its separate identity, and secondly, that "Christ 
is in the last resort only a special instance of the general 
relation of the mature Christian to the Divine Word. "I would 
agree with the second statement, but not with the first. 
248. Section 12 (GCS 1.12.23 25). 
249. Section 34 (GCS 1.31.17,18). 
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250. Anathema 6a of the Second Council of Constantinople, quoted in 
De Princ. II. 8.3 (GCS 5.160.15-18). 
251. De Princ. II. 9.7 (GCS 5.171.15-17). 
252. Cf. Eichinger, op. cit., pp. 89.90. 
253. C%( Etr'r( TO ff0j'4k CrZ111&C-rb1, / -1-,, eaS lrý, / 
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Contra Cels. 11.9 (GCS 1.136.30-137.3). Cf. Fitzgerald, op. cit., 
77-79, and also n. 46 on p. 113, where, however, he makes what 
seems an entirely unacceptable deduction from this passage that 
there was no separation between the Word and the soul of Christ 
before the Incarnation, in the sense that the soul shared in 
all the pperations of the Word. The unionwhich Origen 
insists on is surely a union of wills only. 
254. p. 152. Boon interprets the passage in a prime facie manner when 
he says (op. cit., p. 26) that "notwithstanding the co-existence 
of both natures in Christ, there is in the Incarnation an 
element of deification of the humannature since this is taken 
up into the Divine Nature. Thus both the soul and the body of 
Jesus Christ become a, unity with the Word of God. ". 
255. --- Op. cit., p. 165; the same point is made on p. 178, n. 3. 
256. De Princ. II. 6.3 (GCS 5.142.2-10). See also Comm. in Joh. XX. 19 
(GCS 4.351.25-28), where Origen says that "perhaps the soul of 
Jesus in its perfection was in God and in His fullness; it came 
forth from thence, sent, by the Father, and took flesh in the 
womb of Mary. " 
257. The same criticism can be made of Crouzells interpretation in 
La Conn., p. 461, n. l. 
258. In his article "La christologie d'Evagre at llorigenisme, " OCP 
27,1961, p. 240. 
259. Inserted in De Princ. II. 6.4 AGCS 5.143.8-23). 
260. It is interesting to observe. that according to Refoule', op. cit., 
p. 239, Gregory of Nyssa is caught in the same dilemma as Origen 
when he says that the human Jesus was only exalted as Lord and 
Christ after His Passion, and yet also regards the: union of the 
Divine and human natures as essential and not mer; ely moral. 
If the union were Yessential", there could be no question of 
the human Jesus becoming after His Passion what He had not been 
before it. 
261. As well as in the one referred to in n. 253. 
262. er 
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263. Contra Cels. I. 66 (GCS 1.119.16-21); cf. ibid. (120.20-121.2), 
11.25 (GCS 1.154,16-155.6), and VII. 16 (GCS 2.167.12-168.10). 
Cf. P. 
264.1.60 (GCS 1.111.20-22). 
265. Cf. Wintersig, op. cit., pp. 77,78. 
266. On p. 165 of op. cit. 
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267. e. g. Comm. in Joh. I. 28 (GCS 4.36.24-26) quoted in Nemeshegyi, 
op. cit., p. 73. 
268. On p. 156 of his book. 
269. Op. cit., pp. 119-121. 
270. Comm. Series in Matt. 126 (GCS 11.263.2,3). 
271. Contra Cels. II. 9 (GCS 1.135.3-28). Cf. Miura-Stange, op. cit., 
p. 148, third para. 
272. De Princ. IV. 1.5 (GCS 5.299.4-7). 
273. De Princ. 11.6.2 (GCS 5.141.1-3). 
274. Contra Cels. VII. 16 (GCS 2.167.13-19). 
275. Comm. Series in Matt. 73 (GCS 11.172.21-27). Cf. Lieske, pp. 140 
& 154, and Kelber, op. cit., p. 262, where he says: "The idea of 
a suffering God, which first presented itself through the des- 
cription of the genuine being of Christ, has no place in the 
thought of Origen. The Word of God cannot suffer. Suffering 
was the lot of the soul of Jesus. The Word can take this suffer- 
ing into His consciousness, indeed, but not as a soul which is 
itself capable of undergoing feelings. " Cf. also Sel. in Ps. 
LXVIII. 3 (PG XII. 1512B), where it is said that although the Word 
of God may send up prayers to the Father to be rescued from His 
distress, He is simply making His own the feelings of the man 
'A :Y whom He took to Himself ( Idlicir-ninu 'L, E" to r', V C-, 
276. Comm. in Joh. II. 26 (GCS 4.83.13-17). 
277. Comm. Series in Matt. 90 (GCS 11.205.24-206.16). Cf. Mme. Harl, 
op. cit.., p. 241, where she quotes this passage, and admits that 
the reality of the Incarnation is somewhat diminished thereby. 
Cf. also p. 358, where she says that "leaving the sufferings to 
the man, i. e. to the agent of salvation, Origen reflects above 
all on the glorious scenes in which the Divinity of the Son of 
God was proclaimed. " 
278. Hom. in Jer. XIV. 5,6 (GCS 3.112.7-10); cf. XV. 4 (128.8-13), and 
Hom. in Ezek. I. 5 (GCS 8.330.4-6). 'But strangely enough, in 
Exhort. ad Mart. 29 (GCS 1.2ý. 2-23), Origen suggests that at 
the time when the Saviour asked that "this cup" should pass 
from Him (Matt. xxvi. 39), He cannot be supposed to have been afraid, 
because He was assured of the powerful protection of the Father 
and was therefore afraid of no one. Origen seems here to revert 
to the idea that it was the Word of God Himself Who became incarnate. 
In order to reconcile this assertion with the prayer quoted, 
Origen claims that "this cup" must be distinguished from martyrdom 
as such, because that is called "a cup" of suffering, and says 
that our Lord was asking that He 1; e martyred in a manner more 
severe than crucifixion, so as to benefit mankind to a greater 
extent. But such was not the Father's will. Cf. also p. 108. ' 
Teichtweier, on p. 307 of op. cit., quotes Hom. in Jer. 
XIV. 5,6, but does not recognise that the part of the soul of 
Jesus which experienced feelings was not the pre-existent soul, 
but the part which was assumed at the Incarnation (midway bet- 
ween "spirit" and "flesh"). How can Teichtweier say that "the 
soul of Jesus in no way became pure spirit"? Surely it always 
was pure spirit, and never became anything inferior. See pp. 147.153. 
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for a detailed discus§ion of the two types of soul. 
279. Frag. in Joh. LXXXVIII (GCS 4.552.14-22). Cf. Sel. in Ps. LXI. 2 
(PG XII. 1484D, 1485A); ibid. XVII. 5,6 (1225B); ibid. LIV. 4 (1464C). 
280. Comm. Series in Matt. 92 (GCS 11.208.13-15,26-29). But see Pitra 
A. S. III. 86 (LXVIII. 14,15) for a different view, in fact a view 
which is more in accordance with traditional teaching about the 
Incarnate Jesus. It is there said that when Christ said "Let 
this cup pass from me", He was not intending to deceive Satan 
nor to make the will of worldly people his own, but in His own. 
Person Christ spontaneously implored the Father with a laud cry 
and with tears and sweat, even though He was the Son of God. 
281. Comm. Series in Matt. 91 (GCS 11.207.22-26). 
282. Sel. in Ps. III. 6 (PG XII. 1128BC). 
283. Contra Cels. II. 43 (GCS 1.166.8-11). 
284. Hom. in Sam. xxviii. 3-25 (GCS 3.292.18,19). 
285. Comm. in Matt. XVI. 21 (GCS 10.546.30-547.17); cf. Frag. in Matt. 558. 
*, 
1-14 (GCS 12.229). 
286. De Princ. II. 8.4 (GCS 5.162-11-21); cf. ibid. IV-4.4 (GCS 
' 
5.353.19- 
354.3). Cf. also Hom. in NumIX. 5, referred to on p. 130 , and 
comment made in n. Y-95. But see Convs. with Heracl. 6.20-7.7 
(Scherer, pp. 68,70), referred to again on pp. 156,157 For a dis- 
cussion of the soul of Jesus as conceived of by Origen, see 
Teichtweier, pp. 306-308. 
287. De Princ. 11.8.5 (GCS 5.163.7-11). 
288. Op. cit., 
-pp. 
24,25. 
289. Ibid., p. 49. 
29D. Op. cit., p. 148. 
291. Contra Cels. II. 34 (GCS 1.161.3-7). 
292. Ibid. II. 24 (GCS 1.153.10-16). 
293. S'Alcou 0 rcc-e t, Th u -110 u I 
-ý rl -fOýpý uv00 ut-4E /0 U -T 
(Contra Cels. VII. 16 (US 2.167.26-28)). 
294. Contra Cels. VI. 47 (GCS 2.119.4-15); cf. ibid. VI. 48 (GCS 2.120.2- 
9). 
295. Op. cit., p. 114. 
296. Op. cit., pp. 262,263. 
297. See also notes 3&4 on p. 262 of op-cit., 
298. vo Týj 
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299. Contra Cels. VII. 17 (GCS 2.186.26-29); cf. V. 39 (GCS 2.43.26-44.2). 
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300. Hom. in Ezek-1.10 (GCS 8.333.20-24). Cf. Eichinger, op. cit., 
p. 195, where he says that "Jesus in the body which He assumed, 
even when this is transfigured, is never the Self-revelation 
of the Divine Word, but as the Bearer of a mystical content He 
merely has an inner relationship to the revelation of the Word. " 
Cf. also Mme. Harl, op. cit., pp. 203,204. 
301.11.6.2 (GCS 5.141.12-15). 
302. Ibid. II. 6.3 (GCS 5.143.2-9). Cf. Primmer, op. cit., pp. 84.85. 
303. Section 35 (GCS 1.32.15-24). 
304. See pp. 121-12a 
305. Contra Cels. II. 9 (GCS 1.136.13-18). 
306. J-1 k<JD -, ( 61, Ki Jr_4_V__4_V 'FIIJ (3 1Ur 
C- V ytv. 
307. Contra Cels. VII. 35 (GCS 2.186.8-11). 
308. C-15 TILS (Contra Cels. IV. 18 Ki 
(GCS 1.288.1-10)). Cf . Sx. in Ps. X, 
ýIX. 7 (PG XII. 1293D, 1296A). 
Cf. also Kelber, op. cit., p. 257, and Eichinger, op. cit., p. 145, 
who quotes the passage and also refers to the question introducing 
it - "Does the Word of God undergo anything 
inappropriate by 
bringing down the Saviour to the human race out of His great 
love for mankind? " - as involving "a surprising change of subject", 
presumably meaning that the Word and the Saviour appear to be 
treated as two separate beings. Cf. also pp. 86 & 87 of oP. cit., 
Cf. also Cornelis, op. cit., p. 49, where he says that according 
to Origen, "souls as such are incorporeal, and thus integral 
parts of the invisible world, but they have left their fatherland. 
The soul of Jesus was an exception to this: though it was a 
real tP uký_ it did not -deserve 
to be'brought ' 
down to an inferior level in the'hierarchy of values, for 
nothing belonging to the higher world is of small account. " 
309. De Princ. 11.9.7 (GCS 5.171.15-18). See also Comm. in Jýh. II. 31 
(GCS 4.88.12-18), and XIX. 22 (324.13-16). 
Cf. also De Princ. 111.5.4 &5 (GCS 5.2.75.5-9 and 20-23, 
and 276.1-6). It is worth remarking that Origen is inconsistent 
with himself in the first and last passages referred to in De 
Princ. III-5. In the first, he suggests that the souls who were 
brought down from higher conditions to serve those who on account 
of their own defects were placed on a lower level were brought 
down against their own-will (licet non volentes (5.275.9)). 
In the third passage, he allows that some may have been willing 
and some unwilling (vel volentes vel inviti (5.276.4)). In any 
case, if they were unwilling, that would be a sign that they 
were not in a state of perfect harmony with God and therefore 
deserved to be deprived of unmixed fellowship with Him. Cf. 
Aeby, op. cit., pp. 148,149 (esp. n. 4 on latter page), and Cadiou, 
op. cit., pp. 61,62. 
I suppose the solution would be to say, not that they were 
unwilling, but that they did not desire to be brought down from 
their state of bliss, but none the less consented to sacrifice 
their own desires to the Divine Will, just as our Lord sacrificed 
His human will in the Garden of Gethsemane. 
Perhaps this provides a clue to the solution of the problem 
of whether the Incarnate Jesus had two wills. The "orthodox" 
view is that He had two wills - Divine and human; but in order 
to avoid the corollary of a split personality, it could be said 
that the human will was not independent, but simply consisted of 
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inclinations and feelings, which might on occasion be out of 
harmony with the Divine Will, but could never prevent it from 
being put into effect. See also Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 179. 
310. St. John viii. 42. 
311. Comm. in Joh. XX. 19 (GCS 4.351.24-30). A distinction seems necess- 
ary here between what might be called God's "primary" will, that 
is, what He requires of those in fellowship with Him, and His 
"consequent" will, that is, what He inflicts on those who have 
to a greater or less extent departed from that fellowship. 
312. Comm. in Matt. XIII. 17 (GCS 10.226.2-17). Teichtweier on p. 308 
of op. cit. discusses the difference between the soul of Jesus 
and other human souls, and quotee with approval Redepenning's 
statement that "such a soul (as that of Jesus) is not a real 
soul in the sense which Origen's system demands", because it 
had never grown cold in its love for God, and thus did not 
deserve to be implanted in a human body. 
313. Contra Ceis. VI. 45 (GCS 2.116.14,15). 
314. 
.. 
Ibid. II. 25 (GCS 1.154.21-25). 
315. 
316. Contra Cels. VII. 43 (GCS 2.194.15,16). 
317. Ibid. VIII. 42 (GCS 2.256.27-31). 
318. Hom. in Ezek. VI. 6 (GCS 8.384.16-385.3). Cf. also Frag. in Ezek. 
XVI. 8, where it is stated that God is not without feelings (o6 
Acrt6-A, >1y,, c, & 
cc &9S) (PG XIII. 812. B). Cf. also Sel. in Ps. XLI. 10, 
where it is said that Christ declares Himself to be of a sad 
countenance because He is forsaken by God (PG XII. 1420A), and 
Sel. in Ezek. VII. 27 (PG XIII 796B) where it is said that the 
sentence "the King shall mourn" is not translated in the Septuag- 
int, perhaps because the translators did not think the Saviour 
would mourn, though Origen himself would say that this is not 
an unreasonable idea if the Saviour mourned over Jerusalem. 
Cf. also Crouzel, "Origene devant 1 'Incarnation et 11 histoire", 
p. 83. 
319. Op. cit. The passage from Hom. in Ezek. VI. 6 is quoted on pp. 75 
& 76 of that work. 
320. pp. 68-70. 
321. On p. 21, op. cit. 
322. On pp. 85 & 86, op. cit. 
323. Cf. also what Primmer says, op. cit., p. 89: "The love of the Word 
of God for His Bride the Church is the fundamental idea on which 
the view of God as feeling the emotion of pity rests. " 
324. Cf. Temple, op. cit., p. 269 n. 1 "It is truer to say that there 
is suffering in God than that God suffered. The Greek conception 
of the impassibility of the Divine wrought fearful havoc in the 
theology of the patristic period. If Christ is the revelation 
of God, then God is not impassible. But to say boldly that He 
is passible is not true either. There is suffering in God, but 
it is always an element in the joy of the triumphant sacrifice. " 
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325. Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 162. 
326. Ibid., p. 180. 
327.111.4. 
328. GCS 5.270.27-29. 
329. GCS 5.264.13-265.4. RUsche in Das Seelenpueuma: Seine Entwicklung 
von der Hauchseele zur Geistseele (Paderborn, 1933) seems to 
give a misleading account of Origen's description of the animal 
soul. It is surely not in his view "material", even though it 
is closely associated with the body. RUsche c, orrectly observes 
that Origen parts company with the Stoics in so far as he decl- 
ares the primal Vo in each person to be non-material (p. 45). 
But it seems fanciful to suggest that what Rusche calls the 
"Blutpneuma" originates, according to Origen, from the cooling 
of the ethereal body which he supposes Origen to have associated 
with the Vn13-_ in its pre-existent state (ibid). See also RUsche, 
Blut, Leben, and Seele (Paderborn, 1930) pp. 418 sqq., for a dis- 
cussion of De Princ. 111.4. 
See also Lot-Borodine, op. cit., RHR, 1932, CVI, p. 533, 
and also 1933, CVII, n. I on pp. 32 &3,1 where he points out that 
the Eastern mystics from the time of Origen considered the deiform 
.. as perfectly 
independent of the tý If which is set under 
it, including the rational part of the q10 41 
Hirschberg seems to be wrong when on p. 173 of op. cit., 
he asserts that Origen does not suppose that the soul's fall 
from its original state through sin has added to it another 
and inferior substance. 
Teichtweier on p. 321 of op. cit. seems mistaken in holding 
that Origen rejected the idea that the animal soul originated 
with the body. 
Javierre in his article "Hacia una definicion plena del 
'soma' origenistal"(RET 9 (1949)), when he discusses Origen's 
conception of the u,, Cv[ on pp. 379-382, makes no reference whatever 
to De Princ. III. 4, Which one would have thought vital for a full 
understanding of Origen's doctrine. In particular, if he had 
studied this chapter, he would not have asserted that "Origen 
declares that the q1u&vk, did hot depend essentially on matter 
at the time of its creation. " 
330. Sections 2 and 3 of De Princ. III. 4 (GCS 5.265.2-268.23). Cf. 
Frag. in Rom. XXXI. 5.11 (JTS 13.365). Cf. Teichtweier, pp. 318,319. 
331. XXXII. 18 (GCS 4.455.12-456.13). 
332. St. John. xii. 27. 
333. St. John xiii. 21. 
334. Cf. Mumm's comment on this passage in n. 341 of op. cit., where 
he says that "one has the feeling that Origen has created a 
difficulty and distinction which does not really exist in John, 
and then has resolved it by a bit of ingenious and subtle argument 
which overreaches itself. " Cf. also Dupuis' discussion of this 
passage in op. cit., pp. 84 & 85, and that of Verbeke in op. cit., 
pp. 456,457. 
Cf. also Teichtweier, pp. 271,272 and 300. The statement 
of Origen that "the human spirit does not admit of anything evil" 
is shown by Teichtweier to be in contradiction to the view of 
Origen expressed elsewhere, when Teichtweier says (p. 274) that 
according to Origen, "what disappears in the encounter of the 
human spirit with the Spirit of God is only the state of imper- 
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fection and sin which the human spirit has against its own nature 
appropriated to itself. ". Origen in fact fails to realise that 
sin can hardly be said to originate in the human spirit (in his 
sense), but rather in the lower part of the soul which asserts 
itself against the (unawakened) spirit. The contradiction is 
made still more apparent in another statement (p. 254) to the 
effect that "the human spirit according to Origen remains good 
even after the Fall; it retains the power to remember its former 
state and finally to win it back. There lives in it the unbroken 
power of its initial state, and its danger is that it may leave 
that power unused, and allow itself to be overcome by earthly 
things. " Teichtweier himself admits (on p. 301) that there is 
a contradiction in this aspect of Origen's thought. 
Cf. also Gruber, op. cit., p. 154, n. 56, where this contrad- 
iction is also admitted, and also pp. 178,179, where the passage 
from Comm. in Joh. XXXII is quoted and commented on, and n. 12 
on pp. 179 & 180, where the contradiction in Origen's thought 
is also alluded to. 
335. Comm. in Rom. VII. 3 (PG XIV. 1106A) 
336. Ibid. VI. 1 (PG XIV. 1057A). Cf. Frag. in Rom. XXXI 16-18 (JTS 13. 
--366) 
337. Ibid. I. 10 (PG XIV. 856A). 
338. Ibid. II. 10 (PG XIV. 893B-D). This is the second of the interpret- 
ations of St. Luke xii. 46 suggested in De Princ. II. 10.7 (see 
pp. 134,135 ). Cf. Crouzel, L'Image, p. 133. 
339. Ibid. IX. 25 (PG XIV. 1226A-C). Such a passage as this seems to 
refute Teichtweier's suggestion (op. cit. p. 330) that an individual 
has two souls in addition to the "spirit", namely the "soul of 
the flesh" and a higher soul, which enters the individual from 
outside, and which can fulfil either the will of the spirit or 
the will of the flesh. Origen does not suggest that the "flesh" 
has a soul of its own, though he does suggest that the soul which 
is distinct from the spirit can yield to the solicitations of 
the flesh. 
340. e. g. Comm. in Rom. VI. 9 (PG XIV. 1089A). 
341. Frag. in Matt. 274.6-9 (1st col. ) (GCS 12.123). Cf. Comm. in 
Matt. XII. 4 (GCS 10.75.3-5), and Hom. in Jud. IV. 4 (GCS 7.491.18- 
21). 
342. Comm. in Rom. VII. 12 (PG XIV. 1137A). 
343. Frag. in Matt. 214.2-5 (GCS 12.102). Cf. Comm. in Joh. I. 32 (GCS 
4.40.31-41.2), and Pitra, A. S. II. 458, Frag. in Ps. vii. 13. 
344. Comm. in Rom. VI. 6 (PG XIV. 1069A). 
345. Ibid. V. 6 (PG XIV. 1034D, 1035A). 
346. Frag. in Jer. 10 (GCS 3.202.2,3). 
347. Frag. in Eph. XXI. 15-18) JTS(3.556) 
348. Frag. in I Cor. XXIV. 2,3,9,11-13,16-18 (JTS 9.364). 
349. XX. 22 (GCS 4.355.9-17). 
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350. Comm. in Rom. I. 17 (PG XIV. 866ABC). 
351. Cf. Rahner, op. cit., pp. 213-215, where this prayer is quoted, 
and Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 47-49,65,67,184 n. 114, &P-185. 
Cf. Frag. 
_in 
Rom. XXXI. 16-18 (JTS 13.366), where it is said 
that "the i tself does not seem to remain in one state, but 
either becomes v: ýfg through wickedness or through virtue. ', 
Cf. Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CXLI. 8 p. 131, where it is said 
that the UV 
i% 
which is freed from material things and 
from the bo led out of prison by God. 
Cf. also Pitra A. S. III. p. 32 (XXXVIII. 11,12 , and p. 62 
(LVII. 5), where it is said that when wrath, ( buý)ý ) prevails, 
the becomes bestial; when desire (Tb fire prevails, 
C it becomes a horse or a mule; but when o VL-, us prevails, it 
becomes angelic and Divine. 
Cf. ibid. P. 119 (LXXVII. 19-25), where it is said that those 
who are occupied with mundane matters are sick in Soul( V11-0313-L 
_Vr 
because of the divided state of their soul (Jj-z err 
Cf. ibid. LXXVII. 48-61 (pp. 126,127). 0"-LJ'C 
352. In Comm. in Matt. XIV. 3 (GCS 10.278,29-279.27). Cf. Pitra A. S. 
111.136 (LXXX. 3). 
353. In Frag. in Rom. XXXI. 6-11 (JTS 13.365), Origen says that St. 
Paul in listing "heresies" among the works of the flesh (in Gal. v. 
20) prevents us from thinking that some sins are not works of 
the flesh, but of the orvLlj,; If heresies are included 
among the works of the flesh that is because they arise cý', -r'o -r-ou 
vc, j T, IS cr-4f t<CýL . 
354. Hom. in Lev. II. 2 (GCS 6.292.25-293.4). Rahner, op. cit., p. 222, 
quotes Sel. in Ezek. 14.4 (PG XIII. 805D) as stating that in so 
far as e q)ox inclines to one or the other field of influence 
(i. e. the body or the spirit), the individual becomes either 
a bestial man or a more rational man 
(ý*YIKL'jTEeoE XO)fOIC6S). 
355. Frag. in Eph XXVI. 13-18 (JTS 3.563). 
356. Frag. in I Cor. XVII. 4-6 (JTS 9.353) 
357. XIII. 24 (GCS 4.247.16-20). 
358. Comm. in Rom. VII. 12 (PG XIV. 1134AB). Cf. Frag. in Rom. LII. 7- 
. 17 (JTS 14.20,21). See E. Schendel, op. eit., pp. 83-85-(section 
entitled "Die Vernichtung des Todes"). Cf. also Pitra, A. S. II. 
479 (XXII. 4). 
359. Comm. in Rom. III. 4 (PG XIV. 936A). 
360. Hom. in Lev. XII. 3 (GCS 6.460.1,2). 
361. Ibid. IX. 11 (GCS 6.439.23-440.4). 
362. Comm. in Joh. VI. 11 (GCS 4.120.5-22). Cf. Pitra A. S. III. 52 (L. 13) 
where it is said that the Spirit of God is the source of Tb 1, cfo- 
ýjTt t<of (. ckJ On the other hand, Origen appears to revert 
to his usual view of the IC%reur, 6- as part of man Is natural endow- 
ment when he says in Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CV. 32,33 (p. 92) that 
the qcvec3(, _ý of Moses which the Israelites provoked is the 
spirit of man which is in him, and that perhaps the spirit of 
Elijah in John the Baptist Is this kind of thing (the implication 
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being that John the Baptist was a re-incarnationof Elijah). 
363. Comm. in Joh. VI. 20 (GCS 4.130.16-18). 
364. Ibid. XIII. 24 (GCS 4.247.26-31). 
365. X. 6-10 (JTS 9.239). 
366. Scherer's ed., 23.2-7. 
367. Frag. in Matt. 193.11-16 (GCS 12.93). 
368. Frag. in Eph. (PG XIV. 1297,1298). Cf. De Orat. 31.2 (GCS 2.396. 
10-14). 
369. Frag. in Eph. XXXIII. 24,25 (JTS 3.571). 
370. Pitra, A. S. III. 344 (CXXXVIII. 14-16). 
371.560.8-13 (GCS 12.230). 
372. In L'Image, p. 264 
373. Cf. Frag. in I CorXXXV. 12,13 (JTS 9.503), where with reference 
to St. Paul's statement in I Cor. vii. 9 that "it is better to 
marry than to burn", Origen takes the "burning" ( 'cjro4 to 
%. 0, "1 , 
VCI/j 
be "the desire of the flesh" (r &tctOut_i. L,,, T-Is a-; yt"xW which 
in the sinner is not quenched by reason, but overcomes his YvXq* 
Mme. Harl in op. cit., p. 116, does refer to the alternatives pos- 
sible to the lower soul - that of obeying the -1Uf&j_Ptor yielding 
to the f- but oddly enough she makesno reference to the 
chapter (De Princ. III. 4), where the matter is fully discussed. 
She also seems to fail to distinguish between the two meanings 
of "soul" in Origen. 
374. Op. cit., (see n. 351). 
375. Op. cit., p. 20. 
376. Cf. alsoMumm, who in op. cit. (pp. 250,251) indicates a contradiction 
in Origen's view of the soul, but apparently does not recognise 
it as such (i. e. he recognises that in some places Origen considers 
"soul" to be "fallen spirit", but in other places considers it 
as an entity on its own). 
377. BUrke, op. cit., p. 19. 
378. Op. cit., pp. 258,259; cf. p. 135. 
379. Op. cit., p. 36; cf. also p. 34 
380. It is worth observing that the problem of how the soul could 
choose evil in an incorporeal state was raised by Methodius of 
Olympus, who denied the pre-existence of the soul for this reason 
(see Cornelis, op. cit., p. 207; cf. also p. 61). Teichtweier 
(op. cit., p. 327) also quotes Plotinus as saying that in so far 
as the soul is liable to lapse, that is due to its composite 
character; if the spiritual part of it were its whole being, 
it could not lapse. 
381.6.20-8.17 (Scherer. pp. 68.70.72). See Fitzgerald's discussion 
of this passage, op-cit., pp. 140-142. Fitzgerald makes the 
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interesting suggestion that the reason why Origen failed to 
complete his argument against those who set at nought the sal- 
vation of man's soul and spirit by the Incarnate Christ is that. 
he held views about Christ's assumption of a human souland spirit which 
were by no means universally acceptable, because in Origen's 
view the spirit of-Christ was not identifiable with the Divine 
Word. 
382. Ch. Ch. VI, PP. 222-224 where this matter is discussed further. 
383. Comm. in Matt. XVI. 8 (GCS 10.499.21-501.4). Cf. Crouzel's dis- 
cussion of this passage in L'Image.., p. 135, n. 4,2nd para. Cf. 
also Wintersig, op. cit., p. 79, where he says that when Origen 
says that the Lord handed over His soul (Seele) to the evil spirits, 
the reference was only to the animal soul connected with the 
body (die animalische Leibseele), and not to the spirit (Geist). 
384. Frag. in Matt. 562 (GCS 12.231). 
385. Comm. in Joh-VI. 35 (GCS 4.144.11-16). 
386. Op. cit., pp. 86-88. 
387. Comm. in Rom. I. 4 (PG XIV. 849C-850C). 
388. VI. 3 (GCS 7.33.25-34.2). Cf. also XVIII. 4 (GCS 7.173.26-174.5). 
See also Molland, op. cit., pp. 110.111. 
289. De Princ. II. 6.3 (GCS 5.143.2-9). 
390. IV. 54-end (GCS 1.326.21-373.21). 
391. In op. cit., p. 185. 
392. Cf. Refoult!, op. cit., P. 253, where, after quoting various statements 
of Evagrius regarding Christ in the "Gnostic Centuries", he says 
that the first group of statements could be regarded as , 
Nestorian 
and the second group as Monophysite, and goes on to say that 
the relevant texts'in Origen display the same apparent contradiction. 
393. In his article "Origen's defence of the resurrection of the body" 
(M, 1973). 
394. Op. cit., p. 8. 
395. It is rather significant that the title of Ruis-Camps' article 
referred to in n. 19 on p. 9 of Armantage's article is "The final 
destiny of corporeal substance according to the P. A. of Origen, 
a formulation fluctuating between revealed truth and the philo- 
sophical assumptions of a system. " 
396. P. 11. 
397. p. 15. 
398. Ibid. 
399. p. 22. 
400. H. R. Bramley's hymn beginning "The great God of heaven is come 
down to earth (E. H. , N. 29) . 
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401. Though this is suggested by e. g. Archbp. Wm. Temple op. cit., 
pp. 140-143. Cf. C. J. Cadouy, op. cit., pp. 87-89. 
402. Op. cit. 
403. Op. cit., p. 524. 
404. Thus Archbp. Temple seems to contradict himself when he says 
in op. cit. that "Christ's obedience, always perfect at each 
stage, yet deepened as He advanced from the Boy's subjection 
in. His home at Nazareth to the point where He 'became obedient 
unto death'" (p. 148). Temple seems to express the truth more 
clearly when a little later (p. 150) he says that "there are two 
wills in the Incarnate in the sense that His human nature comes 
through struggle and effort to an ever deeper union with the 
Divine in completeness of self-sacrifice. " 
405. p. 525. 
406. In his article "Logos and Son in Origen, Arius, and Athanasius" 
(TU 64 (1957), pp. 282-287). 
407.7 p. 287 of op. cit. 
408. In his article "Tradition, Exegesis, and the Christological 
Controversies" (CH 34 (1965), pp. 123-142). 
409. Op. cit., p. 133. 
410. De Princ. II. 11.4 (GCS 5.187.22-30). 
411. Cf. Heb. x. l. 
412. De Princ. IV. 1.6 (GCS 5.302.7-10; 301.13-15). Cf. ibid. IV. 2.2 
(GCS 5.308.8-11); Comm. in Matt. XIV. 18 (GCS 10.329.4-8); Frag. 
in RomZXV. 13 (JTS 14.10); ibid. XXXVI. 32,33 (JTS 14 . 11); 
-ibid. 
XXXVI. 63-67 (JTS 14.12); Pitra A. S. III. 210 (CIV. 45). 
Cf. Ruis-Camps, "Origenes y Marcion", p. 5, where he says that 
"with the coming of Jesus, the Divine content of the O. T. 
prophecies and the spiritual meaning of the Lawsh: )ne out. " Cf. 
also Danielou, op. cit., p. 41; Crouzel, La Conn., p. 288; de Lubac, 
"Sens Spirituel", p. 553. 
413. Cf. Crouzel, L'Image.... p. 139, n. 72. See also Mme. Harl, op. cit. 
pp. 140-145, and Crouzel, La Conn., p. 325, where he says that 
"the N. T. has brought us the truth, and put an end to the images 
of the ancient Scriptures. But the temporal Gospel is still 
an image of the truth... It is the truth in the sense that it 
is substantially identical with the eternal Gospel, but it is 
still an image for us, in so far as we remain in the knowledge 
by way of a mirror which is linked to our earthly condition... 
But in accordance with our spiritual progress, the N. T. ceases 
progressively to be an image of the truth and becomes increasingly 
the truth itself, even though it does not here below perfectly 
attain the state of direct apprehension. " Cf. also op. cit., 
p. 335; "Although Christ has taken from the O. T. the veil of the 
letter, our temporal Gospel is itself also enclosed in the letter. " 
Cf. also p. 354; "The knowledge conveyed by the temporal Gospel 
is of the same nature as that conveyed by the O. T., i. e. progressive, 
partial, always capable of being exceeded. " 
Cf. also Danielou, op. cit., pp. 54-56, and Rius-Camps, 
"Comunicabilidad", OCP 38,1972, p. 446, where he says: "Origen 
-seems to help Christians overcome any kind of literalism in the 
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interpretation of Scripture, and every kind of anthropomorphism 
in their conception of God, of blessedness, and of the way which 
leads to it. " 
414. IX. 4 (GCS 7.59.9,10). Cf. Contra Cels. II. 2 (GCS 1.129.2-7), 
11.6 (GCS 1.132.24-31), and V. 60 (GCS 2.63.20-29); Comm. in Joh., 
1.6 (GCS 4.11.8-14), X. 28 (GCS 4.201.22-28), and XIII. 47 (GCS 
4.273.12-17); Hom. in Gen. VI. 1 (GCS 6.66.9-18); Hom. in Lev. I. 1 
(GCS 6.280.5-18); Comm. in Matt. XII. 5 (dCS 10.76.14-18); Frag. 
in Matt. 99.2-6 (GCS 12.56); Convs. with Heracl. 17.2-6 (Scherer's 
ed., p. 90); Pitra A. S. II. 448 (11.3) and 474 (XVIII. 8); A. S. III. 117 
(LXXVII. 19-25) and 290,291 (CXVIII. 102); Comm. in Ps-L (Philocal. 
JAR p. 35,15.16). 
Cf. Crouzel, La Conn., p. 291; Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 460- 
463; Gogler, op. cit., pp. 7 sqq. (section entitled Christus, 
das Mysterium der Schrift). 
See also de Lubac, "Sens Spirituel", where it is made clear 
that not only must the N. T. be interpreted in the light of the 
O. T., but the O. T. itself is only fully intelligible in the light 
of the New. Thus on p. 558 he says: "By the soul which opens 
itself to the Gospel and which clings to Christ, all Scripture 
is perceived in a new light. All Scripture, through Christ, 
_is 
transfigured. " On p. 548 he says: "If Christianity is a body 
of do--trine, the interpretation of the O. T. is not a garment 
thrown over it later on; it is part of the body itself, of which 
the unifying spirit is the present reality of the Saviour. " 
In note 1 on the same page he says: "Every thought, in order 
to come into existence, needs a mode of expression which links 
it, by analogy or contrast, to a thought previously expressed.. 
This is supremely true when it is the concern of the human spirit 
to express in a human fashion, so as to obtain a reflective knowledge 
of it and somehow to 'grasp' it, the Object of Divine revelation.... 
There will as a consequence be-so much more room for symbolism. " 
On p. 570 he says: "All the O. T. Scriptures make plain the mystery 
of the Cross, but they are themselves in turn made plain by it 
alone. " On p. 563 he says that "the religious understanding of 
Scripture (i. e. the understanding possessed by'the Scriptural 
writers and the persons whom they-describe) and the spiritual 
understanding come together in many respects... They have need 
of one another, the one so as not to lose its foundation, the 
other so as not to remain too limited .... The spiritual interpret- 
ation must not interfere in a rash or premature manner with the 
work of the historian. " 
415. De Princ. IV. 2.4 (GCS 5.312.15-313.1). Cf. Comm. in Joh. II. 17 
(GCS 4.74.7-11) and XIII. 48 (274.12-275.12); Comm. in Matt. XV. 12 
(GCS 10.380.23-381.2); Frag. in Luc. 171.4-8 (GCS 9.298) and 
Crouzells note on this passage in Sources Chretiennes 87, pp. 522, 
523; Convs. with Heracl. 27.14-28.16 (Scherer pp. 108,110); Cadiou, 
Frag. in Ps. CXVIII. 44, p. 108. 
416. Frag. in Joh. X (GCS 4.492.27-493.1). 
417. XIII. 2 (GCS 6.469.21-470.2). 
418. Sel. in Ps. CXVIII. 117 (PG XII. 1613B). 
419. Comm. in Matt. XII. 4 (GCS 10.74.8-19) 
420. De Princ. IV. 3.2 (GCS 5.343.12-16). 
421. Comm. in Matt. XI. 12 (GCS 10.54.14-24). 
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15 (GCS 9.315,316). See Koch's comments on this subject in 
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CHAPTER VI. 
The human and Divine aspects of Christ's personality 
It is by distinguishing between the human and the Divine aspects 
of the personality of Jesus Christ that Origen can assert on the one 
hand that Jesus earns God's favour, and on the other that He has always 
enjoyed it. It is to Jesus Christ as Man that Origen applies the 
psalmist's words "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; 
wherefore God, even thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness", 
because as Man He is elevated to a position of kingship on account 
of His obedience to the Father's will. On the other hand, in so 
far as He is Divine He has always been in the position of Kinýk. 
Elsewhere, Origen also says that the human Jesus became entitled 
to the name of "Christ" (the Anointed One) because of His goodness, 
with the result that the psalmist's words could be applied to Him. 
Origen in fact speaks of two images: the Son Who is the Image of 
God, and the being who is said (according to Origen's interpretation! ) 
to be the Image of the Son in Roman viii. 29, i. e. the human soul 
which the Son assumed and which became the Image of the Son through 
. 
(St-L -T7r\v ; ýferqN/ Origen likewise suggests its virtue 
in Contra Cels. that although those who take as their model the life 
of Christ and teach His doctrine have been anointed with the oil 
of gladness by God the Father, it was Christ Himself Who was anointed 
first of all, because He loved righteousness and hated iniquity more 
than His companions, who simply share in His anointing as far as 
(3) 
they are able. In another passage Origen raises the question whether 
the word (wisdom in itself) should be attributed to 
the so-called "Son of Man" as well as to the Son of God, in so far 
PnC 
(4) 
as the former has been made one with wisdom ( eK 'r6u 
It is passages such as these which lead one to wonder whether 
(5) 
the observation made by Refoulle about Origen's disciple Evagrius 
does not also apply to Origen himself, when he says: "Does it (i. e. 
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Origen's Christology) not amount to affirming two Christs, and does 
it not relapse into a form of Adoptionism? " Pannenberg also pertinently 
(6) 
observes that "above all.... the concept of the immutability of God 
necessarily leads to the consequence that the transition to every 
innovation in the relationship between God and man has to be sought 
as much as possible on the side of man. Thus the idea of God becoming 
man has to recede into the background behind that of God assuming 
human nature. In addition to this, the concept of God's immutability 
pressed in the direction of conceiving this 'assumption' of a man 
by God in terms of the scheme of assimilation to God, and thus finding 
this realised in the ethical striving of Jesus, a tendency which 
is traceable from Origen and Paul of Samosata right on into the later 
Antiochene Christology. 11 
On the other hand, Origen elsewhere represents the Son as anointed 
by the Father on His entry into the world, in so far as the Holy 
Spirit compounded all the elements of His human nature into a single 
(7) 
person - the Holy Spirit being regarded as the oil of gladness. In 
another passage, Origen represents Christ as the Bridegroom sent 
by God the Father and coming already anointed to His Bride the Church. 
To Him it is said "Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity. " 
(8) 
etc. Elsewhere, it is the pre-existent soul of Christ which is said 
to have been "anointed with the oil of gladness above its fellows", 
because it was united in an unspotted fellowship with the Word of 
(9) 
God and therefore alone among all souls became incapable of sin. 
We thus gain an insight into the tension in Origen's thought between 
his preconceived notion that the pre-existent soul of Christ was 
already perfect and the necessity of admitting spiritual growth and 
development in the incarnate Christ. 
In one passage, Origen shows that he is himself aware of the 
difficulty. In discussing Psalm xlv. in which he considers the person 
addressed to. be Christ, he asks how the Firstborn of all creation 
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can be anointed as King through loving righteousness, seeing that 
He is righteousness in itself. Surely, says Origen, His kingship 
is bound up with His nature, and not something conferred upon Him 
later. The solution to the problem, says Origen, is to be found 
in calling to mind "the man who is Christ", i. e. the soul which was 
on occasion distressed and agitated because it was human. This soul 
is the "king's son" referred to in Ps. lxxii, to whom the psalmist 
asks God to give His righteousness, whereas the "king" to whom the 
psalmist asks God to give the power of judgement is the Firstborn 
(10) 
of all creation, Who is entitled to it on account of His unique status. 
The soul is also spoken of in this passage as "the man whom He assumed, 
who was moulded and fashioned according to righteousness by the Divine 
Nature" of the Son of God. But Origen none the less shelves the 
problem of reconciling the ideas of changelessness and change by 
saying that since the psalmist afterwards refers to one person instead 
of two, this shows that both beings are brought together in one Divine 
Word. 
(12) 
There is a passage in Comm. in Rom. where the man Christ Jesus 
is explicitly stated not to have been made equal to the Son of God 
(13) 
till after the Resurrection. The passage in Hebrews where the human 
Jesus is said to have been made "perfect through sufferings" is quoted 
in support of this view. Origen says that as the result of the Resur- 
rection, to which the sufferings were a necessary preliminary, "all 
that is in Christ is now the Son of God" (omne quod in Christo, iam 
nunc Filius Dei est), seeing that the Word and the flesh are indis- 
solublY united, so that all that belongs to the flesh is ascribed 
(14) 
to the Word, and what belongs to the Word is referred to the flesh. 
We can only comment that in suggesting that the human nature of Christ 
was not perfectly united with His Divinity until the Passion and 
Resurrection, Origen is not consistent with his general outlook, 
which is that the human soul of Christ, which became incarnate, was 
indissolu bly united to the Word of God in its pre-existent stale. 
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(15) 
In the same vein, Origen states in De Orat. that it was after the 
Resurrection that the "man" whom Christ assumed said: "All power 
is given to me in heaven and on earth", thus indicating that His 
(16) 
human nature shared the power which appertained to His Divine nature. 
What has been quoted so far would appear to lend support to 
Lieske's assertion that the union created between the Man Jesus and 
the Divine Word foreshadows the union which is brought about between 
the individual disciple and his Lord. To quote his own words: "Just 
as the human nature of Christ attained to personal unity with the 
Divine Word inasmuch as it ascended to Him in the vision and love 
of God and formed with Him the unique God-Man, even so each being 
who has attained to the vision of God is likewise made Divine and 
(17) 
-is united to the Word of God. " And again: "Origen understands the 
union of the soul of Christ with the Word of God, in spite of the 
uniqueness of its position, simply as the highest achievement of 
the real union with the Divine Word in the vision of God which is 
(18) 
accomplished in those who are perfect. " 
On the other hand, there is a most baffling passage in Comm. 
(19) 
in Joh. in which Origen appears so anxious to safegUard the unity 
of the two elements - Divine and human - in Jesus Christ that he 
appears to want to have it both ways so far as the changelessness 
of the Divine Word is concerned. He first stresses that it is the 
Son of Man Who was exalted, because He became obedient unto death, 
whereas the Divine Word did not admit of being exalted. The exaltation 
(6rtC-euýcj4rjS) consisted in His being no longer other than the Word 
(20) 
of God, but rather identical with Him. Origen then goes on to say: 
"He Who did not consider equality with God as something worth holding 
on to (ref. to Philipp. ii. 6) was highly exalted, but the Word remained 
in His unique position of glory or else was restored to it, when 
(21) 
the Divine Word, Who was also human, returned once more to God. " 
(22) 
With reference to this passage, Eichinger points Out the uncertainty 
, 
No 
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shown by Origen as to whether the Divine Word Himself was exalted 
at the Resurrection. He also points out that the question is involved 
as to whether, and how, the Divine Word participated in the descent 
to the human level which is clearly affirmed of the soul of Jesus. 
(23) 
(fdgler observes, after quoting this passage, that "through the exalt- 
ation (of the human element in Jesus) the Divine and the human became 
one ITVC-S`týý The C5&ýA_ (of the Divine nature) has grasped 
and magnified the T-6 KwT-. w_Ordft<_4 ...... The communicatio idiomatum 
is now complete. " But surely it was complete before the Incarnation, 
according to Origen's theory, because what became incarnate was the 
pre-exýstent soul of Christ. 
(24) 
The same criticism can be made of Kelber's statement a propos 
of the passage which has been quoted, that according to Origen "the 
original Transubstantiation which was brought about by the indwelling 
of Christ (should it not be rather "the Word of God"? ) in the body 
and blood of Jesus of Nazareth and which was complete on Golgotha, 
was transformed into full union with the Divine Word by the exaltation 
of the manhood of Jesus. " It is true that Origen appears to say 
in the passage quoted that the human Jesus became piýogressively more 
closely united to the Divine Word during His earthly life: but though 
this statement seems reasonable, and in fact necessary to safeguard 
the genuine humanity of Jesus, it does not accord with Origen's general 
outlook. 
The dilemma is very well presented in another passage from 
(25) 
Origen, where it is said that Christ is firstborn (i. e. presumably 
from the dead) according to the flesh (rrpj-r0rj'. 'KoS "r-'r, and 
I /I 
le 
-rrt, / 
(tAovoy&vAjý Only-begotten according to His Divinity 
-r AY 86or -rA_ 
but is none the less one Son of God with both attributes. 
5e f 
is told to sit at God's right hand, not as the Only-begotten, because 
I 
in this respect He is coeternal with the Father, but rather as the 
firstborn from the dead and heir ( KA tvoqO/A_uýz to the privilege 
in store for Him. In other words the seat at God's right hand is 
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assigned to Him TV crýCK'14- i. e. because He was human 
and thus did not have this privilege beforehand, and not SE-4 7-qv 
I 
15C-t)-TjTvA-_ , because as Divine He possessed it by nature. Once more, 
if the pre-existent soul which became incarnate was already linked 
with the Word of God in the closest possible fellowship, how could 
that soul fail to enjoy already the privileges resulting from that 
fellowship? 
(26) 
Elsewhere, Origen states that the Son of God took human nature 
upon Himself precisely in order that the sovereignty of God might 
be accepted as fully on earth as it is in heaven. In so far as He 
is Divine, the Word of God had supreme power over all things in heaven 
and on earth before His Incarnation: but that power was not acknowledged 
by all mankind, and therefore the Word took human nature upon Himself, 
and, to quote Origen's exact words, "received, as man, power which 
(27) 
He had not had before. " Apparently Origen understands the words 
in Psalm 2 where the Lord invites His Son to ask Him to give Him 
the nations for His inheritance, etc., as referring to the power 
(28) 
. of judgement granted to the Son of God in His human aspect. 
(29) 
The same idea is expressed even more vividly ih a passage 
which states that Christ as Man was appointed Heir of all things 
(ref. to Hebrews i. 2) so that He might rescue, as His own inheritance, 
those scattered impiously on earth by evil powers. "See then", says 
Origen, "how He ascends even in the flesh to the riches appertaining 
to Him by nature" .( ý4ý-ri- qýocrt\( ). But how, says Origen, if human 
beings belonged to the Divine Word as well as to the Father, could 
He be bidden in the second Psalm to ask for them as His inheritance? 
The answer is that mankind has revolted from the allegiance it owed 
to God, and so the Father sent the Son into the world so that He 
might be welcomed as a man, even though His real nature remained 
all the while unchanged. ' Hence it was only as Man, says Origen, 
that He is said to have received all things as heir. But Origgen 
might have gone on to say that only through taking human nature could 
206 
the Son of God obtain the allegiance of human beings. In the same 
way, Origen says that although in the angel's message to the Virgin 
Mary it is said that only in the future will He be great and be called 
the Son of the Most High and receive the kingdom of David, none the 
(30) 
less in so far as He is Divine, His Kingship is eternal. 
(31) 
It is to be observed that in one passage Origen interprets 
the words of the psalm "Worship before the footstool of His feet, 
because it is holy" as meaning that the flesh (i. e. the human nature) 
(32) 
of Christ is entitled to the honour due to His Divine Nature. In 
(33) 
De_Orat. it is the Church which is taken to be indicated by "the 
footstool of His feet" as contrasted with Christ Himself, Who is 
indicated by the word "heaven", regarded as God's throne (Isaiah 
lxvi. 1; cf. Matt. v. 34,35); but the Church can be regarded as those 
human beings who share the sonship possessed by the human Jesus. 
(34) - 
In Frag. in Eph. it is suggested that the Church is called by St. 
Paul "Christ's body" because it is animated by 
His Divinity. If this is so, His human element "Irt Kt'-'j-rC-pY 
will, says Origen, itself by part of the Whole body, 
because it is animated by the same Divine power which animates the 
Church. Once more, the suggestion seems to be that the Word of God 
could only obtain the allegiance of other human beings after He had 
taken possession of the human Jesus and employed him for carrying 
(35) 
out the work of God. 
This indeed seems to be the way in which the apparent contra- 
diction between the passages already cited and those about to be 
cited can be reconciled, in so far as the second group appears to 
suggest that the Divine Word did not have authority over all things, 
even so far as His Divine Nature was concerned, until His earthly 
(36) 
work was done. Thus in one passage it is stated that Christ originally 
had authority ot>trtvt, ý4 ) in heaven, and also an authority on earth 
confined to the people of Israel. It was only after He had completed 
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His "rational contests" on behalf of human beings that 
He obtained authority throughout the earth, so that He might reconcile 
all things to God through His blood shed on the Cross. The same idea 
(37) 
is presented even more vividly in the statement that by His Crucifixion, 
Christ triumphed over the hostile unseen powers and won control of 
(38) 
all things. 
(39) 
Another passage makes it clear that what Origen really means 
by saying that the Word of God did not have authority over all things 
before the Incarnatýion and Resurrection is that He did not have it 
de facto, but only de jure. Origen states that the Lord Who by His 
own power hung the world on nothing (cf. Job xxvi. 7) hung fastened 
with nails to the Cross and stretched His hands on the Tree so that 
he might thus bring to nothing the hostile powers and draw the ends 
of the world to Himself (cf. John xii. 32). It will be seen, however, 
in the next section that Origen is only repeating here the traditional 
doctrine of the Church about the Crucifixion; in his own distinctive 
thinking he does not accord it nearly so important a place. 
-In fact, this is made clear in the passage where. Origen says 
that corresponding to the two aspects of the nature 6f the Son of 
God are the two types of disciple. Those who apprehend invisible 
realities are governed by the Divine element in the Son of God, whereas 
whereas those who do not progress further than sensible realities 
are governed by that element of His nature which the Psalmist speaks 
(40) 
of as "anointed. " 
(41) 
Referring to the parable of the treasure hidden in a field, 
Origen likens the field to Christ, and the treasure concealed in it 
to the invisible things which Christ contains, the "treasures of wisdom 
and knowledge" referred to by St. Paul. A little further on, Origen 
says quite plainly that the Person of Christ is composed "both of 
(42) (43) 
what is open and of what is hiddenV In another passage, Origen makes 
a subtle distinction between the gospel which St. Paul preached to 
all and sundry and "the revelation of the mystery which has been kept 
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(44) 
hidden throughout all agesl The revelation is only intended for those 
few chosen ones who are capable of receiving the wisdom and knowledge 
(45) 
of God. Elsewhere, Origen states that this wisdom can only be unfolded 
to those who are versed in discriminating between good and evil. 
Origen goes so far as to say that even after Christ's Incarnation 
He has not really come to those who are immature and are thus not 
really prepared for His Coming. Only the forerunners of Christ come 
to them, i. e. discourses adapted to childish minds; whereas further 
preparation is necessary for those who are going to receive His Divinity 
(46) 
into themselves. Origen makes the same observation in a different 
(47) 
form when he distinguishes between the things we need and "those 
things which form part of riches and luxury. " So far as religious 
matters are concerned, the things which we need are those which admit 
us to the life which Christ supplies; the things superior to what 
we need are the spiritual riches which are the rewards of acquiring 
wisdom. If it is said that there is a contradiction between this 
passage and the previous one, inasmuch as it is suggested in this 
passage that even elementary instruction can introduce. us to Christ, 
the answerseems to be that there is a distinction bbtween knowing 
(48) 
Christ "after the flesh" and knowing Him as the invisible Word of 
God. Even if we know Him in the former manner only, we can still 
(49) 
derive benefit from that knowledge in so far as our conduct is improved: 
but only if we know Him in His Divinity can we obtain the full benefit 
which He desires to bestow. 
The question now arises: what place does the Crucifixion have 
in the thought of Origen? Is it simply one of, the outward events 
in the life of Christ which needs to be transcended in order to arrive 
at the deeper truths which Christ came to reveal, or does it in itself 
contain this deeper truth? Does it veil the truth, or is it a vehicle 
of the truth? The thought of Origen is ambiguous on this point, although 
it could be plausibly said that in the main he comes down on the side 
of the former position. Let us substantiate this suggestion by ref- 
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erence to various passages. 
(50) 
In Contra Cels. Origen suggests that it is better to accept 
doctrines after rational thought than with bare faith, and that it 
wa s only as a makeshift device that the Divine Word was prepared for 
belief to rest on bare faith. He adduces I Cor. i. 21 in support of 
this view, since he interprets it as meaning that God intended that 
He should have become known through the wisdom which He supplies, 
but since this was not possible for many people, He decided to bring 
salvation to believers through what St. Paul calls "the foolishness 
of preaching", this being the preaching of Christ as crucified, as 
is made clear (according to Origen) in the following verses. It seems 
obvious that St. Paul is being misinterpreted by Origen so as to be 
made to conform to his point of view, because St. Paul expressly asserts 
that the preaching of the Cross is not foolishness in itself, but 
is only regarded as such by those who do not accept the Gospel (I 
Cor. i. 18,23). 
Origen makes the same point by the employment of other metaphors. 
With reference to the saying quoted in St. John's Gospel, "When you 
have exalted the Son of Man, then you will know thatj am H6", Origen 
observes that no one exalts Him while he is as yet being fe8 spiritually 
with milk rather than solid food; and so St. Paul says to su6h a person, 
"I thought it right not to know anything among you except Jesus Christ, 
and Him crucified" (I Cor. ii. 2). To such a person the minister of 
the Gospel comes "in weakness and fear and much trembling", as St. 
Paul goes on to say. Here again, Origen is misinterpreting St. Paul, 
because St. Paul is not contrasting elementary Christian instruction 
with more advanced instruction, but rather contrasting Divine wisdom 
(52) 
with human wisdom, as is made clear in verse 5. 
Again, Origen takes as an analogy the Jewish practice whereby 
the priest wore different garments for the offering of sacrifice and 
for going forth to the people. Likewise, says Origen, when St. Paul 
was in the company of the mature, he wore the garment of perfection 
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and said: "We speak wisdom among the mature... the wisdom of God hidden 
in a mystery" (I Cor. ii. 6,7). But when he came out to the people 
he changed his robe and said the words already quoted: "I thought 
it right to know nothing among you, except Jesus Christ, and Him 
crucified. " Just as Jesus Christ spoke in parables to the multitudes 
and afterwards explained those parables to His disciples, so the Christ- 
ian minister gives inferior teaching to those incapable of receiving 
(53) 
higher teaching. We can thus scarcely disagree with Eichinger when 
he says: "Even if a transfigured mode of bodily appearance is ascribed 
to the transfigured Word of God, the Word Who became flesh and was 
crucified remains for Origen always foolishness, and is not, as such, 
(54) (55) 
the Wisdom of God. " Crouzel also justly observes, with reference 
to Origen's exegesis of I Cor. ii. 6-8, that it "distorts the Apostle's 
intention: in preaching Jesus as crucified, Paul does not intend to 
adapt himself to the weakness of his readers, but rather to cause 
offence to human wisdom. " 
(56) 
Muira-Stange takes the same view when she says that "both to 
Celsus and to Origen redemption (ErlOsung) is a bare concept... sin, 
the human need of grace, one's own helplessness, the power of God's 
grace, are ideas which do not affect the central beliefs of either 
of them ... The operations of the Redeemer are limited by Origen to 
the second level, i. e. those called 'sinners'; to the sin-free Gnostics 
(57) 
is sent instead the Word as Teacher of Divine mysteries. " 
On the other hand, as has already been observed, Origen has 
"to re/ckon with the fact that the Crucifixion was regarded by the 
Church of his own time, as by the Church all down the ages, a-ý of 
greater importance than any other event in the earthly life of Christ; 
and this would scarcely by the case if truths did not reside in this 
event which could not be discovered in any other way. Hence in one 
(58) 
passage in Comm. in Matt. Origen remarks that it is necessary in preach- 
ing Jesus Christ to preach Him as crucified. Any other form of preaching 
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would be inadequate. Even if none of the other marvellous events 
of His life were mentioned, the omission would not be so important 
(59) 
as that of the Crucifixion. In another passage, Origen points out 
that our Lord commanded His disciples not to announce that He was 
the Christ and the Son of the living God even after Peter had acknow- 
ledged Him as such, but desired rather that this announcement be 
deferred till after the Crucifixion. The impiication was that the 
meaning of the title "Christ" could only be understood as the result 
of the more advanced teaching which could only be based on the Crucif- 
ixion. The proclamation of the teaching and actions of Jesus-was 
a more elementary form of teaching. 
, 
In two other passages the Greek verbJCiKjurc, %jis 'used as a means 
of showing that the event of the Crucifixion contains more than meets 
the eye, in fact that its significance is only apprehensible as the 
result of the use of reason. It is one thing to see with one's bodily 
eyes the sufferings which Christ endured at the hands of the Jewish 
leaders; it is quite another to see the full significance of those 
sufferings. And so when it is said that Jesus began to show (cret KVur=cv 
to His disciples that He must go to Jerusalem and suffer and die (Matt. 
(60) 
xvi. 21), what is meant is that He explained why this was necessary. 
In another passage, Origen says that a person can obtain perfect know- 
ledge of the m ysteries of Christ's sufferings and death in the sense 
of seeing with his mind Is eye what is shown (T 4- 
JL%-k 
KVutk\f-a_ 
> 
(61) 
as the result of rational demonstration (Alre"Z X-Y, K-e\ý 
dart"(4s). 
Two other passages underline the fact that for Origen, in some 
moods at any rate, the Passion has a hidden meaning, and is not just 
one event among others which merely belong to the outward appearance 
(62) 
of Jesus Christ. In the first it is stated that He offered Himself 
as Victim not only on behalf of earthly beings, but also on behalf 
of celestial beings. For men He poured out the bodily substance of 
His blood; but for the priests who minister in heaven, if there be 
any such, He sacrificed the living energy of His body (vitalem corporis 
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sui virtutem) as a kind of spiritual sacrifice. Perhaps this means 
that some human beings (those more advanced in spiritual insight) 
can appropriate the benefits of His Passion more fully than others 
can. Elsewhere, the giving of the shewbread to David is said to be 
a prophecy of the fact that the priestly and royal dignities were 
going to be united in the Person of Him Who on the human side was 
(63) 
descended from David. 
(64) 
Molland observes, with reference to the former passage, that 
"knowing Origen's strongly spiritualising tendency, and his distinction 
between the two Gospels (i. e. the temporal and the eternal), we should 
expect him to consider Christ's Passion on earth in the form of a 
servant as belonging only to the bodily and temporal Gospel ... But 
we are surprised to see that Origen finds a place for the Passion 
of Christ in the eternal Gospel. This fact proves how central is 
the idea of Christ's sacrifice in Origen's conception of the Gospel. 
He has not been led by his philosophical scheme - bodily - spiritual, 
temporal-eternal, imperfection-perfection - to despise or neglect 
the Passion of Christ. " 
(65) 
It has to be admitted, however, that Cadiou do6s indicate an 
oscillation in Origen's thought between regarding the preaching of 
the Cross as merely introducing the hearer to a higher form of preach- 
ing, and regarding the preaching of the Cross itself as taking differ- 
ent forms, a more elementary and a more advanced. To quote Cadiou's 
own words expressing the second point of view, "if there is a dissim- 
ilarity in the way in which (according to Origen) human souls meditate 
on the Passion, it springs from different degrees of faith. " Perhaps 
this oscillation corresponds to the uncertainty shown by Origen in 
different passages as to whether the Divine Word Himself really under- 
went the sufferings of the Cross. 
(66) 
Mme. Harl, after quoting the passage referred to in note 58, 
points out that in suggesting that the preaching of the crucified 
Christ is a higher form of preaching than that of His words and actions, 
2' 13 
Origen is contradicting what he says elsewhere about the, preaching 
of the crucified Christ. She resolves the contradiction by suggesting 
that for Origen, to be acquainted with the crucified Christ is (at 
any rate in this passage) to be acquainted, not with Jesus the Man, 
(67) 
but with the Son of God in the triumph of His Resurrection. V61ker 
points out that we must take Origen's insistence on the importance 
(68) 
of the Cross more seriously than this; but at the same time he tends 
to place the two outlooks - the one stressing and the other minimising 
the importance of the Cross - side by side, whereas surely Origen 
tends mainly to think of the perception of the crucified Christ as 
at most but one stage in the ascent to the perception of the glorified 
(69) 
Christ, the Christ Who is the form of God. V; ýlker also points out 
that according to de Faye, the Cross plays no distinctive role in 
(70) (71) 
the thought of Origen. Cadiou seems to read too much into the passage 
referred to, inasmuch as he suggests that it proves that according 
to Origen the preaching of the Cross is the highest form of the preaching 
of Christ. 
(72) 
We can in fact scarcely fail to agree with Lebreton that "the 
preaching of Christ"crucified will never be for Origen other than 
an elementary form of Christianity, and the foolishness of the Cross 
is simply a means of help offered by God to those who are incapable 
(73) 
of arriving at real wisdom. " Schendel likwise says that "Origen assigns 
less significance to the historical Jesus than to the eternal Word 
of God", and quotes Kettler as saying that "for Origen, the humanity 
of Jesus is something which needs to be overcome; it is not the foundat- 
(74) 
ion of the Christian hope. " He alsLo quoteý Kettler as saying that 
"the Christology of Origen is (in appearance) two-natured, but in 
(75) 
its main concern Monophysite. " Never a truer word spoken! 
(76) 
De Faye likewise observes that "in Origen's doctrine of redemption 
there is no well-defined place for Christ's death on the Cross ... Would 
Origen have thought of inserting the Cross into his sYstem if he had 
not had to take account of certain Biblical texts? ... One can consider 
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it as a sort of appendix to his general doctrine of salvation. " (It 
is true, however, that de Faye is thinking mainly of the expiatory 
theory of the Cross, according to which Christ bore the penalty which 
should strictly have been inflicted on those who had sinned. ) The 
(77)* (78) 
same verdict is passed by Wintersig, who says that "the saving death 
is in Origen's way of thinking so exclusively connected with Christ's' 
humanity, that this death only stands in the loosest connection with 
the remaining saving work of the Word, and thus cannot be the disting- 
(79) 
uishing feature of an endless redemption. " Nygren likewise says 
that "according to Origen, neither the Incarnation nor the death on 
the Cross has any real meaning for the perfect Christian, the Christian 
Gnostic. " 
(80) 
Kelber points out that Origen expounds a mystique of the Cross, 
in so far as the earthly events connected therewith such as Crucifixion, 
death, burial and Resurrection are events in which Christ's followers 
(81) 
are intended mystically to share. But de Faye's criticism still holds 
good, in so far as even the mystical interpretation of the Crucifixion 
cannot really be harmonised with Origen's general outlook, which sees 
the believer as perfected by increasing enlightenment, not be increasing 
(82) 
self-renunciation. 
(83) 
Primmer refers to the statement of de Faye quoted above, and 
says of him and Koch that they misunderstand the function of bodily 
realities as symbols of spiritual realities. The earthly entity still 
retains its own value in spite of pointing towards a higher entity. 
The various aspects of Christ which are apprehended by 
the more advanced Christian could not be understood apart from Christ's 
Incarnation and Crucifixion. But it may be replied that Origen does 
not explain how the events of the earthly life of Christ can guide 
(84) 
us to this higher knowledge. This remains true, even though, as 
Primmer points out, Origen does at times appear to recognise the sig- 
nificance which the Christian religion attaches to the Incarnation 
(85) 
and the Passion as the gateway to the higher knowledge of God.. 
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There are several passages in which Origen underlines his contention 
that there are differing degrees of knowledge among Christians. In 
(86) 
one passage he states that even those who know Jesus to be the Christ 
do not know Him to an equal extent, because (for instance) Timothy 
was less enlightened in his knowledge of Jesus as the Christ than 
(87) 
was St. Paul. In another remarkable passage, Origen states that those 
who do not possess knowledge can wane in faith itself; this is the 
implication of St. Paul's statement "unless You have believed without 
cause" (I Cor. xv. 2). There are in fact those who do not really seek 
an understanding of the truth in which they believe. It was because 
the Apostles recognised the difference between faith which is simply 
accepted on trust and faith illuminatedby knowledge that they said 
to their Master, "Increase our faith" (Luke xvii. 5); they wished to 
pass on from the former to the latter kind of faith, Origen also points 
(88), 
out that to believe (lrtcrx'ZeýýGdq ) that Jesus is the Christ is infer- 
ior to knowing what is believed, as is clear from St. John's report 
of Jesus as saying to those Jews who believed in Him that "If you 
abide in my word .... you shall know the truth, and the truth shall 
mke you free" (John viii. 31,32).. 
These statements o-bviously tie up with the difference which 
Origen asserts to exist between those who only apprehend the outward 
semblance of the Passion and those who apprehend its inward meaning; 
but it may be questioned how far the distinction is as absolute as 
he asserts. It is very difficult to remain on the same spiritual 
level all the time. 
It is-now timeto refer to certain passages which imply that 
there are some who have advanced no further than to an understanding 
of the outward events of Christ's earthly life. With reference to 
(89) 
Cant. v. 4-6, Origen says that when the bride lifts the bar of the door 
so as to open her soul to the Divine Word, He then simply shows His 
hand and some of His activities and then passes on, partly because 
the bride is not yet capable of a fuller vision, and partly so as 
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(90) 
to increase the extent of her love for Him. Again, with reference 
to the Feeding of the Five Thousand, Origen says that the five loaves 
stand for the things perceived by the five senses, and the five thousand 
who ate of the loaves before the filling of the twelve baskets only 
attend to the things perceived by the senses. Somewhat curiously, 
however, he adds that the five thousand were men, and not women and 
children (these were additional), and concludes from this that the 
things perceived by the senses provide different forms of nourishment, 
(91) 
some kinds being suitable for those who are babes in Christ, and other 
kinds being suitable for those who have made an end of childish things. 
The implication seems to be that one can ascend from sensible things 
(92) 
to spiritual things; whereas in another passage referen ce is made 
to the fragments that remained, gathered up in twelve baskets, which 
are said to symbolise the nourishment which the ordinary disciples 
of Christ cannot receive, but only the more advanced disciples of 
Jesus. Are we thus introduced to an uncertainty in the mind of Origen 
as to whether material things are the gateway to spiritual realities, 
or whether the latter can be apprehended apart from the former? In 
other words, is the preaching of the Cross a necessary introduction 
to the deepest truths of Christiantiy, or is it simply a stage of 
discipleship which must be left behind? Is it by way of the Cross, 
or by superseding the Cross, that the essence of the Christian religion 
is apprehended? 
It is on the whole true to say that Origen tends to regard the 
contemplation of the outward events of the life of Christ as merely 
an introduction to the apprehension of the deeper truths of the Faith, 
in other words as something which can be left behind. Thus he says 
that the crowds could not go to the other side of the lake (Matt. xiv. 
22) because only the disciples of Jesus can "go to the other side" 
in the sense of surpassing seen and temporal things and attaining 
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(93) 
to unseen and eternal things. Elsewhere, he refers to those people 
who admire Jesus Christ when they become acquainted with His life dtory, 
but no longer believe when more profound doctrine than they are capable 
of receiving is unfolded to them. He is speaking with reference to 
the statement of our Lord to some of the Jews "Because I say the truth, 
you do not believe me" (John viii. 45). They were people who believed 
in Him because of His miracles, but did not believe in His more profound 
teachings, as is clear from the words "Because I say the truth" when 
those words are taken in conjunction with the words "You shall know 
(94) 
the truth"(John viii. 32). We can scarcely deny, when considering 
(95) 
this passage and similar ones, that Mme. Harl is right when she suggests 
that for Origen "there is a veil on the Gospel for those who are not 
converted, inasmuch as they find in-the Gospel the body of the Divine 
Word but not His spirit, Jesus Christ crucified but not the Wisdom 
of God, the fleshly meaning but not the spiritual meaning. " We must 
(96) 
also agree with Lomiento when he points out the contrast drawn by 
Origen between the many who rest content with the teaching of Christ 
in the sphere of conduct, and the few who attain to the contemplation 
(97) 
of the Word of God. On the other hand Hanson seems 'to go too far 
(98) 
in suggesting that because Origen regards the movements and gestures 
of the historic Jesus as symbols of theological truths or of the spir- 
itual state of the believer, therefore Origen is not interested in 
history as event, in history as the field of God's self-revelation 
par excellence. I think it is true to say that Origen regards the 
Incarnation and the earthly life of Jesus as necessary for enabling 
the ordinary human being to apprehend the truths and attain to the 
spiritual states of whi'ch the events of that life were symbols. It 
is as though a man were to come into a room dressed in an ordinary 
suit of clothes and then disappearinto another room and don a special 
uniform and then admit the viewers into the other room. Even so, 
according to Origen, God reveals Himself, however inadequately, through 
the senses before admitting human beings to a fuller knowledge of 
21& 
Himself. But the question then arises, if the two revelations are 
not bound up with each other, why should the earlier one need to be 
given before the later? 
(99) 
Fitzgerald in his thesis highlights the problem when he contrasts 
the "spiritual coming" of Christ in His pre-incarnate state to the 
patriarchs and prophets with the visible coming in the days of His 
flesh, in so far as the latter coming was not a privilege confined 
to the perfect, but a grace offered to all men without distinction. 
(100) 
He explains the meaning of this statement by describing Christ's apper- 
ance in the flesh as "the condition and foundation of that universal 
economy whereby all men, even the 'simple' and 'common' souls who 
cannot'rise above sensible realities to the invisible things of God, 
can be raised up to union with the Divinity of the Word, and through 
Him to the Father. " Once more, how is it that the visible appearance 
of the Word can of itself provide the introduction to. the apprehension 
of the invisible nature of God, if the visible appearance does not 
contain within itself the spiritual realities which are the object 
of Christian aspiration? 
1. 
It is also true that there are various passages where Origen 
appears to suggest that Christians can be divided into two catego ries, 
according as they are or are not capable of receiving the deeper 
knowledge which Christ came to impart. He is very fond of employing 
the simile of "animals" to denote those less gifted intellectually, 
and "men" to indicate those better equipped to apprehend Divine mysteries. 
This is how he interprets the words of the Psalm "Thou, Lord, shalt 
save both men and beasts. " Those who desire the word of God and rational 
teaching are called "men"; those who live without these aspirations 
and are yet among the faithful are called animals, and yet clean animals. 
Moses and Elijah were men of God; but just as Ezekiel refers to the 
Lord's sheep, so does the Saviour Himself when he says in the Gospel 
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"My sheep hear my voice" (John x. 27), by which He meant that whereas 
(101) 
men hearHis word, sheep hear His voice only. Origen likewise says 
(102) 
elsewhere with reference to John iv. 12 that Jacob's well can be inter- 
preted as the Law of Moses, and his flocks and herds can be understood 
to be those who possess a stable and gentle disposition without reason 
Origen sometimes suggests that it was those gifted with greater 
spiritual perception whom Christ mainly came to save, because they 
are more akin to Him, and that He only chose those whom St. Paul terms 
"the foolish things of the world" (whom Origen regards as meaning 
the less perceptive) so as to put to shame "the wise" (whom Origen 
regards as meaning the more perceptive), in so far as He handed on 
to the less perceptive what St. Paul calls "the foolishness of the 
preaching", which was all they were capable of receiving, seeing that 
(103) 
the more perceptive were opposed to the truth. (It is scarcely necc- 
essary to point out that Origen is here misinterpreting St. Paul, 
who is not contrasting one type of disciple with another, but rather 
those who have accepted the wisdom which the world counts folly with 
(104) 
those who are content with this world's wisdom) The. same suggestion- 
is made elsewhere, when Origen interprets those who were originally 
invited to the wedding-feast, recorded in Matt. xxii. 1-14 as those well- 
endowed with understanding and perception; if these people refuse 
(105) 
the invitation, the less well-endowed are invited in their place. 
Origen indeed likens the powere possessed by the Divine Word 
to food of which the quality is changed in accordance with the condition 
of those to whom it is administered, so that an infant requires food 
in the form of its mother's milk, and an invalid receives it in a 
specially prepared form, whereas a strong man receives it in its ordinary 
form. Origen ends by saying: "Surely the Word is not false to His 
own nature when He becomes food for each man in accordance with his 
(106) 
capacity to receive Him. " There are various passages where Origen 
compares the elementary instruction which is given by the Word of God 
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to milk, in so far as those who are children in spirit (tTk, TqV 
(107) 
uXIV ) cannot assimilate anything stronger. Elsewhere, those in whom 
the power of reason is as yet only partially developed and who therefore 
cannot receive more advanced instruction are compared to "dogs" who 
rec eive crumbs, and those in whom that power is more fully developed 
(108) 
are compared to "children" who receive bread (ref. to Matt. xv. 26,27). 
(109) 
There is a rather curious passage in Comm. in Joh. where Origen 
says that those who see what is incorporeal, the things called by 
St. Paul "invisible" and "not. seen", inasmuch as in so doing they 
transcend sense-perceived things by the power of reason,. are governed 
" %. el% by the principal nature of the Only-begotten Son (ulCo TIS Trfo- 
L'3 C-&'3. S whereas those who advance no further 
P-0 V10 Y 
than the knowledge of sense-perceived things and thereby glorify their 
Creator are also ruled by reason and so ruled by Christ. He does 
not specify the precise nature of that rule in the case of the second 
class of people; but he presumably means that they are guided by the 
example set by Christin His earthly words and deeds without being 
aware of the spiritual realities of which those words and deeds are 
outward signs. (Origen nowhere makes it clear what these realities 
are; if they are moral qualities, they can surely also be apprehended 
by those on a lower intellectual level. ) In the same way, in Hom. 
(110) 
in Exod. he says that there are certain people who can only receive 
the preaching of Jesus Christ as crucified (cf. I Cor. ii. 2), whereas 
to others is revealed the wisdom of God hidden in a mystery (I Cor. ii. 7) 
the wisdom identifiable with Christ. The latter people are those 
who are invited to pass on from a fleshly understanding to a spiritual 
understanding of Christ, and to them it is said by St. Paul that "the 
Lord is Spirit" (II Cor. iii. 17). (It seems worth quoting the comment 
(111) 
of Hirschberg that this attitude suggests theological relativism, 
i. e. that Christian truth is not single, but manifold, in so far as 
it can only be grasped to the extent that the capacity of the hearer 
permits. To quote Hirschberg himself, "when this method (i. e. the 
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method of advancing from sensible objects to spiritual realities) 
is transferred from the philosophic to the theological sphere, and 
is thus made to suggest that instead of there being one Truth, there 
are. many truths, it is out of harmony with the thinking of the Church. 
The method which is in itself right, springing as it does from the 
motive of adaptation (i. e. to the needs of the undeveloped), must 
not be made into a form of teaching. But it is so made when Origen 
draws from it such deductions as that of lower forms of knowledge 
imparted by the Word of God in the form of the historical Jesus, or 
, ý, 
/ . 1, 
(112) 
that of the inferiority of 'bare faith' -Tr ( er, [- I. S 
(ý13) 
Again, there is a passage in Comm. in Joh. in which Origen refers 
to St, Paul's statement in Galatia: ns that a man will reap what he 
sows, and also to Ps. cxxvi. 5, where it is said that he who bears forth 
precious seed in tears will return brings his harvested sheaves in 
joy. Origen says that St. Paul's statement (Gal. vi. 8), although 
it refers to different sorts of seed, does not tell us whence the 
seeds originated, whereas the Psalm appears to refer to the descent 
6 
into this world of nmbler souls (qiJ%f who enter 
kv U kLJ V 
this llfe with seeds which tend to salvation, but enter unwillingly 
and with weeping, but return in joy because the seeds with which they 
came have been well cultivated and so have come to maturity. A more 
arbitrary exposition of Scripture can scarcely be imagined - as though 
not all human beings have within them the seeds which can win salvation 
if tended, but only some! But at least this passage is in harmony 
with the thought contained in the passage from Hom. in Exod. already 
referred to on p. 220, when it separates human beings into two categories. 
In the same vein, he refers to the heavenly Jerusalem as the city 
into which no one on earth ascends, in the sense that only those whose 
T, jXd, A are naturally elevated and have a keen perception of intellig- 
iable things are citizens thereof. It is possible, however, for even 
.' 
'4uec the most well-endowed ( 176uS C- -TJ--rOUS ) to sin (presumably 
in the sense of losing sight of things unseen by the outward eye), 
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and so lose their native nobility (-rrý*%f &jcýutAV ), and so become 
members not of Jerusalem but of one cities alien to it, i. e. remain 
unaware of the things which it is vital for their welfare that they 
(114) 
should recollect, and become fast bound to the things of sense. 
It has already been stated that those who apprehend invisible 
realities are governed according to Origen by the Divine element in 
the Son of God, whereas those who do not progress further than sensible 
(115) 
realities are governed by the human element of His nature. It is 
clearly, to the latter element that Origen refers when he states that 
the Lord Who made an end of all His enemies by His Passion needed 
the cleansing which the Father alone could bestow on account of His 
exploits and thus prevented Mary Magdalene from touching Him when 
(116) 
He appeared to her after His Resurrection. We may observe that this 
(117) 
is the supreme instance of the fact recorded in Hom. in Num., where 
it is said that those who fight against the powers of evil and overcome 
them are defiled, and therefore need to be cleansed by the very fact 
of having had dealings with them. In fact the greater the achievements, 
the greater the purification needed (as in the case of St. Peter and 
St. Paul). 
(119) 
On the other hand, in Convs. with Heracl. a quite different 
reason is adduced for His refusal to allow Mary Magdalene to touch 
Him. There it is stated that He had not yet returned to the Father 
A to claim His spirit (IT%fe-uroL-), which had been yielded to the Father 
to be kept in trust for Him at the time of His crucifixion. It could 
however be said that only through claiming back His could 
(120) 
the other elements of His nature be cleansed. 
In order to understand the meaning of the "cleansing" which 
Christ is alleged to have needed after the Crucifixion, it seems desir- 
able to refer to another passage, where Origen states that it was 
because our Lord submitted to death on behalf of mankind that He became 
worthy of the second place of honour after the God of the universe 
as an acknowledgement of His outstanding achievements alike in heaven 
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(121) 
and on earth. It is clearly to the human element of our Lord's nature 
that this statement refers: so far as His Divine nature-is concerned, 
the second place is accorded to Him by the very fact of His sharing 
(122) 
in the Father's Divinity. This perhaps gives us a clue to the meaning 
of the cleansing referred to by Origen as being needed after the Crucif-( 
ision. In so far as Christ was human, He could not be said to possess 
the full knowledge characteristic of the Word of God, and so while 
He was undergoing the suffering of the Cross, although He might have 
some inkling of the purpose of it, that purpose would not be fully 
apparent to Him, as the Cry-of Dereliction makes clear. It was only 
after the pain and agony were over that He would be in a full position 
to appreciate why He had been obliged to suffer, and how the sufferings 
contributed to the end they were intended to serve. That could only 
come about when His qr\fr=N"jjk-k became fully self-conscious, i. e., 
when it received the full influx of Divine anlightenment. It was 
as true of the human Jesus as it is of every human being that he needed 
to advance in self-knowledge, and that at no time in His life could 
it necessarily be said that the self-knowledge was complete. If His 
chief work was accomplished without His full awareness, that is simply 
equivalent to saying that God was in control of His life, but that 
being human, He did not fully understand how that control was exericised. 
In Matt. Comm. Series it is stated that when Jesus hung on 
the Cross, there was inscribed over His head the text "This is the 
King of the Jews";. but when he ascended to the Father and received 
the Father into Himself, He gained possession of Him Who was really 
designated by the title inscribed above the Crossj and seeing that 
He had become worthy of Him, He became the Father's dwelling-place,, 
(12) 
He being the one Who was alone able to appropriate the Father completely. 
"To gain possession of the Father" really means to accomplish to the 
full the Father's purpose, to have linked one's own will indissolubly 
to the will of the Father; but it is still possible to hold that even 
in the act of doing so, Christ in His human nature was not fully 
22 4' 
aware that this was what He was in fact doing, and only became so 
aware later on. In this sense, the human Jesus Himself progressed 
(124) 
from "faith" to "knowledge", inasmuch as He endured what He did endure 
in a state of uncertainty as to whether it was valuable, but in the 
end came to understand its value after emerging on to the "other side. " 
These considerations may help us to understand the meaning of 
(125) 
the curious passage in Hom. in Lev. where Origen refers to the purif- 
ications which Christ underwent. The first is suggested by the man 
who led the scapegoat into the wilderness in accordance with Jewish 
custom, and was obliged to wash his clothes at eventide because he 
had touched what was unclean; in the same way, Christ took human nature 
upon Himself, i. e. flesh-and blood, and washed it at the close of 
His earthly life in His own blood, and thus became clean. In other 
words He fulfilled in His own body the requirements of God when He 
suffered on the Cross, because previously He.. had not been able to 
fulfil them. On the other hand it is made clear that further purific- 
ation was needed when He said to Mary Magdalene after His Resurrection 
when she wanted to hold His feet "Do not touch Me. " After He had 
taken the powers of evil to a desert place in the power of His Crucif- 
ixion, it was necessary for Him to ascend to the Father and be more 
fully purified at the heavenly altar, so that He might bestow on our 
flesh, which He had not ceased to wear, the gift of perpetual purity. 
In other words, though he suffered to the full for our sakes on the 
Cross, He did not become aware of the extent of His achievements until 
it was all over and He could enter into uninterrupted communion with 
God and so be enlightened as to what He had in fact accomplished. 
Then, and only then, could He convey these benefits to others. 
As a matter of fact, Origen is open to the charge of letting 
his intellectuals, who pride themselves on their ability to contemplate 
things not seen by the senses, get away with a lack of cleansing. 
The distinction between those who can see visible things only and 
those who can see with the mind's eye is surely invalid; it is really 
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a matter of dealing with earthly affairs in accordance with the vision 
of spiritual realities made possible by Christ's act of sacrifice 
(126) 
on the Cross. The person who has progressed from "faith" to "knowledge" 
has no more right than Plato's guardians in the Republic had to rest 
content with his exalted state; he should apply that knowledge to 
the practical affairs of life and so improve the state of the world. 
That surely is the meaning of "redemption"; being made able to see 
the world with the eyes of. God and so taking steps for its improvement 
and renovation. 
It is also the case that even the same individual can waver 
from time to time between belief in the sense of accepting dogmatic 
statements about events alleged to have occurred (equivalent to resting 
content with visible realities in Origen's sense), and belief in the 
sense of recognising spiritual truths of which those outward events 
are the verification and confirmation (equivalent to the perception 
of unseen realities in Origen's sense). In the biography of Archbishop 
(127) 
William Temple, there is a letter written by him in 1930 to the then 
Bishop of Birmingham (Dr. Barnes) which shows a somewhat naive assump- 
tion that most Christians do not "build their faith on miracles", 
but rather accept the miracles "on the basis of a faith accepted in 
independence of miracles. " He presumably means that Christians accept 
Christ as Divine because He displays the character which is alone 
worthy of God, and go on to accept the miracles because it seems app- 
ropriate that they should occur as features of His earthly life. 
It seems very doubtful if people who are not theologians give. a sufficient 
amount of thought to their faith to arrive at that position. One 
I 
would have thought that most of them base their faith - in so far 
as they enquire what basis it has - both on the miracles of our Lord 
and on His character, without stopping to enquire how the former are 
related to the latter. Thea thus cannot be said to come down definitely 
either on the side of a faith in visible realities or of a faith in 
unseen realities; their faith is thus immature. 
22- 26 
It seems appropriate to refer to John vi. 26,27, where our Lord 
reproves the crowd which had been miraculously fed by Him for not 
recognising that this miracle was a sign of something far greater 
than itself., that is, of the bestowing of spiritual nourishment. 
In that sense, a distinction can be drawn between those who are content 
with sensible realities and those who go on to the apprehension of 
something higher; but that does not seem to be the sense in which 
(128) 
Origen makes this distinction. His distinction is rather betwen those 
who use the life of Christ as. a model for their own conduct and those 
who ascend inimind to the apprehension of unseen realities which are 
not identifiable with principles of action. 
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regards all human beings as in the end capable of ascending 
from "faith" to "knowledge". 
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CHAPTER VII. 
The eventual reconciling of human beings to the Father by 
Christ, and His consequent subjugation tothe Father. 
The subordination of the Son to the Father, as conceived of by 
Origen, comes out most clearly in the passages which discuss the goal 
of Christ's earthly work, which is the : reconciling of human beings 
to the Father. In one striking passage it is stated that the spring 
of water arising in the believer as the result of Christ's gift (cf. 
John iv. 14) may well ascend to the Father after it has ascended to 
everlasting life; for if Christ is the Life, He Who is greater than 
(2) 
Christ is greater than life. In the same way, Origen states that 
is is possible to interpret the words of Christ "Lo, I am with you 
always, even to the end of the world" as meaning that He Who is with 
His followers till the consummation of the ages is He Who emptied 
(3) 
Himself (i. e. Christ Incarnate); whereas it will be, as it were, someone 
else, that is, He Who is in the state in which He was before emptying 
Himself, Who will be with His followers afterwards, until the time 
when the Father will have put all the Son's enemies under His feet; 
but after that time, when the Son delivers the kingdom to the Father, 
the Father will Himself say, "Behold, I am with you always. " 
(4) 
Franco says, with reference to the immediately preceding passage 
(5) 
in Comm. in Joh.., that Origen there appears to say that whereas Christ 
is merely with His disciples until the consummation of the world, 
when the world has been crucified to them and they to the world, they 
will say with St., Paul, "It is not I who lives, but Christ Who lives 
in me. " In this passage, Origen says nothing about the surrender 
(6) 
of the Kingdom to the Father. In the subsequent passage (already 
referred to), Origen does not distinguish between "being with" and 
"being in", but between the different meanings of "I". But, says 
Franco, the two passages do not contradict each other, because even 
if it is the Father Who will be with Christ's disciples after the 
surrender of the Kingdom, that does not amount to saying that Christ 
(7) 
will not be in them, even though Origen does not say this explicitly. 
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There are several passages where the metaphor of "seeing" is 
used to denote the process whereby Christ introduces human beings 
to the Father. Thus with reference to the text "In Thy light shall 
we see light", Origen declares that by knowing Christ we shall eventually 
(8) (9) 
see God. In the same way he says that although the Son said "He who 
sees me has seen Him Who sent me", He would not have said "He Who has 
seen theiFather; has seen me", because it is after the soul has contem- 
plated the Word of God that it ascends to the contemplation of God 
(10) 
Himself. 
Elsewhere the metaphor of "sharing" is used to denote the relationý 
ship between the individual soul on the one hadd and Christ and the 
Father on the other. Thus Origen prays that his disciple Gregory 
may continually share ever more fully in the Spirit of God and the 
Spirt of Christ, so that he may not only say "We have become partakers 
of Christ" (JLETO %-, n, I -1-no but also "We have become partakers I\ Ke ( cr-rc-S %J 
of God" 
fz)E-'%J). Such a passage as this justifies Výlker 
(12) 
in saying that "the mystical notion of the marriage between the Divine 
Word and the human soul is itself only a transition stage and a necessary 
preparation for the summit consisting in mystical union with God, 
just as the whole system of Origen can-be summed up in the idea of 
God being all in all. " 
Yet. another metaphor employed in describing the process of. recon- 
cilliation of mankind-with the Father thourgh Christ is that of "ascent". 
Thus Origen says with reference to John xiii. 36, where Our Lord tells 
Peter that he cannot follow Him to His destination at present, that 
even-though a disciple of Jesus may not be in a position to follow 
his Master to the Father now, he may through diligence be able to 
(13) 
do so later on. Elsewhere, in a curious allegorical interpretation 
of Luke vii. 37, where the woman in the Pharisee's house anointed the 
head of Jesus after His feet, Origen says that the more mature soul, 
when it has rendered fitting service to the Word of God, is free to 
(14) 
approach the Head of Christ, Who is God. Elsewhere, Origen says that 
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if anyone is ready to ascend the spiritual mountain with Christ, as 
Peter, James and John did, He will not only be illuminated by the 
(15) 
light of Christ, but will also hear the Father's voice. Likewise, 
(16) 
in Hom. in Num. it is said that after Christ had come : Anto the world, 
the Father recalled Him, so that a way might be opened up for those 
(17) 
who wish to ascend from this world to God. In Contra Cels. Origen 
says that he who has ascended to the God set above all things is he 
who gives his individual worship to that God through the Son, Who 
alone leads to God those who desire to have fellowship with God. 
(18) 
Elsewhere. he says that just as Christ is said to have passed from 
this world to the Father in order to resume the fullness of which 
He had emptied Himself, so we, if we follow Himas Guide, will-when 
we arrive at our destination be transformed from being spiritually 
empty to being spiritually full. 
There are several passages in which Christ is said to "offer" 
to the Father those whom He reconciles to the Father. For instance, 
(19) 
in Hom. in Num. it is stated that in the early stages of spiritual 
development it is the angels who are deputed to take. charge of human 
souls, but that in due course they offer the firstfrUits (primitiae) 
of their cultivation to Christ, Who in-turn offers them to God the 
Father, just as He offered Himself. The same sentiment is expressed 
(20) 
in Comm. in Rom., where it is also stated týat before human souls 
are mature enough to be offered to the Father, they call upon the 
Name of our Lord Jesus Christ as Mediator between God and man; but 
after the Spirit of God has entered their hearts and there cries "Abba, 
Father", the Spirit teaches them to call on the Name of the Father 
(21) 
also. Elsewhere Origen prays that he and his readers may be sufficiently 
pure in heart and upright in action to have a share in the Divine 
Sacrifice offered through the eternal Priest ind Saviour, the Lord 
Jesus Christ. 
It is noteworthy that this offering is in several places only 
regarded as adequate when it is corporate, i. e. when it includes all 
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(22) 
mankind (we shall revert to this theme later). Thus in Comm. in Joh. 
(23) 
Origen says that it would not be incorrect to say that no one now 
knows the Father to the fullest possible extent, even though he may 
be an apostle or a prophet, and that human beings will only attain 
to the fullest knowledge of Him when they attain to the unity which 
(24) 
exists between the Father and the Son. Likewise in Hom. in Jos. he 
declares that it is through the Spirit of Christ that we are enabled 
tO attain to that unity of spirit which will enable us to make ourselves 
into a worthy offering to God the Father. But the clearest indication 
of the fact that it is a corporate offering which Christ makes to 
(25) 
the Father occurs in the passage where Origen says that when Christ 
shall have delivered His Kingdom to God the Father (I Cor. xv. 24), 
all those living creatures who have already been made part of that 
kingdom will be delivered with the rest of it to the Father's rule, 
so that when God is all things in allcreatures (I Cor. xv. 28), they 
also, as being included amongst those creatures, may themselves be 
indwelt by God. 
But before believers can be introduced by the Divine Word to 
God the Father, it is first necessary that they should ascend from 
contemplating the Incarnate Word to contemplating the pre-existent 
(26) 
Word. Origen declares, as has already been indicated, that there 
is a two-fold coming of the Divine Word into the human soul. As first 
apprehended, He has no- beauty or attractiveness, because He is apprehended 
by way of the "foolish preaching" as the Christ Who was born and crucified. 
But the second coming takes place when the believer no longer knows 
Christ "after the flesh" only, but comprehends Him in a more rational 
manner, with the result that he experiences the end of the world in 
(27) 
so far as "the world in crucified to him, and he to the world. " 
In another passage, Origen says that the Word in the opened 
heaven (Rev. xix. 11) is called "faithful and true" in contrast to the 
shadow and image which the Word on earth is. It is by the shadow of 
the Word, and not by the true Word of God, that the great mass of those 
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(28) 
who are considered to be believers are taught. It is interesting 
that Origen considers that just as the Word condescends to human infirmit- 
ies by appearing as a man, so He condescends to the limitations of 
the angels by appearing amongst them as one of themselves. He makes 
this observation with reference to Genesis xxii. 11,12, where an angel 
is said to have spoken to Abraham and later on this angel is shown 
(29) 
to be God Himself. 
There is one passage where Origen appears to suggest that the 
contemplation of the pre-existent Word is not possible for those who 
(30) 
are still imprisoned in the body. He says in fact that for all who 
are in the body and are thus away from the Lord, the Lord Himself 
is away, because they walk by faith and not be sight, and that it 
is only when we are freed from the body that we shall be with the 
Lord and He with us and we shall thus walk by sight instead of by 
faith, that is, by seeing the Word in all His various aspects of wisdom, 
truth, righteousness, peace, and the rest. But if we compare this 
passage with others, we can only say that Origen would allow that 
some Christians can transcend bodily limitations even in this life; 
otherwise how could any one attain to the contemplation of the Divine 
(31) 
Word before physical death? 
(32) 
In fact in another passage, which is worth quoting verbatim, 
Origen implies that-it is possible to apprehend the Divinity of the 
Word even in this life; for he says that "it is necessary that the 
Divine Word Who cleanses the soul should pre-exist in this soul, so 
that as a result of the purification whichHe carries out, all deadness 
and weakness may be removed, and unmixed life may come to exist in 
that soul, in so far as it is capable of receiving the Divinity of 
the Word. " 
There is also a rather curious passage which allegorises the 
story of the feet washing at the Last Supper. It is there said that 
the Lord "rises from supper, lays aside His garments, and girds Himself 
with a towel. " Origen says that if there were no hidden meaning under- 
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lying these words, it is hard 
have washed His disciples' fe 
the clothes as the discourses 
more recondite teaching which 
(33) 
had been purified. 
There is also a passage 
to understand why the Lord should not 
et in His clothes. And so he interprets 
He normally gave, and the towel as the 
could only be given when His disciples 
where Origen's outlook is illustrated 
in the following striking way. He says that the soul apprehends God 
in various ways. Through its actions it apprehends Him as householder 
(that is, as being in charge of itself); through the study of nature 
as King (that is, as having charge of the whole world); but through 
the study of theology as God (that is, in His innermost nature and 
character). Origen also says that from the third mode of apprehension 
there follow the two previous ones, in other words they are implicit 
in it; but from the first the other two do not necessarily follow , 
in other words, there may be people who get no further than apprehending 
(34) 
God as having the right to lay down what they should do. Origen would 
say no doubt that those who are taught by the "shadow" of the Word, 
(35) 
that is, the Word in His-earthly form, simply gain a clearer understanding 
of the actions which they are expected by God to perform, whereas 
in order to obtain an intimate acquaintance with God in Himself it 
is first necessary to apprehend the Word in His Divinity. 
There are several passages where Origen leaves us in no doubt 
that he regards many Christians as not having advanced beyond the 
stage of being taught and governed by the Word in His earthly form, 
(36) 
the Word Who was crucified. Thus he says that some Christians are 
governed (+<C-K 
/ 
a-rrkV1--J-t ) by the Word of God Himself, but others 
by a Word united to Him and "appearing to be the primal Word" (strange 
phrase! ). The second group know nothing but Jesus Christ, and Him 
crucified; they see the Word as flesh only. It is noteworthy that 
even Old Testament worthies areregarded as having been capable of 
entering into fellowship with the Word Who was in the beginning with 
God, whereas the generality of Christian believers are described as 
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(37) 
imagining that the entire Wordconsists of the Word made flesh. And 
so Origen recommends that each Christian should receive the Divine 
message to the full extent of his capacity. If he is able to assimilate 
solid food, let him receive the wisdom which St. Paul spoke among., 
the mature (cf. I Cor. ii. 6); but he who is not ready for this should 
receive. the teaching which conveys to him knowledge of nothing except 
(38) 
Jesus Christ, and Him crucified. It is interesting that when Origen 
1 (39) 
refers to the men who have joined the Christian Church after being 
steeped in what Christians call "wisdom after the flesh" (cf. I Cor. i. 26), 
he says that some have passed on to the Divine wisdom - as though 
it was necessary first to divest oneself of human wisdom completely, 
as though it were wholly misleading, and simply accept elementary 
Christian teaching before going on to the more advanced! Such an 
outlook seems at variance with the opinion of Origen's predecessor 
Clement of Alexandria, which is that heathen thinkers had had grasped 
fragments of the truth but had given then a one-sided emphasis. 
Perhaps the main clue to the way in which Origen's mind works 
(40) 
regarding the Crucifixion is given by Bertrand, when he says that 
"the reproach levelled by Origen against simple believers is that 
they are not willing to go beyond the outward fact of the Crucifixion 
so as to try to penetrate the mystical aspect of it. " Indeed, so 
(41) 
much is suggested in Comm. in Matt. when it is stated that one can 
become acquainted with the triimph of Christ on the Cross either by 
(42) 
faith or by a higher form of knowledge. " But as we shall see, the 
mystical interpretation which Origen gives of the Crucifixion is not 
in line with the main stream of Christian thought, but is rather governed 
by his emphasis on the need to leave this sense-perceived world behind. 
The distinction which Origen makes between faith (or belief) 
and knowledge a propos of the Crucifixion is in fact merely one example 
(43) 
of the same distinction a propos of Christ Himself. Thus Origen says 
with reference to John viii. 31,32 that many believed in Christ, but 
not manyknew Him. Only those believers who remained in His word and 
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thus became His true disciples would come to know the truth which 
resided in Him; and the majority of believers would not advance further 
(44) 
than believing Him. Origen says-elsewhere that the beginner believes 
in the Son of Man, but the one who makes progress ascends to believing 
in the Son of God also. In fact, after one Is initiation there is need 
of advancing so that one may be seen and known by God, in accordance 
with St. Paul's words "but now having come to know God, or rather 
to be known by Him" (Gal. iv. 9). 
(45) 
Origen expresses the same contention more fully when he says 
that "those who are introduced to the Christian Faith receive the 
truth,, without the wisdom which acts as a confirmation of it, and without the Word 
of God Who demonstrates it.... For instance, an initiate is introduced 
to belief in one God, and is taught that Christ was sent for the benefit 
of mankind in order to put away sin by His own blood, and that after 
this life. is over, the blessed will inherit a happy life, and sinners 
will inherit a life of punishment. This is truth, but truth which 
is not un folded or established with wisdom and reason. " 
In view of what has been said, we can hardly fail to agree with 
(46) 
Mersch when he says that according to Origen, "Christ is Teacher rather 
than Life; Christianity has more the appearance of an immense and 
magnificant school, rather than that of an assimilation to God of 
the very substance of our race. " We must also subscribe to the statement 
(47) 
of Molland that "the tendency in Origen to leave behind the historic 
revelation in his speculations is due to the influence of Platonism, 
which sometimes superseded the theology of the Incarnation in His 
thinking. When the Platonic line of thought is continued to its logical 
conclusion, all revelation within the sphere of this world becomes 
problematic, and he cannot retain his hold on the position of the 
Church; y C-J e--Tri 
It is now time to refer to several passages in which Origen 
gives us his own mystical interpretation of the Crucifixion, which 
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it will be generally agreed is rather forced. In a very obscure Frag. 
(48) 
in Luc. he interprets St. Paul's statement "I am crucified to the 
world, and the world to me" as meaning that the rational principle 
explaining the world ccý IX-c- crre, 0 is perceived 
by me, and the Word is hence raised up and no longer lies 
below; for to him who does not understand the reason why the world 
was made the Word is not crucified. Origen goes on to say "For I 
think it right to be mystically crucified with Christ, as Paul was, 
in so far as the world (j<o6j-o-%) was to the mind of Paul lifted up 
and so understood. " The general meaning seems to be that the mature 
Christian does not simply allow himself to become immersed in this 
world's affairs, but obtains a more detached view of the world by 
referring it to its origin and ruling principle, which is the Word 
of God. 
(49) 
Another striking passage where Origen interprets the words of 
St. Paul in his own way is that in which be declares that the effect 
of the invisible entry of the Word of God into a person's soul is 
that the world is destroyed and brought to an end, in fact crucified 
to the person concerned, in the sense that worldly things have no 
attraction for him. The Word of God is able to enter the souls of 
those who having known Christ in an earthly manner ascend in order 
to grasp ( capere) the glory'of the Only-begotten Son of God. Once 
again, the Crucifixion is interpreted in terms of detachment from 
the world. 
In an obiter dictum regarding the words "Heaven and eart'n shall 
(50) 
pass away, but my words shall not passa away", Origen declares that 
the place of the sinner referred to by the Psalmist when he says "Soon 
the wicked will be no more; you will look well at his place, but he 
(51) (52) 
will not be there" is the present heaven and earth -a clear indication 
of the fact that he regards the present material universe as only 
temporary and in fact the result of the fall of immaterial spirits. 
The Crucifixion is thus regarded, not as a means of redeeming the 
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the world, but as a means of transcending the world; it thus has the 
same message for Origen as the Transfiguration, which is mystically 
interpreted as symbolising what supervenes on the disappearance of 
(53) 
this world, the previous six days referred to in St. Matthew's account 
(54) 
being understood as symbolising the bringing into being of this world. 
In the same way, Origen says elsewhere that when we are exalted from 
earth to heaven by the Cross of Christ in fulfilment of His words 
III, if I be lifted up, will draw, all men unto me", we then truly magnify 
the Lord, Who magnified the Father by submitting to His will and so 
bestowing on believers, as far as He could, the highest conception 
4" 
(55) 
UtCc: -Arj+i\() of the Father. Origen is only repeating himself when 
he, says elsewhere that even those who possess no more than "belief" 
can endeavour to worship God, but to see (OC-T-iff-t-V ) the Word, and 
to apprehend the Father in Him, is the prerogative not of all believers 
(56) 
but of those who are pure in heart, and thus needs time and practice. 
In fact when it is said that the Son of God came to seek and 
(57) 
to save the lost, what is meant is that the Father seeks true worshippers 
through the Son 110"33 d" inasmuch as. the Son by a process 
(58) 
of cleansing and instruction makes human beings into'true worshippers. 
It is now time to discuss the way in which the Divine Word helps 
people to develop the faculty of reason inherent in them, so as to 
enable them to offer adequate worship to the Father. For Origen, 
reason is the, pre-requisite of virtuous living. In order to obtain -. 4rc-t 
we must first pray for knowledge of how it is manifested, then we 
must find out how that knowledge can be applied to ourselves, and 
then we must knock at the door which is Christ (cf. Matt. vii. 7) so 
that He may release us from the narrow and restricted way of self- 
(59) 
will and lead us into the wide field of intelligent action. There 
is an interesting passage in Comm. in Joh. where it is said that the 
gift of reason in which the human race participates can 
be understood first as consisting in the innate ideas (6V,, fot--U) which 
come into consciousness in those emerging from childhood, and secondly 
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as the mature rationality found only in those who are fully developed 
(60) 
Origen presumably means that the innate ideas", 
presumably moral and ethical principles, need tobe continually kept 
in mind and applied to practical situations so as to bring human life 
into some kind of harmony. In fact Origen says that before reason 
is fully developed, human life is defective and therefore blameworthy, 
inasmuch as the irrational elements (metaphorically called "sheep" 
(61) 
in John x. 8) are not fully obedient to reason. Origen then makes 
a very surprising pronouncement; he says that perhaps in the first 
sense of "reason" the Word became flesh, and in the second sense of 
"reason" the Word was Divine. He could mean, of course, that the 
seminal reason inherent in all human beings is due to the activity 
of the Word of God, but that this activity is only fully manifested 
with the full development of reason in human beings; but he could 
also mean that the Word of God Himself underwent the process of rational 
development to which every human being is subject. This, however, 
would be in contradiction to Origen Is doctrine of the changelessness 
of the Divine Word, a doctrine which he firmly maintains in spite 
of St. John's-insistence that "the Word became flesh. " Dr. C. J. 
Cadoux maintains that in spite of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, 
He was not exempt from the imperfection involved in the process of 
moral development. He says: "While we can distinguish in the abstract 
between conspicuous and indubitable sins committed against the light 
and in wilful disobedience to God, and unintenticnal imperfections 
or lapses incidental to all human life as it develops out of its initial 
immaturity, yet, in the actual experience of living, it is virtually 
impossible clearly to separate the one from the other .... So long as 
our conception of sin is clear only when sin is considered as a pure 
abstraction, we cannot treat the sinlessness of Jesus as if it were 
(63) 
one of the obvious factual data on which our Christology must be based. " 
It is noteworthy, however, that although Origen at times-adopts 
247 
the ordinary view of moral progress as being raised from a lower to 
a higher state of consciousness, he at times tends to make the notion 
of moral development conform to his own world-view, which regarded 
spirits who bad originally been in perfect union with God as having 
later departed from Him through disobedience and as having thus become 
(64) 
encased in material coverings. Thus he says in one place that the 
captivity which Christ carries out is the return of a rational nature 
(65) 
from sin and ignorance to virtue and knowledge. Elsewhere he says 
that the destruction of a sinner is the separation. of the rational 
soul 
Aoy%Kw'ý' from every kind of evil life. Origen indeed 
implies that the rational faculty inherent in spiritual beings was 
(66) 
originally fully developed when he says that these beings, though 
endowed with reason by God's bounty, transgressed the limits and 
commandments prescribed by reason, and thus deviated from what is 
right and just. 
There are, however, two passages where he accepts the more common- 
sense account of moral progress as not so much a return to an original 
state of perfection as a progress from a lower to a higher state. 
With reference to St. Paul's statement that "we are saved by hope" 
(Rom. viii. 24), he says that our adoption as sons and our redemption 
are at present received indirectly and though. a mirror; but when we 
(67) 
attain perfection, we shall obtain our adoption "face to face. " 
Elsewhere, in a rather curious interpretation of Genesis xx, where 
Sarah is represented as both Abraham's wife and his sister, Origen 
represents the acquisition of virtue as occurring in two stages. 
So long as we are not in complete possessionof virtue it is fitting 
that it should be confined to us and enclosed within us, i. e. be 
regarded as our wife. But when we have entered into complete possession 
of virtue, then it is that so far from keeping her to ourselves, we 
should share her with others who desire her, as though she were our 
(68) 
sister. 
It would appear that the oscillation in Origen's thinking about 
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moral progress to some extent derives from the fact that for him the 
exemplar of perfection is at one time the Word of God and at another 
time the historic Jesus. In the former case Origen thinks of moral 
perfection as consisting in contemplation only, after the removal 
of everything which obstructed it, sin being regarded primarily as 
that which interferes with the contemplation of God; in the latter 
case he thinks of moral perfection as consisting, in the words of 
the Collect, as "following the blessed steps of the most holy life" 
of the Incarnate Son. It is only if moral perfection be regarded 
as consisting in contemplation that moral progress can easily be regarded 
as a return to a former state; if it be regarded as necessarily manifesting 
itsel--f in action, it is bound to be thought of as evolutionary in 
(69) 
character. Thus Mme. Harl says: "Is there not in Origen's conception 
of the role of Christ a constant ambiguity, which comes from the fact 
that his thinking is directed, in a not very explicit fashion, now 
to the Word Who is the illuminator of spirits, and now to the historic 
Jesus? What precisely is the imitation of Christ? Is it not the practice 
of the virtues? ... But is it not also conformity to the - life of Jesus, 
seeing that, as the Pauline formulas express it, we are 'grafted' into 
Christ and share in His life? " . 
But in any case Origen would say that although all human beings 
possess the gift of reason, albeit not yet fully active, only the person 
spiritually united to the Word of God can be described as "rational" 
in the full sense. Thus he says that if it is true that only the person 
who (consciously) participates in the Word of God as (i. e. 
reason) is rational (i. e. 
Aaytt,;: 
--'S 
), then it follows that only the y(as 
(70) (71) 
is X. YIKC*>s Elsewhere he says that the Xo7aS takes 
over him who has been under the law and the prophets and gives him 
(72) 
his paternal inheritance (Týt-oL-qtK Yet again, he 
pronounces happy those who no longer need the Son of God as Doctor 
or as Shepherd or as Redeemer, but are able to receive Him in His capacity 
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of perfect wisdom, reason, and justice, and whatever else is appropriate 
to those who are sufficiently-mature to receive His best gifts. 
There are indications that Origen regards the goal of full communion 
(73) 
with the Divine Word as only attainable in the future life. Thus he 
(74) 
says that so long as a person is in this life, his vision is only indirect 
and by means of a mirror, and he is hence like a sheep led by a Shepherd. 
Only when he is transferred to the future life, and is there acquainted 
with the truth face to face, will he have access to the spiritual table. 
In another passage, however, Origen seems to suggest that the transition 
(75) 
from the one state to the other can be accomplished in this life. 
He says indeed that when he who makes progress has reached the goal 
of be, coming Aoyt K,, LS rather. than a sheep led by his shepherd ) he 
is admitted to the table on which God has prepared rational food N: ýJ, / 
(76) 
Origen even goes on so far as to say that in their original state, 
men are comparable to beasts, because the gift of reason within them 
is undeveloped, and that only the Word of God can rescue them from 
(77) 
that state. It is curious that he does not regard the function-of 
Christ as Shepherd in the way. in which it is regardeý nowadays, namely 
as that of guiding all those who accept Him as Lord, but in the more 
restricted sense of protecting disciples who are immature against rash 
courses of action and encouraging them in right courses of action without 
their fully understanding the reason why such actions are enjoined 
(78) 
on them. Thus Origen says that if, as the Psalmist says, God saves 
both men and beasts (Ps. xxvi. 7), ' He saves the beasts whom He saves 
(79) 
by granting a shepherd to those who cannot receive a king. Later on, 
Origen explains the meaning of this statement when he says that the 
Son of God, in His benevolence towards mankind, welcomes any kind of 
inclination of human souls towards what is better, even if they do 
not direct themselves towards the Word of God, but rather acquire a 
gently and mild spirit which is devoid of reason, and so becomes their 
(80) (81) 
shepherd, for "the Lord saves both men and beasts. " Elsewhere, Origen 
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says that when the disciple"s relation to his Lord is no longer that 
of a sheep to a shepherd, because he has now advanced to a more mature 
understanding of the Faith, it can be said that he is "converted" (Ps. 
(82) 
xxiii. 3). It would appear that Origen is making a distinction between 
those who simply follow the example of the human Jesus, in so far as 
they model their actions on His, and those who ascend to the contemplation 
of the invisible Word of God, and so perceive the ultimate principle 
(83) 
from which those actions proceed. 
(84) 
There is a passage in which Origen allegorises the story of the 
two wives of Elkanah - Anna and Peninna - in so far as the name of 
the first means "grace"-and the name of the second means "conversion. " 
"Grace" is joined to us by faith, and is the nobler gift; "conversion" 
follows on from it. But it is the second which first brings forth 
fruit, as in the case of Elkanah's two wives, because conversion produces 
the first shoots of righteousness in our actions; but those children 
do not wait on God, as Samuel did. In other words, the actions proceed- 
ing from conversion are not derived from intimate fellowship-. with God. 
Only when "grace" comes fully into its own do the children appear who 
wait on Godand receive His word. In other words, only when the converted 
person is in full communion with the Word of God can that person perform 
actions which are fully acceptable to God. Origen quotes the episode 
of Martha and Mary in the Gospels: Martha, does the works proceeding 
from conversion, but Mary sits at the feet of the Word of God and thus 
produces the fruits of grace. 
On the other hand Origen is humble enough to recognise human 
limitations even when a person's rational powers appear to be in full 
exercise. "Compared with the true Word (To\f he says, 
"we are animal-like, and not only we, but beings much more rational 
and wise than we are. " In fact Origen goes so far as to say that 
the reasoning faculty in the most mature of men, when compared with 
the true Word, is more distant from Him than is the life-principle 
(85) 
of an ass or a colt from that of a man. Here Origen almost 
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seems to be adopting the view already mentioned that full access to 
the truth enshrined in the Divine Word is only obtainable in the next 
(56) 
life. At any rate he makes it clear that we can never be certain 
that we have transcended the relation of sheep to shepherd in our relat- 
ion to the Divine Word. It might also be said that the same applies 
to the function of Christ as Physician; Origen says in one place that 
the outward miracles of Christ, such as the bestowal of sight. -and hearing 
(87) 
are symbolic of His cure of human souls. In fact we can never be certain 
whether our wills are as stable as they should be, and whether the 
teaching of the Word of God will not again be necessary for rescuing 
them from sloth and wickedness 
(88) 
their intended good works. It 
beings as appointed by the Fat] 
time when those souls have the 
(89) 
with evil. 
and thus enabling them to bring forth 
is noteworthy that Origen regards ang&lic 
aer to protect immature souls until the 
inner resources needed for their conflict 
There are numerous passages when Origen insists that it is necessary 
for the Divine Word to enter 
(90) 
to progress spiritually. On 
other agents prepare the way 
has been made. Thus he says 
the ýOq of the person whom He helps 
the other hand, he also recognises that 
for that entry and enlarke it when it 
that Christ does not enter the VtvW, 
" 
I Xýwhich 
is Jerusalem on His own, or with few companions: for there need to be 
many who precede the Word of God Who makes. us perfect, and many who 
(91) 
follow Him. 
(92) 
In Comm. in Cant. Origen states that the Word of God dwells 
as King in that soul which has arrived at spiritual perfection. It 
was of such a soul that the Lord said, "The Father and I will come 
and sup with him and make our abode with him. " Origen pronounces blessed 
the breadth of that soul and the resting-place of that mind where the 
three Persons of the Divine Trinity recline and dine and make their 
(93) (94) 
abode. Likewise in De Orat. it is stated that God lives in the saints, 
and that this is what is meant by saying that God lives in heaven, 
because every saint bears the image of the Heavenly One. Elsewhere 
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it is said that. since every'saint is obedient to the spiritual laws 
of God and has thus attained perfection of character, both the Father 
(95) 
and the Son reign in his soul. St. Paul's language about all Christ's 
enemies being subdued to Him and all forms of authority being abolished 
(I Cor. xv. 24,25) can thus be applied to the individual soul)in so far 
as the power of sinful tendencies has been broken, and the Father and 
(96) 
the Son thus take possession of the soul. 
There are several passages where Christ's work in the human soul 
is referred to in the same manner as the work which God is reported 
to have imposed on the prophet Jeremiah, i. e. that of plucking-up and 
breaking down, destroying and overthrowing, building and planting (Jer. 
i. 10) The intention is that'God's glory may be apparent in human 
souls. Thus in one passage it is stated that Christ is both a builder 
and a destroyer; He destroys the buildings erected in us by unclean 
spirits, and builds in us a temple of virtue and true beliefs in which 
(97) 
God's glory can appear. In another passage, the "glory" of God is 
C held to be equivalent to His Divinity r\ That 
Divinity, being so abundant, is difficult for created nature to compre- 
hend; but from the riches of His Divinity He imparts'a share to those 
to whom it is appropriate to receive it. This is brought about through 
Christ, Who, although He does not need individual souls as His dwelling- 
f, place, none the less dwells (Kr&rotmeo in those who partake of Him 
(98) 
through faith. 
The help which Christ offers is often compared by Origen to nourish- 
ment. In his own words, "we feed on whatever discourse we hear, whether 
from the dragon, if we hear what is vain and useless, or from Christ, 
(99) (100) 
if we receive words which are edifying and helpful. " Elsewhere, Christ 
is described as the Food which, though always consumed, always remains, 
and indeed is augmented. For the more abundantly and eagerly a person 
receives the food which is the Word of God, the more richly will it 
enter that person. In an unusual interpretation of the phrase 
\ I/ C- 11 %. 5 
(101) 
, Tov Afro\f ýftj\i -r-. 5v in the Lord's Prayer, Origen says 
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9/ 
that genuine substance () is what remains fixed, whereas 
bodily substance is fluid and disappers, and hence it is genuine substance 
which is nourished by the Divine Word Who is the Living Bread, from 
which the bridegroom's companions have to fast when they are deprived 
of the bridegroom himself, that Bridegroom Who nourishes invisibly 
le the invisible soul +-)ý, q (cf. Matt. ix. 15). Likewise Origen say s 
that those who are humble in heart and poor in spirit are invited 
to the ban, quet provided by Divine Wisdom, and they thus escape the 
hunger which prevails on the earth (cf. Amos viii. 11). The true 
Israelite is fed alike by the Law, the Prophets, and the Apostles. 
He is invited to recline on Abraham's bosom in the Father's kingdom, 
and there to eat 6f the Tree'of Life and drink from the true Vine 
(102) 
which is Christ. 
Origen also says that food can actually be offered to Christ 
Himself, though it is only clean food if we have dined with Him prev- 
(103) 
iously. This rather puzzling statement is elucidated in two other 
passages. In the first it is sa id that we must use the food which 
is given to us so as to prepare such food within ourselves as may 
worthily be set before the three Persons of the Divine Trinity Who 
desire to make their home within us. This food is interpreted as 
being such feelings as anger and desire which can be directed to right 
(104) 
. and wrong objects. 
In the second, it is. stated that we are the trees 
in Christ's garden (cf. Is. lviii. 11) if we ourselves provide Him with 
nourishment, namely the salvation of our souls, as is suggested by 
the saying "My food is to do the will of Him Who sent me" (John iv. 34), 
because the fruit which we produce condsts in our own acts of choice 
(105) (106)' 
T-1, Ecris We can thus understand the meaning of the passage 
where Origen says that a person who makes progress in virtue grants 
a place in his soul to the Son of God, Who thereafter fills it with 
His own wisdom and holiness, and finally brings His Divine Father 
with Him, so that together they can dine on the food which He Himself 
has provided. 
254 
There are, however, two other passages which raise a problem 
which Origen never satisfactorily solved - the problem of the original 
(107) 
state of human beings. In the first, he says that when Christ is 
spoken of as "reclining at the table" of a soul (Cant. i. 12), this 
means that this soul is perfected in virtue; but where Christ reclines, 
there the Father also is, as is made clear in the saying "My Father 
and I will come and sup with him, and will make our abode with him. " 
In the second, it is stated that when the human mind is nourished 
by the food of Divine Wisdom to the integrated and perfected state 
in which it was made in the beginning, it will be restored to the 
(108) (109) 
image and likeness of God. In the meantime as has been said already, 
the Father seeks true worshippers through the Son (9t"'L-FbZ uk"013), 
Who came to seek and to save the lost, whom by a process of cleansing 
(110) 
and instruction He makes into true worshippers. Elsewhere the Son 
declares that His mission is to "finish the Father's work" (John iv. 34). 
This is at first a puzzling statement, because it implies that the 
work of God is imperfect, and how can that be so? Moreover, how can 
the Father's work be completed by Him Who said, "The Father Who sent 
me is greater than I? " The dilemma can be resolved, 'says Origen, 
by saying that Christ is continuing the Father's work by bringing 
rational creatures to perfection. That was the purpose of the Incarn- 
ation. It would appear that beings who were originally perfect became 
imperfect through disobedience, and thus stood in need of One Who 
(112) 
would restore them to perfection. Hence, says Origen, the Saviour 
was sent to perfect the rational creatures who are the work of God, 
(113) 
and thereafter accustom them to the solid food of true wisdom. We 
(114) 
have seen already that if the work of the Son of God is limited to 
what the Incarnation was meant to bring about, it becomes easier to 
think of the process of redemption as distinguishable from that of 
creation; for whatever Origen may say, a being who was capable of 
transgressing the Divine will could scarcely be said to be perfect, 
and the result would be that the process of bringing rational beings 
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to perfection would be co-eval with the history of human beings. 
(115) 
In fact Origen suggests in Contra Cels. that God could have made human 
beings perfect at the beginning, but did not do so, in order to leave 
scope for freewill. 
It seems quite clear that there is a contradiction between Origen's 
outlook in De Princ. and his outlook in Contra Cels., in so far as 
he seems to lay it down in the former work that all things were origin- 
ally created perfect. Thus he says that since Christ, Who is the 
Word and Wisdom of God, is alsg perfect Righteousness, the result 
is that all that He has made has been made in that righteousness Which 
is identifiable with Himself; and this means that there is nothing 
accidental, nothing unrighteous, in the things which have been made, 
but everything can be shown to be such as the principle of righteous- 
(116) 
ness and justice requires. But in that case, how did evil creep into 
the world? The answer is, says Origen, by the misuse of freewill, 
which resulted in different creatures receiving different positions 
(117) 
in the universe. But that appears too facile a solution if we recall 
that according to Origen himself, the act. of creation did not take 
place at one definite time, but is a continuous process in which the 
(118) 
Word of God is engaged everywhere in the universe. This means that 
God's creatures are not as independent as they would like to think, 
because the omnipotent Word of God uses them as channels of His activity. 
The solution of the difficulty would seem to be that whereas 
human beings were originally fashioned in a state of imperfection, 
the Divine Word leads them on to greater perfection, and more especially 
if they are conscious of His guidance. Indeed, this is suggested 
by Origen himself in De Princ. (surprisingly enough) where he says 
with reference to Gen. i. 27 that it was stated that God made man in 
His own "image" (as distinct from "likeness") because the "image" 
was only an inchoate form of the "likeness", which could only be acquired 
by man's own earnest aspirations after it. The "image" is in fact 
no more than the inherent possibility of acquiring the "likeness" 
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(120) 
through performing works acceptable to God. Origen goes on to say 
that this happy consummation will come about through the pleading 
of the Divine Saviour on behalf of human beings, as expressed in the 
words of the High-priestly prayer "As Thou and I are one, so may they 
be one in us" (John xvii. 21). Origen here introduces a subtle distinction 
between "likeness" and identity", ad though "likeness" implies a measure 
of difference, whereas in the consummation of all things God's nature 
(121) 
will be perfectly expressed in all things and creatures. Elsewhere, 
Origen says that the perfection of human beings is attained when God 
is "all things" in each individual (with ref. to I Cor. xv. 28). This 
means that the mind is purified from its vices and its powers of per- 
ception are unhindered by the clouds interposed by wickedness, with 
the result that all itfeels or understands or thinks will be God, 
(122) 
and God will supply the regulation of its every movement. 
It is also worth remarking that Origen stresses that since God's 
creatures are not co-eternal with Himself, they do not possess His 
(123) 
attribute of changelessness. But surely, if they were created perfect 
in the beginning, as Origen suggests in certain places, that would 
imply that they received the gift of changelessness: But Origen is 
compelled by the facts to deny this, because of the obvious imperfection 
of the world. He seems to be obsessed with the idea of evil as the 
result of deliberate choice, often stimulated by evil suggestion from 
outside,. rather than as something resulting from an immature stage 
of spiritual development. Origen indeed says in one passage that 
"one who is always in the good and to whom God is all things will 
(124) 
no longer desire to eat of the tree of the knowledge of Good and evil. " 
He is referring to the perfected state of human beings: but according 
to him, their perfected state is a restoration of their original state. 
(125) 
So we are still left with the problem: how did evil originate? 
But whatever the defects of his explanation of evil, no one 
would surely wish to take issue with Origen's contention - already (126) 
referred to and discussed - that Jesus Christ is to be thought of 
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as the Agent by Whom human beings are enabled to gain the Vision of 
God Himself. Origen here shows himself more ready to adopt the evol- 
utionary account of moral progress. In his own words, "he who sees 
the Wisdom which God brought into being for the fashioning of His 
works, ascends from the knowledge of Wisdom. to the Father of Wisdolp. 
It is impossible to conceive thd God of Wisdom w, ithout the introduct- 
(127) 
ion which (incarnate) Wisdom affords. It is the same with Truth. -.... " 
Origen then compares the process of becoming acquainted with the Father 
through the Son to the steps of the Temple which lead to the holiest 
place. The first step is His human nature, and then we travel through 
(128) 
the other aspects of His Nature, the angelic and-the rest. From another 
point of view, we first encounter Him as the Way, and then as the 
Door, and again first accept Him as Shepherd in the manner of irrational 
creaturesso as eventually to enjoy the benefits of His Kingship. 
Again, we first obtain the benefit of the deliverance from sin which 
He bestows as the Lamb of God, and then we eat of the true nourishment 
(129) 
which-His Flesh provides. But all this is simply designed to enable 
(130) 
us to advance towards. our final goal of coming to know the Father. 
(131) 
A propos of this passage, Koch begins by pointing out-that though 
Origen is a mystic, his mysticism, is of a purely intellectual Character, 
and consists in the knowledge of God, not in an ecstatic union with 
Him. He then goes on to. say that Origen's understanding of the Divine 
Word. js more closely connected with the philosophic conception of 
the Logos' than with the historic Jesus Christ. None the less, says 
Koch, there is something additional, which consists not in the consider- 
ation of the Gospel story of His life, or even His sufferings and 
death, but rather in the fact that for Origen, the Divine Word is 
a personal Being, with whom one can enter into personal relationships. 
But this fact is rendered rather less significant when one considers 
that the ultimate goal for Origen is not a union of the will with 
that of God, but rather a mere knowledge of Him. This is true even 
if, as Koch says, Origen felt more at home with simple-minded Christians 
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(132) 
than with philosophers like Alýinus and Numenius. 
It is the view of Origen that eventually all rational creatures 
(133) 
will be persuaded by the Son of God to accept the Father's rule. 
This is his interpretation of St. John's statement (xiii. 3) -that Jesus 
knew that the Father had given all things into His hands. This statement 
was anticipated by the psalmist in the words "Thc Lord said unto my 
Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, until I makc thine enemies the foot- 
stool of thy feet. " The enemies of Jesus were cimply numbered among 
the things which Jesus knew that the Father had given into His hands, 
. (134) 
even though they did not yet appear to be subject to Him. Origen 
then quotes thfý words "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall 
all be made alive" (I Cor *xv. 22) as showing that what St. John meant 
was that all creatures would receive a share in Christ's risen life, 
though not all at the same time. The end will come when Christ, having 
put down all rule and authority (i. e. the things which are objects 
of contention) shall deliver His Kingdom to God the Father. 
The Lord in fact realised before His Passion that the persuading 
of Judas by the devil to betray Him'was only a means whereby the purpose 
of the Father might be fulfilled. Even though the Father had given 
all. things into the Son's hands, it rested with- the Son to subdue 
all things by His outstanding deeds, in accordance with His own words 
"Just as my Father has been at work till now, eve n so I mustwork. " 
We thus see once more that Jesus came forth from God for the sake 
of those who had rebelled against God, even though He did not really 
(135) 
wish to leave the Father's presence, so that the creatures who had 
rebelled might come into the hands of Jesus in due order, and finally 
(136) 
be brought back to God through following Jesus. 
There is of course a sense in which everything is already under 
the control of the Son of God, in so far as He brought all things 
into being and still exercises His providential care of them. And 
so although as St. John says in two places, the Father entrusts every- 
(137) 
thing to the Son, this must be understood in the sense of entrusting 
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to Him the work of salvation, seeing that what He has made has gone 
astray from His protecting care. There never has bedn a time when 
the Son of God has not been concerned about the things which He has 
made; but special action was needed to make them aware of this concern 
and to persuade them to accept the enlightenment and healing which 
He provides. The believer is thus entrusted to the Son for his own 
(138) 
benefit, and not for that of the Son. This statement is amplified 
(139) 
elsewhere, in a passage where it is said that Christ's rule over all 
creatures is exercised partly-in so far as He is Creator of all things 
and has power over all things, and thus rules over evil beings as 
well as good ones, and partly in so far as He persuades. them to accept 
His rule of their own free will. To'quote-Origen's own words, "He 
persuades them by instruction rather than by command, by invitation 
rather than by torture. " The supreme example of such persuasion was 
His death on the Cross, because in that way above all He bequeathed 
(140) 
the example of obedience to those who are prepared to die to sin. 
Two observations may be made here. First, Origen seems to imply 
that if the Word *of God so desired, He could exact. obedience instbad 
(141) 
of requesting it. So much Ls implidd in another passýage, where he 
says that Christians are persecuted when God permits them to be, and 
enjoy freedom from disturbance when God does not allow it, because 
the world only has power ( lcrKo6i- ) in so far as this is allowed by 
Him Who has received from the Father power to conquer the. world. 
(This of course is a reference to John xvi. 33 "I have overcome the 
world"; but Origen seems to invest these words with his own meaning, 
because our Lord's meaning surely was "I have not allowed myself to 
be affected by the attitude of the world. ") 
The second observation is that Origen states elsewhere that 
the Son of God does in fact employ chastisement as well as admonition 
for the improvement of human beings. We have seen this outlook fully 
(142) 
set forth in an earlier chapter, and we shall also allude to it later 
(143) 
in this chapter. Presumably Origen would say that as Man, Christ 
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only exercises persuasion, whereas in so far as He is the Word of 
God and is'therefore in ultimate control of all things, He exercises 
compulsion in the way in which the owner of a dog lets the animal 
move freely within the area to which the lead extends, but makes 
the animal sharply aware of his control if the animal tugs at the 
lead. 
(144) 
There is a rather curious passage in Contra Cels. in which it 
is first stated that the Word of God is in one sense not in control of 
creatures who are unwilling to obey Him, but in another sense He is, just 
as we say that human beings can obtain control of irrational creatures 
not by subduing the principal part of their nature ( -To 11"y6p-oVt 11-W 
but in the way that a tamer gains control of lions and other wild beasts. 
The Word of God, however, takes all possible steps to exercise control 
through persuasion over those at present disobedient. Onewould have 
thought that the simile of "taming" was more appropriate to the influence 
exerteo by the Divine Word upon those who are spiritually immature, 
inasmuch as they do what is right without fully understanding the reason 
for it. The simile of a dog on a lead seems more appropriate in the 
other case, as would that of a cage in which wild animals are confined, 
because Origen is surely wanting to suggest, not that those who are 
rebellious are won over to doing what is required of them by methods other 
than rational argument, but rather that they are prevented from doing 
what God does not want them to do. The simile of "taming" would, as has 
been said, be appropriate to the influence which persuades the spiritually 
immature to do what is right without fully understanding the reason (145) (146) 
for doing it. (Indeed, Origen states in one place that it must have 
been by the aid of supernatural power that Christ hag converted so many 
people, not only among the wise, but also among the more irrational, 
so that they are no longer so liable to let their feelings run away with 
them. ) 
The tension between the control which Christ exercises over 
human beings in the one sense and that which He exercises in another 
(147) 
sense is well brought out in the passage where it is said that the 
reign of Christ over creation is not complete. True, He reigns in 
the sense that the reign of sin is gradually being diminished, even 
though it had previously extended over all mankind; and so it is true 
that as St. Paul says, "He must reign until He has subjected all His 
enemies" (I Cor. xv. 25). But when this statement is set alongside 
the reminder that "We do not as yet see all things in subjection to 
Him" (Heb. ii. 8), the statement "He must reign" is seen to mean "He 
must extend His kingdom. " 
Origen is now faced with the curious text of St. Paul in which 
it is said that when all things have been subjected to the Son, the 
Son will be subjected to the Father (1 Cor. xv. 28) - as though He were 
not already subjected to the Father! The solution to the problem, 
says Origen, lies in thinking of Christ as operating amongst His follow- 
ers so as to transform them into His own likeness. In so far as He 
is at work in this way and persuades them to submit themselves to the 
Father, to that extent He Himself is subjected to the Father, because 
(148) 
He indwells His followers. As Origen himself expresses it, "Since 
Christ is the Head of the Body of which all human beings are members, 
it is true that He is not yet subjected to God, if His members are 
(149) 
not so subjected. " As so often, Origen presses into the service of 
His own outlook a phrase of Scripture which he interprets in his own 
way. He refers to I Cor. xii. 27, which is usually translated "You are 
V 11 
the body of Christ, and individually CK ) members of it. ": 
but he understands it to mean "You are only partially members of the 
body", in so far as your wills are not yet in full harmony with Christ. 
Hence he feels able to say that when Christ has led 'Che entire creation 
to the height of perfection and so coýpleted His work, He himself will 
be said to be subject to the Father in so far as He is in those whom 
(150) 
He has subjected. 
It is on similar lines that Origen interprets the passage where 
it is stated that the Son does not know the day and hour of the final 
judgement (Matt. xxiv. 36). This statement at first sight appears inconsist- 
ent with the omniscience of the Divine Word; but once again Origen 
applies to Christ what strictly speaking is only applicable to His 
followers, in so far as when the Church, His Body, experiences that 
day and hour, He Himself will experience it, and not before, (Origen 
defends this interpretation of the word "know" by reference to the 
text in which Christ is said to have "known no sin" (II Cor. v. 21). ) 
(152) 
As has already been stated in an earlier chapter, Christ's method 
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of subjecting human beings to Himself differs according to the state 
of those beings. SDmetimes harsh methods are needed, and sometimes 
mere instruction will suffice. He is very fond of adducing Ps. xxiii. 4 
(153) 
"Thy rod and Thy staff comfort me" in support of this contention. 
The rod and the staff, says Origen, alike refer to beatings and punish- 
ments. The sheep who sins is chastised with a rod; the man who sins 
is chastised with a staff. The distinction seems to be between immature 
(154) 
and mature Christians. On the other hand, the person who is punished 
is consoled, because he knows that God scourges every son whom He receives. 
(155) 
The same idea is expressed elsewhere by saying that when God punishes, 
He is not an enemy of those whom He punishes; rather, He-desires to 
help. those who undergo the. punishment, or failing that, those who witness 
it, i. e. by discouraging them from sinning in the same way. Indeed 
(156) 
Origen says, with reference to the passage "Rule in the midst of your 
enemies", that Christ shows Himself to be the Image of God's goodness 
by bringing help to His enemies and so ruling them. An even more striking 
(157) 
expression of the same idea is the statement that the Saviour, because 
He is friendly towards mankind, brings to Himself by compulsion those 
who are no longer free to make their own decisions ('i. e. those who 
(158) 
are sunk in sin and so spiritually dead). As elsewhere, Origen says 
that the destruction of Christ's enemies is equivalent to their being 
turned into friends, becuase the power of sin within them is destroyed. 
(159) 
To be subjected to Christ is in fact to "have the mind" of Christ. 
In another passage, when reference is made to the text "He must reign 
(160) 
till He has put all His enemies under His feet", Origen says that Christ's 
kingly rule ( 
Pol-d-t is the contemplation of all the 
ages (--tiwVL-J1J ) that have occurred and will occur, and that through 
this contemplation even His enemies become His friends. In other words, 
Christ's enemies are converted from the assumption that other people 
exist to supply their wants to the recognition that they themselves 
are intended to promote the agelong purpose of God; in short, they 
see things sub specie aeternitatis. 
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To the question whether ultimately all creatures will submit 
to Christ of their own free will, or whether some will continue to 
be so stubborn as to require forcible subjection, Origen does not give 
the same answer in all the passages which deal with the question. Thus 
(161) 
in Contra Cels. he says that when each person by the exercise of his 
own freedom has chosen what is in accordance with the will of the Divine 
Word, and has adhered to that choise, the Divine Word will then have 
obtained control over rational creatures, because he will have changed 
them into His own perfection-(cT-E C-1cT J'P-1- Likewise, in a curious 
(162) 
interpretation of the passage "All power is given to Me in heaven and 
on earth", Origen suggests that at the end of the world all those on 
(163) 
earth (i. e. all those in a state of sin) will submit to the persuasive 
power of the Son of God in accordance with the example of those who 
have already attained perfection by submitting to that power, and will 
thus attain a happy end. The subjection of the enemies of the Son 
of God is thus something which so far from being harmful tothem, is 
beneficial to them, because it results in the restoration and salvation 
(164) 
of those who are subjected. In Hom. in Jos. Origen says that the Cru- 
cifixion was the episode when the power of the devil began to'be brought 
to an end as the result of the availability of the spiritual life bestowed 
(165) 
through the Crucified Christ. It remains, however, for human beings 
to accept that gift of life, and so contribute to bringing to an end 
the devills. reign. The devil himself, in spite of the harm he has 
(166) 
wreaked, will eventually accept the rule of God. 
(167) 
On the other hand, there is also a passage in Hom. in Jos. which 
appears to suggest that the time available for voluntary submission 
is limited, and that eventually those who still remain obstinate will 
be subjected by force. Origen interprets with reference to Christ 
the two statements made about the occupation of the land of Canaan 
by Joshua, the first being that "the land ceased from warfare as the, 
result of Joshua's taking possession of the whole land" (Josh. xi. 23), 
and the second being that "much of the land remained to be possessed" 
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(xiii. 1). Origen says that our Lord at Hisfirst coming sowed the Word 
of the Gospel throughout the earth and so put to flight the hostile 
powers which had held sway. over human minds; but in so far as there 
is still much which remains unsubdued, and He has thus not yet entered 
into possession of His entire inheritance, He needs to come again to 
subject by force those who still defy Him. But these latter. will lack 
the blessing bestowed on those who voluntarily joined the Son of God 
(168) 
in attacking evil powers. The same idea is expressed in a passage 
where reference is made to those who despise the Word of God when they 
hear it, and are hence forcibly converted through punishments and 
chastisements. 
11 It seems clear that Origen did not really know his own mind on 
the subject of whether all rational creatures will eventually submit 
voluntarily to the control of the Word of God. There is a passage 
(169) 
in De Princ. where this uncertainty seems to appear, in so far as Origen 
there says that there are two ways in which God exercises sway over 
all things through the wisdom which is Christ, one in so far as they 
cannot escape His ultimate control, the other in so far as they serve 
Him of their own free will. A little later, with reference to Philipp. ii. 
(170) 
10, Origen says that if every knee bows to Jesus, it follows that it 
is through Him that all things are subjected to the Father in so far 
as their subjection is brought about by wisdom and reason, and not by 
force and necessity. Perhaps 'the view at which Origen eventually arrived 
(171) 
is the one stated in the passage where it is said that the world will 
not become subject to God through the compulsion of necessity, but 
rather by an appeal to the creature's own sense of what is right, though 
this does not exclude such warnings as are necessary for those who 
neglect their own spiritual welfare. In fact Origen seems to regard 
compulsion as an intermediate stage in obtaining the genqýae submission 
of human beings; it is exerted in the expectation that it will soon 
be unnecessary. 
Origen lays stress on the fact that those who are subjected to 
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Christ of their own freewill have themselves won the victory over sin. 
(172) 
Thus he says that Christ ascribes the victory to those who are conquered 
by Him, because in so far as a person is conquered by Christ, he has 
conquered the sin which formerly adhered to him, and has blotted it 
out. For Christ as the Word of God conquers no one unwillingly; he 
only conquers by persuasion. In the same way, Origen says in Hom. 
(173) 
in Num. that although Jesus Christ is rightly called "King of kings" 
in so far as He exercises supreme oversight of the various communities 
of Christians, none the less Christians themselves can also be called 
"kings"in so far as through belief in Christ they have overcome the 
dominion of sin in themselves and have established the kingdom of right- 
(174) 
eousness. In one, passage, however, the ultimate fruits of the victory 
of Christians are postponed till the future age, in so far as Origen 
says that it is after the present world has come to an end that those 
I 
who have won the victory under Christ's leadership will receive the 
(175) 
kingdom prepared for those who have kept God's commandments. 
Origen indeed recognises that the victory over sin obtained by 
those who accept the Lordship of Christ is not accomplished all at 
once, but gradually. He says in fact that the Church'on earth, while 
it is yet in the early stages of the worship of God and the knowledge 
of Christ, may be regarded as the footstool of Christ's feet (cf. Matt. 
xxii. 44), just as the sinful woman who came into the Pharisee's house 
remained at Jesus' feet at the beginning of her repentance because 
she could not yet pour the oil of her good actions on His head (luke 
(176) 
vii. 38). In the same way, each of us must first become the footstool 
of Christ's feet when we have ceased to be the enemy of Christ, that 
is, the enemy of righteousness, truth, wisdom, and peace. On the other 
hand, even if we are rele. gated to that position, that is not done for 
our destruction but for our salvation, as St. Paul makes clear in I. 
(177) 
Cor. xv. 20-28. 
On the other hand there is no suggestion that we should remain 
in that position. In fact the Son of God desires to impart to others 
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Hi: _ own 
Sonship, and thus to bring about their direct fellowship with 
the Father. This Origen considers to be the real implication of the 
text in I Cor. xv (verse 28) in which it is said that the Son will even- 
tually hand over His Kingdom to the Father. Thus he declares in Comm. 
in Cant. that the different ways in which Solomon is described in the 
opening words of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Canticles respectively 
remind us that, first, Jesus Christ acquaints us with the commandments 
of God without as yet enrolling us in the company of His mature disciples; 
then after making further progress we are admitted into fellowship 
with the members of the heavely Jerusalem, i. e. with those who have 
abjured the things of this world; and finally, after all rational creat- 
ures_have been reconciled by Christ to God, Chirst ceases to bear rule 
as King Himself, and hands over kingly authority-to the Father, and 
is thenceforth simply called "the peace-making One" (which is after 
(178) 
all the meaning of the name "Solomon"). Later on in the same treatise-, 
however, Origen shows that he is thinking more of individual rational 
beings than of rational beings collectively, because he says that the 
reason why at the beginning of Canticles the writer calls himself Solomon 
only is that in that book of the Bible the servant has been made as 
(179) 
his Lord, the disciple as His Master, and the subject as His King. 
Likewise in De Princ. Origen suggests that there are three stages in 
the way in which those destined for blessedness are supervised. First 
they come under the care of inferior governors (i. e. human or angelic 
overseers); then they are taken over by Christ Himself so as to be 
instructed by Him in His capacity of Wisdom; and finally, when they 
have been made capable of receiving God Himself, they are handed over 
(180) 
to the direct rule of the Father. 
On the other hand this statement must not be taken as implying 
that Christ ceases to have any relationship to those who are so handed 
(181) 
over. Franco points out that the apparent contradiction between the 
(182) 
passages referred to above and the passage in Comm. in Cant. where 
Christ is described as occupying the perfected soul as King is resolved 
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by saying that "when the soul has arrived at perfection, Christ is 
not called 'King' in so far as that word implies struggle and conquest, 
but in so far as it implies overlordship, and possession.... We can 
say that He ceases to be King in so far as being King is opposed to 
being Bridegroom , which amounts to saying, in so far as conquest 
is 
(183) 
opposed to possession. " Later on he says that "if in the sphere of 
personal religion the reign of Christ is a transitory and supersessible 
phase, that is not in the sense that Christ ceases to influence the 
soul, but rather in the sense that His influence, which up to now has 
been external, is now so intimate that the soul forms 'one spirit' 
with Him. " Curiously enough, Franco seems to think that this is true 
(184) 
of the human soul of the Son of God Himself. In discussing the passage 
(185) 
in Comm. in Joh. in which the relation between the Divine and the human 
nature of Christ is discussed, he points out that Origen says that 
the anointing of the human soul of the Divine Word as Christ was calýried 
out because that soul loved righteousness and hated iniquity; in other 
words it was not received from the beginning of that soul's existence, 
but wa-, s, if it may be so expressed, a reward, for effort made. On the 
other hand, the Kingship of the Word of God is eternil; otherwise He 
would not be what He is, i. e. changeless. But in that case, when the 
(186) 
condition which prevailed before the fall of created spirits is restored, 
the Word of God will be King in the same sense as He was in the beginning, 
and will only cease to be King in so far as Kingship implies war and 
conquest rather than peaceful possession. It is also worth quoting 
(187) 
Franco's statement elsewhere that "the Word does not cease to influence 
souls when they attain to the highest stage of union with God and to 
the vision of the Father.... but it is precisely then that we can enquire 
whether this union is not of the same intensity as that of the soul 
of Christ with the Word of God. " Aeby puts the matter very well when 
(188) 
he says that "the Word is the plenipotentiary Agent of the Father, 
and as such has the task of conducting all rational beings to the vision 
of God. He does so by becoming incarnate, by coming to dwell in them, 
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by leading them to the contemplation of Himself, by transforming them 
into Himself and imparting to them His own Sonship so fully that finally 
those beings can, like Him, contemplate the Father face to face. " 
So far, Origen has considered the introduction of souls to the 
Father which Christ carries out from the point of view of mystical 
contemplation; but there are at least two passages in which he thinks 
(189) 
of it in terms of a transformed way of living. In one of these passages 
Origen points out that in Rom. xiv. 10 St. Paul speaks of all human 
beings as standing at God's judgement seat, whereas in II Cor. v. 10 
the judgement seat is that of Christ. The reason for the difference 
of language is that Christ as the Word of God has the function of recon- 
ciling the world to God through His Incarnation; but this reconciliation 
takes time because human beings are reluctant to accept the help which 
He offers, and so until He has finally subdued all His enemies He reigns 
as one who reveals those who are good and rewards the blameworthy accord- 
ing to their deeds; in other words, He is gradually conquering those 
opposed to Him. But when all human beings have been converted and 
reformed, He will deliver His Kingdom to God the Father in so far as 
He will have reconciled all human beings to God. Oýce again, the surrender 
of the kingdom to the Father does not mark the end of the work of Christ, 
but rather the completion of it, in so far as He completely indwells 
those whom He has converted. Origen expresses the matter in another 
(190) 
way when he says With reference to. the individual that when a person 
is set free from sin, that is, when he becomes aware of his need of 
delivereance, he is first bound to become a servant of all the virtues 
so that he may make progress towards becoming a servant of God, even 
though in a sense he is serving God all the time. It is only later 
that he can become a servant of God in the full sense, that is, when 
he is perfected in virtue; it is then that Christ is said to deliver 
the kingdom to the Father, because only then is God "all in all" in 
the individual. We may compare the contrast which Origen makes elsewhere 
(191) 
between those who are merely converted and those who wait on God. 
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(192) 
In another passage Origen says that even though in one sense the 
Word of God and His servant cannot both be in the same place, in another 
sense they can be, because in so far as the servant is honoured-by 
the Father the servant comes to be where the Word Himself is. The 
meaning seems to be that in so far as a human being endeavours to 
enter into fuller union with Christ, to that extent he receives honour 
from the Father, and the greater the extent of that union, the more 
fully is that person elevated to the level of Christ Himself and the 
more closely does the honour which he receives approximate to that 
(193) 
accorded to the Son of God. Elsewhere, with reference to John xii. 26, 
Origen says*that when Christ promises that His servant shall be where 
He is, this must be understood primarily-ýin a spiritual fashion; but 
it can also be understood corporeally and spatially, in so far as 
those outstanding in virtue will eventually be installed at the resurrect- 
ion in the purest and most illuminated places, seeing that these places 
are most fitted for the contemplation of the Word of God. Origen 
seems here to recognise that thedestiny of human beings is not that 
of disembodied spirits, but that of beings who will be able to enact 
through their bodies the vision which they have beeh able to perceive 
through spiritual purification. In the same way he says that Jesus 
as the Wisdom of God provides those who are truly wise with their 
heavenly dwelling-places, just as it was Joshua, and not Moses, who 
(194) 
provided the Levites with their dwellings, and that the members of 
the true Israel will share the glory of Christ, in so far as He is 
(195) 
universal Ruler, at the time when they rise again with glorious bodies. 
(Onthe other hand, Origen suggests that the Christian whose merit 
is greater will receive from Christ a greater reward in the future 
(196) 
heavenly kingdom. ) 
We may sum up the whole discussion of the effect of Christ's 
redeeming work by referring to Origen's comment on the passage in 
(197) 
the Book of Numbers where it is foretold that the people shall rise 
(198) 
up like a lion's cub, and rejoice like a lion. Origen says that the 
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mature Christian has dominion over all things, just as a lion has 
dominion over all other animals, and therefore Christ, the Lion of 
the tribe of Judah, also grants the name of lion to all who believe 
in Him. The mature believer is-no longer a servant of Christ, but 
a partner and fellow-worker, and thus has no need of the outward mediation 
(199) 
of the Son of God, because he experiences His inward presence. There 
4200) 
is a passage in which Origen states that whereas it is not possible 
for human beings to change their relationship to each other in the 
sense that a child becomes a brother, the person who was originally 
a child of Jesus can become His brother. He instances 
the command of Jesus to Mary Magdalene to tell His "brothers" about 
(201) 
His forthcoming ascension. Indeed, there is a lower stage than that 
%Q& 
; for the disciples of being a -r, &K%roV , i. e. that of being a 
JOU 
were spoken of as oJX-(in the Upper Room before they were addressed 
(202) 
as children. And so there are four stages through which the Christian 
believer passes, thaf of being a "slave", that of being a "disciple", 
that of being a "child", and that of being a brother of Christ and 
(203) 
a Son of God. Elsewhere, Origen says that the person who has reached 
the stage of being a. Ildisciple" is in good health, presumably because 
he has overcome obvious sins, and -therefore needs Jesus not as Physician, 
but in connexion with His other powers, i. e. presumably as Enlightener. 
We must now discuss the question whether in Origen's view that 
Christian in the final stage of His discipleship can obtain a direct- 
and unmediated vision of God the Father. Is this what is meant, in 
Origen's view, by the surrender of the Kingdom by the Son to the Father 
(204) 
(I Cor. xv. 24)? In one passage it is stated that the fact that the 
Son sees the things of the Father directly is shown by the words "I 
speak what I have seen in the Father L (John 
viii. 38). Origen wonders whether the angels themselves (who in his 
view are simply human beings raised to a higher level) will one day 
see what is in the Father without any mediation. There is in fact 
a distinction between seeing the Father in the Son, as is done by 
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a person who sees the Son and thus sees the Father Who sent Him, 
and seeing the Father and the things in the Father in the same way 
as the Son, does and thus seeing the Father directly k 
(205) 
, T-O, j -ITAre Os In the latter case the person no longer obtains 
from the Image 6: % K, --S-V ) an understanding of the things in Him 
Whose C-t KE-J%1 the Son is. It is thus that God becomes all in all 
as the result of the surrender to the Father by the Son of the kingdom 
(206) 
He has gained. In another passage the same opinion is summarised 
in the statement that after the final consummation the one task of 
those who have attained to God by way of His Word will be to obtain 
an ever-increasing comprehension of God, so that they may through 
their-knowledge of the Father be transformed into a single Son, inasmuch 
as they will know the Father as fully as the Son now does. 
There has been much discussion of the meaning of the two passages 
just referred to by those who have commented on Origen's writings. 
(207) 
Crouzel considers, in my opinion rightly, that the Son is never rendered 
supEýrfluous. He says that "if the vision of. the Father is not now 
obtained by means of the Son, it is a vision, similar to that of the 
Son; the soul is assimilated to the Son, and sees thd Father in the 
same manner as He does. The Son is not a stage which one surmo'unts; 
the Son is He Who imparts continually to His brothers His unique 
(208) 
attribute of being the Son of God. " Elsewhere Crouzel says, with 
reference to the same two passages, that "the mediation of the Son 
will be changed; from a connexion which is in some sense external, 
it will become a very intimate union. Human beings will not become 
'one Son', except in so far as they are included in the unique Son 
of God. " 
Crouzel is in fact saying that although the Son will never 
cease to be the Agent whereby human beings are enabled to obtain 
the vision of the Father, the Son's agency will in the end be continuous 
instead of intermittent, and so human beings will scarcely be conscious 
of it. At earlier stages of their development, their glimpses of 
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God will be fitful and transient and they will be keenly aware 
that they only obtain these glimpses as a result of their acquaintance 
with Jesus Christ; but later on the influence of Christ will be less 
intermittent, and the vision of God thus granted to human beings 
will be more continuous and less interrupted. 
(209) 
Mme. Harl concludes from the first passage that there is a 
knowledge of God which is superior to the knowledge obtained through 
the Son, and describes this as a weakness in Origen's theology. 
(210) 
Crouzel's observations are worth bearing in mind in this connexion. 
(211) 
Dupuis takes the same view as Crouzel when he says that when a person 
is described as , I-u-roTxrYjT 'r6u it means that it is in the Word 
rf-ýLT-f as 
rather than by means of the Word that that person sees the Father. 
(212) 
Dupuis refers to Nemeshegyils work on Origen, where it is said that 
"the Christian, being united to the Son, must not stop short at the 
Divinity of the Son, which, in spite of its equality with that of 
the Father, is merely derived from it; he must, by means of (aý travers) 
this open door which is the Saviour, project himself in love towards 
the Father Himself. " It is noteworthy that Nemeshegyi uses the phrase 
"a travers" to indicate the manner in which the believer ultimately 
views the Father by the Son's agency, whereas Dupuis rejects that 
phrase in favour of I'dans"; but Nemeshegyi shows that he agrees with 
(213) 
Dupuis and Crouzel when he says that "the superseding (deýpassement) 
of the mediation of the Son does not in any way mean that the. Only- 
begotten Son ever becomes superfluous in the life of grace. " Lieske 
(214) 
takes the same view when he says that "because the Word is the Head 
of all mankind and the Fullness of those who in Him attain salvation, 
He is also the Agent by Whom all are brought together into union 
(215) 
with the Father. " 
(216) 
Volker also takes the same view when he says that "mystical 
union with Christ, though a stage of transition to mystical union 
with God, has a value which is not superseded, but endures.... As 
the Crucified Christ in some way plays a part in mystical union with 
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the Divine Word, even so on the highest level of mystical union with 
(217) 
God, the Word does not quite disappear. " 
(218) 
Schendel concludes the section in which he discusses this matter 
by saying that "the return (i. e. of created spirits) to their original 
unity.... to the direct, restored vision of God, provided Origen with 
a foundation for his doctrine of the end of the sovereignty of the 
(219) 
Son of God. " And yet he also quotes M. Eck, art as say ing that "even 
in the surrender of the Kingdom by Christ and His subjection to the 
Father, He remains Head of the Mystical Body which includes all created 
spirits. The final goal of union with the Father does not involve 
a breach of the relation of the redeemed to their Redeemer, but only 
an increased inwardness, ennobling, and exaltation of that relationship. 
In this sense the cessation of Christ's kingship is the supersession 
of the relationship of Lord and slave by a relationship of friends 
(230) 
and brothers. " 
(221) 
Refoule quotes the passage from Origen referred to in note 
202, but does not indicate whether in his opinion the mediation of 
the Son is still necessary in the direct vision of God. He does 
(222) 
however raise the important question of whether union-with God is 
substantial in the case of Christ and accidental in the case of human 
souls. He considers, as against Lieske, that the logic of Origen's 
system compelled him to assimilate the final condition of all souls 
to that of Christ. But it remains true that Origen conceives of 
the possibility of a perpetual falling and rising again in the case 
(223) 
of other souls, and one is compelled to ask why in logic he should 
not have regarded this as equally possible in the case of the soul 
of Christ. In this instance, as in others, he seems to have wanted 
(224) 
to try to have it both ways. 
It is of course a cardinal feature of Origen's system that 
the direct vision of God can only be obtained when out of the body. 
He appears to suppos. e that bodily entanglement is somehow an obstruction 
in the way of that vision. In his own words, "a person placed in 
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the body cannot completely acquire the adoption of sons. " He seems 
to suggest that the practice of the virtues is only preliminary to 
a state in which the struggle between d uty and desire will be a thing 
of the past, in so far as those in that state will be free from bodily 
trammels. In a curious interpretation of St. Paul's description 
of himself as "a servant of Christ" in Romans i. 1, Origen says that 
St. Paul is thinking of himself as in a state of slavery as contrasted 
(225) 
with the liberty which he and his fellow-saints will eventually enjoy. 
The question now arises-how far Origen's conception of the 
Christian goal is in line with the authentic Christian tradition. 
(226) 
C. Vagaggini seems to answer far too readily in the affirmative. 
He says that the question which concerned the Alexandrian Fathers 
was that of "salvation by a kind of assimilation to the Di, ýine Nature. 
It is Gnosis (knowledge) which imparts this saving assimilation. 
This Gnosis includes as an essential element a knowledge of the philosophic 
type of which the objects are God, man, and other things; but this 
philosophic knowledge is here essentially at the service of a much 
wider process, which aims at a contemplative. and joyful intuition 
bringing into play not only the speculative intellect, but all the 
(227) 
vital forces of man. " Granted, Origen considers self-discipline 
and the cultivation of the good life as an essential preparation 
for this state: but to say that the final vision of God engages "all 
the vital forces of m. an" is to ignore Origen's dualism, according 
(228) 
to which man tends to be thought of as "a ghost in a machine. " 
(229) (230) 
Later on Vagaggini, after quoting a passage in Comm. in Joh. 
which states that "to know God in the final and perfect sense of 
that phrase should be understood as a mingling and union", says that 
"faith for Origen is not a mere conceptual acceptance of a body of 
doctrine, but implies the beginning of union with God, of sharing 
in the union between God and man which came into being in the Incarnation 
of the Son of God, a union which develops into perfect knowledge. 
From the fact that in Christ the Divine Word assumed a true human 
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soul and body, Christ's disciples 'saw that in Him the Divine nature 
and human nature began to be united, so that human nature might become 
divine as the result of union with the more divine element, not only 
in Jesus, but in all those who together embrace the life which Jesus 
taught and which leads all those who live in accordance with the 
(231) 
precepts of Jesus to friendship with God and union with Him,. " Yes: 
but the nature of that union is left ambiguous. Does it involve 
the whole of human nature and so express itself in -action, or is it 
purely intellectual? 
(232) 
Still later, Vagaggini says that Porphyry and others "did not 
consider the entirety of Origen's synthesis nor his method, in which. 
the philosophic activity in connexion with the Gospel message does 
not determine that message but is determined by it, and is directed 
to the contemplative and joyful vision of the Word and of God. Although 
in Origen the philosophic, speculative, conceptual element is vastly 
more emphasised than in any other Father of the Church and though 
in him this element is derived from his Neo-Platonic environment, 
none the less Origen cannot in any way be considered as a. Greek philosopher 
who lives in a Christian fashion. The synthesis of Grigen is theological..... 
but not in the Aristotelian sense nor in that of Thomas Aquinas, 
nor in the post-Tridentine sen se; it is rather a theology which beings 
with faith and culminates in joyful contemplation, and in which the 
aspect of conceptual enquiry on the basis of philosophic coneepts 
is considered only as an element in a vaster process. The intention 
is to arrive not only at intellectual vision, but also, as far as 
is possible in this life, at the salvation and blessedness of the 
whole concrete man. " 
I do not really think that a careful study of Origen really 
supports this suggestion: he was too much of an intellectualist to 
think along these lines. Man for him is not a spirit which exists 
to direct the body associated with it, but a spirit encased in a 
body and eventually destined to escape from it. 
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Von Balthasar expresses the essential outlook of Origen much 
(233) 
more accurately when he says that "Origen's passionate intellectualism 
did not allow him to think of the unity (i. e. the final unity between 
God and created things) otherwise than as a light, vast but empty.... 
He displays a tendency to try to go beyond the Word of God Himself 
in order to gaze on the depths of the Father, to desire knowledge 
rather than life, to exaggerate the importance of the symbol of the 
(234) 
Word and to underestimate the importance of that of love. " If, for 
Origen, the Word of God never became fully human, that was because 
he never really thought of the totality of human nature as capable 
of being redeemed. And this, I submit, is partly due to his own 
rash Pct in his later 'teens when he deprived himself of his virile 
powers and so created a dichotomy between his intellectual and his 
physical nature. 
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which conform to the Divine Word. " Cf. also Fitzgerald's comments 
on Comm. in Joh. I. 20 in op. cit., pp. 151-154. 
73. This matter has already been discussed on P. 240. 
74. Sel. in Ps. xxii. 5 (PG. XII. 1264A). 
75. Ibid. (PG. XII. 1264C). 
76. Ibid. (PG XII. 1261D). Cf. Pitra, A. S. II. 480 (Frag. in Ps. *xxii. 5).. 
Cf. Crouzel's discussion of the transition which according 
to Origen needs to be made from being the crTC', 'Gftýý of God 
in the sense of being potentially rational to being the -rC-K%fo-, / 
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of God in the sense of having developed the germs of reason 
innate in oneself (L'Image .... pp. 219-221 & 237). 
Cf. Sel. in Ps. IV. 3 (PG XII. 1140C), where, with reference 
to I. Cor. xv. 47, Origen says that he who is on a lower spiritual 
level can be a son of man on the level of the earthly man, 
but that he who is converted can become d son of man on the 
level of the heavenly man. 
Cf. also Matt. Comm. Series 93 (GCS 11.211.20-24), where 
he points out that to come to Jesus is to escape temptation, 
and that those who come to Jesus are drawn to Him by the Father, 
so that they may be raised to life by Him (ut resuscitetur ab eo). 
Cf. Lomiento, op. cit., p. 42, where he says that according 
to Origen, "the disciples of Christ strive to gather together 
the 'breath' of Divine sonship in everyone whom they meet, 
so that it may not become extinct as the result of being suffocated 
by the material element, but expand itself into all their being. " 
77. Cf. Pitra A. S. III. 545 (in Ezek. XIV. 4); Frag. in Luc. 155 (GCS 
9.288); Frag. in Jer. 25 (GCS 3.210.15-19); De Princ. IV. 3.12 
(GCS 5.342.6-10). 
78. Comm. in Joh. I. 20 (GCS 4.25.8-11). 
79. There is no need to deduce, with Hirschberg, from such passages 
as this one that there is a class of believers who cannot advance 
in insight, and must remain on the level of simple faith ( qtý-" 
). Most of the passages which Hirschberg quotes 
could be interpreted as referring to believers at an early 
stage of their discipleship (op. cit., pp. 221-224). 
80. Comm. in Joh. I. 27 (GCS 4.35.7-13). Cf. Comm. in Cant. II. (GCS 
8 . 135.10-17); Hom. in Num. XIV. 4 (GCS 7.127.6-15); Sel. in Num. 
xxiii. 1 (PG XII. 580C). Cf. also the passage from The Brothers 
Keramazov quoted on p. 17 of Carroll Simcox's Living the Ten Command- 
ments (Dacre Press, 1957): "We have corrected thy work (the Grand 
Inquisitor is speaking to Christ) and have founded it upon miracles, 
mystery, and authority. And men rejoiced that they were again 
led like sheep, and that the terrible gift (i. e. of Christian 
freedom) that had brought them such suffering was, at last, lifted 
from their hearts. " 
81. Comm. in Cant. II (GCS 8.138.10-130). 
82. Cf. Convs. with Heracl. 14.8-16 (p. 84, Scherer's ed. ), and Comm. 
in Joh. I. 28 (GCS 4.36.14-16). Cf. also Koch, op. cit., p. 32, 
where he says that according to Origen, God's purpose is to evoke 
the original nature of each man, and awaken his better self to 
life; in fact what needs to be achieved is the unfolding of the 
divinity immanent in man. Cf. also Schendel, op. cit., p. 87. 
83. This subject has already been discussed in Ch. VI, PP. 218-221. 
84. Hom in I Reg. I. 5 (GCS 8.8.14-9.16). 
85. Comm. in Matt. XVI. 16 (GCS 10.527.22-33). Cf. Crouzel, L'Image 
p. 109, note 186, where this passage is quoted. 
86. See p. 
87. Sel. in Ps. IV. 6 (PG XII. 1161D). Cf. Comm. in Matt. XII. 24 (GCS 
10.123.16-19). 
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88. Comm. in Cant. III (GCS 8.227.7-13). Cf. Carroll E. Simcox, op. cit., 
p. 22: "In God's ordering of history it was expedient that the 
people of God should live for an age under a dominion of moral 
law in order to prepare them for the freedom which Christ would 
bring (i. e. the freedom which springs from loving God). This 
statement holds true also of the individual ChristiLn's experience. 
We need the preparatory discipline of the law .... Who can dispense 
with it? Who is, at all times and in all his being, fit for 
the full freedom? " 
89. Hom. in Jud. VI. 2 (GCS 7.500.1-3), and Hom. in Gen. VIII-8 (GCS 
6.83.16-18). 
90. e. g.. Hom. in Lev. XVI. 7 (GCS 6.506.22-507.3); Comm. in Matt-X. 14 
(GCS 10.17.28-30); Hom. in Jud-VI. 3 (GCS 7.501.10-14); Sel. in 
Ps. cxviii. 32 (PG XII. 1593D) 
Cf. Beskow Rex gloria;: the Kingship of Christ in the early 
Church (Stockholm, 1962), p. 227; Rahner "Die Gottesgeburt: Die 
Lehre der Kirchenvater von der Geburt Christi in Herzen der Glaubigen" 
(ZKT 59 (1935)), p. 351; Aeby, op. cit., pp. 164-168,171 & 176, 
where he expresses Origen's view as follows: "The coming of Christ 
into me, which displays itself by the conformity of my actions 
, with His, is thus the prolongation in me of His Incarnation. " 
Cf. also p. 177, where he says that according to Origen, "the 
fact that all men are sinners demands that Christ should always 
come into them to cure them. " 
Cf. also Lieske, op. cit., pp. 5-7, where he refers to Origen's 
comparison between the union of the human soul with the Divine 
Word and that of a wife with her husband. Cf. also pp. 68,69. 
Cf. also Kelber, op. cit., pp. 252 sqq., in which that union is 
said to result from the birth of the Word of God within the human 
soul. 
91. Comm. in Joh. X. 28 (GCS 4.201.26-202.2). 
92.11 (GCS 8.165.2-11). 
93. See Franco, op. cit., pp. 77-79, where this passage is discussed, 
and where the contrast is drawn between kingship in the sense 
of conquest and kingship in the sense of possession. 
94.23.4 (GCSý; 2.352.15-17). 
95. Op. cit., 25.1 (GCS 2.356.30-357.9). 
96. Op. cit., 25.3 (GCS 2.358.29-259.7). See Franco, op. cit., pp. 73- 
75, where this passage and the two previous ones are discussed, 
and where the author says that "according to Origen, both the 
reign of Christ and the reign of God in the soul are described 
as things which grow and develop and attain perfection, but with 
a clear subordination of the reign of Christ to the reign of 
God, as of means to end, or of acquisition to possession. The 
reign of God is the logical consequence, the completion of the 
reign of Christ. " 
97. Frag. in Jer. 23 (GCS 3.209.21-28). Cf. Pitra, A. S. III. 539 
(in Jer. i. 10); Hom. in Jos. XIII. 1,4 (GCS 7.371.10-13 and 374.8- 
13); ibid. XV. 1 (GCS 7.381,20-24); ibid VI. 1 (GCS 7.321.12-17). 
98. Frag. in Eph. XV. 15-22 (JTS 3.411). Cf. Nemeshegyi, op. cit., 
pp. 180,181, where he says that "faith is for Origen the beginning 
of an ontological and spiritual contact with Christ, accomplished 
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by the effect of the Saviour's grace .... But faith itself only 
receives its full perfection in the life beyond. " Cf. also 
Rahner, op. cit., p. 354: "The typical outlook of Origen is that 
the dormant grace consisting in the indwelling of the soul by 
the Divine Word is an immanent principle of an ever-advancing 
life. -The indwelling Word will awaken: He must daily increase. " 
99. Sel. in Job (PG XII. 1048B). Cf. Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. I. 4 (PG XII. 1326A); 
ibid. I. 2 (1324D); Frag. in Jer. 19 (GCS 3.207.15-17); Hom. in 
Num. XXIII. 6 (GCS 7.218.15-28). 
100. Hom. in Num. XI. 6 (GCS 7.88.11-15). Cf. Hom. in Gen. XVI. 3 (GCS 
6.139.18-22). 
101. Frag. in Matt. 122.4-10 (GCS 12.64). 
102. Hom. in Gen. XVI. 4 (GCS-6.141.4-8,13-18). Cf. the comments made 
on this passage by Crouzel, '-La Conn., p. 333. 
103. Comm. in Ezek. iv. 9 (PG XIII. 779D). 
104. Hom. in Gen. II. 17 (GCS 6.22.7-10 & 20.22-21.3). 
105.7 Excerpt. in Cant. vi. 1 (PG XIII. 206A). Cf. Rahner, op. cit., p. 353, 
note 23, where this passage is quoted. 
106. Hom. in Jos. XXIV. 3 (GCS 7.451.4-11). 
107. Comm. in Cant-II (GCS 8.165.2-8). Cf. Beskow, op. cit., p. 229, 
where reference is made to this passage. 
108. De Princ. II. 11.3 (GCS 5.186.11-13). 
109. See p. 245. 
110. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 20 (GCS 4.244.3-6). Cf. Nemeshegyi, op. cit., 
p. 163, where he says that "the true adoption df human beings 
as children of God results from a continual and gradual influence 
exerted by Christ, the God-Man, Who raises them, purifies them, 
and unites them'to Himself. " 
Cf. Crouzel's discussion of this passage in L'Image, pp. 221,222. 
He points out justly that there is a contradiction implicit in 
Origen's thought, in so far as on the one hand he conceives of 
the history of the individual as the recovery of the original 
perfect state lost by disobedience, and on the other hand thinks 
of it as a process of evolution from a lower to a higher state. 
V61ker, op. cit., pp. 109,110, sees the whole world view 
of Origen as based upon the backward progress of souls from Christ 
to the Father, and thus as a reversal of the process whereby 
the world arrived at its 
/ 
present stated. He sees the inner develop- 
ment of the 1WC-ut-. L-r% ý<aýl as an anticipation in this life 
of the future transformation of the world itself. But the question 
remains: how did God's creation lose its original perfection? 
Cf. Rahner, Das Menschenbild des 0., pp. 232,233, where 
he says that the anti-gnostic reply to the question "Whence and 
to what purpose did evil appear? ", namely, that evil comes from 
the created free wills of human spirits, does not satisfy Origen, 
even though in one sense it is the final answer; for God's overflowing 
grace could without compulsion have prevented this freely-chosen 
Fall. Cf. also BUrke, op. cit., pp. 5 sqq. 
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112. Cf. Lieske, op. cit., pp. 59.60, especially the following passage: 
"If the original perfection of the soul's likeness to the Word 
of God is destroyed, that likeness is not lost; for the Word 
of God dwells in each human being, even in the unbelieving, but 
only becomes awake in one who is holy. " Koch, op. cit., pp. 31,32, 
stresses that the Incarnation was only one of the many measures 
taken by Divine Providence for the instruction of mankind; the 
appearance of the Incarnate Word is not the final stage in God's 
dealings with man. Cf. also Boon, op. cit., p. 31. I 
Cf. also Teichtweier, op. cit., p. 263, where he says: "Rational 
beings ( tkoykKcit )' are by their own nature equipped with reason 
through being endowed with-ioaS, but need to take possession 
of the eternal Logos in order to achieve their true nature as 
spiritual beings (Geistwesen). " 
113. Comm. in Joh. XIII. 37 (GCS 4.261.32-262.25). Cf. the discussion 
of this passage in Koch, op-cit., p. 105, and in Franco, op. cit., 
pp. 102,103, and note 120 on latter page. 
114. See Ch. I p. 15. 
115. Cf. Contra Cels. IV. 3 (GCS 1.276.12-19), where Origen 
-that 
God could have made human beings perfect at the 
but did not, so as to leave scope for freewill. 
116.11.9.4 (GCS 5.167.26-31). 
117. Ibid. II. 9.6 (GCS 5.169.25-170.5). 
suggests 
beginning, 
118. Comm. in Joh. VI. 38 (GCS 4.146-12-22). Sel also Ch. I, pp. l, '2-&'-13. 
119. Cf. Rahner, op. cit., p. 356, where he says: "Origen continually 
insists that the marvellous birth of the Divine Word in the heart 
of the believer is useless, unless it continually renews itself 
in moral growth. " 
120. Cf. Ch. II P47, where it is suggested that originally God made 
man in His "likeness" as well as in His "image". 
121. De Princ. III. 6.1. (GCS 5.280.10-281.5). Cf. V61ker, op. cit., 
pp. 126-128, where this passage is discussed. Výlker appears 
to consider that this passage implies that in Origen's view the 
individuality of the soul is eventually obliterated, even though 
at the stage of mystical union with the Divine Word this has 
not yet taken place. Such a conclusion does not seem warranted 
by Origen's actual words, as Burke points out in op. cit., p. 9. 
Fr. anco on p. 87 of his thesis seems to suggest that if the 
union of souls with the Divine Word grows progressively so as 
to be equivalent to the union of the soul of Christ with the 
selfsame Word, it would follow that there is a hypostatic union 
of all humanity with the Divine Word and the consequent loss 
of individual personality. Franco also suggests that this would 
not imply loss of personal consciousness (see p. 89), and that 
loss of individual personality is not altogether foreign to Origen's 
thought, although he does not offer a definite solution to this 
problem (see p. 90). On the contrary,, -if the union of other souls 
with the Word of God became as close as the union of the soul 
of Christ with the Word, that would not seem to imply loss of 
personality, for the simple reason that the soul of Christ. itself 
does not lose its personality and indiViduality. 
It seems worth quoting Franco's comment on De Princ. III. 6.1 
in n. 132 on p. 106 of his thesis, that "the Father will be in 
us in so far as we are transformed into the Son, because it is 
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in the Son that the Father is. " 
122 Ibid. III. 6.2.3 (GCS 5.283.10-21). 
123. Ibid. II-9.2 (GCS 5.165.17-21). Cf. Gronau, op. cit., pp. 78,79. 
124. Ibid. III. 6.3 (GCS 5.284.1-3). 
125. Cadiou in his Introd. au Systeme dO.,. pp. 49 sqq., suggests that 
Origen demands more than a mere forgetfulness of heavenly things 
as the cause of the fall of the soul, and insists that'this cause 
consists in the act of"the will, the admission of evil into the 
soul itself. But if evil as such is "non-being" - deficiency 
in goodness - how can it be the cause of the fall of the soul? 
The problem of evil is also discussed in Ch. I, pp47and 48& 
Ch. II, pp 6 -& 7. 
126. See PP. 236 & 239, & 265 - 268 and also Ch. II pp. 49 & 50. 
127. Comm. in Joh. XIX. 6 (GCS 4.305.10-14). Cf.. Výlker, op. cit., p. 98, 
and Hirschberg, op. cit., p. 170, where he says that "the soul 
ascends the qualities of Christ, which lie upon each other in 
, 
the form of steps, during its pilgrimage, as'though it were ascending 
a staircase. " Cf. also Schendel, op. cit., pp. 102,103, where 
reference is also made to Comm. in Joh. XIX. 6. 
128. Cf. Hom. in Is. IV. 2 (GCS 8.260.1-4), where it is said, with reference 
to the vision recorded in Isaiah vi, that our aim should be to 
become partakers of the door and the lintel of the door which 
is Christ Jesus, the door being His flesh and the lintel the 
Divine Word. 
Cf. also Hom. in Jer. (GCS 3.130.18-21), in which it is 
said that the Son makes us partakers of His Divinity. 
129. Cf. KochT op. cit., p. 72, where this passage is quoted. Kelber, 
op. cit., p. 267, makes the interesting point that Origen considers, 
with reference to our Lord's declaration that He is the Bread 
of Life, that "this statement must be understood symbolically, 
as is apparent from the statement that 'the Bread, of which the 
Divine Word says that it, is His Body, is the Word as Nourisher 
of souls' (Matt. Comm. Series 85 (GCS 11". 196.19.20)). " Kelber 
goes on to say that "spiritual communion is thus treated as a 
stage in the inner development of the soul, a stage which has 
its rightful place between 'Way' and 'Door' inasmuch as the Word 
as Bread is nourishment along the way. "- 
130. Comm. in Joh. XIX. 6 (GCS 4.305.17-34). Cf. Comm. in Matt. XVII. 36 
(GCS 10.702.27-31), and Frag. in Luc. 10 (GCS 9.236.2-4), where 
it is said that the maturer soul, after rendering due service 
to the Word of God, is emboldened to approach the Head of Christ, 
Who is God. Cf. also Comm. in Matt. Series 32 (GCS 11.58.16- 
27). 
Cf. Crouzel, La Conn..., pp. 111.112. 
131. Op. cit., pp. 320.321. 
132. See also on the same passage Fitzgerald, op-cit., pp. 208-212. 
It would appear that Fitzgerald is reading into this passage 
his own idea that Origen consistently held the view that Christ 
used a human soul as the means of becoming incarnate (p. 208). 
On the other hand, on p. 210 he says that "the humanity of the 
Word Incarnate is the proximate cause of our deification: God 
has become man that man may be made a sharer in the Divine nature. " 
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On p. 211 he says that "His (i. e. the Word's) visible humanity 
is the first point of contact between souls imprisoned. in 
material bodies and the Divine nature adapted to their weakness 
by being veiled 'in the likeness of sinful flesh'. " There 
is also an ambiguous statement on p. 212 to the effect that 
"it is not Christ as the Word in His Divine Nature alone, but 
Christ, the God-Man, Who 'makes both one' in Himself, Who is 
'all the steps' in the Christian's ascent to the vision of 
God. " 
133. Cf. Contra Cels. VIII. 15 (GCS 2.233.21-24). 
134. Cf. Comm. Series in Matt. 8 (GCS 11.12.28-23.2). 
135. Cf. Ch. V, P-103. 
136. Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 3 (GCS 4.429.8-430.26). Cf. Ruis-Camps. 
"Comunicabilidad", OCP 34,1968, p. 37. 
137. iii. 35 and xiii. 3. 
138. Frag. in Joh. L (GCS 4.525.7-23). Cf. Contra Cels-VII. 68 (GCS 
2.217.15-218.2); Sel. in Ps. II. 1.2 (PG XII. 1104A); Hom. in 
Num. XVI. 6 (GCS 7.144.23-30) and XVII. 6. (165.12-15). 
139. Comm. in Rom. IX. 39 (PG XIV. 1239BC). 
140. This conception of the Cross is more in accordance with traditional 
teaching than is the one which Origen normally gives, i. e. 
that it symbolises withdrawal from the world of sense. 
141. Contra Cels. VIII. 7 (GCS 2.287.7-14). 
142. Ch. IV, pp. 86-89. 
143. See PP-261-264. 
144. VIII. 15 (GCS 2.233.11-22). 
145. See passages referred to in notes 78,80 and 
, 
81. On the thought 
expressed in the passage referred to in note 144, cf. the comments 
in Marcus, op. cit., p. 161, where the passage is quoted (in 
note 23): "In the order of being and creation, not only the 
world of rational creatures, but 'all that comes into being 
in consequence', i. e. the whole created universe, is subordinate 
to the Word and is thus 'controlled' by Him. Of course, in 
the fulfilment of the general plan of creation through the 
freely-given loving service of the Son, the relation between 
the Word and rational beings and between the Spirit and holy 
beings has a decisive meaning. The resulting apparent narrowing 
and abbreviation of the relationship of'the Word and the Spirit 
to the created universe is thus a means of fulfilling the Divine 
purpose and is thus the highest possible intensification and 
the ultimate completion of that all-embracing plan. " 
146. Contra Cels. II. 79 (GCS 1.201.14-20). 
147. Comm. in Rom. V. 3 (PG XIV. 1028C). Cf. Frag. in Eph. IX. 103.108 
(JTS 3.401). 
148. Coýim. in Rom-VII. 5 (PG XIV. 1115A). 
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149. Hom. in Ps. xxxvi. II. 1 (PG XII. 1329C-1330B). See Nemeshegyi, 
op. cit., pp. 207,208, where this passage is quoted. Cf. also 
Sel. in Ps. lxi. 2 (PG XII. 1484C); De Princ. III. 5.6 (GCS 5.277.15- 
17) and 111.5.7 (278.1-18). See Franco, op. cit., pp. 67-72, 
where this question is discussed. He says on p. 78: "If the. 
subjection of the Son to the Father is understood as the unity 
of all rational creatures in the Son, so that they may acquire, 
as far as possible, the same relation to the Father as the 
Son has, the surrender of the Kingdom is not to be understood 
as the transferring of it from the Son to the Father.... In 
other words, it is not a matter of human beings being separated 
from the Word so as to be united to the Father, but of uniting 
them to the Father precisely in virtue of their union with 
the Son. " Cf. also pp. 71 & 72, where he says: "The subjection 
of Christ to the Father at the end of the ages is nothing more 
than the completion of the relation which the Son of God has 
had to the Father from all eternity, a relation which is not 
complete while any of the members of the Body of the Son has 
not submitted (i. e. to the Father). " 
150. Hom. in Lev. VII. 2 (GCS 6.376.12-19 377.1-5,379.5-8). See 
the discussion of this passage and of the longer one of which 
it forms part in Mersch, op. cit., pp. 368-372. Mersch ends 
by saying that according to Origen "the unity between Christ 
and His followers, between the Head and the members, is so 
close that Scripture attributes to the one what in all strictness 
is only true of the other. " 
Cf. also Schendel, op. cit., pp. 94 & 95, and also p. 97, 
where he justly observes: "After the restoration of all things, 
the sovereignty of Christ must not be thought of in a temporal 
and soteriological manner, but as the expression of a relationship 
between the Divine Word and the spiritual beings who have been 
set free for the etern-al contemplation of God. " 
151. Matt. Comm. Series 55 (GCS 11.126.8-127.18,128,1-10); Frag. 
in Matt. 485.1-3 (GCS 12.199). 
152. See Ch. IV, PP-86-89 See also p. 259,260. 
153. Sel. in Ps. xxii. 4 (PG XII. 1260D-1261B). Cf- 
' 
Sel. in Ps. II. 9 
(PG XII. 1108D-1109A), and xliv. 7 (PG XII. 1429D). 
154. Cf. Ch. VI, rP. 218,219. 
156. Cadiou, Frag. in Ps. CXIV. 2, p. 97; cf Frag. in Lam. CIV (GCS 
3.272.25-27). 
157. Frag. in Luc. 214.7,8 (GCS 9.230). 
158. Sel. in Ps. VII. 7 (PG XII. 1180C). 
159. Sel. in Ps. lxi. 2 (PG XII. 1484C). 
160. Pitra, A. S., II. 462, Frag. in Ps. ix. 37,38. 
161. VIII. 72 (GCS 2.288.24-289.2). 
162. De Orat. 26.4 (GCS 2.361.10-15). 
163. Ibid. 26.6 (GCS 2.362.28-373.1). Cf. Sel. in Gen. vi. 7 (PG XII. 
104B). 
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164. De Princ. I. 6.1 (GCS 5.79.13-18), and 111.5.7 (278,18-23). 
Cf. Schendel, op. cit., p. 81. 
165. This conception of the Crucifixion - as something which makes 
available to believers a higher quality of life - is not in 
harmony with the main tenor of Origen's thought, as is 
clear from the exposition of it on pp-243-245 and in Ch. VI, 
PP- 210-214. 
166. Hom. in Jos. VIII. 6 (GCS 7.342.13-19) and VIII. 4 (339.28-340.7); 
De Princ. 111.6.5 (GCS 4.286.17-287.3). On the other hand 
Origen contradicts the doctrine of the devil's ultimate restor- 
ation in Comm. in Rom. VIII. 9 (PG XIV. 1185B), where he says 
that there will be no conversion even at the end of the world 
(in fine saeculi) of him who is said to have fallen from heaven 
(Is. xiv. 12. and Luke x. 18). 
167. XVI. 3 (GCS 7.396.23-398.5). 
168. De Princ. III. 5.8 (GCS 5.279.8-10). 
169.1.2.10 (GCS 5.43.8-10). Per sapientiam enim, quae est Christus, 
-tenet Deus omnium potestatem, non solum dominantis auctoritate, 
verum etiam subjectorum spontaneo famulatu. 
Cf. Cornelis, op. cit., where on the one hand (p. 39) he 
suggests that according to Origen the law of the Divine Word 
is to be distinguished from all the other exercise of the powers 
within the creation, in that it acts by persuasion, in respecting 
the liberty of rational creatues; -whereas in n. 31 on p. 43 it 
is said that the Word of God holds together in His own Person 
the beneficent power and the royal power, and that one of the 
characteristics of the Word of God according to Origen is that 
He exerts His benevolence in the very act of punishing. 
170. Ibid. I. 2.10 (GCS 5.44.5-8). In commenting on this passage 
Franco says (op. cit., p. 105) that "the mission, of Christ, the 
reign of Christ, ends when all that is irrational has been 
subdued, and everything has thus been subjected to Him, not 
by force, but by reason. " He adds, however, in n. 127 on that 
page, that "hardships are necessary while human beings are 
disobedient to reason. The fully mature perfect themselves 
171. Ibid. III. 5.8 (GCS 5.278.24-29). 
172. Sel. in Ps. IV. 1 (PG XII. 1133AB). 
173. XII. 2 (GCS 7.99.25-100.4,100.24-101.9). Cf. also ibid. XXVIII. 4 
(7.285.11-14). Cf. Beskow, op-cit., pp. 226,227, where the 
passage is XII. 2 is referred to. 
174. Hom. in Jos. XIV. 2 (GCS 7.380.24-381.9). 
175. Cf -P . 240. , and also P . 249. 
176. Cf - P- 237. 
177. Matt. Comm. Series 8 (GCS 11.12-28-14.13). It is noteworthy, 
however, that in this very passage Origen does not regard the 
phrase "the footstool of God's feet" as necessarily implying 
the humiliation of those to whom it is applied. He quotes 
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Lam. ii. 1, where the daughter of Sion is described as having 
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been cast down to the earth, and also Isaiah lxvi. 1, where 
the description of the earth as God's footstoool does not indicate 
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are quoted where the phrase "the footstool of His feet" are 
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178. Prol. (GCS 8.83.20-85.1). 
179. Ibid. 8.86.13-27. 
180.111.6.9 (GCS 5.290.18-291.1). Cf. V61ker, op. cit., p-109, 
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525, 
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Cf. also dadiou, op. cit., pp. 86,87, where he says that 
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in the Alexandrian school for a point of connexion with a future 
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theology of grace. " A little later he says: "Salvation (according 
to Origen) consits in being enlightened by the Word of God. 
Origen's entire psychology demands a doctrine of illumination. 
It is to this light that he gives the name a grace, 'and it 
is from truth that this grace derives its strength. " 
In so far as the function of the Divine Word is thought 
of by Origen chiefly as illumination, Koch and de Faye seem 
justified in saying that "dogmatically considered, Origen's 
understanding of the Word of God has a closer link with the 
Logos-conception. of philosophy than with the historical Jesus 
Christ", and that "in spite of all the Biblical terminology 
employed, the ideas formulated are realy Platonic, and the 
Logos of Origen is thus that of philosophy". (quoted in Teichtweier, 
op. cit., p. 264). 
181. OP-Cit., pp. 77-79. 
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187. Op. cit., P. 96. 
188. Aeby, op. cit., p. 181-. -Cf. 
Výlker, op. cit., p. 125, where he 
says that "just as for the pious person mystical union 
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with 
Christ is but a transitory stage, so in the future life the 
task of the Divine Word consists precisely in making those 
who are united to Him worthy of and ready for the direct lordship 
of the ýather, this being the summit of blessedness. " 
189. Comm. in Rom. IX. 41 9PG XIV. '1243ABC). 
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without Him. " 
210. Jules Gross, op. cit., p. 183, appears t6 agree with Mme. Harl. 
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212. Op. cit., p. 201 
213. Ibid. 
214. Op. cit., -p. 128. 
215. Cf. Comm. in Oseam (Philocal. JAR 53.32-54.4), where Origen 
says: "That those who please God are one can be seen from the 
prayer which the Saviour made to the Father on behalf of His 
disciples: 'Father', He said, 'grant that as Thou and I are 
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216. Op. cit., p. 110. 
217. Cf. also Aeby, op. cit., p. 181, note 3, where he says that "we 
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He remains necessary for eternity. " 
218. Op. cit., pp-98-102. 
219. 
-in note 
50 on p. 102. 
220. Cf. op. cit., p. 205, where he says: "Christ remains even after 
His surrender of the Kingdom and His subjection to the Father 
in a purely spiritual sense 'Lord' in His relationship as the 
Word of God to redeemed spiritual beings, who are bound together 
in a. common direct vision of God. " 
Cf. also Franco, op. cit., p. 64, where he says that there 
is an aspect of the Son's mission which is contingent and ess- 
entially temporal, i. e. that in which He is the Bestower of 
divinity, because He only bestows it in so far as the capacity 
of souls has not reached the level sufficient to receive the 
life of the Father directly, But in so far as the Son 
is the Source of reason, His mission is eternal, because it 
is precisely in so far as created beings participate in the 
Son as Reason that they are enabled to obtain the direct vision 
of the Father. " 
221. Op. cit., pp. 264,265. 
222. in note 6 on p. 265. 
223. Cf. ChAV, ES.. 
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world will arise after the end which is described as definitive. " 
He points out in note 101 on p. 94 that in Comm. in Joh. XX. 13 
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5.91.11-92.15): 11.11.7 (191,20-192,3); 111.6.1 (281.6-282.20). 
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230. XIX. 4 (GCS 4.303.2,3). 
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CONCLUSION OF THESIS 
One may begin by quoting the celebrated statement in Hebrews 
that "it was fitting that He, for Whom and by Whom all things exist, 
in bringing many sons to glory, should make the Pioneer of their 
salvation perfect through sufferings" C, \/ 
, e% 
my 
C, /JTLJN/ P-r V 
-r-c, \ &1 '0 Lrd, Heb. ii. 10). It is rather significant that in 
one of the modern translations of the New Testament the verb -I-EAC- t L^j (--d- 
is not allowed to have its full force, but is translated "crown with 
suffering the life of... 11 In other words, the suggestion is that 
Jesus Christ was already perfect, as being the Divine Word of God, 
and therefore did not need any perfecting so far as His essential 
nature was concerned. It has been the purpose of this thesis to 
suggest that Origen, like other early Christian thinkers, is content 
to assume an original state of perfection from which creation has 
declined and to which it is intended to return, and that his contrad- 
ictions and inconsistencies about the Person of Christ stem from 
that assumption. 
In the first chapter it is shown that Jesus Christ in His Divine 
nature is conceived of not only as having created the universe but 
also as being the source of all that occurs within it (the 6-iTcyr. ý-r-i raý 
rý C>Y 0 of the Stoics). But this lands him in considerable difficult- 
ies when faced with the problem of evil, because it thus becomes 
hard to set it in sharp opposition to good. It is rather to be thought 
of as a necessary ingredient in the bringing into being of the highest 
good. 
We are anticipating here what will be more fully brought out 
when discussing the relation of the Divine nature to the human nature 
of Jesus Christ, but the present writer regards it as an unnecessary 
multiplication of hypotheses to credit the Divine Word with having 
brought the universe into being under the Father's direction, and 
as being immanent in it in a secondary capacity to the Father. Surely 
it is sufficient to think of the Father alone as the Creator and 
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immanent principle, and as having in due course brought into being 
Jesus Christ as the most striking example of conformity to His will 
and purpose. 
There appears to be no need to assert that the Father brought 
Jesus Christ into being directly, and left it to Jesus Christ to 
bring the rest of the world into being. It seems sufficient to describe 
God the Father as Creator and Sustainer of the universe, and Jesus 
Christ as having emerged during the course of human history to act 
as God's supreme Messenger to human beings. We can only succeed 
in thinking of Jesus Christ as genuinely sharing human nature if 
we think of Him as so opening Himself to the influence of the Divine 
Spirit as to partake of God's nature as fully as a human being can, 
and thereafter imparting that nature to others in accordance with 
their capacities. Indeed, Origen gives us a hint that he may be 
uneasy about the vast functions originally assigned to the Son of 
God by suggesting that His real function is that of bringing into 
full operation the rational faculty of beings endowed with it. 
Only if we take fully into account the humanity of Jesus Christ 
can we really distinguish creation from redemption. ' Origen lands 
himself in hopeless tortuosities when he suggests that the Word of 
God was continually at work in the pre-Christian era revealing Himself 
to those who were qualified to glimpse Him; for he thus finds it 
very difficult to make it clear what the precise function of the 
incarnate Christ is. The Incarnation in fact becomes an awkward 
episode in the activity of the Divine Word - an episode which has 
to be taken account of because Christian tradition emphasises it. 
In Chapter II there is a discussion of Origen's assertion that 
the Father used the Divine Word as an intermediary in communicating 
His plan to others, and in particular to the outstanding persons 
of the Old Testament. But once again, this seems an unnecessary 
multiplication of hypotheses. It is simply a matter of the Divine 
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Spirit gradually imparting itself in fuller measure to the minds 
of human beings in so far as they are in a fit state to receive it. 
There is no need to ante-date the work of Christ; in fact if this 
is done the significance of the Incarnation is obscured. Nor is 
there any need to imagine that the prophets received knowledge which 
they did not impart to their contemporaries so as not to anticipate 
the Incarnation. Surely, if that knowledge would have been beneficial 
to their contemporaries, there is no reason why they should not have 
imparted it. Once more, Origen is influenced by his assumption that 
there was an original state of perfection from which creation has 
degenerated. The prophets are, as it were, regarded as receiving 
glimpses of that original state - glimpses denied to their contempor- 
aries. But - all credit due - Origen has misgivings about this 
idea, misgivings which he occasionally voices. He recognises that 
it would seem absurd to suggest that the prophets were set so much 
higher spiritually than the other Jews, and that it was only the 
Incarnation which revealed the truths adumbrated in the prophetic 
writings, and not fully understood even by the prophets themselves. 
It cannot be denied that the view which Origeri occasionally 
takes of the prophets, namely that they had an insight into the nature 
of the Divine Word, really implies that the Incarnation was unnecessaryl 
because in the first place the unseen Christ can be apprehended apart 
from it, and in the second place even those who become acquainted 
with the visible Christ do not always pass on to the vision of the 
unseen Christ. 
Origen says in one place that human co-operation is required 
in order that human beings may be transformed into the Divine likeness. 
It would surely have been easier for him to recognise that only through 
becoming acquainted with the human Christ could human beings ascend 
to the contemplation of the Divine Word if he had been prepared to 
admit that the human Christ Himself needed to exercise His own will 
in order to ascend to the statewhich He eventually attained - that 
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of perfect fellowship with God. It was a matter of eventually recog- 
nising what He had been sent into the world to do, after exploring 
other-avenues and finding them unprofitable. 
In Chapter III, it is pointed out that Origen's uncertainty 
about the significance of the Incarnation appears in so far as he 
occasionally suggests that it brought about a full knowledge of Christ, 
and yet suggests elsewhere that a deeper acquaintance with Christ 
is needed. 
There is a striking passage in which it seems to be suggested 
that the Son Himself is not fully acquainted with the Father. This 
seems to suggest that Origen himself had doubts about whether the 
human. Jesus should be identified with the Divine Word, since to do 
so is to deprive Him of the limitations essential to human nature. 
There are. passages where Christ is said to pass judgement on 
those who fail to give to the Father the honour due to Him. This 
of course is consistent with His true humanity. And yet in other 
passages, referred to in Chapter IV, he speaks of the Son as inflicting 
'chastisement on evil-doers-, as was done in the case of Pharaoh; but 
this can only be attributed to Christ in His Divine'hature. Once 
more, Origen can with some justice be accused of obscuring the true 
function of Christ by putting Him on a pedestal which He would never 
have wished to occupy. Supreme Revealer of the effects of God's 
Spirit at work in the lives of human beings - yes: the all pervading 
and all controlling Divine Word - no. 
From the evidence cited in Chapter V, it would appear that 
Origen's conception of the human Christ and his conception of the 
fallen spirit of men are interlinked. According to him, the -tcVGjj-rý! -. 
having become lukewarm in its love of God is degraded to the material 
sphere; but in order that it may be linked therewith through the 
sensations conveyed through the body, the "animal soul" has to be 
added thereto. Once more, the underlying idea is that of something 
perfect degenerating into something imperfect. The same is true 
of his conception of. the Incarnation. He cannot really conceive 
of the Word of God as Himself becoming incarnate. It is the soul 
which. continually cleaved to Him in love which alone can enter the 
material sphere, although it did not deserve to do this; and to this 
soul the "animal soul" must likewise be added. On the other hand, 
the higher soul is incapable of yielding to temptation because its 
love for God is unalterable: there is therefore no possibility of 
moral progress, and it can thus scarcely be termed "human" in the 
(I) 
ordinary sense. 
It would appear that Origen's conception of the original state 
of the human soul (a state in which it can be termed leads 
him into difficulties when he discusses the temptations to which 
human beings are liable and to which they often succumb. The animal 
soul has to be added to the higher soul in order that the latter 
may become incarnate, and it is this lower soul which is subject 
to the attraction of spirit and body respectively: but the question 
is never answered how it is that it succumbs to the attraction of 
one or the other, because according to Origen it has no will of its 
own. Logically, it is the fallen spirit which should be thought 
of as taking the higher or the lower course as the result of its 
moral choice; but Origen does not find it easy to take that view, 
because it does not belong to the essential nature of the "spirit", 
even if fallen, to be associated with the body and with the things 
which this world contains. 
Origen in fact falls between two stools in his account of the 
(1) A. M. Farrer skirts the Droblem 
when he says ("Lord, I Believe", pp. 43,44) 
sin, (Christ) made all choices wholesomely 
uprightly when he became the master of his 
a denial of Christ's true humanity. Every 
his moral freedom was mortgaged. 
of Christ's genuine humanity 
that "being innocent of 
in his mere infancy, and 
acts. " That is indeed 
thing was pre-determined: 
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soul of man in its incarnate state. If he says that it is the higher 
soul which Yeilds to temptation, this is in contradiction to his 
idea'of this soul as essentially independent of the material world; 
if he says that it is the lower or llani mall' soul, that means that 
the higher soul is absolved from guilt, and therefore it is hard 
to see why it should be incarnate at all. 
Once we are prepared to abandon the idea of the original perfection 
of mankind, room is left for suggesting that what Origen terms the 
the highest part of the individual soul, only gradually becomes aware 
of itself, and so only gradually directs the activities of the other 
elements of human nature. Moral lapses can thus ultimately be traced 
to sp iritual immaturity. In the same way, the incarnate Christ Himself 
ne eded to advance to the state of greateiý self-knowledge so as to 
fulfil His mission to the world. Origen himself appears to recognise 
this when he suggests that Jesus Christ was not as fully aware as 
the Father that he was obliged to drink the cup of suffering to the 
dregs, and so needed to be enlightened by the Father. 
In the sixth chapter, it is suggested that Origen's conception 
of the enlightenment imparted by Christ derives dir6ctlY from his 
strict division between the human Jesus and the Divine Son of God. 
The Divine Word cannot directly enter the material world (although 
in certain passages Origen regards Him as immanent within it! ), and 
so an intermediate agent is employed for carrying out God's purpose 
of redemption. The effects of the work of the human Christ correspond 
to the character of the persons for whose benefit the work is done; 
some are enabled to pass from the knowledge of the earthly Christ 
to that of the Divine Word; others remain hidebound by their initial 
knowledge. 
The knowledge of the "simple-minded" is not of course confined 
to the mere contemplation of Christ's earthly deeds: they are able 
to. discern the moral principles underlying them and so use them as 
a pattern for their own lives. But those who are more intellectually 
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gifted can learn more from Christ's earthly life than this: the events 
occurring in that life become for them symbols of heavenly realities 
which are apparently quite distinct from spiritual qualities as normally 
understood. But because Origen conceives of the ultimate destiny 
of man as that of a disembodied spirit, he is unable to give a clear 
indication of what those heavenly realities are. 
In fact he seems at times to have an uneasy feeling that his 
account of the aim of Christ's earthly work is really inadequate, 
as it posits a two-tier outlook on reality which cannot be regarded 
as justified. The most important item, in Christ's life, the Crucifixion, 
is something about which Origen is uncertain. Does it contain within 
itself the key to the inner nature of Christ, or is it a mere introduction 
to a higher form of knowledge which, once obtained, entitles its 
possessor to forget about the means whereby it was obtained; rather 
as though one climbed a ladder to an upper storey and then knocked 
it down once one had attained one's goal? Nowhere does Origen give 
a final answer to this question; different passages contradict each 
other. In one passage he says that the Crucifixion was the most 
important event of our Lord's life, and the one most worth recording. 
Surely this implies that whatever Origen may say elsewhere, the key 
to the full understanding of our Lord's nature lies in this event. 
It is not a mere introduction to the knowledge of the Son of God; 
it is in itself inseparable from that knowledge. 
Origen almost suggests in fact that the Son of God Himself 
only attained to complete self-knowledge as the result of undergoing 
the sufferings of the Cross, because although He always desired to 
carry out the Father's will, he only fully understood the reasons 
why it was necessary for him to suffer after his sufferings were over. 
In the seventh chapter it is pointed out that so far as Origen's 
conception of the work of Christ is concerned, it would doubtless 
be. uniýersally agreed that it is to introduce human beings to God, 
in the sense that as the result of being acquainted with Christ we 
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eventually gain a clearer insight into the Divine nature. But once 
again, Origen cannot emancipate himself from the three-tier notion 
of knowledge which he has brought over from the Platonic tradition. 
First comes knowledge obtained by the senses, then a perception of 
the concepts by which sense-data can be classified, and finally the 
contemplation of the Form of the Good which gives rise to everything 
else. So in the case of Christ, the knowledge of the principles 
underlying Hiý acts must eventually be superseded by the knowledge 
of the Divine nature which is the origin of everything else. But 
is that contemplation an end in itself, or is it the starting-point 
of world-transformation? Origen nowhere gives a decisive answer 
to that question. His thought is uncertain. Or take the question 
whether the world has degenerated to the extent that a U-turn is 
required of which the incarnate Christ is the starting-point, or 
is the world in a state of progress to which the incarnate Christ 
gives a boost? Once more, no decisive answer is given. ' 
In fairness to Origen, we must allow that his conception of 
reason is one which is a wholesome corrective to the logic-chopping 
conception of reason so prevalent nowadays, and in particular to 
logical positivism. Onlythe saint is a fully rational person, because 
the saint participates fully in the Word of God. It would seem to 
follow that reason only fully operates in the sphere of action; it 
is the pre-requisite of all action which is realy fruitful. Unfortun- 
ately Origen is still under the sway of the idea that the body is 
an encumbrance, and that reason will eventually operate in what we 
should regard as a vacuum, because it will be employed in mere contemp- 
lation, in thinking God's thoughts after Him on a purely theoretical level. 
So far as Origen's conception of Christ's surrender of His 
Kingdom to the Father is concerned, we would doubtless agree that 
He corrects any superficial understanding of this surrender by pointing 
out that Christ does not cease to influence those who have been brought 
to the knowledge of the Father through Him. Rather, it is through 
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His complete indwelling that they arrive at that knowledge and continue 
in it. They become His brothers instead of His disciples. But this 
req uires complete docility, complete abandonment of self-satisfaction, 
complete willingness to be led to higher levels of spiritual perception. 
Self-fulfilment is thus only reached by self-abnegation. 
Origen is led by his distinction between the pre-incarnate 
and the incarnate Christ into an unreal distinction between the general 
providential care exercised by the Word of God and the special activity 
of Christ in His earthly life. It would be impossible to maintain 
that distinction, so the present writer feels, without dividing Christ 
into two persons, because Christ's providence is not exercised ab extra 
but extends to the bringing into being of everything that occurs. 
If He uses compulsion to divert human beings from evil courses of 
action, that is simply one expression of His immanent activity: but 
so is the persuasion He also employs, whether in His pre-incarnate 
or in His incarnate state. It is the contention of the present writer 
that Origen elevates the human Christ to a far higher position than 
the evidence really warrants, and that it is sufficient to regard 
the human Christ as the supreme embodiment of the uiýiversal Spirit 
of God. 
